



Studies on Buddhism

IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR A.K.WARDER

edited by

N.K. Wagle and F. Watanabe

Studies on Buddhism
in Honour of Professor A.K. Warder

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**Studies on Buddhism
in Honour of Professor A.K. Warder**

edited by N.K. Wagle and F. Watanabe



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Preface

Professor Anthony Kennedy Warder began his distinguished career in the University of Edinburgh in 1955. In 1963 he was invited to join the University of Toronto as Professor of Sanskrit in which capacity he served till he retired in 1990. In the late nineteen sixties and early seventies Professor Warder assumed the responsibility of developing Indian and Sanskrit Studies at the University of Toronto, a thankless and onerous task that drained his energy. It was due to his efforts that Toronto University became a premiere centre of Indian studies in Canada. Presently he is busy completing the seventh volume of his monumental *Indian Kāvya Literature*.

Buddhism has always been Professor Warder's forte. He has edited Pāli Texts and compiled the *Pāli Tipiṭaka Concordance* for the Pali Text Society of London. He is the author of *Introduction to Pāli Language*. His critically acclaimed book, *Pāli Metre*, put the study of Indian metres on a scientific basis, and remains a standard treatise on that subject. His much cited book is *Indian Buddhism*. Of course, we should not ignore his many significant contributions to Indian history, philosophy, language and literature. In a small way, the contributors of this volume have paid tribute to his dedication to Buddhist studies. His writings have inspired his students, colleagues, and friends to think clearly about scholarly issues and to develop a capacity to assert boldly what they believe to be true.

I must record here a personal tragedy. The Co-editor of this book, Professor Fumimaro Watanabe, died suddenly of cancer while editorial work was in progress. His passing away is a great loss to his family, friends, and Buddhist scholars all over the world. He would have been very glad and proud, indeed, to see the book in print.

N.K.Wagle
Toronto, August 1993

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The *Triskandha*, Practice in Three Parts: Study of an Early Mahāyāna Buddhist Ritual

Nancy J. Barnes

I am very glad to be able to make this contribution to the felicitation volume for Professor A.K. Warder, especially since it was he who first introduced me to the *Mahāratnakūṭa* collection of Buddhist sūtras, to which the texts discussed in this paper belong. His truly formidable understanding of Buddhist thought and literature were an invaluable guide to me when I was his student, and they continue to be an inspiration to me now.

One finds in Mahāyāna Buddhist *sūtra* literature occasional reference to rituals performed by those who followed the bodhisattva path. One of the most interesting and important of these is that known as *Triskandha* or *Triskandhaka*, the practice in three parts, which is described in the *Ugraparipṛcchā Sūtra* and the *Vinayavinīścaya-upāliparipṛcchā*, two early texts belonging to the *Mahāratnakūṭa* collection of sūtras in the Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist canons.¹

The “three-part rite” is mentioned twice by Śāntideva in his *Śikṣāsamuccaya*,² and it is primarily through this well-known work that the ritual has come to the attention of Western scholars of Buddhism. Śāntideva names the ritual at the end of his long quotation from the *Upāliparipṛcchā* (Bendall, 169-171; Bendall and Rouse, 165-167). The quotation contains the Upāli’s version of the ritual, and the Upāli itself refers to the ritual by name, the *Triskandha* (Python, 107). Śāntideva refers to the ritual again in his chapter on increasing good conduct, citing the *Ugraparipṛcchā* as the source (Bendall, 290; Bendall and Rouse, 263-264). Śāntideva reports that the UPP says the *Triskandha* is to be performed three times a day and three times a night. The three practices to be performed are confession of sin (*pāpadeśanā*), rejoicing at merit produced (*puṇyānumodanā*) and invitation to the Buddhas (*buddhādhyeṣaṇā*). Śāntideva adds that praise (*vandanā*) and solicitation (*yācana*) of the Buddhas are understood to be included in these practices, but that worship (*pūjā*) is not. He also points out that the *Triskandha* practices are called by that name because of the accumulation of merit (*puṇyarāśi*) they imply; thus Śāntideva takes *skandha* in this compound as a synonym for *rāśi*, with the meaning of “accumulation.”³ It is possible that Śāntideva preferred this interpretation of the name of the ritual because it had metamorphosed by his time into a longer, more complex rite with six, seven or more parts rather than the original three – as mentioned, Śāntideva names three extra practices (*vandanā*, *yācana*, *pūjā*) which were normally included in the rite as he knew it.

The six or seven parts of the developed form of the ritual once known as the *Triskandha* vary in later Mahāyāna texts. Taking the triple refuge (*śaraṇagamana*), resolving to attain enlightenment (*bodhicittotpāda*), and transferring to others the merit gained from performance of the rite (*pariṇāmanā*) are included in many lists, and sometimes the offering of one's self (*ātmadāna*). The order of the parts varies, too.⁴ The *Upāli*, which Śāntideva cites as the *locus classicus* of the fully developed rite, presents this series of practices: taking the triple refuge (*śaraṇagamana*), praise of the Buddhas (*vandanā*), confession of sins (*pāpadeśanā*), transfer of merits (*pariṇāmanā*), rejoicing at merits (*puṇyānumodanā*), invitation to the Buddhas (*buddhādhyeṣaṇā*) and resolve to attain enlightenment (*bodhicittotpāda*) (Python, 98-103).

The earliest description of the *Triskandha* rite known in Mahāyāna literature is in the UPP.⁵ The UPP is a very old Mahāyāna *sūtra*, probably one of the very earliest written, and it is a most important source of information on Mahāyāna practices and on an early level of doctrinal development. It was first translated into Chinese at the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, between about 180 and 190 A.D. This translation survives (T322), as do two subsequent translations, one dating from about 300 A.D. (T323) and the other from 425 to 440 A.D. (T310, 19). The text was translated six times altogether into Chinese by the mid-fifth century, which suggests that it was quite a popular work. Its popularity was no doubt due to its clear, attractive and detailed exposition of the bodhisattva path, for those who remained in lay life as well as for recluses who abandoned ordinary society and went to the forest to reside.

The UPP was probably composed in the first century A.D. or earlier, and already by that time many characteristic practices of the bodhisattvas had been ritualised, their crucial pronouncements of faith and commitment crystallised into revered liturgies. The bodhisattva's fundamental *praṇidhāna*, resolution to bring about the liberation of all beings, is such a ritual pronouncement, and appears in the UPP in the basic form appropriate for all bodhisattvas. The *Triskandha* ritual was apparently as widely used by bodhisattvas in the early centuries of the Mahāyāna as was the repetition of the *bodhisattva-praṇidhāna*. The *Triskandha* is itself a sequence of *praṇidhānas* (Lindtner, 105) by the recital of which the bodhisattva purifies and recommits himself to the bodhisattva career. The recital is accompanied by a series of ritualised actions and meditations – the three-part rite fully involves body, speech faculty and mind. Because it was the rite through which the bodhisattva purified and recommitted himself, it was unquestionably used very frequently by each struggling, hard-pressed individual in a Buddhist community who had bravely taken up the bodhisattva career and was finding it difficult and confusing.

The *Triskandha* ritual appears in the UPP not quite halfway through the text, in the section explaining the lay bodhisattva's conduct. Since the scripture is very carefully structured, with all parts fitted into a neatly maintained logical sequence,

I must briefly summarise its contents in order to demonstrate the ritual's practical function.⁶

Ugra, a wealthy householder of Śrāvastī, has recently converted to the Mahāyāna and asks the Buddha how a beginner on the bodhisattva path should conduct himself after the great resolution (*praṇidhāna*) to liberate all beings has been made. Ugra observes that some bodhisattvas choose to follow the path while remaining in lay life, and others elect to leave worldly society to reside in the seclusion of the forest. Their daily disciplines (*śīla*) differ profoundly yet both are legitimate bodhisattva vocations. Will the Buddha explain in detail how each should live, righteously?

The Buddha answers first for the lay bodhisattva (about half of the sūtra) and characterises him as one whose fundamental action must be generosity (*dāna*) to all beings. The lay person must accumulate wealth in order to give it, must selflessly take responsibility for the physical and spiritual well-being of all who live in his land, giving Dharma as well as material goods. *Dāna* is the focus of a lay bodhisattva's commitment, it is the essence of his discipline.

To be a wealthy, active leader of the community, responsible head of household and still a bodhisattva dedicated to unlimited generosity to others is a very difficult task, however. There will be an inevitable crisis when a stranger comes to beg a gift, a wandering mendicant or a simple beggar, and so the text prescribes an efficacious sequence of mental exercises designed to prod the bodhisattva out of his habitual mind-set. The *Triskandha* is the culmination of this sequence.

First the bodhisattva contemplates the spiritual value to himself of giving without holding anything back. Then he attempts to regard the almsman as like a close relative or a good friend, and directs an urgent meditation on the six *pāramitā* toward the problem of giving to a stranger. Following that, the layman systematically detaches himself from the special love of wife and child by contemplating the impermanence of human attachments, and the bondage of human affection. And then, when the beggar approaches, the bodhisattva must be ready: he must either give what is requested, or respectfully confess to the beggar that:

At present my strength is inadequate, my good roots not yet ripe. I am still a beginner in the Mahāyāna, my heart lacks the self-mastery to practice generosity, I am attached to the notions "me" and "mine." My good man, I face you now with regret. But do not bear resentment toward me. I shall nonetheless energetically strive to satisfy the wishes of all beings. (T310, 19.475. c. 19-22)⁷

And then, in order to purge himself of the weaknesses confessed to the beggar and free his mind to "energetically strive to satisfy the wishes" of that suppliant, the bodhisattva must confess again to an appropriate Buddhist authority.

If the bodhisattva, having heard the words of the Buddha in the past, does not meet a Buddha and is not with the *Ārya Saṃgha*, then he should

respectfully salute all the Buddhas of the Ten Directions. All those Buddhas' original actions, up to the time when each attained Buddhahood, cause rejoicing. And so, three times each in the day and the night, purifying the actions of body, speech and mind, pure in compassion and charity, full of shame, the bodhisattva puts on pure robes. Good roots are what is accumulated by means of the thought of enlightenment, and that causes rejoicing. Flexible, performing well, respectful, without pride, the bodhisattva carries out the practice in three parts, chants the dharma in three parts:

(1) With my mind concentrated I repent of my sins and all bad actions and resolve not to perform them anew.

(2) I wholeheartedly rejoice at all merits.

(3) Accumulating the marks and signs, I exhort all the Buddhas to turn the wheel of Dharma, to explain it fully so that I can receive and uphold all of the Dharma.

I resolve before the Buddhas: Let my land be one where good roots can be increased over the course of a long lifetime. (T310, 19.475. c. 24-476.a.3)

After performing this ritual the lay bodhisattva contemplates how worthy are monks of all kinds to receive gifts, and he goes to the monastery to give to them all, realising that one day he, too, must go forth from worldly life in order to perfect his understanding, as the monks are doing.

Then the Buddha describes in detail the discipline to be observed by the bodhisattva who elects to go forth from home life (*pravraj*) to practice the Dharma. The *pravrajita-bodhisattva* goes forth to seek understanding directly, while the householder-bodhisattva, as we have seen, gradually acquires understanding as it is needed for each occasion he meets while practising *dāna* full time. The path of the *pravrajita-bodhisattva* naturally culminates, then, with the perfection of his "pure understanding" together with that of "pure moral discipline" and "pure concentration" (*śīla*, *samādhi*, *prajñā*) which are succinctly summarised at the end of the sūtra. When the bodhisattva has gone far toward perfecting these three, living in solitude in the forest, he may finally return to the village to practice and to teach. The *pravrajaka* thus proceeds from his solitude back into society to give Dharma and consequently perfect his *dāna*, while the lay bodhisattva goes from the crowded village into the seclusion of the forest to perfect his understanding.

All recensions of the UPP follow this same scenario, although they vary significantly in details. Differences in the *Triskandha* section of the text show that the ritual was somewhat simpler in its earlier stages of development. In the second century Han Dynasty translation, the occasion for practising it is the same: the bodhisattva is unable to make a free gift to a stranger and, finding himself far from any teacher and unable to meet face to face with the *Arya Saṃgha*, "at a time when there is no Buddha in the world," prostrates himself before all the Buddhas of the

Ten Directions. He recalls how those Buddhas had accumulated merits by their conduct in previous lives, and rejoices. And then,

Three times by day and three at night, the bodhisattva recites the three classes of sūtras,⁸

(1) I freely repent of all wicked actions relative to giving which I have done in past lives.

(2) I shall change my behaviour in the future.

(3) I implore the pity of all the Buddhas. (T322.18. c. 27-29)

The other Chinese translation and the Tibetan resemble T310, 19 more closely.

As one can see from the above account, the UPP speaks of a practice which is replete with categories of three. The three-part observance is to be carried out three times at a time: thrice in a day and thrice in a night. And according to all recensions except T322, the three kinds of actions – acts of body, speech faculty and mind – are to be purified before the recitation begins. The ritual actually included more than three practices, however; even T322 describes a ritual which begins with an initial act of veneration to the Buddhas (*pujanā*) and a rejoicing at their meritorious acts (*anumodanā*) as a prelude to the three-part rite proper. And the preparatory acts in T310, 19 include a *pujanā*, an *anumodanā* at the Buddhas' past actions, then the bodhisattva's purification of himself and a second *anumodanā*.

Śāntideva understood the three central actions of the *Triskandha* to be confession of sins, rejoicing at the merit accumulated, and invitation to the Buddhas to teach Dharma. That is what we find in T310, 19. In T322, however, the rejoicing precedes the others and in fact is not counted as one of the three. T323 is also unclear about the place of "rejoicing." Further, T322 invites the Buddhas to pity the miscreant, not to preach the Dharma as the other texts have it. What we seem to have, then, is a three-part ritual which took some time to become fixed in the form in which Śāntideva knew it, and which was always flexible enough to permit the accretion of other suitable practices for various occasions and in various texts. One practice, however, never changes: confession of sins. The *Triskandha* is fundamentally a confession ritual, a formalised method for purging oneself of past sins so that one can go forward and do better.

UPP's bodhisattva is taught to use the *Triskandha* rite when he, having dedicated himself to giving, finds himself in a situation where he is unable to give. The *Upāli*⁹ also places the confession rite in the midst of a discussion of the bodhisattva's *dāna*, and his sins. And, again like the UPP, the *Upāli* speaks of the two possible bodhisattva vocations, lay and *pravrajita*, and of the *dāna* practised by each: the lay bodhisattva gives material objects and Dharma, the *pravrajita-bodhisattva* gives the necessities for writing the Dharma, but either can make the ultimate gift, the gift of one's own body or life. The text goes on: even a bodhisattva is capable of sinning if he has not become free of attachment, hatred and mental confusion, and all sins must be confessed. There are sins, says the Buddha, which

are to be confessed before a chapter of ten monks, others require a chapter of five, still others may be confessed to two persons, or even one. But if a bodhisattva is guilty of certain grave sins, such as matricide, parricide, etc., these must be confessed one by one, day and night, before the thirty-five Buddhas. Then comes the long confession ritual, the *Upāli*'s version of the old *Triskandha* rite.

Although the *Upāli* began by celebrating the generosity of all the bodhisattvas, like the UPP, the sins it mentions which would require the employment of the *Triskandha* confession rite are not necessarily connected with *dāna* at all. The rite has broad application. But instead of confessing to the "Buddhas of the Ten Directions," the *Upāli* names a group of thirty-five Buddhas who are to receive the bodhisattvas' confessions. The origin of this group of thirty-five is unknown; the thirty-five are mentioned in one other Mahāyāna sūtra known since the fifth century in China, the *Ākāśagarbha Visualisation Sūtra* (T409),¹⁰ but the *Upāli* was the first sūtra to mention them. In time the thirty-five usurped the place of the undefined but also unlimited group of the Buddhas of the Ten Directions,¹¹ and became the Buddhas of Confession par excellence.

The *Triskandha* as known from the UPP and the *Upāli* is an oral declaration accompanied by physical actions and meditation. The meditation is *buddhānusmṛti*, "calling the Buddha(s) to mind," the *samādhi* which has always been the mainstay of Mahāyāna meditation practice. As the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* says (Lamotte, I, 415), it is not that the bodhisattvas do not practise other *samādhis*, but they practise *buddhānusmṛti* the most frequently of all. The Buddhas are "called to mind" in the prelude to the *Triskandha*, according to the UPP and the *Upāli*, and again when they are invited to teach the Dharma. After the entire rite has been completed and the bodhisattva has been purified of sins, the thirty-five Buddhas will "reveal their faces" to the bodhisattva, says the *Upāli*; the bodhisattva will be able to see them clearly at last.¹²

The invocation of the Buddhas in the UPP *Triskandha* does not culminate in a *samādhi* visualisation, however. The *buddhānusmṛti* described there, in all translations of the text, is a recollection of the Buddhas' accomplishments, the merits they have accumulated; that is, it is the older form of *buddhānusmṛti*, the non-visualising meditation which was also used in the pre-Mahāyāna schools. The UPP was either written before the visualising form of *buddhānusmṛti* became common among Mahāyānists, or it was produced in a community which set little store by the visual techniques. In the various translations of the UPP, there are several occasions when a bodhisattva "calls the Buddhas to mind;" sometimes the thirty-two visible marks of the Buddha as *mahāpuruṣa* are mentioned, and the eighty signs, but even in those cases there is no suggestion that a vision of the Great Being is sought. However, the ending of T322 is different from the ending of the sūtra in all other recensions; in T322 Ugra and the others at the assembly are overjoyed at the Buddha's preaching, five hundred of them conceive the aspiration to

attain *anuttarasamyaksambodhi*, and then the company disperses. But in the other translations, including T323 which was completed at the end of the third or the beginning of the fourth century, the ending has been completely changed. Ugra's companions request ordination as *pravrajaka* while Ugra himself chooses to remain a layman but to take on an especially rigorous discipline which in effect combines the householder's and *pravrajita-bodhisattva*'s paths. At this the Buddha smiles, and coloured rays flash from his mouth to illuminate all the immeasurable, infinite world-systems. The Buddha then praises Ugra as best of the bodhisattvas, incomparable in 100,000 *kalpas*. And he adds that unless a bodhisattva knows the UPP he will not be able to see all the Buddhas face to face; for the Buddhas are manifest in this sūtra.

This new ending, which parallels so many in countless Mahāyāna scriptures produced under the full inspiration of Mahāyāna visualisation practices, was definitely added, for it is inconsistent with all the rest of the text – not inconsistent with the sūtra's doctrinal viewpoint, but inconsistent with its complete lack of visual imagery. Since T323 has the new ending, down to the last detail, it was probably added to the text sometime during the third century – before the Indian language manuscript used for the T323 translation was written, but after that used for T322.¹³

Despite what was done to the very ending of this sūtra, the bodhisattva who carries out the *Triskandha* ritual in the UPP does not obtain a vision of the Buddhas of the Ten Directions. But whether he can see them or not, why should the bodhisattva invoke the presence of all those Buddhas from infinitely distant Buddha realms? It is because the lay bodhisattva is pursuing a heroically solitary course¹⁴ – he lives in the world surrounded by people of all sorts and other creatures, it is true, but he is not in a Buddhist community, there are no Buddhist teachers nearby to consult, no monks or nuns or other bodhisattvas at hand to whom to confess his sin of meanness. The bodhisattva *must* confess, however, in order to put the sin behind him and enable himself to get on with the lay bodhisattva's essential practice, *dāna*. He has immediate need of a properly initiated Buddhist congregation to which to confess – and so he is taught to “call to mind” the most venerable congregation possible, the assembly of all the Buddhas of the Ten Directions, that is, of all the Buddhas existing in this infinite and expanding universe.

Not only will the Buddhas hear his confession, they will start the wheel of Dharma turning again: they will teach the bodhisattva and thus empower him to move beyond his present level of understanding and advance in his practice. It is necessary to get rid of the baggage of old habits and biases in order to go forward, and that is what the *Triskandha* ritual makes possible: the errors of the past are vitiated by confession, future possibilities are opened up by the Buddhas' guidance.

When one reads the Upāli after reading the UPP, it is obvious that one has entered a different milieu. The Upāli's bodhisattva is not a lone representative of the faith out there. There is a community of monks nearby with which he can interact. The motive for confessing to the Buddhas is not the same. Now it is the nature of the offense which determines the congregation to which it should be confessed; the congregation of visualised Buddhas is superior to the rest and hears of the worst sins.

Confession of sins has always been a mandatory step in the ordination ceremony for Buddhist monks and nuns¹⁵ and for more than 2,000 years it has been the central communal activity at the fortnightly *poṣadha* observance. The *Prātimokṣa* is a liturgy, a highly formalised group confession ritual which functions to insure the purity of the congregation of monks and nuns, and to bind it together into a community.¹⁶ The *Prātimokṣa* is a catalogue of monks' and nuns' misdeeds, but its ritualised recitation is not a true confession. Instead, the catalogue is recited by the preceptor and the clerics are invited to interrupt only if someone has committed the offense mentioned; otherwise silence signifies that the *Samgha* is pure, not guilty of any proscribed action. Actual confession of a transgression would be made privately by the offender to a fellow cleric, and penalties would be set then. The *Prātimokṣa* recitation itself is not a purifying action, it simply validates the community's actual purity.

There is certainly a perceptible relationship between the ancient *Prātimokṣa* recitation and that of the *Triskandha*, but they are related only in spirit, not at all in form and only partially in function. It is not in the confession of sins that the two are similar, nor in the purification of the sinner, but in the formal affirmation that a religious community exists to which the erring individual belongs and to which he can look for sanction and guidance. In that sense, the *Triskandha* did fulfil for bodhisattvas the same function that the *Prātimokṣa* recitation at *poṣadha* filled for the Hinayāna clerics: it reestablished the bodhisattva's membership in the community of pure followers of the Buddha.

The *Triskandha* must have been an indispensable ritual for early Mahāyāna bodhisattvas, particularly for those living apart from their confreres. Although there were undoubtedly other liturgical acts that bodhisattvas regularly performed, the *Triskandha* was unique, for it was the ritual by means of which the bodhisattva recommitted himself to the bodhisattva path. For every bodhisattva, even for the *pravrajaka* who had sharpened his understanding through years of study and solitary meditation in the forest, the path was full of surprises. Fulfilling his resolve to succor and save all beings required daily confrontations with the realities of human life: major tragedies, minor dissensions, and his own mortal frailties. Some means to restore one's courage after the last defeat so that the next trial could be met was psychologically essential. That is the need which the *Triskandha* ritual met. The bodhisattva used it to put the past behind him, and to recommit himself gloriously to the noble way of the enlightened ones.

Notes

1. *Ugraparipṛcchāsūtra* (hereafter referred to as UPP)
Chinese translations:
Taishō (T) 310, section 19, translated Dharmamitra, ca. 424-440.
T 322, translated An Xuan and Yan Fo-tiao, ca. 180-190.
T 323, translated Fa Hu, ca. 266-308
Tibetan translation:
Peking Edition, 760, section 19
Vinayaviniścaya-upāliparipṛcchāsūtra (hereafter referred to as Upāli)
Taishō 325, translated between 265-420
T 310, section 24, translated Bodhiruci, 706-713
Vinayaviniścaya-upāliparipṛcchāsūtrā, Enquête d'Upāli pour un Exigèze de la Discipline, par Pierre Python (Paris, Adrien-Maisonneuve: 1973)
2. Śāntideva, *Śikshāsamuccaya*, edited by C. Bendall. (St. Petersburg: 1897-1902; reprint Osnabrück, 1970), 169-171, 290. Translated C. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse (Delhi, Motilal Banarasidass: 1971; reprint), 165-167, 263-264.
3. The Chinese texts of the UPP itself understand *skandha* in the sense of "part" or "class." The Tibetan UPP, p. 265.2.6 has: *phuñ-po gsum-pai chos-kyi rnam-graṅs kha-ton-du byao*, recite the enumeration of dharma in three groups.
4. Discussions of the fully developed rite and the form it takes in texts such as *Dharmasaṃgraha*, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, *Prañidhānasaptati* and *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* can be found in Python, *op. cit.*, p. 98, n. 7 and p. 107, n. 4; *La Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra)* (translated by E. Lamotte, Louvain, 1949), I, 415-422; C. Lindtner, "Maṭṛceta's *Prañidhānasaptati*," *Asiatische Studien*, 38 (1984), pp. 104-106.
5. There is a text called *Triskandhaka* in the Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist canons: three Chinese translations (T1491, 1492, 1493) and a Tibetan (Peking Edition 950). I am preparing another article on early Mahāyāna ritual which will include a study of these texts, and their relationship to UPP and Upāli.
- i. The UPP's "story" – that is, the actions of Ugra the householder who questions the Buddha about the *bodhisattva-pratipad*, and the concerns revealed in his questions – is a retelling of the older tale of the conversion of Ugra the householder which was current in some of the pre-Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism. An analysis of this relationship, and a discussion of all the relevant sūtras can be found in my "The Bodhisattva figure in the *Ugraparipṛcchā*," in A.K. Warder (ed.) *New Paths in Buddhist Research* (Durham, N.C., The Acorn Press: 1985). When recounting the contents of the UPP and discussing the bodhisattva's career in this paper, I shall use the masculine pronoun since the Sanskrit word *bodhisattva* is masculine, and the UPP's bodhisattva is specifically a man. It is to be understood, however, that a woman can be a bodhisattva as well as a man.
- . I translate from T310, 19 because this is the most readable text. This passage is also quoted in *Śikṣāsamuccaya*: Bendall, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20; Bendall and Rouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.
- . T322 reads "sūtra" at this point, T323 has "dharma-sūtra," T310, 19 and the Tibetan

translation have "dharma." The reference seems to be to the three resolutions which follow, however, and not to a recitation of other scriptures. Presumably the Indian text had "dharma" in the sense of "rule." T322 and 323 frequently translate "dharma" as "sūtra" or "dharma-sūtra."

9. Python, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 90-107; Bendall, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-171; Bendall and Rouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-167.
10. Alex Wayman, "Purification of sin in Buddhism by vision and confession," in G.H. Sasaki (ed.), *A Study of Kleśa*, (Tokyo: 1975), pp. 68-73.
11. On the *daśadigbuddhāḥ* see Randy Kloetzli, *Buddhist Cosmology* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass: 1983), pp. 90-110.
12. Wayman, *op. cit.*, p. 70: up to that point the bodhisattva only imagines the Buddhas, but then sees them "as they really are."
13. The change could have been made much earlier, of course, since it is impossible to know exactly when the Indian text used for T322 was produced.
14. I have no evidence that the UPP was written specifically for missionaries to far countries. But whatever the intent, texts like the UPP would have been of great practical use for missionaries, and that might help to explain the remarkable popularity of the UPP among missionaries to China.
15. P. Lévy, *Buddhism: A "Mystery Religion"?* (London, Athlone Press: 1957), pp. 21, 48, 53-54, 101 n. 3. Nalinaksha Dutt, "Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa Sūtra," *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 7(1931): pp. 262-266. According to the manuscript of the *Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa Sūtra* Dutt edited, the *Triskandha* rite was used as part of the ordination ceremony.
16. C.S. Prebish, "The Prātimokṣa puzzle: Fact Versus Fantasy," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 94 (1974): 169, 171-172.

The *Nikāyas* of Mediaeval Sri Lanka and the Unification of the *Sangha* by Parākramabāhu I

Heinz Bechert

*The rise of the three nikāyas*¹

Buddhism was introduced in Sri Lanka in the time of Aśoka in the form of *Theravāda* or *Sthaviravāda*. The first schism which was recorded in our sources arose during the reign of king Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya (29-17 B.C.) when a group of monks residing in the newly founded Abhayagirivihāra formed a separate *nikāya* (lit. “group” i.e. “school” or “sect” of the *Sangha*). This group became known as the *Abhayagirivihāravāsins* or the *Dhammarucika* monks. During the reign of Mahāsena (274-301 A.D.) another schism arose, from which the *Jetavanavihāravāsins* or *Sāgalika* school originated. From this period onwards, the *Sangha* in Sri Lanka is described as consisting of “three *nikāyas*”. The amount of relevant information found in the ancient chronicles of Sri Lanka is rather limited, and the additional details recorded in later sources (*Mahāvamsaṭṭikā*, *Nikāyasangrahaya*, etc.) are partly contradictory and do not necessarily reflect the original facts. However, it remains beyond doubt from the evidence found in our sources that these three *nikāyas*, viz. the *Mahāvihāravāsins*, the *Abhayagirivihāravāsins*, and the *Jetavanavihāravāsins* together formed the monastic community of mediaeval Sri Lanka before the 12th century.²

As we know from the chronicles, the kings “for political reasons generally were impartial towards the different Buddhist doctrines and their representatives ... So we often read that the same gifts were given by the king to all three fraternities ... The three fraternities were purified by Sena II ... and by Kassapa IV.”³ It was only during the reign of Parākramabāhu I of Ceylon (1153-1186) that all the *Theravādins* of Ceylon were reunited under the leadership of the *Mahāvihāra* school. It seems that the earlier kings of Sri Lanka did not feel strong enough to deal with a united *Sangha*. Therefore, they preferred to actively support the co-existence of the traditional three *nikāyas* within the *Sangha*: (a) the *Mahāvihāra* sect, which claimed to be the most orthodox and which dominated national historiography, (b) the *Abhayagiri* sect, which controlled the island’s most venerated relics, the Buddha’s tooth relic and alms bowl, and (c) the *Jetavana*, the role of which in mediaeval Sri Lankan Buddhism has remained somewhat obscure. Parākramabāhu I, however, had gained absolute control of all regions and all social groups of the island, when he decided to reunite the *Sangha*.

The nature of the Ceylonese nikāyas

There can hardly be any doubt that the formation of Buddhist "sects" or *nikāyas* in India had begun in a period before Aśoka's reign. The use of a rather inadequate translation for the term "*nikāya*", i.e. "sect" has obscured the facts. A *nikāya* has nothing in common with a "sect" in the accepted understanding of this word, if used in the context of the history of Christianity. A *nikāya* is a group of monks who mutually acknowledge the validity of their *upasampadā*, and consequently, if staying within the same *śīmā*, can commonly perform *vinayakarmas*. The early *nikāyas*, therefore, represent groups of monks who had accepted an identical interpretation of the rules of *vinaya*.

There are, however, many examples of monastic communities following the same *vinaya* tradition, but not mutually recognising the validity of their *upasampadā*. In such cases, these communities belong to different "sub-*nikāyas*" within one *nikāya*. Unfortunately, there is no specific terminology in Buddhist tradition which would always allow us to clearly differentiate between *nikāya* in a narrower sense (i.e. what we would term "sub-*nikāya*") and *nikāya* in the wider sense of the word. Thus, the present-day *Theravāda* community of Sri Lanka is subdivided into 30 autonomous *nikāyas* (in the narrower sense of the word).⁴ However, almost every Buddhist in Sri Lanka would answer the question about the number of *nikāyas* not by quoting the actual number, but by giving the information that there are three *nikāyas*, viz. *Syāmanikāya*, *Amarapurānikāya*, and *Rāmaññānikāya*. It is evident that the division of the Sangha into three *nikāyas* in Sri Lanka has remained a traditional pattern, which is still being preserved in spite of its disagreement with reality. In order to relate this theory to the facts, all existing *nikāyas* are considered as subdivisions of one of the three main *nikāyas*. In the Sangha of Burma we also find the concept of three subdivisions of the *Theravādanikāya* as well, viz. *Sudhammanikāya*, *Shwe-gyin-Nikāya* and *Dvāranikāya*, though this description does not represent reality either. Here nine *nikāyas* have been officially recognised.⁵

It is almost certain that the real *nikāya* divisions in Sri Lanka during the mediæval period as well did not always agree with the traditional tripartition. Thus, we know from the *Cūlavamsa* that the *Pāmsukūlika* monks branched off from the *Abhayagirivāsins* during the ninth century.⁶ The situation concerning the validity of the traditional divisions of the Sangha was not very different in India. Here, Buddhist tradition fixed the number of *nikāyas* not at three, as in Sri Lanka, but at eighteen, evidently not because there were eighteen *nikāyas* in reality, but because eighteen was their number as hallowed by ancient tradition. These eighteen *nikāyas* were grouped in two to five divisions, and that of four divisions was the most commonly accepted of these systematisations.⁷

The definition of a *nikāya* in this sense originally had nothing to do with the profession of particular doctrinal or dogmatic opinions. However, the situation changed in this respect rather early. At a later period, when Mahāyāna as a new

religious program spread in Indian Buddhism, its new teachings could be accepted in various *nikāyas*, and in many cases Hinayanistic and Mahayanistic monks remained members of one and the same monastic community. This fact was already explained by de la Vallée Poussin in 1930.⁸ Mahayanistic ideas were also accepted by certain sections of the *Theravādins*. In Sri Lanka there existed Mahayanistic factions within the *Abhayagiri* and *Jetavana* communities, while the *Mahāvihāravāsins* rejected such influences.

Some modern scholars perpetuate the theory that the *Abhayagirivāsins* were "using Sanskrit versions of the Canon". This theory was proposed by E.W. Adikaram, and is based on one particular passage in the *Samantapāsādikā* by Buddhaghosa (volume 3, pp. 582 ff.). The text relates that during the reign of king Bhātikābhaya, in the first century A.D., a dispute arose between the *Abhayagiri* and *Mahāvihāra* schools over a *vinaya* problem. The king appointed the Brahmin Dīghakārāyaṇa to decide the case. Dīghakārāyaṇa is said to have been *bhāsan-tarakusala* ("versed in other languages"). From this word Adikaram infers that "the ground of difference between the dwellers of the two monasteries was, in this case, more of a linguistic than of a doctrinal nature", i.e. that the *Abhayagiri* monks used a Sanskrit version of the *Vinayaṭīkā*.⁹ This conclusion, however, is not acceptable. The words *pañḍita bhāsan-tarakusala* may have another meaning here, viz., "a scholar versed in (knowing) the inner (meaning) of the language", or it might have been a title of this minister. At any rate, it is no proof of the use of a Sanskrit *Tripiṭaka* by the *Abhayagiri* monks, particularly in view of the existing evidence for their use of the Pāli *Tripiṭaka*. Though the Mahayanistic faction within the *Abhayagirivihāra* community made use of certain Mahāyāna works in Sanskrit, they used the Hinayanistic canonical and extracanonical texts in Pāli.¹⁰

It has been wrongly stated that "all the works belonging to the *Abhayagiri* were destroyed".¹¹ At least two major literary works of the *Abhayagirivāsins* have been discovered so far, viz. the *Vimuttimaggā* by Upatissa, and the *Saddhammopāyana* by Abhayagirikakravartin Ānanda.

P.V. Bapat established the fact that Upatissa in his *Vimuttimaggā* advocated certain views which were different from those of the *Mahāvihāravāsins*, but held by the *Abhayagirivāsins*.¹² In the meantime an English translation of the Chinese text has been published.¹³ In addition, a Tibetan translation of the *Dhutaṅga*-Chapter of the *Vimuttimaggā* and an abbreviated version of a reconstruction of the Pāli text of the work were also published.¹⁴ Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli was definitely wrong when he argued that the *Vimuttimaggā* was not a work of the *Abhayagiri* school, but "a product of the Great Monastery (*Mahāvihāra*) before the *Visuddhimaggā* was written", because "the *Vimuttimaggā* itself contains nothing at all of the Mahāyāna, its unorthodoxies being well within the 'Hinayāna' field".¹⁵ Evidently he missed the fact that the *Abhayagiri* tradition was basically Hinayanistic.

The only major *Abhayagiri* work to survive in its original Pāli text is the *Saddhammopāyana*. It is a work of the 10th century and its authorship is attributed to

one Ānanda Thera.¹⁶ H. Saddhatissa has made a comparative study of this work of the *Abhayagiri* school, and the *Upāsakajanālaikāra* of Ānanda, which is a work of the *Mahāvihāravāsins*.¹⁷ He has shown that "there is no fundamental difference in essential doctrine between the two schools, but only differences on certain points in their interpretations", and he concludes that we may see from this comparison "how easily the *Abhayagiri* school could have merged into the school of *Mahāvihāra* by the decree of Parākrāmabāhu I."¹⁸

Valentina Stache-Rosen has studied the Chinese translation of a *Vinaya* work named *Yu-po-li wen fu* (*Upālipariṣcchā*, Taisho No. 1466), which proved to be a close parallel of the *Parivāra* of the *Vinaya* in the Pāli Canon.¹⁹ In the introduction of this publication I argued that this text represented the work referred to by the author of the *Mahāvamsa-tīkā* (*ad Mahāvamsa* 5.13) when he informs us that the *Abhayagirivāsins* altered the *Parivāra* section of the *Vinaya*, a passage which was misunderstood by many scholars.²⁰ J.W. de Jong has, however, shown, that my theory cannot be upheld any more.²¹

Additional literature for the knowledge of the literature of the *Abhayagiri* school was recently discovered by Peter Skilling in the *Samskṛtāsamskṛtavinīścaya*, a work written by Daśabalaśrīmitra, who probably lived in India in the second half of the twelfth century. This text is available in its Tibetan translation only, and is contained in the *Mdo 'grel* division of the *Tenjur*. Daśabalaśrīmitra treats his subject according to the traditions of the *Vaibhāṣika* (*Sarvāstivāda*) school, the *Sthavira* school, the *Sammatīya* school and the *Mahāyāna* doctrine. In his study of the text, P. Skilling showed that four long passages agree with the passages in the *Vimuttimaggā*. It is therefore at least highly probable, that Daśabalaśrīmitra made use of the *Theravāda* texts in the tradition of the *Abhayagiri* school. Had he been influenced by the *Mahāvihāravāsins*, he could have been expected to quote not from the *Vimuttimaggā*, but rather from Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimaggā*.²²

Traces of the tradition represented by the *Vimuttimaggā* have also been found in mainland Southeast Asian esoteric *Theravāda* meditation practice as handed down by the local Buddhists of Cambodia, Laos, and northern Thailand in the so-called "ancient *Mahānikāya*" of these countries.²³ This form of Buddhist practice incorporates a methodology which may be described as Tantric, but the tenets have remained those of the non-Mahayanistic *Theravāda*. In view of the fact, that *Theravāda* in late mediaeval Indian Buddhism was represented by an evidently non-*Mahāvihāra* tradition, as we have seen from the *Samskṛtāsamskṛtavinīścaya*, it is likely that F. Bizot is right in connecting the indigenous Southeast Asian *Theravāda* with the *Abhayagiri* school. Though these traditions were superseded by *Mahāvihāravāsa* traditions in the course of subsequent reform movements, the ancient forms of meditation survive even today.²⁴

Summing up, there can be no doubt that the "three *nikāyas*" of ancient Sri Lanka are nothing else but "sub-*nikāyas*" of the *Theravādins*. They are also listed as

such in the Indian lists of the Buddhist schools, including the relevant passage in the *Mahāvīyutpatti* (no. 9095-9098).²⁵ There is an interesting document from mediaeval Ceylon which has not been taken into consideration in most of the modern studies on the religious history of the island, though it was already published in 1904 in volume 1 of the *Epigraphica Zeylanica*.²⁶ It was erroneously called the Jetavanārāma Sanskrit Inscription, and it was discovered in 1894 in a monastic compound north of the “Twin-ponds” in Anurādhapura. This compound seems to have formed part of the *Abhayagirivihāra*. The inscription is written in the Sanskrit language and in a North Indian script which has been determined to be similar to that used in the area of Bihar and Bengal during the ninth century. The inscription contains regulations for the administration of a particular *vihāra*, and thus it would be termed a *vihāra* *katikāvata* in later terminology.²⁷ In this inscription it is recorded that monks “from four great *nikāyas*” reside in the *vihāra* in question. The names of the *nikāyas* are not given, and they have been identified in various ways. R.A.L.H. Gunawardana argues that they were the *Mahāsāṅghika*, *Sarvāstivāda*, *Sthavira* and *Sammitiya* schools,²⁸ while D.J. Kalupahana identified them as *Vaibhāṣika* (*Sarvāstivādin*), *Sautrāntika*, *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra*.²⁹ I have shown elsewhere³⁰ that both these theories are erroneous. I agree with Gunawardana’s view, however, that the inscription was meant to regulate the affairs of a monastic establishment which housed monks of Indian origin, because regulations for Ceylonese monks would have been written in Pāli or Sinhala, and, even if in Sanskrit, not in an Indian alphabet, but in Sinhala script. The text of the inscription seems to suggest that these Indian monks had to retain their separateness from the Sri Lankan monastic communities. However, I do not agree with Gunawardana’s identification of the *nikāyas*. I feel that the evidence available so far is not sufficient to identify these four *nikāyas*, and that all attempts to do so remain pure speculation.

The unification of the Sangha

The purification and unification of the Sangha which was achieved during the reign of Parākramabāhu I – probably in 1164/65³¹ – is recorded in several sources, of which the relevant sections in the so-called *Cūlavam̐sa*, which forms the younger part of the *Mahāvam̐sa*, and the “Galvihāra Inscription” are the most authentic accounts.³² The Galvihāra Inscription is the first one in a series of so-called *Katikāvatas*, i.e. collections of regulations and laws for the Sangha of Sri Lanka which were issued under the patronage of the rulers, and to which a historical introduction is added.³³ According to the unanimous record of the sources, King Parākramabāhu I took the initiative, but the reform measures were carried out by the Sangha. The synod was presided over by Mahākassapa of Udumbaragiri, a leading monk of the *Mahāvihāra* who belonged to the *ārañṇika* (“forest-dwelling”) subdivision of this *nikāya*. It is evident that the king followed the traditional model of Aśoka’s *sāsana* reform. It was, of course, not the historic event that

served as a model, but the *sāsana* reform as described in the *Mahāvamsa*, which was the authoritative source for the history of Sri Lanka by that time.³⁴ It was this particular transformation of the tradition which was followed by the king. In the inscription, as well as in the *Mahāvamsa*, the roles of Parākramabāhu and Mahākassapa are equated with those of Aśoka and Moggaliputta Tissa.

This event has been interpreted so far, in accordance with the sources, as a purification of the Sangha, followed by a re-ordination of the *bhikkhus* of the other two *nikāyas* in the tradition of the *Mahāvihāra*. As a consequence, all *bhikkhus* of Sri Lanka now belonged to the *upasampadā* lineage of the *Mahāvihāra*. It was one of the initial stages of a development which finally resulted in the gradual replacement of most other *Theravāda* traditions by that of the *Mahāvihāra*, not only in Sri Lanka but all over Southeast Asia. The *Abhayagiri* and *Jetavana nikāyas* ceased to exist as separate *nikāyas* in the sense of Buddhist ecclesiastical law, though their monastic establishments were, of course, continued, generally by the same monks who had lived there before but had been reordained in the *Mahāvihāra* lineage.

However, R.A.L.H. Gunawardana has argued that all these traditions “tend to give a distorted view of the event”,³⁵ that the “unification” of the Sangha “merely amounted to an arrangement providing for the co-existence of the varied factions under a common leadership”³⁶ and that “the reforms of the reign of Parākramabāhu I did not amount to the suppression of the *Abhayagiri* and *Jetavana nikāyas*”.³⁷ It would not seem worthwhile to discuss this theory at length, had not André Bareau accepted it and thereby lent his authority to it.³⁸

In his somewhat unmethodical discussion Gunawardana adduces a number of arguments. Firstly he states that later information concerning the leading monks does not always agree with the record of events in the *Mahāvamsa*. The information quoted in this context is, however, irrelevant to the problem under discussion.³⁹ Secondly, he comments on the two steps of the reform measure, *viz.* the “purification” and the “unification”. In this context, he quotes a number of well-known instances when, during the Anurādhapura period, attempts at a “purification” of the Sangha were not followed by its unification, and he correctly states that the three *nikāyas* continued to coexist at that time.⁴⁰ By implication, Gunawardana suggests that this was the case at the time of Parākramabāhu I as well, despite the clear testimony of the sources that it was not so. As “more specific evidence on the persistence of the teaching of the *Abhayagiri nikāya* after the unification” he quotes the *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī* of Sumaṅgala, which was compiled after the reform, and in which certain views of the *Abhayagirinikāya* were criticised.⁴¹ In another paragraph he argues that the Galvihāra Inscription, which records the purification and codifies the regulations for the conduct of the monks, “confines itself to matters of training and discipline of monks and the organisation of monastic living”. Thus, he concludes that the “purification of the Order was confined to matters of discipline”, and that the teachings of the schools opposed to the

Mahāvihāra were not suppressed.⁴² Later authors like Dharmakīrti, the author of the *Nikāyasaṅgrahaya*, even attest to the fact that the Tantric *Vājiriyavāda* “had survived in the island and that it was being practised in secret by foolish men”.⁴³ In a lengthy discussion Gunawardana further argues that “the *Mahāvihāra* came to be influenced by the teachings of the *Abhayagiri nikāya*” as seen from the presence of certain unorthodox teachings in writings of the subsequent period.⁴⁴ Summing up, he states that “the unification was accomplished by reconciling the eight fraternities which had replaced the *nikāyas* as the primary units in the organisation of the community of monks, and by persuading their leading monks to live in the same monastery and to accept a common leader in Sāriputta.” Therefore, he claims that “it did not amount to the victory of the *Mahāvihāra* and the suppression of other *nikāyas*, as some later chroniclers and certain modern writers claim”, though the initiative for purification was taken by *Mahāvihāra* monks.⁴⁵

It is evident that Gunawardana confuses questions of Buddhist ecclesiastic law, which he does not seem to have understood, with the issue of the continuation of certain doctrinal views and even of certain “heretical” traditions which went underground and which had nothing to do with the legitimate Sangha. The Galvihāra Inscription, which represents the first *Katikāvata* of Sri Lanka, is by definition a collection of monastic rules and, like the other *Katikāvatas*, does not elaborate on doctrinal matters. As mentioned above, such *Katikāvatas* have been issued in Sri Lanka from time to time.⁴⁶ If understood correctly, the “purification” brought about by Parākrāmabāhu I must be considered as a question of monastic discipline (*vinaya*) in a double sense: (1) the Sangha had to be “purified” from undisciplined monks, and (2) it was necessary to establish an *upasampadā* the validity of which was beyond doubt. We have learnt that the *Mahāvamsa* account of Aśoka’s Sangha reform served as a model for Parākrāmabāhu’s reform, but there was no major controversy on doctrinal matters at that time. The majority of monks of all three *nikāyas* in mediaeval Sri Lanka followed the *Theravāda* doctrine, and the spread of Mahāyāna in Sri Lanka was a phenomenon of restricted periods. The records refer, of course, to the fact that the *Vetullavāda* (i.e. Mahāyāna teachings) was no longer tolerated after the reform.

In any event, the refutation of some *Abhayagiri* tenets in the *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī* has nothing to do with an alleged persistence of the *Abhayagiri nikāyā*. In the first instance, there is nothing unusual about views of older schools being criticised in a later source. Most Buddhist sources discussing philosophical views abound in such references, and it is difficult to understand that Gunawardana does not know this. The author of the book in question was a disciple of Sāriputta, one of the leading personalities of the reform, so that he most probably learnt of these controversies from his teacher. The books of the *Abhayagirivāsins* did not, of course, suddenly disappear either, and we have seen that the *Saddhammapāyana* has remained a popular book up to the present. Furthermore, the

refutation of other views is often repeated from earlier sources, and it is possible that Sumaṅgala took it from some earlier work which is not available now. Finally, the fact that some views of the *Abhayagirivāsins* are being discussed does not at all presuppose the existence of this *nikāya* as a separate *nikāya* in terms of Buddhist ecclesiastical law. This is even more true of the alleged instances of *Abhayagiri* teachings in the *Mahāvihāra*. Under these conditions, it is safe to state that Gunawardana's assumptions have not the least degree of probability, but are totally unfounded. Far from being able to quote conclusive evidence, he has not been able to quote a single piece of testimony which has at least some degree of probability in proving his case, that the *Abhayagiri* and *Jetavana nikāyas* as such, and not only some knowledge about their teachings, continued to exist after Parākramabāhu I.

The essential features of Parākramabāhu's Sangha reform were the expulsion of undisciplined monks and the standardisation of the *upasampadā* tradition, i.e. the acceptance by all recognised *bhikkhus* of the island of the *upasampadā* as handed down by the Sangha of the *Mahāvihāra* community, in the same way in which "unifications" were carried out later on in Sri Lanka and in Southeast Asia. In Sri Lanka, this type of replacing earlier non-recognised *upasampadās* by a universally accepted one was practised during the well-known Sangha reform initiated by Saranaṅkara in the 18th century, in Burma under king Dhammaceti in the 15th century, etc. etc. The only difference consists of the fact that in 12th century Sri Lanka it was one of the three existing traditions which finally prevailed, whereas in most similar instances it was usually a tradition introduced from abroad. The acceptance of a universally acknowledged *upasampadā* tradition from another lineage was not at all considered in and of itself a disadvantage, and it was often consciously sought after as a factor of legitimation. There is no doubt that, during the period of Parākramabāhu I, the *Mahāvihāra* tradition was already considered the leading monastic tradition of Sri Lanka in "the world of *Theravāda* Buddhism" in South and Southeast Asia. Its prestige originated from the rich literary heritage of the *Mahāvihāra*, which included the leading commentarial works in Pāli. It points to the extent of the general acceptance of Parākramabāhu's unification that it resulted in the disappearance from Sri Lankan tradition of most literary works of the *Abhayagiri* school which were not copied anymore, including the *Vimuttimagga*.

Under these circumstances it is reasonable to say that the unification did amount to the "victory" of the *Mahāvihāra* tradition and to the disappearance of the other two *nikāyas* as organised monastic groups; in accordance with what not only – as Gunawardana puts it⁴⁷ – "some later chroniclers and certain modern writers" but in fact all Sri Lankan historical sources and, until Gunawardana, all modern writers have correctly understood. Gunawardana has succeeded in tracing the growth of "eight fraternities" in the mediaeval Sangha of Sri Lanka in his book,⁴⁸ but while these eight "fundamental monasteries" (*mūlavihāra*) represent

entities of great economic and even political importance, they were organised on a level which is quite separate from the *nikāya* organisation. Therefore, their existence was not much affected by the "purification" and "unification" of the Sangha which was carried out as a matter of Buddhist ecclesiastical law. For some time the monastic lineage of the *Abhayagirivāsins* might have survived outside Sri Lanka, e.g. in *Theravāda* monasteries in India and Southeast Asia. In the *Cūlavamsa* it is recorded that "many (of the monks who opposed Parākrāmabāhu's reform) began departing to foreign lands".⁴⁹ However, in the long run, all other monastic traditions of *Theravāda* were, of course, replaced by that of the *Mahāvihāra*, though some traces of their doctrines and their literature have survived.

Notes

1. The author wishes to express his thanks to Mr Philip H. Pierce of the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project who has kindly read through the text and corrected the English style.
2. For details see H. Bechert, "Zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Sekten in Indien und Ceylon," *La Nouvelle Clío* 7-9 (1955-57), pp. 311-360; W. Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times* (Wiesbaden, 1960), pp. 207-210; H.G.A. van Zeyst, "Abhayagirivāsins," *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, Volume 1 (Colombo, 1961-65), pp. 25-28; A. Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (Saigon, 1955), pp. 207 ff., 241-244; R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, *Robe and Plough: Monasticism and Economic Interest in Early Mediaeval Sri Lanka* (Tucson, 1979), pp. 7-51.
3. Geiger, *op. cit.*, pp. 209
4. For the *nikāyas* in modern Sri Lanka, see H. Bechert, *Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravāda Buddhismus* (Volume 1, Frankfurt, 1966), pp. 210-220, 263-267 and K.M. Malalgoda, *Buddhism in Sinhalese Society 1750-1900* (Berkeley, 1976).
5. cf. H. Bechert, "Neue buddhistische Orthodoxie: Bemerkungen zur Gliederung und zur Reform des Sangha in Birma," *Numen*, 35 (1988), pp. 24-56.
6. *Cūlavamsa Being the More Recent Part of the Mahāvamsa* (translated by W. Geiger, London, 1929), Part 1, p. 108 (47.66), 152 (51.52), 203 (61.59); W. Rahula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon, The Anurādhapura Period* (Colombo, 1956), pp. 195 ff; Gunawardana, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-44; F. Bizot, *Le don de soi-même* (Paris, 1981), p. 87. Another separate group were the *Lābhavāsins*; see *Cūlavamsa*, Part 1, p. 181, n. 3; Rahula, *op. cit.*, p. 197, n. 1; for the *Damīlabhikkhusangha*, see Gunawardana, *op. cit.*, pp. 47f.
7. For these subdivisions see E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* (Louvain, 1958), pp. 584-604.
8. L. de la Vallée Poussin, "Notes bouddhiques XVIII: Opinions sur les relations des deux véhicules aux point de vue du Vinaya," *Académie Royale de Belgique; Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Politiques* 5e série 16 (1930), pp. 20-39.
9. E.W. Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (2nd edition, Colombo, 1953), p. 88; on the dispute in question see also Gunawardana, *op. cit.*, pp. 24ff.

10. See also van Zeyst, *op. cit.* (Note 1), pp. 27ff.
11. This outdated view is repeated in D.J. Kalupahana, "Schools of Buddhism in Early Ceylon," *The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities* 1 (1970), p. 161.
12. See P.V. Bapat, "Introduction" in *Vimuttimaggā and Visuddhimaggā, A Comparative Study* (Poona, 1937).
13. *The Path of Freedom by the Arahanṭ Upatissa* (translated from the Chinese by N.R.M. Ehara, Soma Thera and Kheminda Thera, (1st edition, Colombo, 1961; second edition, Kandy, 1977).
14. See *Vimuktimārga Dhutagaṇa-nirdeśa, A Tibetan Text* edited and translated by P.V. Bapat (London and Delhi, 1964). On the work *Vimutti-maggo* (edited by G. Ratanajoti and K. Ratanapāla), which was printed in Sinhala script, see P.V. Bapat, in *Journal of the Vidyalyan-kara University of Ceylon* 1 (1972), pp. 172-190. It was mistaken by several scholars for a fragment of the original Pāli version (e.g. by Gunawardana, *op. cit.*, p. 22). See also H. Bechert, "Vimuttimaggā and Amātākaraṇṇanā", *Professor P.V. Bapat Felicitation Volume* (Delhi, 1989), pp. 11-14.
15. *The Path of Purification (Visuddhimaggā) by Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa* translated by Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli (Colombo, 1956), pp. xxvii f.
16. S. Paranavitana, "Civilisation of the Period," *University of Ceylon History of Ceylon* (Volume 1, Part 1, edited by H.C. Ray, Colombo, 1959), p. 393.
17. H. Saddhatissa, *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra by Ānanda, A Critical Edition and Study* (London, 1965), pp. 59-64.
18. *Ibid.* p. 60. For a survey of views attributed to the *Abhayagirivāsins* in various sources, see Gunawardana, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-30.
19. Translation of this work with a reconstruction of the Pāli text: V. Stache-Rosen, *Upālipariṇipucchāsūtra, Ein Text zur buddhistischen Ordensdisziplin, aus dem Chinesischen übersetzt und den Pāli Parallelen gegenübergestellt* (Göttingen, 1984). See also V. Stache-Rosen, "Das Upālipariṇipucchāsūtra, Ein Text zur buddhistischen Ordensdisziplin" in H. Bechert (ed.), *Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries* (Göttingen, 1978), pp. 58-60.
20. For a discussion of the wrong interpretations of this passage (*Vaṃsatthappakāsini, Commentary on the Mahāvamsa*, edited by G.P. Malalasekera, London, 1935, Volume 1, pp. 175 ff.) I refer to H. Bechert, "On the identification of Buddhist schools in early Sri Lanka," *Indology and Law, Studies in Honour of Professor J. Duncan M. Derrett* (Wiesbaden, 1982), pp. 67ff.
21. Review by J.W. de Jong, in *BSOAS* 49 (1986), pp. 591 ff.
22. P. Skilling, "The Saṃskṛtasaṃskṛtaviniścaya of Daśabalaśrimitra", *Buddhist Studies Review* 4 (1987), pp. 3-24.
23. See F. Bizot, *Le Figuier à Cinq Branches, Recherches sur le Bouddhisme Khmer* (Volume 1, Paris, 1976: Publications de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient, 107) pp. 25f., 32, 122, 135.
24. Concerning these traditions and their history see *Ibid.* note 31; also F. Bizot, *Le Don de Soi-même (Recherches sur le Bouddhisme Khmer, III, Paris, 1981)* and F. Bizot, *Le Traditions de Pabbajjā en Asie du Sud-est (Recherches sur le Bouddhisme Khmer, IV, Göttingen, 1988)*.
25. Lamotte, *Histoire*, p. 603; cf. also Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques*, pp. 205-244.

26. D.M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, "Jetavanārāma Sanskrit Inscription," *Epigraphica Zeylanica* 1 (1904-1912), pp. 1-9.
27. See N. Ratnapala, *The Katikāvatas, Laws of the Buddhist Order of Ceylon from the 12th Century to the 18th Century* (München, 1971), pp. 7ff. All other Ceylonese inscriptions of this type are written in the Sinhala language and script.
28. R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, "Buddhist Nikāyas in Mediaeval Ceylon," *The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies* 9 (1966), pp. 55-66; also Gunawardana, *op. cit.* (Note 1), pp. 247-254.
29. D.J. Kalupahana, "Schools of Buddhism in Early Ceylon," *The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities* 1 (1970), pp. 159-190.
30. Bechert *op. cit.* (note 20), pp. 60-76.
31. For the date of this event see Gunawardana, *op. cit.* (Note 1), p. 314.
32. See Mahāvamsa Chapters 73 and 78; *Epigraphica Zeylanica* 2, pp. 256-283.
33. See Ratnapala *op. cit.* (Note 27).
34. For this difference, see H. Bechert, "The importance of Aśoka's so-called schism edict," *Indological and Buddhist Studies, Volume in Honour of Prof. J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Canberra, 1982), pp. 61-68.
35. Gunawardana, *op. cit.*, p. 318.
36. *Ibid*, p. 319.
37. *Ibid*, p. 321.
38. A. Bareau, "Etude de Bouddhisme," *Annuaire du College de France 1982-1983, Resume de Cours et Travaux* (Paris, 1982), pp. 573-575.
39. This holds true of the discussion by Gunawardana, *op. cit.* (Note 1), pp. 315-318.
40. *Ibid*, pp. 321-323.
41. *Ibid*, p. 321.
42. *Ibid*, p. 320.
43. *Ibid*, p. 320.
44. *Ibid*, pp. 324-327.
45. *Ibid*, p. 334.
6. See Ratnapala *op. cit.* (Note 27). Unfortunately Gunawardana did not make use of this important publication and interpretation of relevant sources, which he does not seem to know. It is difficult to understand this, because this book was listed by the standard work of H.A.I. Goonetilleke, *A Bibliography of Ceylon*, Volume III, 1976, p. 326, No. 4667.
7. Gunawardane, *op. cit.*, p. 334.
3. *Ibid*, pp. 282-312.
3. *Cūlavamsa* 78.13 (Note 6).

Le Végétarisme défendu par Haribhadrāsūri contre un bouddhiste et un brahmane

W.B. Bollée

*Aṣṭakaparakaraṇa 17 et 18**

La religion des Jaina, dérivant probablement de Pāsa (8^{me} s. av. J.-C.) et ayant été réformée par Vaddhamāṇa Nāya (putta), dit le Mahāvīra,¹ n'était pas à l'origine si strictement végétarienne; elle l'est devenue plus tard, peut-être en dehors de sa terre natale de Magadha, par le contact avec l'hindouisme. Aux temps des Angas (*Āyāranga*, *Viyāhapannatti*) le Jina et ses moines mangeaient de la viande d'animaux et des poissons tués par d'autres (laïcs ou animaux) et qui ne l'étaient pas spécialement pour les ascètes.² Une attitude plus rigoureuse se voit dans le *Dasaveyāliya* et cette tendance s'est renforcée de plus en plus jusqu'à nos jours où le végétarisme est presque la marque distinctive du jinisme, parce que les croyants refusent d'accepter le développement historique de leur religion au cours de plus de deux millénaires. Ce fait explique la double apparence de ce thème (*tantra*) dans l'exposition de la doctrine jaina qui est l'*Aṣṭakaparakaraṇa*, un texte qui se compose de 32 chapitres de huit *śloka*.

Le sujet qui commence la série, c'est naturellement l'hommage au Jina intitulé ici Mahādeva. Parmi les autres, on trouve le bain (*snāna*), le repas secret (*prachannam bhojanam*), la consommation d'alcool (*madya-pānam*), les rapports sexuels (*maithuna*) etc. tous interdits au moine, mais aussi des sujets positifs, p.ex. l'empêchement de la souillure de l'Écriture sainte (*śāstra-mālīnya-niṣedhana*) et la Délivrance (*mokṣa*) à la fin du traité.

Ces thèmes positifs peuvent être une indication que le texte comme tel a pour destinataires non seulement les adversaires du jinisme (c.à.d. dans les chapitres 17 et 18 sur l'abstention de la viande traités *infra*: les bouddhistes non-végétariens et les brahmanes), mais aussi les propres moines, car s'il y avait quelques-uns de ces derniers, déjà aux temps canoniques, qui n'observaient pas le quatrième vœu de s'abstenir du commerce charnel,³ il fallait s'attendre à ce qu'il y en avait aussi quelques brebis galeuses qui transgressaient (toujours) la règle touchant la vie végétarienne, de tels membres étant rapportés plusieurs fois dans la longue histoire de l'ordre.

La langue de Haribhadra (ca. 750 après J.-C.) dans ce petit traité, à l'opposition de son argumentation, n'est pas toujours simple.

Quant au texte, je me suis servi de celui publié à Ahmedabad en *saṃvat* 1968,

donc en 1911 de notre ère; il contient en outre la *vr̥tti* ou *ṭikā* (desormais: T) de Jineśvara (Jin.) remaniée par Abhayadeva.

aṣṭaka 17

1. *bhakṣaṇīyaṃ satā māṃsaṃ prāṇy-aṅgatvena hetunā
odanādi-vad ity evaṃ kaścid āhātītārkikah*

Un certain “hyperscolastique” a émis (une fois) l’opinion qu’un homme vertueux peut manger de la viande de la même manière que du riz etc., puisque ce n’était qu’une part d’un être vivant.

Jineśvara (Jin.) qui spécifie *māṃsa* par *piṣita* “viande cuite” (SNR) est contre la comparaison du riz, le dernier étant une part d’un être vivant muni d’un seul sens (v. R.-F., §2475), tandis que la viande mangée appartenait à un être muni de cinq sens. L’hyperscolastique – mot ridicule (*upahāsa-vacanam*) pour indiquer un savant aride (*śuṣka-tarka*, 64a 3) ou d’une autorité fausse-porte sur un bouddhiste (*saugata*), comme il ressort de vs. 8.

Kaścid: “It is a fact that the Indians tend to pay more attention to the unknown and to the undefined than to the known and the defined (...); their way of thinking tended to prefer the dark and obscure over that which was clear”.⁴ Préférence de l’ombre au soleil?

2. *bhakṣyābhakṣya-vyavasthēha śāstra-loka-nibandhanā
sarvāiva bhāvato yasmāt, tasmād etad a-sāmpratam.*

Ce qui est ici kascher selon la loi religieuse et ce qui ne l’est pas, se base entièrement sur l’Ecriture sainte et le droit coutumier. C’est donc pour cette raison que la (consommation de la viande) n’est pas admise.

Jin. répond à la question éventuelle, si la condition kascher de la viande est un argument de l’école propre (*svatantra-sādhana* sc. de l’hyperscolastique) ou bien un argument fortuit (*prasaṅga-sādhana*) en faveur du dernier et nous donne comme exemples des choses, qu’on ne doit pas manger, le miel, la viande et les oignons (*palāṇḍu*, 64a 9).⁵

**Loka*:- *loka-vyavahārah* (64a 10).

3. *tatra prāṇy-aṅgam apy ekaṃ bhakṣyam, anyat tu no tathā
siddhaṃ gavādi-sat-kṣīra-rudhirādaṃ tathēkṣaṇāt*

Suivant ses sources on peut manger même l’une part d’un être vivant, mais non pas l’autre. De ce point de vue, cela s’applique entre autres respectivement au bon lait et au sang de boeufs etc.

En illustration, Jin. porte une citation en prose que je ne peux pas repérer: “quant à leur caractère potable, le lait ou l’urine de boeufs ⁶ ne sont pas interdits dans l’Ecriture sainte et le droit coutumier, mais le sang et la viande n’y sont pas permis”.⁷

4. *prāṇy-aṅgatvena na ca no 'bhakṣaṇīyam*⁸ *idaṃ matam*
kiṃ tv anya-jīva-bhāvena: tathā śāstra-prasiddhitāḥ

Ce n'est pas parce que la (viande) fait part d'un être vivant que nous ne la considérons pas kascher, mais parce qu'il y a d'autres âmes que celle à qui appartenait la viande, car c'est l'Écriture sainte qui nous en donne ainsi la preuve.

Anyajīva-bhāvena māṃsa-svāmi-vyātikṛta-prāṇi-samutpādena hetunā (T 64b 10). Alors Jin. continue "la cause (de l'interdiction de manger de la viande), c.à.d. la connexion étroite de chair et âme, est bien connue dans l'Āgama", ce qu'il exprime <en citant le vers>⁹: "dans des morceaux de viande crus ainsi que bien cuits on dit qu'il y a toujours une présence d'âmes *nioya*.¹⁰ Pourtant, ce n'est pas une citation canonique que plutôt une provenant d'une autre oeuvre (sous le nom) de Haribhadra.

5. *bhikṣu-māṃsa-niṣedho 'pi na cāivaṃ yujyate kvacit*
asthy-ādy api ca bhakṣyaṃ syāt prāṇy-aṅgatvāviśeṣataḥ

De cette façon, il n'est pas convenable d'interdire de manger de la chair d'un moine, alors que ses os etc. sont kascher, parce qu'ils ne représentent qu'une part d'un être vivant, car il n'y a pas de différence entre le tout et la part.

Bhikṣu: bhikṣor Bauddha-viśeṣasya (T 65a 2).

Bhikṣu-māṃsa-n: *sa kila bhavan-matena bhikṣor atipūjyātvād avaśyaṃ yukto bhavati, so 'pi, āstāṃ gavādi-māṃsa-niṣedhaḥ* (T 65a 2 sq.).

6. *etāvan-mātra-sāmyena pravṛttir yadi cēsyate,*
jāyāyāṃ sva-jananyāṃ ca strītvāt tulyāiva sāstu te

Si donc, par cette similitude d'être part d'un être vivant, la pratique (de manger de la viande) est approuvée, de la même façon il vous faut traiter votre mère comme si elle était votre épouse parce qu'elles sont toutes deux des femmes.

Tulyāiva: samānāiva, abhigama-rūpā pūjā-rūpā vā (T 65a 12 sq.).

Te: tava, c.à.d. l'hyperscolastique adversaire de vs. 1.

7. *tasmāc chāstraṃ ca lokaṃ ca samāśritya vaded budhaḥ*
sarvatrāivaṃ budhatvaṃ syād anyathānāmatta-tulyatā.

En s'appuyant donc aussi bien sur l'Écriture sainte que sur le droit coutumier un homme sage peut dire qu'il faut ainsi toujours garder la prudence, autrement une similitude peut devenir ridicule.

En illustration de la vérité de ce vers, Jin. en cite un autre.¹¹

8. *śāstre cāptena vo 'py etan-niṣiddhaṃ yatnato nanu*
Laṅkāvatāra-sūtrādaḥ tato 'nena na kiṃcana!

Mais la (consommation de la viande) n'a-t-elle pas été défendue avec fermeté, aussi par votre autorité religieuse dans une Écriture sainte, par exemple dans le *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*? Pour cette raison, finissez de (manger de la viande)!

Laṅkā°: *niśā-cara-vinayanāya Laṅkāyām avatāraḥ sūtryate Tathāgatasya ... tad-ādau tatra kilōktaḥ*: “*na prāṇy-aṅga-samutthamḥ mohād api śaṅkha-cūrṇam aśnīyāt*” (Ṭ 65b 11 sq.). Pas contenue dans le *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* abrégé que nous avons aujourd’hui,¹² cette citation faisait part peut-être d’une version plus longue. Cependant, dans le ch. 8 de notre *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* intitulé *Māṃsa-bhakṣaṇa-parivarta* “le Buddha” prohibe comme on sait la consommation de la viande. – *Ādau*: *śīlapaṭalādi-parigrahaḥ* (Ṭ *ibidem*). Le *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* mentionne, à part lui-même, quatre autres textes dans lesquels le Buddha aurait désapprouvé le non-végétarisme: *Hasti-kakṣya*, *Mahāmegha*, *Nirvāṇa*¹³ et *Āṅgulimālīka* (ch. 8, p. 258, vs. 16).¹⁴

aṣṭaka 18

1. *anyo ’vimrśya śabdārtham nyāyyam svayam udiritam*
pūrvāpara-viruddhārtham evam āhātra vastuni

Un autre (hétérodoxe), sans avoir considéré le sens étymologique du mot (“viande”) qu’il a prononcé lui-même, émet son opinion à ce sujet comme suit, mais il ne parvient qu’à se contredire dans l’une et l’autre (stance):

Anyah: pūrvam pūrva-pakṣi-kṛta-bauddhād aparō dvijaḥ (Ṭ 66a 5), c.à.d. *Manu*.

2. *na māṃsa-bhakṣaṇe doṣo na madye na ca maithune –*
pravṛttir eṣā bhūtānām –, nivṛttis tu mahā-phalā

Ni la consommation de viande ni celle d’alcool pas plus que les rapports charnels ne sont des fautes – celles-ci sont le penchant à voir des êtres –, mais s’en abstenir est très méritoire.

3. *mām sa bhakṣayitrāmutra, yasya māṃsam ihādmy aham*
etan māṃsasya māṃsatvam pravādanti manīṣiṇaḥ

Celui (sa) duquel je mange la chair (*māṃsa*), moi, dans ce monde -ci, me (*mām*) mangera de sa part dans l’autre monde. Voilà l’étymologie de *māṃsa* que prononcent les savants.

Cf. *Mahābhārata* 13, 117, 34:

mām sa bhakṣayate yasmād, bhakṣayiṣye tam apy aham;
etan māṃsasya māṃsatvam ato budhyasva, Bhārata!

Ces deux strophes proviennent de la *Manusmṛti* 5, 56-57.¹⁵

4. *ittham janmāiva doṣo ’tra; na śāstrād bāhya-bhakṣaṇam*
pratyāīṣa niṣedhaś ca nyāyyo vākyaṅtarād gateḥ

Sous cet angle la naissance même est alors une faute. Manger (de la viande) n’est pas une activité qui ne se trouve pas dans l’Ecriture sainte, mais (ca) une prohibition à ce sujet est reconnue comme juste, sauf exception d’un autre passage (de l’Ecriture).

Itthaṃ: bhakṣakasya bhakṣaṇīyatva-prāpti-lakṣaṇena (Ṭ 66b 11).

Janma: semble porter sur *iha* (str. 3).

Doṣo: dūṣaṇam, anarthāvāptir ity arthaḥ (Ṭ 66b 12).

Atra: māṃsa-bhakṣaṇe (Ṭ *ibidem*).

Vākyāntarāt: na māṃsa-bhakṣaṇe doṣaḥ ity evaṃ vidhāt sāmānyata eva māṃsādana-doṣābhāva-pratipādana-parād vākyād; yad anyat “prokṣitaṃ bhakṣayet” ity-ādi vākṣyamānaṃ vā vākyam, tad vākyāntaram. Tasmāt, “gateḥ” paricchitṭeḥ. Śāstrōktatvena māṃsādana-viśeṣasya nirdoṣatayāvagamād ity arthaḥ (Ṭ 67a 6 sqq.).

5. *prokṣitaṃ bhakṣayen māṃsaṃ brāhmaṇānāṃ ca kāmīyā yathā-vidhi-niyuktas tu prāṇānāṃ eva vātyaye*

c = 7a

Et d'après l'intention des brahmanes, l'officiant régulier (du sacrifice) peut toutefois manger la viande consacrée aux prix même de la vie (des animaux).

Jin. cite de *Manu* les *śloka* 3, 268cd jusqu'à 271ab¹⁶ (où sont énumérés les animaux qui sacrifiés servent de nourriture aux âmes des défunts pendant une certaine période) et de *Yājñavalkya* 1,109.¹⁷ Je n'ai pu repérer la citation *sarvata evātmānaṃ gopayet* (Ṭ 67b 3).

6. *atrāivāsāv a-doṣaś cen, nivṛttir nāsya sajyate anyadābhakṣaṇād atrābhakṣaṇe doṣa-kīrtanāt*

Si quant à la (consommation) même (de viande consacrée) celui-ci (c.à.d. l'"hyperscolastique") est innocent, son abstention de celle est une réussite, puisque si un jour il cesse de manger de la (viande consacrée), cette abstention est qualifiée de fautive.

Asya: māṃsa-bhakṣaṇasya (Ṭ 67b 9).

Sajyate: prāpnoti (*ibid.*) Apparemment une expression idiomatique JHS, cf. *na sajyate* dit de flèches "nicht stecken bleiben an, durchboren, hindurchfliegen" (pwb) et allemand "ein durchschlagender Erfolg".

Abhakṣaṇāt: ukta-vidhi-vyatikreṣṭa hi māṃsaṃ na bhakṣyate ato māṃsa-bhakṣaṇasyāprāpter nivṛttir nāsya prasajyate ity ucyate "prāptir pūrvako hi niṣedhaḥ sa-phalo bhavati".

Doṣa-kīrtanāt: dūṣaṇābhīdhānāt (Ṭ 67b 13).

7. *yathā-vidhi-niyuktas tu yo māṃsaṃ nātti vai dvijaḥ sa pretya paśutām yāti sambhavān eka-viṃśatim*
a = 5c; – cf. *Manu* 5, 35:

*niyuktas tu yathā-nyāyaṃ yo māṃsaṃ nātti mānavah
sa pretya paśutām yāti etc.*

Le brahmane officiant régulier (du sacrifice), qui ne mange nonobstant pas de viande, renaît après son décès à l'état d'animal pendant vingt et une existences.

Tu: le fait que *Manu* oblige les prêtres à manger de la viande de la victime sous peine de renaissances animales jette déjà le doute sur une certaine aversion qu'éprouvait une part du clergé brahmanique pour le sacrifice sanglant.

Ekaviṃśatim: cp. *Manu* 4, 166 où il est dit que celui qui, de colère, frappe un brahmane même avec un brin d'herbe renaîtra vingt et une fois dans un ventre ignoble.

8. *pārivrājyaṃ nivṛttiś ced – yas tad-apratipattitah,
phalābhāvaḥ sa evāśya doṣo, nirdoṣatāiva na!*

Si l'abstention de la consommation de viande équivalait à l'état d'ascète mendi-ant – l'inefficacité même du non-végétarisme) qui suit l'impuissance d'observer cette (règle) est une faute, pas du tout un état idéal.

Nirdoṣatāiva na: "l'hyperscolastique" était d'avis: *na māṃsa-bhakṣaṇe doṣaḥ*.

Abbreviations

pwb: von Böhtlingk, O., *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in Kuerzerer Fassung* (St. Petersburg, 1879-1889).

R.-F.: Renou, L. et Filliozat, J., *L'Inde classique I-II*. (Paris, 1947-1953).

SL: Schubring, W., *Die Lehre der Jainas* (Berlin, 1935).

SNR: Stchoupak, N., Nitti, L., Renou, L., *Dictionnaire sanskrit-français* (Paris, 1932).

Notes

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1. A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*. (2nd. rev. ed., Delhi, 1980), p. 42. (avec renvoi à W. Schubring, *The Doctrine of the Jainas*, Delhi, 1962, §16)

2. L. Alsdorf, "Beiträge zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien", *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz. Abh. der Geistes- und Sozialwiss.* Kl. Jg. 1961. Heft 6, p. 565 sqq.; puis J.C. Jain, *Life in Ancient India as Depicted in the Jain Canon and Commentaries* (Delhi, 1984), p. 171, *ubi alia*.

3. Voir W. Bollée, *Studien zum Sūyagaḍa II* (Stuttgart, 1988), p. 144 sqq., *ubi alia*.

4. H. Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India-China-Tibet-Japan* (Honolulu, 1964), p. 57 ff.

5. Cp. *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 256 vs.1 *madyaṃ māṃsaṃ palāṇḍuṃ na bhakṣayeyaṃ mahā-mune*.

6. Cp. quant aux Jaina, *Ohanijjuttī* (Bhavnagar, 1957), vs. 369; et, en général, J. von Negelein, *Weltgeschichte des Aberglaubens II* (Berlin, 1935), p. 264 ("eau de mille fleurs").

7. *Gavāṃ kṣīraṃ mūtraṃ vā peyatayā śāstre loke ca na niṣidhyate, rudhi ra-māṃse tu nānu-manyete* (64b 4 sq.).

8. Notre *pothī* lit: *bhakṣaṇīyantvim idam*.

9. Appelé *śloka* par Jin. (64b 13).

10. *āmāsu ya pakkāsu ya vipaccamāṇāsu māṃsa-pesīsu
sayayaṃ ciya uvavāo bhaṇio nigoya-jīvāṇaṃ*

(*Sambodhaprakaraṇa*. Bombay, 1916, p. 44a str. 75)

C'est après ce texte que j'ai corrigé une corruption du nôtre, c.à.d. *āyantiyaṃ* (sanskritisé *ātyantikam*!) *uvavāo* (...). Cette citation se trouve aussi dans le commentaire *ad* Hemacandra, *Yogaśāstra* 3, 33, où la source est à ajouter dans la belle édition du Munirāja Jambūvijaya (Bombay, 1981).

Pour les *niōya-jīva* voir SL. §104.

11. *satāṃ pathā pravṛttasya tejo-vṛddhī raver iva yad-ṛcchayā pravṛttasya rūpa-nāśo 'sti vāyuvat* (T 65b 6 sq.)
 "De celui qui poursuit sur la voie des vertueux l'énergie s'augmente comme celle du soleil, tandis que celui qui agit sans circonspection perd sa forme comme le vent".
12. D.T. Suzuki, (*The Lankavataraśūtra*, London, 1932) dit dans sa note sur le ch. 8 que ceci est la version la plus brève par rapport aux trois traductions chinoises et une addition postérieure au texte.
13. Un texte de ce nom ne se trouve pas dans P. Pfandt, *Mahāyāna Texts Translated into Western Languages* (Bonn, 1983), ou dans d'autres sources à ma disposition.
14. Ce passage a été cité dans le *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 133. Sur la consommation de viande par les moines bouddhistes voir E. Washburn Hopkins, "The Buddhistic Rule Against Eating Meat", *JAOS* 27, 2 (1907), pp. 455-465, et D.Seyfort Ruegg, "Ahimsā and Vegetarianism in the History of Buddhism" in S. Balsooriya et al. (edd.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Wal-pola Rahula*. London, 1980, pp. 234-241.
15. Dans son *Yogaśāstra* 3, 26ab, Hemacandra cite *Manu* 5, 57ab tandis que *Manu* 5, 56 est cité dans le commentaire *ad* *Yogaśāstra* 3, 25.
16. Avec *aurabhreṇṇha* au lieu de **eṇātha*; *śākunena tu* au lieu de *śākunenātha*; (269) *pārṣatīyena* pour *pārṣatena ca*; *śaukareṇa* pour *rauraveṇa*; (270) *kūrma-śaśaka-māṃsena* pour *śaśa-kūrmayos tu māṃsena*.
17. Avec *śrotriyāya prakalpayet* pour *śrotriyāyōpakalpayet*.

Ministering to the Sick and Counselling the Terminally Ill

Lily de Silva

“He who attends on the sick attends on me” declared the Buddha, exhorting his disciples on the importance of administering to the sick. This famous statement was made by the Buddha when he discovered a monk lying in his soiled clothes, desperately ill with an acute attack of dysentery. With the help of Ānanda, Buddha washed and cleaned the sick monk in warm water. On this occasion he reminded the monks that they have neither parents nor relatives to look after them, that they must look after one another. If the teacher is ill, it is the bounden duty of the pupil to look after him, and if the pupil is ill, it is the teacher’s turn to look after the sick pupil. If a teacher or a pupil is not available, it is the community’s duty to look after the sick.¹

On another occasion² the Buddha discovered a monk who was covered with sores, his robe sticking to the body with pus oozing from the sores. Unable to look after him his fellow monks had abandoned him. On discovering him the Buddha boiled water and washed the monk with his own hands, and cleaned and dried his robes. When the monk felt comforted Buddha preached to him and he became an *arahant*, soon after which the monk attained *parinibbāna*. Thus the Buddha not only advocated the importance of looking after the sick, he also set a noble example by himself administering to the helplessly sick who were even considered repulsive by others.

Buddha has spelt out the qualities that should be present in a good nurse. He should be competent to administer medicine; he should know what is agreeable to the patient and what is not. He should keep away what is disagreeable and give only what is agreeable to the patient. He should be benevolent and kind-hearted; he should perform his duties out of a sense of service and not just for the sake of remuneration (*mettacitto gilānaṃ upaṭṭhāti no āmisantaro*). He should not be repelled by saliva, phlegm, urine, stools, sores etc. He should be capable of exhorting and stimulating the patient with noble ideas, with *dhamma* talk.³

Here it is noteworthy that the nurse expected to be efficient not only in taking care of the body by giving proper food and medicine, but he is also expected to take care of the patient’s mental condition. It is well known that the kindness of doctors of nurses is almost as effective as medicine for the patient’s morale and recovery. When one is desperately ill or helpless, a kind word or a gentle act becomes the source of comfort and hope. This is why benevolence (*mettā*) and compassion

(*karuṇā*) which are also sublime emotions (*brahmavihāra*) are regarded as praiseworthy qualities in a nurse. The *sutta* adds another dimension to the nursing profession by including the spiritual element to a nurse's talk. Sickness is a time when one is face to face with the realities of life and it is a good opportunity to instil a sense of spiritual urgency even to the most materialistic mind. Further, the fear of death is naturally greater when a person is ill. The best means of calming this fear is by diverting attention to *dhamma*. A nurse is expected to give this spiritual guidance to the patient in his charge as part and parcel of his duty.

In the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*,⁴ Buddha describes three types of patients. There are patients who do not recover whether they get proper medication and nursing care or not, there are others who recover irrespective of whether they get medical and nursing care or not, and there are others who recover only with appropriate medical treatment and care. Because there is this third type of patient, all those who are ill should be given the best of medical treatment available, agreeable food and proper nursing care. So long as a patient is alive, everything possible should be done for his recovery.

According to another *sutta* in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*,⁵ illness is one of the inevitables in life. When faced with it, all resources available to one, even magical incantations, should be utilised with the hope of restoring health. Here the question of whether such performances are effective or not is not discussed. The spirit seems to be that at the time of crisis there is no harm in trying out even methods which are traditionally held to be efficacious, but in which one does not necessarily have faith or belief. Of course, such methods should not clash with one's moral consciousness. If, in spite of these efforts, death does occur, then one has to accept it as a verdict of *kamma* with equanimity and philosophical maturity.

Here we are reminded of an episode⁶ where a mother who was critically ill needed rabbit meat as a cure. The son finding that rabbit meat was not available in the open market went in search of a rabbit. He caught one but was loath to kill even for the sake of his mother. He let go of the rabbit and wished his mother well. The story goes on to relate that the power of the son's moral virtue brought about the mother's recovery. The Buddhist tradition seems to accept that moral power has healing properties superior to those of orthodox medicine.

The *Bhesajjakkhanda* of the *Vinaya Mahāvagga*⁷ shows that a number of minor *vinaya* rules were relaxed to accommodate the needs of the sick. Though a strict disciplinarian, the Buddha has shown great sympathy and understanding to those who are ill. The value of health has been fully realised, and it is even recognised as the greatest gain.⁸

It is recognised that the patient, too, should cooperate with the doctor and the nurse in order to get well. Such a good patient should take and do only what is agreeable to him. Even in taking agreeable food he should know the proper quantity. He should take the prescribed medicine without fuss. He should honestly

disclose his ailments to his duty-conscious nurse. He should bear with patience even excruciating physical pain.⁹

The *suttas* show that the Buddha has had great willpower and composure on occasions when he happened to fall ill. The Buddha experienced excruciating pain when a stone splinter pierced his foot when Devadatta hurled a stone at him. He endured such pain with mindfulness and self composure, and was not overpowered by it.¹⁰ During his last illness, too, the Buddha mindfully bore with great physical pain, and with admirable courage he walked from Pāvā to Kusinārā with his devoted attendant Ānanda, resting in a number of places to soothe his tired body.¹¹ The *Mahāparinibbānasutta*¹² also reports that the Buddha willfully suppressed a grave illness once in Beluvagāma, and regained health. It seems possible for those who are highly developed mentally to suppress illness at least on certain occasions. Once Nakulapitā visited the Buddha in old age, and Buddha advised him to remain mentally healthy even when feeble of body.¹³ There is physical and mental pain (*dve vedanā kāyikañ ca cetasikañ ca*). If, when one has physical pain, one gets worried and adds mental pain, too, it is like being shot with two arrows.¹⁴ One who is spiritually evolved will be capable of keeping the mind healthy proportionate to his spiritual development. As an *arahant* is fully developed spiritually, he is capable of experiencing physical pain only, without getting mentally involved (*so ekaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati na cetasikaṃ*).¹⁵

A number of *suttas* advocate the recitation of *bojjhaṅga* for the purpose of healing physical ailments. On two occasions,¹⁶ when Mahākassapa and Mahāmoggallāna were ill, the Buddha recited the *bojjhaṅgas* and it is reported that the monks regained normal health. It is perhaps significant to note that all the monks in question were *arahants*, and had therefore developed the *bojjhaṅgas* fully. The *Bojjhaṅgasamyutta*¹⁷ also reports that when the Buddha was ill once, he requested Cunda to recite the *bijjhaṅgas*. The Buddha was pleased at the recitation (*SamanuññoSatthā ahoṣi*) and it is said that he regained health. According to the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*¹⁸ Girimānanda was very ill once, and Buddha informed Ānanda that if a discourse on *dasa saññā* is delivered to him there is a possibility that he would get well. The *dasa saññā* are the perception of impermanence, egolessness, impurity of the body, evil consequences (of sense pleasures), elimination (of sense pleasures), detachment, cessation, disenchantment with the entire world, impermanence of all component things and mindfulness of the breath. Ānanda learnt the discourse from the Buddha, and repeated it for Girimānanda, and it is reported that he recovered.

According to the *Salāyatanasamyutta*,¹⁹ once Buddha heard that a newly ordained monk, who was not very well known among his fellows was very ill, and visited him. When the latter saw the Buddha approaching him, he stirred in his bed and tried to get up. But Buddha cautioned him not to get up and said that there were seats around and he could sit down. Having taken a seat, Buddha enquired

after his health, whether the pain was decreasing or increasing. The monk replied that he was feeling very ill and weak, and that his pains were increasing. Buddha then enquired whether he had any misgivings or remorse. The monk replied that he had plenty of misgivings and remorse. Buddha then asked whether he reproached himself for any breach of virtue. He said no. Then Buddha questioned him as to why he should feel remorseful if there was no guilt on account of a breach of virtue. The monk replied that the Buddha did not preach the doctrine for purity of virtue. Buddha asked him for what purpose the *dhamma* was preached. He replied that the Buddha preached *dhamma* for detachment from lust (*rāga-virāgaṭṭhāya*). Greatly pleased, Buddha exclaimed *Sādhu Sādhu* in approbation. Buddha then went on to preach the doctrine to the monk. He explained that the sense faculties were impermanent, unsatisfactory and egoless, therefore they should not be considered as “I” or “mine.” Understanding their true nature the noble disciple will get disenchanted with sense faculties. When this explanation of *dhamma* was being given, the vision of truth (*dhammacakkhu*) dawned upon the monk; he realised that whatever had the nature of arising, necessarily had also the nature of cessation. In other words, he became a *sotāpanna*, a stream enterer.

According to the *Sotāpattisaṃyutta*,²⁰ Anāthapiṇḍika was very ill once, and at his request Sāriputta visited him. On being told that the pains were excruciating and increasing, Sāriputta delivered a *dhamma* discourse reminding Anāthapiṇḍika of his own virtues. Sāriputta explained that the uninstructed worldling who has no faith in *Buddha*, *dhamma*, and *saṅgha*, and has not cultivated noble moral habits reaches a state of woe in the destruction of his body. But on the contrary, Anāthapiṇḍika had unshakable conviction in the *Buddha*, *dhamma*, and *saṅgha*, and cultivated noble moral habits. Sāriputta exhorted that when these noble qualities were mindfully appreciated the pain would subside. Further, Sāriputta pointed out that uninstructed worldlings reach a state of woe on the disintegration of the body, as they have not cultivated the noble eight fold path. But, on the contrary, Anāthapiṇḍika has cultivated the noble eight fold path. When attention is paid to them, and the noble qualities are appreciated, the pains will subside. It is reported that the pains subsided and Anāthapiṇḍika recovered from that illness. So much so that Anāthapiṇḍika got out of bed and served Sāriputta with the meal that was prepared for himself.

The *Sotāpattisaṃyutta*²¹ records an account of another occasion when Anāthapiṇḍika was ill. Ānanda was summoned to the bedside and he delivered a *dhamma* discourse. Ānanda explained that uninstructed men who have no faith in *Buddha*, *dhamma*, and *saṅgha*, and who are given to immoral habits are seized with trepidation at the approach of death. But the noble disciple who has deep conviction in the *Buddha*, *dhamma*, and *saṅgha*, and who has cultivated moral habits, does not experience the fear of death. Anāthapiṇḍika then expressed unshakeable conviction in *Buddha*, *dhamma*, and *saṅgha*, and declared that he was endowed with the spotless virtue of a householder. Ānanda exclaimed that it

was indeed a great gain that Anāthapiṇḍika has disclosed the attainment of the fruit of stream entry. However, it is not reported if Anāthapiṇḍika recovered straight away.

A *sutta* in the *Anguttara Nikāya*²² recommends that a monk should not relax his energy and determination for spiritual progress even when he is ill. It is possible that the illness will become more serious, and before that happens care should be taken to advance spiritually as much as possible. After recovering from an illness, too, one should not be negligent because, should there be a relapse, the chances of gaining higher spiritual attainments will become less.

The Buddhist method of administering to the sick, as is evident from the Canonical *suttas* cited above, seems to attach great importance not only to proper medical and nursing care, but also to diverting the mind of the patient towards wholesome thoughts. There seems to be a belief that attention paid to doctrinal topics, especially the recitation of virtues which one has already cultivated in one's personality, is endowed with healing properties. In the case of the Buddha and *arahants* the recitation of *bojjhaṅgas* has restored normal health. In the case of the monk Girimānanda, who was probably not an *arahant* at the time of his illness, it was a discourse on *dasa saññā* that restored his good health. Anāthapiṇḍika was a *sotāpanna* and a discussion on the special qualities of a *sotāpanna* was instrumental for his speedy recovery. It may be that when one is reminded of the spiritual qualities one has already cultivated in one's personality, great joy must be arising in the mind. Such joy is perhaps capable of altering the body's chemistry in a positive manner. Here we are reminded of a relevant episode contained in the *Papañcasūdanī*.²³ A monk while listening to the *dhamma* was bitten by a snake. He ignored the snake bite and continued to listen. The venom spread and the pain became acute. He then reflected on the unblemished purity of his virtuous conduct (*sīla*) from the time of his higher ordination. Great joy and satisfaction arose within him when he realised the spotless nature of his character. The healthy psychological change as an anti-venom and he was immediately cured. These episodes seem to reveal that when attention is drawn to one's spiritual qualities at times of serious illness, and pious joy wells up in the mind thereby, health promoting factors get activated in the body, perhaps by way of the secretion of health-restoring hormones. That may be the mechanism by which spiritually advanced individuals regain health when appropriate *suttas* are recited.

There is much material in the Pāli Canon on counselling the terminally ill. Speaking about death is not avoided as an unpleasant topic near a terminally ill patient. On the contrary, its reality and perhaps imminence is accepted without any pretense and the patient is made to face it with confidence and tranquility. The advice given by Nakulamātā to Nakulapitā is extremely valuable for our discussion.

Once Nakulapitā²⁴ was seriously ill and Nakulamātā noticed that he was anxious and worried. She advised him thus: please sir, do not face death with anxiety.

Painful is death for one who is anxious. Buddha has looked down upon death with anxiety. It may be, you are anxious because I may not be able support the family after your death. Please do not think so. I am capable of spinning and weaving, and I will be able to bring up the children even if you are no more. Perhaps you are worried that I shall remarry after your death. Please do not think so. We both led pure wholesome lives according to the noble conduct of householders. So do not entertain any anxiety on that account. It may be, you are worried that I shall neglect attending on the Buddha and the *saṅgha*. Please do not think so. I shall be more devoted to the Buddha and the *saṅgha* after your death. Perhaps you are worried that I shall neglect keeping to the precepts. Please do not have any worry on that account. I am one of those who fully practise the moral habits declared for the laity and, if you wish, please ask the Buddha about this matter. Perhaps you fear that I have not gained inner mental composure. Please do not think so. I am one of those who have gained inner mental composure as much as a householder could gain. If you have any doubts about this, the Buddha is at Bhesakalāvana, ask him. Perhaps it occurred to you that I have not attained proficiency in the Buddha's dispensation, that I have not gone beyond doubt and perplexity without depending on another. If you wish to have these matters clarified, ask the Buddha. But please do not face death with anxiety, for it is painful and censured by the Buddha. It is reported that after Nakulapitā was thus admonished by Nakulamātā, he regained his health, and gone was that illness never to arise again. Later on, this incident was narrated to the Buddha, and Buddha commended Nakulamātā for her sagacious advice.

The *Sotāpattisaṃyutta*²⁵ contains a valuable discourse on the question of counselling the terminally ill. Once Mahānāma the Śākyan enquired from the Buddha how a wise layman should advise another wise layman who is terminally ill. (*Sappaññena upāsakena sappañño upāsako ābādhito dukkhito bālhagilāno ovaditabbo*). Here it should be noted that both the counsellor and the patient are wise lay Buddhists. Buddha delivered a whole discourse on how this should be done: First of all, a wise layman should comfort a wise layman who is terminally ill with the four assurances: Be comforted friend, you have unshakable confidence in the Buddha, the *dharmma* and the *saṅgha*, that the Buddha is fully enlightened, the *dharmma* is well proclaimed and the *saṅgha* is well disciplined. You have also cultivated unblemished virtuous conduct which is conducive to concentration. Having thus comforted the patient with the four assurances he should ask him whether he has any longings for his parents. If he says yes, it should be pointed out that death will certainly come whether he has longing for his parents or not. Therefore it is better to give up the longing. Then, if he says he gives up his longing for parents, he should be asked whether he has any longing for his wife and children. With the same reasoning as above he should be persuaded to give up that longing, too. Then he should be asked whether he has any longing for the pleasures of the senses. If he says yes, then he should be convinced that divine pleasures are

superior to human pleasures. He should be encouraged to be determined on divine pleasures. Then he should be gradually led on the scale of divine pleasures, and when he comes to the highest heaven of the *kāmāvacara* sphere, his attention should be diverted to the *brahma* world. If he says he has made up his mind on the attainment of the *brahma* world, he should be admonished that even the *brahmaloka* is characterised by impermanence and the rebirth personality. Therefore, it is better to be determined on the cessation of the rebirth personality. If he can establish his mind on the cessation of the rebirth personality, then, Buddha says, there will be no difference between him and the monk who is liberated.

This, undoubtedly, is the highest form of counselling that can be given to a highly advanced person who is terminally ill by a spiritually equally advanced person. It is very clear from the discourse that the patient must be one who is as advanced as a *sotāpanna*, as the four assurances, or the consoling factors mentioned at the very beginning of the discourse are identical with the qualities of a *sotāpanna*.

The *Cittasamyutta*²⁶ contains an interesting episode of the near-death experience of a spiritually advanced lay disciple. Citta the householder was an *anāgāmi*²⁷ and was terminally ill. Then a group of sylvan deities invited Citta to set his mind on becoming a universal monarch (*cakkavattirāja*) because the aspirations of the virtuous do come to pass. He refused, saying that that, too, is impermanent. Though lying on his deathbed, he admonished the relatives who had assembled round him on the importance of cultivating faith in the Buddha, *dhamma* and *saṅgha*, and on the importance of charity and passed away.

According to the *Sotāpattisamyutta*,²⁸ Buddha visited the bedside of Dīghāvu, the lay disciple, who was terminally ill. Buddha advised him to fix his attention on unwavering confidence in the noble qualities of the Buddha, *dhamma* and *saṅgha*, and to will that he be endowed with spotless virtuous conduct. Dīghāvu replied that these qualities of a stream-enterer were already found in him. Then the Buddha advised him to be established in those virtues and develop the six qualities conducive to understanding, namely the perception of the impermanence of all component things, the unsatisfactoriness of all that is impermanent, the ego-lessness of what is unsatisfactory, the perception of elimination, detachment and cessation. Dīghāvu replied that these qualities, too, were found in him, but he was concerned that his father will be sad when he dies. Then Jotipāla, his father advised him not to be worried on that account, but to pay heed to what the Buddha said. The Buddha, having admonished him, left and Dīghāvu died soon after. Later, Buddha pronounced that Dīghāvu died as an *anāgāmi*.

According to the *Dhanañjānisutta*,²⁹ Dhanañjāni was an unscrupulous tax collector who exploited both the king and the public. Sāriputta met him once, and exhorted him on the evil consequences of an unrighteous life. Shortly thereafter, Dhanañjāni was seriously ill and Sāriputta was summoned to his bedside. On being enquired of his health, Dhanañjāni informed Sāriputta that he had an

unbearable headache. Sāriputta then engaged him in a *dhamma* conversation gradually drawing his attention from lower to higher realms of existence. Sāriputta asked: "which of the two forms of existence is better, hell or the animal kingdom?" Dhanañjāni replied that the animal kingdom was better. "Which is better, the animal kingdom or the *peta* world?" The *peta* world was better. "Which is better, the *peta* world or the human world?" The human world was better. In this manner the conversation continues through the *Cātummahārāja*, *Tāvativamsa*, *Yāma*, *Tusita*, *Nimmānaratti*, *Paranimittavasavatti* and *brahma* worlds. Having thus diverted the attention of the near-death patient to the *brahma* world, Sāriputta went on to explain the path leading to the attainment of the *brahma* world, namely the full development of the *brahmavihāras*, *mettā*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā* to suffuse all quarters. At the end of the discourse Dhanañjāni requested Sāriputta to convey his respects to the Buddha. Sāriputta departed, and shortly afterwards Dhanañjāni died. It is reported that he was reborn in the *brahma* world. Later, when the matter was related to the Buddha, he found faults with Sāriputta for not having led Dhanañjāni further along the spiritual path.

This *sutta* shows that even a man who has been unscrupulous in his dealings could be guided to a happier rebirth by counselling during the crucial period just prior to death. It is highly doubtful whether any and every evildoer could thus be guided for rebirth in a happy realm. Perhaps Dhanañjāni's good qualities outweighed his evil deeds and so it was possible to lead him to rebirth in a happy state by counsel offered by a noble *arahant* at the hour of death.

That this may have been the case can be inferred from the facts reported in the *sutta*.³¹ Sāriputta made a point of enquiring about Dhanañjāni's spiritual zeal, soon after enquiring about the Buddha's health, from a monk coming from Rājagaha, when he himself was touring far away in Dakkhināpatha. It is very likely that Dhanañjāni was a faithful patron of the *saṅgha* when his first wife, who was a lady full of faith, was still alive. His second wife was a faithless woman. When Sāriputta heard that Dhanañjāni was negligent he was dismayed, and made up his mind to talk to Dhanañjāni should the occasion arise to meet him.

Another noteworthy feature of this discourse is that Sāriputta starts the discourse from the lowest level of existence, and works upwards as far as the *brahma* world. Perhaps he started from the *niraya* level because Dhanañjāni had deteriorated to that level. Sāriputta may have helped to remind him of his former good deeds, and also draw his attention to a relevant *dhamma* discourse Sāriputta had delivered to him perhaps just a few days prior to his illness. Thus, by drawing on the spiritual potential that was hidden in him, Sāriputta may have been able to help him attain a happy rebirth by last minute counselling.

Here we are reminded of the episode of the young Maṭṭakuṇḍali.³² When he was lying on his deathbed, Buddha appeared and Maṭṭakuṇḍali, being greatly pleased, generated much faith in the Buddha. Dying soon after, he was born in a celestial realm.

A *sutta* in the *Sotāpattisaṃyutta*³³ maintains that when an uninstructed ordinary man at the threshold of death sees that he has no faith in the noble qualities of the Buddha, *dhamma* and *saṅgha*, and that he has led an immoral life, great fear of death and trepidation will arise in him. But a person who has deep unwavering faith in the noble qualities of the Buddha, *dhamma* and *saṅgha*, and who is spotlessly pure in his conduct will not experience such trepidation. It seems to be the guilty conscience that causes much anguish at the moment of death. When there is fear and anxiety at this crucial moment, rebirth must be taking place in a sphere that is commensurate with that experience of anguish.

It is appropriate to record here a relevant discussion, Mahānāma the Śākya had with the Buddha regarding the faith of one who meets with a violent death.³⁴ Mahānāma tells the Buddha that when he comes to the serene atmosphere of the monastery, and associates with pious monks of noble qualities, he feels quite calm and self-possessed. But when he goes out into the streets of Kapilavatthu, busy with constant traffic, he feels frightened what his future world would be in case he meets with a violent death in a traffic accident. Buddha assures him that a person who has cultivated moral habits and led a righteous life need not entertain such fears. He explains the situation with the help of a simile. If a pot of ghee is broken when submerged in water, the potsherds will sink to the riverbed but the ghee will come to the surface. Similarly, the body may disintegrate, but the cultured mind will rise up like the ghee.

It is the same idea that is emphasized in such *suttas* as *Saṅkhārupatti*,³⁵ *Kukkuravatika*³⁶ and *Tevijja*.³⁷ Rebirth depends on the thoughts that are entertained most during life. If one entertains thoughts and dispositions that are suitable for an animal, for a dog or a cow as given in the *Kukkuravatikasutta*, then there is the likelihood of the person being reborn among such animals, i.e. beings who have similar dispositions. If, on the other hand, one has entertained thoughts and dispositions comparable to those among the *brahmas*, by the cultivation of sublime emotions such as *mettā*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā*, there is the possibility of such a one being born among the *brahmas*. Therefore, preparation for death has to be undertaken while living. Even to be guided in thought to a higher rebirth when death is imminent, one has to have the prior requisite of having cultivated faith in the ideal of human virtue and understanding – for this is what is meant by having faith in the Buddha, *dhamma* and *saṅgha* – and having cultivated moral habits. If one lacks virtue, guidance of thought patterns at the hour of death to a higher level will be difficult to the extent that one is deficient. But, however difficult and effective the actual guidance may be, it is a Buddhist custom to invite a monk to the bedside of a terminally ill patient with the hope that chanting *paritta* will help the patient to develop faith and elevate his thoughts to a higher plane of spirituality.

We are reminded here that, according to the *Pārājikapāṭi*,³⁸ some previous Buddhas such as Vessabhū, whose dispensations did not last long, used to instruct their disciples, looking into their mental make-up with telepathic powers, guiding

their thought patterns, saying: "Think thus, do not think thus, pay attention thus, do not pay attention thus, give this up, develop this, etc." Perhaps this may be the technique used by Gotama Buddha and his eminent disciples to guide thought patterns of amenable adherents at the hour of death. They seem to have mainly used more general techniques with lengthy doctrinal discourses at other normal times in preference to guided meditation with insight into the thought pattern of individuals.

Perhaps it is possible to raise the question of how effective spiritual guidance will be if the terminally ill patient is unconscious. Here what is important is that we are unaware of the patient's mental condition at the hour of death. The doctors and onlookers might conclude that the patient is unconscious because he does not respond to the environment and to the questions put to him. It may be that some, or all, of his five faculties have become defunct, but nobody can be certain that his mental faculty is active or not. We certainly do not know what special potentialities the mind is capable of near the time of death. It is quite likely that the mental faculty is most active at this crucial hour. Perhaps this is the time one has the most violent mental struggle, yearning for life with the firm habitual resistance and protest against death. It is our conjecture that yearning for life is greatest when the fear of death is greatest. The fear of death is greatest when one's sense of guilt is greatest, that one has squandered the great opportunity of human life, an opportunity which could have been utilised for spiritual growth. If, on the other hand, one has well utilised the opportunity of human life for spiritual growth, one can face the inevitability of death with relatively calm contentment. One's rebirth seems to be commensurate with one's spiritual potential, which in Buddhist terminology is called *kamma*.

It would be appropriate to conclude this essay by giving thought to what we should do when we visit a terminally ill patient. Our normal attitude is one of sadness and pity. But we feel that it would be wrong to entertain negative thoughts at such a moment. It is our conjecture that it would be helpful to the terminally ill patient, indeed for any patient, if we radiated thoughts of *mettā*, loving kindness, to him. As the dying person's mind may be working at this crucial hour, unencumbered by the limitations imposed by physical sense faculties, it is possible that it will be sensitive and receptive to the spiritual thought waves of those around him. If negative thought waves are generated by grief and lamentation, it is equally possible that the dying person will be adversely affected.

Abbreviations

Pāli texts referred to are editions of the Pāli Text Society, London

- A *Āṅguttara Nikāya*
- D *Dīgha Nikāya*
- Dh *Dhammapada*
- Dh A *Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā*

M	<i>Majjhima Nikāya</i>
S	<i>Saṃyutta Nikāya</i>
Vin	<i>Vinaya Piṭaka</i>

Notes

1. Vin. I. 301 ff.
2. Dh A I. 319.
3. A. III. 144.
4. A. I. 120.
5. A. III. 56, 62.
6. *Majjhima Aṭṭhakathā*. I. 203.
7. Vin. I. 199 ff.
8. *ārogya-paramā lābhā*; Dh 204.
9. A. III. 144.
10. S.I. 27, 110.
11. D.II. 128, 134.
12. D.II. 99.
13. S.III. 1.
14. S.IV. 208.
15. S.IV. 209.
16. S.V. 79-80.
17. S.V. 81.
18. A. V. 109.
19. S.IV. 86.
20. S.V. 380.
21. S.V. 385.
22. A. IV. 335.
23. M A. I. 78.
24. A. III. 295-298.
25. S.V. 408.
26. S.IV. 302.
27. A. III. 451, Vsm 442.
28. S.V. 344.
29. M. II. 184-196.
30. Dh. 173.
31. M. II. 185.
32. Dh A. I. 26.
33. S.V. 386.
34. S.V. 369.
35. M. III. 99.
36. M. I. 387.
37. D.I. 235.
38. Vin. III. 8.

The Archaeology of Early Buddhism

George Erdosy

Introduction

With a rich corpus of texts at their disposal it is not surprising that students of early Buddhism have taken little notice of the archaeological record, especially since the latter, consisting of the large-scale clearances of the Marshall era (1902-1934) which lacked chronological control, and of recent excavations whose technical competence has been outweighed by a narrow concern with culture sequences, is hardly capable of revealing life in ancient India. Moreover, unlike texts which "feed directly into the modern structure of knowledge" (Kemp, 1984: 26), the residual patterns of material culture unearthed by excavations do not contain easily decipherable messages. This realisation was recently prompted by the emerging weaknesses of the hitherto dominant concept of archaeological culture, which held (after Childe, 1929) that recurring assemblages of artefacts constituted the basic units of study, whose distribution in space and time and correlation with (loosely defined) social groups admitted of historical interpretations. With the consequent disagreement among archaeologists regarding even fundamental issues of their discipline, it is little wonder that historians have shied away from the material evidence in settling their own controversies.

That said, the literary tradition of ancient India poses its own problems, not the least of which is the wide chronological gap separating the final composition of most texts from the period they purport to describe. In circumventing this issue, "a good deal of ancient Indian history seems to have been written on the principle that when good sources are lacking, bad sources become good." (Trautmann, 1971: 65). The moral-philosophical orientation of the available sources further compounds our difficulties; while D.D. Kosambi (1956, etc) has been correct in stressing that their lack of historical content is handsomely compensated for by a wealth of evidence on social institutions, the fact is that many students of ancient India persist in writing dynastic histories, and place an undue reliance on the historicity of traditional accounts, in particular Epic and Puranic literature. In such a situation even the limited findings of South Asian archaeology can test the accuracy of historical reconstructions: for example, it is clear from excavations that no city existed at the site of Ayodhyā in the 7th century BC in spite of its glowing description in the Rāmāyaṇa (Erdosy, 1988).

While historians of early Buddhism (e.g. Wagle, 1966) have been more careful in their analyses of the literature, and resisted the temptation to use the comparatively late but superficially informative accounts found, for example, in the Jātakas, their research has also left many questions unanswered, especially concerning the origins of Buddhism and the chronology of its early years. It is the contention of this paper that only the integration of archaeological sources into historical analyses can provide answers to these issues, and in what follows I shall attempt to demonstrate the utility of such an approach, first by outlining the material evidence for the background to the rise of Buddhism, and then by examining the problem of the date of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, recently rekindled by Bechert (1981). If a bias towards the consideration of archaeological data may be detected, it is because the latter have seldom been lucidly presented. By contrast, the literary sources are well-known, and need only be referred to in cases where my own interpretations differ from commonly accepted views.

The Archaeology of Northeastern India

The Neolithic and Chalcolithic periods

The homeland of Buddhism is clear from tradition: the Buddha was born in Lumbinī, attained enlightenment at Bodh Gayā, preached his first sermon at Sārnāth, and passed away on the outskirts of Kuśinagarī. All these settlements may be found in the modern states of eastern Uttar Pradesh (here taken to include the Nepal Tarai) and Bihar, corresponding chiefly to ancient Kośala and Magadha. The majority of places named in the Pāli Canon also fall within this area (K.T.S. Sarao, pers. comm.) that need only be extended slightly to the west to include the city of Kauśāmbī, which – along with its ruler Udayana – figures prominently in the early history of the faith. One of the major accomplishments of recent fieldwork in South Asia has been the discovery of a long history of settlement in this region, with important consequences for the interpretation of classical Indian civilisation.

It is clear today that, far from being the result of "Aryan" colonisation, the cities of the eastern Ganges Valley are rooted in the Neolithic-Chalcolithic settlements of the 3rd-2nd millennia BC.¹ Of these, Chirand in Bihar (See *Indian Archaeology – Review* (henceforth IAR) 1968-9 to 1972-3 esp), and Mahagara (Sharma, *et. al.* 1980) and Koldihwa (Misra, 1977) in the Vindhya, are the best documented. They represent an early stage in the evolution of complex societies. On the one hand, all of them are small villages. Mahagara measures a mere 0.8 hectares, other sites do not even extend to that. On the other, their layout (best observed at Mahagara: Sharma, *et. al.* 1980: Fig. MGR-1) shows that individual dwellings – circular huts of wattle and daub with floors of beaten earth – were clearly delineated, in contrast to the beehive pattern presented by huts of the preceding Mesolithic Period (*Ibid*: Figure CPM-1), and documents the emergence of (joint?) families as the primary

social unit. While the central location of the cattle-pen suggested to the excavators of Mahagara the continued communal ownership of this most valuable of resources, such an inference cannot at present be substantiated.

Differences in wealth may be seen from variations in the size and artefact content of individual dwellings. Huts range between 22 and 80 m² in size, and the largest one contains 70% of all cooking vessels, 66% of all querns, 30% of all storage jars, and 25% of all dining vessels found in the excavation (of 8 dwelling units), while another hut contains 43% of all microliths but only a small fraction of ceramics. While artefacts which may be taken to symbolise social status are few in number and relatively modest – restricted to a few beads and bangles of semi-precious stones, copper and terracotta – the beginnings of occupational specialisation and, perhaps, of status distinctions may thus be tentatively inferred. Unfortunately, the general absence of burials – commonly used as indicators of social stratification by archaeologists – handicaps further elucidation of this process, although it may be mentioned that a solitary example from the Chalcolithic level of Chirand (IB) yielded most of the objects which can be interpreted as status-markers, along with ground stone axes and microliths which might have been deposited to signify the sex or occupation of the deceased (IAR 1968-9: 5).

The economy supporting this social structure was a combination of hunting-gathering and agriculture. On the one hand, the rotation of crops is already indicated by the presence of both the principal winter and summer cereals of the Ganges Valley (wheat and barley *vs.* rice); most modern domesticates – sheep, goat, cattle and pigs – can be found in the faunal record; and, with the exception of iron tools, the technological basis of the economy has already attained a level not to be exceeded until the 20th century, as a wide range of bone, antler and stone implements (of both the Microlithic and Neolithic varieties) testifies. On the other hand, the bones of rhino, elephant, deer, chital, river turtle, fish, birds and molluscs attest to the continuing importance of hunting. Interestingly, the introduction of copper had no significant effects, the metal being restricted almost exclusively to jewellery and a few household items. Hence the traditional periodisation of Neolithic *vs.* Chalcolithic has little, other than chronological, relevance in the Ganges Valley. As already discussed (in Note 1), the sites of this period can be dated to the 3rd-2nd millennia BC, and are commonly recognised in surface surveys by their characteristic Black and Red, and Cord Impressed Wares.

The Early Iron Age

The next stage in the (pre-)history of the eastern Ganges Valley is marked by the appearance of iron smelting, although this innovation – like copper metallurgy – had little immediate impact on the economy, iron being utilised chiefly in weapons. The manner of the introduction of iron need not detain us here, though it may be mentioned that recent evidence (Erdosy in press) suggests the indigenous origin of iron smelting in Central and South India, as originally proposed by

Chakrabarti (1977). As regards the date of this development, radiocarbon measurements from Chirand (TF-336: 2640 ± 95 ; TF-444: 2590 ± 105), Mahisdal (TF-389: 2565 ± 105), Noh (TF-993: 2600 ± 150 ; TF-994: 2560 ± 100), and Sonpur (TF-376: 2510 ± 105) provide a consistent cluster of dates, and on this basis, the Early Iron Age of Northern India may be placed in the 10th-7th centuries BC. In the eastern Ganges Valley this period is best represented by Rajghat IA (Narain and Roy, 1976), Prahladpur IA (Narain and Roy, 1967), Śringaverpur II (Lal and Dikshit, 1981), and Narhan II (Singh and Lal, 1985), all of them producing the characteristic ceramic assemblage of Black and Red and Black Slipped Wares; further west, in the Doāb, sites producing Painted Grey Ware, such as Ahicchatrā II, Hastināpura II, Jakhera II and Atranjikhhera III belong here, although will not be discussed in this paper.

Although the range of excavated artefacts – and by inference economic life – differs little from that of the previous periods, it is now, that we see the first extensive colonisation of the alluvial plains. Even in the surveys of Allahabad and Kanpur Districts (Erdosy, 1988 and Lal, 1985), where visual coverage was limited, 16 and 46 sites were found, respectively, although none as yet were located away from the banks of rivers and lakes. However, the most important development of this period is the first sign of complex social organisation, namely, the emergence of a hierarchy of settlements. In my own survey of sites in Allahabad district (Erdosy, 1988) I noted that the site of Kauśāmbī, later to become one of the chief urban centres of northern India, already measured 10 hectares in 950-600 BC, based on the observation of surface remains, while other sites ranged between 0.42 and 2.80 hectares in size. This two-tier hierarchy has not as yet been observed elsewhere in the eastern Ganges Valley; that this is more likely the product of insufficient research than of the absence of large sites is suggested by the observation of a similar hierarchy in Haryana during the Painted Grey Ware phase (Bhan and Shaffer, 1978); here a site of 9.6 hectares may be contrasted with smaller settlements not exceeding 4.3 hectares. In another isolated example, the site of Ahicchatrā in the Pañcāla region, the heartland of Late Vedic civilisation according to the literary sources, may have already grown to 15-20 hectares, and careful survey of surface remains at other important sites is likely to confirm this picture. It may also be added that the preponderance of nucleated settlements, characteristic of much of the Ganges Valley (Ahmad, 1952), was already established and may, above all, reflect the political uncertainties accompanying the growth of complex societies.

From a study of the hinterland of Kauśāmbī it was concluded that proximity to the mineral-rich Vindhyan hills was a major influence on the location of this centre, which outweighed the poor quality of the agricultural land surrounding it. Since the procurement of raw materials in the alluvial plains was always a crucial activity, its organisation can be inferred to have played a major part in the emergence of complex societies. The similarly anomalous location of Rājagṛha supports this interpretation, and the site of Mathurā has also been observed to

straddle the boundary of two ecological zones (Dalal, 1980). Unfortunately, of all phases of the cultural evolution of the Ganges Valley the Early Iron Age is the least well documented. Consequently, we can only support the inference of social complexity with a single example of an elaborate structure, unearthed at Bhagwanpura (Bisht and Asthana, 1979), which – like the Chalcolithic burial at Chirand – contained the full range of potential status-markers: figurines, bangles and beads of terracotta, bangles and antimony rods of copper, and bangles and beads of glass and faience. We may note, in addition, that on the basis of archaeological parallels (particularly in Mesopotamia, see e.g. Wright, 1981) and ethnographic observation, a two-tier settlement hierarchy may be associated with chiefdoms, where the central place would above all act as a ceremonial centre. Given the importance of ritual in Late Vedic society (the historical equivalent to the Iron Age) we may expect sites such as Kauśāmbī to yield evidence of ceremonial structures upon careful excavation, but until such take place, all our interpretations must remain at the level of conjecture. We may, however, repeat that the evidence for increasing social complexity already exists, along with the major technological advance of iron smelting, even if the latter was as yet insufficiently exploited. It is on the back of these developments that the urban centres of subsequent periods were founded.

The first cities and states

For the 6th-4th centuries BC the archaeological record of the Ganges Valley shows dramatic changes. Most important of these is the appearance of an elaborate hierarchy of settlements, crowned with large, fortified sites. Due to the limited excavations of these sites – Kauśāmbī (Sharma, 1960, 1969), Kāśī (i.e. Rājghat; Narain and Roy, 1976-78), Rājagṛha, Ujjayinī (Bannerjee, 1960), Campā (Sinha, 1979) and Śrāvastī (Sinha, 1967) in particular – their nature remains somewhat enigmatic, since their large fortifications are seldom matched by impressive structural remains within, until the 3rd-2nd centuries BC (Erdosy, 1987). Nevertheless, the presence of a settlement hierarchy where sites of a higher order assume all the functions of smaller settlements in addition to some unique to themselves is a sufficient indicator of the emergence of cities and states. At the bottom of the ladder were villages, which housed agricultural producers; above them were minor centres which revealed traces of craft activities, and to whom an administrative function may also be attributed; next in scale were towns where a full compliment of manufacturing and trading activities was carried out; and at the top of the pyramid stood capital cities which, in addition to possessing all the functions of the smaller settlements, acted as the centres of political power (See Map 1). It is also interesting to observe that larger settlements tended to cluster in limited areas, where they were regularly distributed. This indicates the presence of highly centralised polities, which in the 6th-4th centuries BC occupied only limited areas and were separated by broad tracts of exclusively rural settlements. The overwhelming size of capital cities, which would agree with the literary evidence

for administrative organisation in the pre-Mauryan and Mauryan periods (Erdosy, 1988), supports this contention. Once again, the emergence of this hierarchy can only be fully documented in Allahabad District, although the presence of large, fortified settlements all over the Ganges Valley (See Map 2) shows that this was a widespread phenomenon.

In tune with these developments we may also observe a rapid rate of population growth; this was computed at .41% per annum for Allahabad District,² which may appear insignificant in comparison with modern rates of growth, but is exceptionally high for long-term growth rates in ancient times. Interestingly, much of it was absorbed in the larger settlements appearing for the first time; in fact this period shows population nucleation at its maximum, as in later periods the pattern appears to be the growth of population at the two extremes of the settlement hierarchy at the expense of sites of the middle ranks. Although settlements are still mostly rooted to riverbanks, the initial colonisation of the forested upland areas may have already taken place by the end of this period, spurred on, no doubt, by the need to feed a rapidly expanding population.

In the economic sphere the extensive utilisation of iron tools, in agricultural and household activities, may be noted for the first time, as remains of ploughshares, sickle-blades, axes, adzes, hoes, nails, knives and other implements were found at many sites. The large-scale production of such artefacts as ceramics and bone and iron objects at, for example, Rajghat and Ujjain, as well as the sophistication reflected in the jewellery moulds found at Campā and in the variety of beads of semi-precious stones, all attest to full-time craft-specialisation. As regards the organisation of economic activities, the ability to marshal labour for the erection of monumental architecture – the ramparts and moats of large settlements – suggests the presence of a centralised administration, which has already been inferred from the regional settlement pattern. Finally, the appearance of coinage during this period facilitated the extensive trade carried out within and without the Ganges Valley, which finds its reflection in the notably broadened horizons of the contemporary literature of the period. While the absence of elaborate architectural remains – with the exception of fortifications – up to the 3rd-2nd centuries BC suggests that urbanisation did not reach its maturity until the advent of the Mauryan Empire, society by the 6th-4th centuries appears sufficiently complex to require a major ideological readjustment, which seems to be represented by Buddhism itself, as well as support the demands of the emerging monastic institutions.

Conclusions

As our interest concerns the background to the rise of Buddhism, this summary of the archaeological evidence need not extend to subsequent periods. Instead, it may be useful to summarise at this stage the lessons one may draw from even this cursory survey of a severely limited data base. The most important conclusion

apparent to this observer is what has already been hinted at above; namely, that it is a great mistake to derive classical Indian civilisation solely from its Vedic antecedents. Such an approach may be criticised on two counts: to begin with, recent surveys of the "Aryan" problem (Chakrabarti, 1968; Shaffer, 1984, 1986; and Erdosy, 1989 and in press) suggest that far from being an invading race, the *Āryas* of the Rigveda were a locally emerging ethnic group of northwestern India, distinguished by a set of social and religious institutions. Secondly, as has just been demonstrated, many regions of northern India, previously thought to have been colonised only by the Aryans of the first millennium BC,³ had in fact been populated for at least 1000 years previously, and reveal a gradual progress of civilisation which need not assume anything so drastic as foreign invasions. The "Aryanisation" of the Indian Subcontinent, therefore, is best seen as the selective adoption of an attractive ideology – first associated with an ethnic group of northwestern India that called itself *Ārya* – by local elites, who strove to justify expanding and increasingly inegalitarian social systems, whose presence in the archaeological record we have just traced through the emergence of settlement hierarchies. As it became dominant – mainly, one suspects, due to its ability to absorb a rich variety of ethnic groups in a unified social system – the ideology and social system of the Vedic Aryans – along with later modifications – is the only one that is extensively preserved in the literary records. However, one must assume that alternatives to it also existed, and even if not usually detectable in traditional literature, they must have exercised a subtle influence on the latter.

In this context the emergence of Buddhism is particularly important, since it has long been seen as the first serious challenge to the evolving social system of the Indian Subcontinent, which – even if ultimately driven from its native land – left a deep imprint on Indian society. It is easy to see Buddhism, with its reaction to – albeit tacit acceptance of – the caste-system, as merely a revolt against the dominance of Vedic ideology, and hence a development essentially internal to it. However, given the long history of settlement in the homeland of Buddhism, the disdain of the later Vedic texts composed in Madhyadeśa towards eastern India, and the strong territorial (and organisational) coincidence of Buddhism and the tribal oligarchies of northeastern India, the possibility of Buddhism being rooted in the cultural evolution of northeastern India, and essentially independent of the Vedic ideology of more westerly regions, may warrant closer attention. An approach to its study along those lines is likely to lead to far more profound insights into the social and intellectual progress of ancient India than has been the standard hitherto; although any progress, of course, must be complimented by further archaeological research, whose results will have to be incorporated into historical reconstructions. With this general argument having been concluded, it is time to turn to a more specific problem, and examine the utility of archaeological research in helping to find a solution to it.

Archaeology and the date of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa

One of the most challenging contributions to the chronology of Early Historic India has been Bechert's recent reexamination of the date of Buddha's Nirvāṇa (Bechert, 1981). As he himself stressed, the doubts expressed in his paper regarding the generally accepted figure of 486 BC have often been voiced in the past, but have recently faded away. Thus his contribution is all the more valuable, as it may help to arrest the creeping legitimisation of a hypothetical date as an established historical fact. While it is unnecessary to delve into Bechert's theses in detail, the salient points of his argument may be summarised thus:

1) The Sinhalese tradition, on which the date is based is historically accurate up to the time of king Duṭṭagāmaṇī, but for preceding periods its chronology proceeds along little more than guess-work, due to the absence of an established tradition of historiography. If even the dates of such a crucial, and relatively recent, figure as Aśoka are too early by about 70 years, how could one depend on the dates assigned to a much more remote figure?

2) Closer examination reveals that, in fact, the date of Buddha's Nirvāṇa is established on the basis of a synchronism between the Buddha and king Vijaya, mythical forefather of the Sinhalese: by such a device did the Sinhalese chroniclers seek to substantiate the claim of their race to be Buddha's elected people. Clearly, such a method inspires no confidence in the reliability of the Sinhalese tradition. [Instead, it provides us with an excellent example of the dangers of taking at face value a tradition, which upon closer inspection turns out not to have the slightest connection with history; most of the Purāṇas belong to the same category.]

3) Instead of relying on the Sinhalese king-lists, which are hopelessly corrupt, one may obtain an estimate of the date of Buddha's Nirvāṇa by the list of patriarchs preserved independently in three Buddhist traditions (Theravādin, Sarvastivādin, and Mūlasarvastivādin). The fact that patriarchs were of far greater importance to Buddhists than kings, and are listed identically in all three traditions, suggests that their number is accurate, while the unusually long life-span attributed to many of them can be explained by the need to accommodate an artificially inflated chronology. In fact, if one relies on their number and assigns a reasonable span of time to each, the date of Buddha's Nirvāṇa may be more reliably estimated at ca. 85-105 years prior to Aśoka's coronation or between 375-355 BC.

Needless to say, such an argument is bound to raise considerable debate, especially as no consensus seems to be possible on the basis of the literary traditions. In this case, it may be natural to turn to the archaeological evidence, to see how it may contribute to a solution of the problem, and it is surprising that this has not yet been done, even if archaeological chronologies are generally much less precise than those derived from literature. Given this imprecision, resulting from the nature of radiocarbon dating, one must be satisfied here with taking two alternatives, the commonly accepted date of 486 BC and Bechert's suggested modification

to 355-375 BC, and seeing which is more satisfactory in a comparison of the respective pictures of society in the early Buddhist texts and in the material record. Needless to say, such an approach is in danger of dating the Pāli Canon, rather than Buddha's Nirvāṇa, unless we can make the assumption that the two have a close chronological relationship. While this will always be debatable, the fact that already by the time of Aśoka at least the nucleus of the Canon was well-established (as shown by the similarity between the state of Buddhism described in the Canon and apparent from Aśokan edicts, and by the almost verbatim quotations from the Canon in the Bhabru inscription) lends credence to this assumption. The style of the Pāli Canon likewise suggests (or at least strives to give the impression) that the Buddha was a living figure at the time of its composition, rather than a remote person already passing into the realms of mythology. With these caveats – the necessarily imprecise chronology provided by radiocarbon dating and the difficulty of assuming the equivalence of the date of the Pāli Canon and of Buddha's Nirvāṇa – we may proceed.

As regards the society we may briefly summarise its salient features, based on Wagle's authoritative study (Wagle, 1966). Above all, we may infer the existence of both cities and states – while the hierarchy of settlements revealed in literature is not elaborate, villages (*gāma*), (market?) towns (*nigama*) and cities (*nagara*) are clearly distinguished, and the latter often appear to be fortified. Similarly, a well-developed administrative structure with a full compliment of officers, which even undertook such actions as organised famine relief, can be inferred, and both principal types of government – monarchical and oligarchical – are referred to. Political conflicts between states – as we may justifiably call them – are equally clear, with the gradual emergence of Magadha as the leading power, culminating in the defeat of Kośala in the time of Ajātaśatru. The social system is similarly advanced: castes, occupational specialisation and residential segregation are all established. The geographical horizon of the inhabitants is quite wide, as exemplified by the story of Jīvaka, a physician educated at Taxila, and plying his trade in all the large cities of eastern India. Long-distance trading contacts are extensive, and are assisted, no doubt, by a monetary economy, which is occasionally alluded to, as in the story of Jīvaka just referred to (see also Wagle, this volume).

Now, such a picture agrees very well with the archaeological record for the 6th-4th centuries BC, as already detailed above. Unfortunately, this span of time can comfortably accommodate both the longer and shorter chronologies. It is therefore necessary to find a few specific traits, whose introduction could be more narrowly dated; two such may be thus examined: coins and fortifications. To deal with coins first, the following facts appear clear after decades of excavations in the Ganges Valley:

1) Around the 6th century BC (a date which we shall discuss at length in a while) a new type of ceramic appears in northern India, called Northern Black Polished

Ware (henceforth NBPW) after its lustre which is achieved with the employment of an alkaline substance in its slip (Hegde, 1975). While the appearance of this ware, far from being a major cultural event as many have assumed, denotes no more than a minor technological innovation, it does provide a very convenient chronological anchor, as it appears to have spread rapidly all over the Ganges Valley after its introduction. In the first phase of the appearance of this ware it exists side by side with its precursor, Black Slipped Ware (BSW), which it appears to have replaced as the deluxe ware of the times. This phase is represented, among the better excavated and published sites, by Rajghat IB (Narain and Roy, 1976-78), Prahladpur IB (Narain and Roy, 1967), Śrāvastī I (Sinha, 1967), Śringaverpur IIIA (Lal and Dikshit, 1981), and Atranjikhhera IVA (Gaur, 1983). During this period coins are entirely absent from the archaeological record.

2) In the succeeding phase the BSW disappears from the archaeological record, no doubt due to its displacement by NBPW, and new ceramic forms such as carinated *hāṇḍīs* and a piriform water-jar named after the place of its earliest discovery (Ahicchatrā; see Ghosh and Panigrahi, 1946, Type X) appear. It is during this phase, which is by now well-established due to its identification at most extensively probed and published sites (Rajghat IC, Prahladpur IC, Śrāvastī IIA, Hastināpura IIIA (Lal, 1955), Śringaverpur IIIB, Atranjikhhera IVB, and Ahicchatrā VIII-VII (Ghosh and Panigrahi, 1946)), that coins and other attributes of urbanism, such as brick structures, appear.

While it is the dating of the latter phase that is crucial to our argument, one must begin with the former phase, partly because it helps to substantiate the dating of the latter, and partly because in view of recent authoritative calibration curves for radiocarbon dates (e.g. Pearson and Stuiver, 1986) and of renewed discussion on the proper interpretation of such dates (e.g. Gillespie, 1984; Pearson, 1987) a new synthesis is imperative. Although there is an extensive list of radiocarbon dates for Early Historic India, the impression of abundance is soon dispelled if one considers that many of the series from key sites (those from Koldihwa, Bateshwar, Mathura and Jodhpura, above all) are far too inconsistent to claim serious consideration. Nevertheless, the remaining dates, prior to calibration, still present identifiable clusters:

Dates for the end of the Painted Grey Ware (PGW) Phase:

Hastināpura:	TF-91	2450±120 bp
	TF-85	2385±125 bp
Atranjikhhera:	TF-291	2415±100 bp
	TF-194	2410±85 bp
Rajghat:	TF-292	2350±95 bp
Noh:	TF-1144	2370±85 bp

Dates for deposits with the overlapping of PGW and NBPW Phases:

Ahicchatra:	WSV	2400±150 bp
	TF-311	2360±105 bp
Allahpur:	PRL-83	2160±105 bp

(*While there is no indication of contamination of the sample producing this date, it is necessary to disregard it as it is the only seriously discrepant estimate present)

Dates for the beginning of the NBPW Phase:

Ahicchatra:	BM-194	2420±150 bp
Kayatha:	TF-394	2380±95 bp
	TF-674	2350±95 bp
Rajghat:	TF-293	2370±105 bp
Besnagar:	TF-387	2350±100 bp
Kauśāmbī:	TF-221	2385±100 bp
	TF-219	2325±100 bp
Rupar:	TF-209	2365±100 bp
Ujjain:	TF-409	2335±95 bp

Unfortunately, if we consider the effects of calibration (based on the curve published by Pearson and Stuiver, 1986), the dates for the end of the PGW Phase, even without accounting for errors, spread between 750 and 210 BC, reflecting the fluctuations of the calibration curve for the period between ca. 800-400 BC. The corresponding spread for the PGW - NBPW overlap is 506 - 411 BC, and for early NBPW dates it is 506-398 BC - this may seem a great improvement, until it is remembered that errors should also be taken into account, and at the 95% confidence level the calibrated dates are the following:

Late PGW:	830 - 172 BC
PGW / NBPW overlap:	888 - 128 BC
Early NBPW:	894 - 174 BC

Although the temptation to ignore the quoted standard deviation of radiocarbon dates is always difficult to resist, it will never produce statistically reliable results. The central date in many cases has no greater likelihood than any other date within the quoted error-range. However, while it is laudable to eliminate wishful thinking from the analysis of radiocarbon dates, the results presented above seem to rule out the utility of radiocarbon dates between ca. 2300-2500 bp, a period of time which inconveniently includes many events of world-historical importance. One method whereby the utility of radiocarbon measurements may be rescued is to see if dates coming from the same event (i.e. from the same archaeological deposit) could be taken as deriving from the same mean, in spite of their differences. If so, then their weighted average may be computed (along lines

proposed by Gillespie, 1984), and as this will have a significantly reduced error-range, much narrower bands of time may be obtained.

Unfortunately, no site in the Ganges Valley has long runs of dates from the same deposits, because in the absence of a proper understanding of radiocarbon dates this was never deemed necessary. At best we may assume that even if radiocarbon dates do not come from the same deposits, they all come from deposits that are datable by the same event, namely the introduction of NBPW. This assumption involves the additional circumstance that the latter event should have occurred simultaneously at all sites in the Ganges Valley. As the latter is certainly questionable, the results of the averaging process can only be treated as useful indicators, until a long and consistent sequence of dates from each of the important cultural phases hitherto identified becomes available. Nevertheless, they can be of help in deciding between alternative dating schemes, and can set up specific hypotheses for testing.

After stating our reservations we may calculate the weighted average of the dates of the end of the PGW Phase, and as they can be shown to be from the same mean at 95% confidence levels, they may be treated as coming from a single date, 2397 ± 54 bp. While this still represents a span of 370 years, between 760-390 BC, the dates in the range of 550-390 BC have a higher probability than those from the earlier times, and on this basis the end of the PG phase may be dated to no earlier than the 6th century BC. Likewise, the dates from the beginning of the NBPW phase (including those from Ahicchatra from the overlapping of PGW and NBPW periods) can all be shown to derive from a single date of 2365 ± 41 bp, and this represents a range of 550-400 BC. In combination with the averaged date for the end of the PGW phase, this date suggests that the transition between the two principal ceramic horizons of northern India took place between the middle of the 6th and the end of the 5th century BC. At the very best little justification exists for any dating of the appearance of NBPW prior to the 6th century BC (as has been advocated, for example by Lal, 1985), even if definite conclusions should wait until the appearance of a new series of radiocarbon dates.

As regards the succeeding phase, marked by the already enumerated ceramic changes as well as by the appearance of coinage, we may evaluate the dates from Hastinapura, as they are the only ones which have definitely come from the second phase of the life-span of the NBPW, the provenance of other dates not having been given with any precision. It has long been assumed that the dates in question, TF-83, 88, 90 and 112, came from the end of the PGW phase, but an examination of the description of their contexts makes it clear that they are from the first layers of the NBPW deposit of this site, which corresponds to the second phase of the appearance of NBPW overall in the Ganges Valley.⁴ Sample TF-88 is described as coming from Layer 25, the lowest NBPW-bearing layer of the site, and this has always been accepted. The other 3 all come from a context described as "layer 26, pit sealed by layer 25" Now, even if layer 26 may be taken to belong to the PGW

phase, the pit cutting it, which has clearly not been separated stratigraphically from it, comes from the subsequent phase and by simple rules of stratigraphy all finds from it, including the radiocarbon samples, should also be assigned to this phase, which marks the advent of NBPW at the site. Apart from making stratigraphic sense, this also removes the potential embarrassment of 3 very late dates for the PGW period – which has always made archaeologists reluctant to use them – and provides three useful dates for the beginning of the second phase of NBPW-bearing deposits in the Ganges Valley. The three dates of 2270 ± 110 bp, 2260 ± 95 bp and 2220 ± 110 bp have the added attraction of coming from the same layer and can be legitimately combined to produce a weighted mean date of 2253 ± 78 bp, which, in combination with another date of 2225 ± 110 produces a range of dates between 420–200 BC. Combined with the likely derivation of Indian punch-marked coins, the earliest kind known in the Subcontinent, from Iranian prototypes (Dhavalikar, 1975), which would connect the introduction of coins with the Achaemenid expansion into India in the late 6th–early 5th centuries BC, the date of the appearance of coinage, and thus of the second phase of the NBPW-bearing deposits may be put in the middle to late 5th century BC, though once again with the caveat that more research is needed to settle this contentious issue.

The effects of the foregoing with regards the date of Buddha's Nirvāṇa are obvious: if we cannot assume the existence of a monetary economy prior to the late 5th century BC, and if the texts clearly assume its existence during the Buddha's lifetime, then Bechert's date for the Nirvāṇa is more acceptable than the traditional figure of 486 BC. This is borne out also by the examination of the appearance of fortified cities, as the following enumeration of the 6 reputedly most prominent cities of Buddha's time shows:

A) Rajghat: here the fortification is clearly datable to the transition between the pre-NBPW and NBPW horizons, and thus perhaps to the mid-6th century BC (though possibly as recently as the late 5th century BC, bearing in mind the lower limit of radiocarbon dates discussed above). Such a dating is supported by the 2 radiocarbon dates already listed above, one coming from the end of Period IA and the other from the beginning of Period IB (marked by the appearance of NBPW). That this may be one of the earliest fortified cities is not surprising, given the prominence of Kāśī (or Vārāṇasī) even in Late Vedic literature.

B.) Campā: the excavator dates the fortifications to the "early NBPW" phase, and as no more information is supplied, we can tentatively assign this structure to 550–400 BC.

C.) Kauśāmbī: the dates assigned by the excavator to the massive rampart and its revetment – i.e. 1025 BC (Sharma, 1960) – has long been questioned by scholars (Sinha, 1973; Lal, 1982). As I already suggested in a previous article (Erdosy, 1987), the excavator's structural phases could easily be compressed into 4 or 5 major phases, instead of more than a dozen phases, each assigned 75 years, and this would already deflate Sharma's chronology. More importantly, however, the finds of

coins as well as Ahicchatra Type X water vessels in deposits against even the earliest phases of the defences means that – based on the discussions above – the defences of Kauśāmbī should not predate the late 5th–early 4th centuries BC.

D.) Rājagṛha: this is a crucial and much neglected site; only the walls of New Rājagṛha, traditionally attributed to Ajātaśatru, have been excavated and are datable by radiocarbon measurements to the 4th century BC at the earliest (but possibly as late as the 1st century AD, at the 95% confidence level). Although one may assume that the area surrounded by natural defences – what is called Old Rājagṛha, and is attributed to Bimbisāra – was fortified first, as yet no conclusive evidence exists for the presence of fortifications prior to the 4th century BC.

E.) Śrāvastī: although the excavator of the site dated the defences to ca. 275–200 BC, it is clear that this is a conservative estimate. In fact, Phase I at Śrāvastī corresponds well to the earliest phase of the NBPW horizon, while Phase IIA (the phase associated with the fortification wall) matches with the second phase of the NBPW horizon. Consequently, the fortifications could be dated to the 4th century BC.

F.) Ayodhyā: according to its excavators no fortifications are present at this site prior to the 3rd century BC (IAR 1976–77, 1979–80).

On the basis of the foregoing, we can strengthen the case for a shortening of the traditional chronology: of the 6 great cities enumerated, only Kāśī (Rajghat) and perhaps Campā can be assumed to possess fortifications by the early 5th century BC, while the rest must be dated to the 4th century BC at the earliest. This is confirmed by the pattern of urbanisation elsewhere in northern India: with the exception of Ujjain (whose walls date, like Rajghat's to the beginning of the NBPW horizon) and of minor sites like Jakhera (which had a small rampart already in the PGW phase), all the major fortified sites belong to the 4th century BC or later. One of the strongest arguments in favour of the dating of the Buddha to a later period is the chronology of Śrāvastī: it is inconceivable that this city, which is so prominent in the early Buddhist accounts, should be a mere village at the time of the Buddha, which is what a dating of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa to 486 BC would suggest. Summing up the evidence, *as it presently stands*, we must therefore propose that a shortened chronology of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa accords much better with the archaeological record.

Notes

1. While from Chirand a long and fairly consistent sequence of dates gives a span of ca. 2200–800 BC for the Neolithic-Chalcolithic phases, the situation from the Vindhyān sites has been more confusing. The excavators of these sites claimed, primarily on the basis of dates from Koldihwa that the Neolithic-Chalcolithic phases may be dated to the 7th millennium BC onwards. However, as the Koldihwa sequence is totally erratic (giving dates of 3300 bp for the Neolithic-Chalcolithic transition, 800–7200 bp for the Chalcolithic, and 2050–8300 (!) bp for the Iron Age) it must be altogether disregarded. By contrast, the dates from Kunjhun (3120 to 4600 bp for the Neolithic), Mahagara (3190 to 3330 bp for the

- Neolithic) and Chopani Mando (4540 bp for the Mesolithic) give a consistent series in the 3rd-2nd millennia BC, into which we must assign the Vindhyan Neolithic, at least for the present.
2. The total occupied area by settlements of the Early Iron Age was 35.8 hectares, while that of the succeeding period (600-350 BC) was 100.5 hectares. Assuming that the occupied areas refer to the end of each phase, the rate of growth of the occupied area between 600 and 350 BC – and by extension the rate of population growth (assuming the occupied area and population to be directly related) – comes to .41%. If such a rate of growth had been sustained since Early Historic times, then even taking into account only the sites discovered by the survey (which probably underestimates the number of sites actually present) as the base, the population of Allahabad District today would be in the region of 40,000,000 souls instead of the actual figure of 1,200,000.
 3. Even the otherwise excellent, and in many respects pioneering, study of Kosambi accepts this view of the colonisation of eastern India (Kosambi, 1956: 123), which was originally propagated in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.4.1.14-17. It must be added, in fairness, that at the time of his writing there was no archaeological data contradicting this impression.
 4. The earliest phase of the NBPW horizon was either non-existent at Hastināpura, or was washed away by a flood, whose residue is clearly identifiable in section. See Lal, 1955.

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Lack of space precludes the presentation of an extensive bibliography on the archaeology of Early Historic India; however this may be found in Lal, 1985, or in Erdosy, 1988.

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Ivo Fiser

Sex (*kāma*) was one of the main concerns in the life of the Theravāda Buddhist order (*saṅgha*). The article on *kāma* belongs to the longest ones in PED – considerably longer than that on *nibbāna*.¹ According to Sanskrit sexology (*kāma-śāstra*), theoretically discussed at length in the classical ‘Manual of sexology’ (*Kāma-sūtra*) of Vātsyāyana Mallanāga (c. 3rd century A.D.), *kāma* is a positive concept and should be cultivated as, unlike in other animals, it can be regulated by the mind (KS. 1.2.11). For the Theravādins, it was the first of the five obstacles (*nīvaraṇāni*), leading to desire and clinging to worldly existence which had to be totally eradicated. Numerous passages in the ‘Book of the Discipline’ (*Vinaya-Piṭakam*) show that this goal was never achieved completely.

The impetus leading men and women to diverse sexual activities is named negatively in Pāli, viz. *an-abhirati* f. ‘(sexual) dissatisfaction,’ but in terms of sexual attitudes it ought to be interpreted positively as ‘sexual urge’ or ‘craving.’ The word corresponds to BHS *kāma-rāga*² ‘sexual craving’ or ‘libido.’ While in Pāli Buddhist monks and nuns are ‘tormented by sexual urge’ (*anabhiratiyā pīḷitā*), in Bhi-Vin the nuns are ‘consumed by libido’ (*kāma-rāgena khajjanti*).

The only instinctive way, common to men and other animals, to release the physical as well as psychic tension caused by sexual urge in solitary men and women is a sexual self-gratification or masturbation, which involves producing an orgasm by exciting one’s own genitals.³ This was, understandably, enemy number one to all monastic communities that strived after higher spiritual goals, a practice much harder to discover and eliminate than any sexual activity between opposite sexes. While these practices were kept strictly hidden from the eyes of the outside world in most (if not in all) other monastic orders,⁴ in the Buddhist Order they were lucidly described, seriously investigated and duly penalised. The calm tone of these passages dealing with sexual problems, the pedantic classification of all the details of facts, possibilities and/or probabilities, and the important place given to these passages in the *Sutta-Vibhaṅga* is a sign of moral strength of the Order. Sex was accepted as one of the most important factors of human life that impedes spiritual progress and had to be dealt with accordingly.

It may be noted that abstention from sexual activities, a prerequisite of life in the Order, was not synonymous with a preventive elimination of sexual desire through castration: ‘Now at that time a certain monk, tormented by sexual urge,

cut off his member' (i.e. castrated himself).⁵ The Buddha's reaction to his operation was strong: 'This foolish man, monks, cut off one thing when another should have been cut off. Monks, one should not cut off one's own organ. If anyone should cut it off, there is a grave offence.'⁶

Most of such passages are introduced by the stereotype statement: 'Now at that time a certain monk' either 'tormented by sexual urge' or 'being infatuated' (*sāratta*). Compared with the richness of *kāma-śāstra* terminology, Pāli sexual terminology is virtually non-existent. The only term used for the sexual organ of both sexes is *aṅga-jāta* n. 'a (certain) kind of limb' (CPD), even in the case of dead bodies and animals. When, however, a female organ is not real, but looks like it, the word *nimitta* n. is used.⁷

There are two cases of acrobatics unknown in Sanskrit. One monk in his craving 'took hold of his organ by his mouth' (*attano aṅga-jātaṃ mukhena aggahasi*, iii, 35), another 'made his own organ enter into his own rectum' (*attano aṅga-jātaṃ attano vacca-maggaṃ pavesesi*, *ib.*). 'A certain monk, being infatuated, touched with his organ the organ sign of a plaster decoration.'⁸ Yet another, 'touched with his organ the organ sign of a wooden doll.'⁹

Several cases of necrophilia come under this category as well, because the act is aimed solely at self-gratification. Some monks might have developed a certain intimacy with dead female bodies if they meditated upon them in detail. Two such cases are almost synonymous: 'Now at that time a certain monk saw a dead body ... having penetrated (her) organ with (his) organ, pulled it out through the slit/(her) organ.'¹⁰ In both cases he thought that 'there will be no offence for me' (*evaṃ me anāpatti bhavissati*). Even if sometimes the word 'coitus' (*methuno dhammo*) is used, it is a one-way traffic: 'A certain monk going to a cemetery and seeing a body not yet decomposed, performed sexual intercourse on it' (rather than 'indulged in sexual intercourse with it' BD).¹¹ The body could have been 'practically undecomposed,' at other times 'practically decomposed.'¹² Another monk, going to a cemetery and 'seeing a decapitated head, inserted his organ into its wide open mouth.'¹³ If his organ touched its mouth (*chupanta*), he would commit an offence involving defeat (*pārājikam*); if not (*acchupanta*), an offence of wrong-doing (*āpatti-dukkāṭassa*). One of these somewhat macabre stories is not without a human touch: 'Now at that time a certain monk was in love with a certain woman. She died, and her bones were thrown in the charnel-ground and scattered. Then the monk, going to the cemetery, collected the bones, and put his organ into her organ sign.'¹⁴ His offence was, accordingly, only one of wrong-doing. This kind of evidence is especially interesting as very little is known about sexual stimulation derived from corpses.¹⁵ Naturally, the *kāma-śāstras* offer no help in this respect.

One of the most irritating problems facing men who live in celibacy is an involuntary erection of the penis. The Order dealt with that problem in its usual systematic way. According to the Buddha, the penis gets erected, literally 'fit for work,

ready' (*aṅga-jātaṃ kammanīyaṃ hoti*) on account of five different reasons: "Monks, the penis gets erected in five-fold ways: through lust, faeces, urine, wind, and the bite of the maw-worm. In these five-fold ways, monks, the penis gets erected." ¹⁶ Buddhaghosa explains that 'the maw-worms are hairy creatures; touched by their hair the penis starts itching and becomes hardened (stiff)'. ¹⁷ Later on, the Old Commentary explains that the erection takes place when one is tormented (*pīḷita*) by them and adds one more cause: "shaking his waist 'in the air'" means: of one who exerts himself in the air (without looking on) the penis gets erected. ¹⁸ The problem of the Sanskrit *kāma-śāstra* texts was just the opposite: they were never tired of giving various kinds of advice and recipes for making the penis stiff and erect and staying that way as long as possible.

Long passages of the *Sutta-Vibhaṅga* deal with the serious problem of the emission of semen or ejaculation (*sukka-visaṭṭhi*, *visaṭṭhi*, *mocanaṃ* or *mokkho*). Night pollution was very well-known to the Elders. In the Buddha's own words: 'Monks, there are five disadvantages to one who falls asleep, thoughtless, careless: badly he sleeps, badly he wakes, he sees an evil dream, deities guard him not, semen is emitted.' ¹⁹ Monks who have eaten abundant food and fell asleep, thoughtless, careless, suffered from such an emission (i 294 = iii 112). 'Ānanda, those monks who fall asleep calling up mindfulness, careful, by these semen is not emitted; and, Ānanda, those who are ordinary people, passionless in regard to pleasures of sex, by these semen is not emitted.' ²⁰

The causes of unintentional emission of semen are many: in a dream, while defecating, urinating, cherishing lustful thoughts, or bathing in hot water. ²¹ No offence is committed under such circumstances. Another charming specification is given further on: 'There is no offence if he was dreaming, if there was no intentional emission, if he was mad, unhinged, in pain, a beginner.' ²²

In one unusual case, which belongs partly to this category, the emission was provoked by an unbecoming sight due to insufficient clothing. The monk Udāyin used to eat a meal with his former wife who also became a nun. After he dressed in the morning, taking his bowl and robe, he approached this nun, and 'having disclosed his organ in front of this nun, he sat down on a seat.' ²³ She did the same. 'Then the venerable Udāyin, infatuated, looked intently at this nun's organ and ejaculated.' ²⁴ Nothing more is said about this case, because the story illustrates quite a different rule, while these monks who become 'infatuated' (*sārattā*), occur in anecdotes involving not more than bawdy language (iii 127, 130-131).

Much more serious and widely discussed was the case of actual masturbation called an 'intentional ejaculation of semen' (*sañcetanikā sukka-visaṭṭhi*, iii 112), which in the *Sutta-Vibhaṅga* is the first and most urgent matter entailing a formal meeting of the Order (*saṅghādisesa*), immediately followed by coitus (*kāya-samsagga*), another of the thirteen offences of this category. Such a monk has a 'desire/intention to ejaculate' (*mokkhādhippāya* or *mocanādhippāya*), and the procedure is laconically described in a unique stock phrase unknown in Sanskrit:

'he imagines, masturbates, ejaculates' (literally, 'it is ejaculated:' *ceteti upakkamati muccati*, iii 113-116)²⁵ The causes leading to the desire to ejaculate, i.e. masturbation are multifarious and are registered in a long sequence under the first *saṅghādisesa* offence (iii 112-119). They can be mental states, functions of the body, food, medicaments, or certain social occasions.

Another unusual discussion concerns the colours of semen. According to the Old Commentary, 'there are ten kinds of semen: dark-blue, yellow, red, white, the colour of buttermilk, of water, of (sesamum) oil, of milk, of curds, and of ghee.'²⁶ Various kinds of fantasies produce various colours of the ejaculated semen (iii 114-115). The character of the offence depends on the stage of the procedure. When he goes through all the three stages, he commits an offence as stated above. When he imagines, masturbates, but does not ejaculate, it is a grave offence. If he imagines, but does not masturbate and does not ejaculate, there is no offence. The mental fantasy was considered to be the decisive factor. For instance, there was no offence, if he did not imagine, but masturbated and ejaculated; if he did not imagine, did masturbate, but did not ejaculate; or, if he did not imagine, did not masturbate, but ejaculated (unintentional emission of semen discussed above). Such causes could have been purely mechanical, while bathing in hot water or against the stream, while applying ointment on a wounded penis, in the case of itching testicles, etc. (iii 116-117; cf v 34). However theoretical some of these possibilities might have been, they indicate a heightened sensitivity of the body under the adverse conditions of a tropical climate.

In two extreme cases, a monk upon his own request was masturbated by his novice, and the monk himself masturbated a sleeping novice.²⁷

The habit of manual manipulation was kept strictly hidden from the rest of the community. A monk addicted to it asked his companion, "Do not tell anyone!"²⁸ Such a knowledge was damaging in the eyes of the lay community as well. Thus the notorious 'group of six monks,' famous for their disruptive activities, used it against monk Upananda, after he had announced his offence to the Order. They said to his lay followers: "Your reverences, this venerable Upananda, son of the Sakyans, an esteemed dependant of yours, is eating the gift of faith with the very same hand which he used to masturbate and ejaculate!"²⁹ Such an offence was classified as 'not concealed' (*a-paṭichanna*, ii 38), 'concealed for one day' (*ekāha-paṭichanna*, ibid 40), 'concealed for two days' (*dvīha-paṭichanna*, ib. 43), for three, four, five etc. days, for weeks, for months. This shows clearly how worrying such cases were for the Order.

Yet in spite of all the abuse heaped on it, the very first story illustrating the offence of masturbation describes with astonishing frankness its beneficial effects on the physical condition of the monks practising it: 'Now at that time the venerable Seyyasaka led the Brahma-life, dissatisfied. Because of this he was thin, wretched, his colour bad, yellowish, the veins showing all over the body.'³⁰ On seeing him in such a state the venerable Udāyin gave him the following good advice:

“Now then, you, the reverend Seyyasaka, eat as much as you like, sleep as much as you like, bath as much as you like: eating as much as you like, sleeping as much as you like, bathing as much as you like, if dissatisfaction arises in you and craving assails your heart, then masturbate and ejaculate with your hand!”³¹ Seyyasaka did so, and soon ‘he was nice-looking with rounded features, of a bright complexion, and a clear skin.’³² There is hardly anything that can match this frankness in any religious text in the world!

Only one *sūtra* in the voluminous work of Vātsyāyana mentions in passing those men who have no access to women, who satisfy their sexual urge using artificial images of women (*stri-pratimā*) or masturbation (*upamardanam*),³³ KS 5.6.5.

As far as women are concerned, KS 5.6.1-3 mentions the ladies of the harem, who satisfy their libido by mutual manipulation (*parasparam rañjayanti*, 1) or by means of artificial devices called *apadravya* (2-3). The Pāli *Vinaya* is in this respect much less communicative than its Sanskrit counterparts. Vin iv 260 (*Pācittiya* iii) gives a single example of manual self-gratification practised by some nuns, called ‘a slap with the palm of the hand’ (*tala-ghātakam*): ‘Now at that time two nuns, tormented by sexual urge, having entered an inner room, slapped with the palms of the hands. Nuns, having run up at the sound of this noise, spoke thus to the nuns: “why do you, ladies, misbehave with a man?” Saying “Ladies, we are not misbehaving with a man,” they told this matter to the nuns.’³⁴ This is a case of pure circumlocution, which would be unintelligible without a commentary. Sp 960 explains *tala-ghātaka* as ‘a slap with the palm of the hand on the cunnus’ (lit. ‘urine-making’)³⁵ which was an offence of expiation. The Thai *Tripiṭaka* reads on this place ‘touching the private parts,’³⁶ while M-L-Bhi-Vin 265 is more descriptive: ‘they agitate quickly the organ with the palm of the hand.’³⁷ The Chinese M-Bhi-Vin p. 392 speaks about a *bhikṣuṇī* who ‘was overcome by sexual passion, and patted her pubic region with her hand.’

The following story, Vin iv 261 (*Pācittiya* iv) is equally uninspiring in its Pāli version. It deals with the use of an artificial device called ‘the device of lac’ (*jatu-matṭhakam*), which was used by the nuns for sexual self-gratification. Such gadgets called *apadravyas* are richly documented in *kāma-śāstra* texts,³⁸ and were also used by kings who wanted to satisfy a larger number of their wives in one night (KS 5.6.4). According to the Vin version, the knowledge of this device came to the nuns from a similar source:

‘Now at that time a certain woman, who had formerly been a king’s concubine, had gone forth among the nuns. A certain nun, tormented by sexual urge, approached this nun, and having approached, she spoke thus to this nun: “The king, lady, came to you (only) after a very long time.”³⁹ How did you manage (in the meantime)?”⁴⁰ “By means of a device of lac, lady.”⁴¹ “What is this device of lac, lady?” Then this nun showed the device of lac to that nun. Then that nun, having inserted⁴² the device of lac, having forgotten to wash it, put it aside. The nuns, having seen it surrounded by flies spoke thus ...’⁴³

What is meant by this 'device' is clear from Sp 961: 'a polished penis made of lac.'⁴⁴ And the Old Commentary explains: "'Device of lac" means: it is made of lac, made of wood, made of flour, made of clay.'⁴⁵ Further on, "'should insert" means: if she, enjoying the contact, makes even a lotus-leaf enter the cunnus, there is an offence involving expiation.'⁴⁶ The corresponding passage in M-L-Bhi-Vin 266 enumerates other kinds of material and explains: 'having made the device of lac in the shape of a male organ, she inserts it into her organ and by it dispels her sexual urge.'⁴⁷ In the Chinese version (p. 393) the device is made of powdered paste, or some other material such as copper, lead, tin, pewter, or wax 'so as to satisfy her sexual desire.'

One interesting detail may be added here. Only the Pāli version speaks of the device not being cleaned after use. This corresponds exactly with Yaśodhara's comment on the use of roots and fruits for the same purpose at KS 5.6.2: 'these are to be applied after being cleaned' (*etāni saṃśodhya grāhyāṇīti*).

Finally, there is an example of sexual self-gratification of nuns which makes little sense in the Pāli wording: 'Now at that time nuns bathed against the stream enjoying for themselves the contact with the current.'⁴⁸ M-L-Bhi-Vin 273 characterises such a nun as 'of lustful thoughts,'⁴⁹ and explains that by holding her organ against the stream she dispels her sexual urge.⁵⁰ The Chinese Bhi-Vin pp. 394-398 gives several more examples of a similar kind. A *bhikṣuṇī* while washing her organ inserts her finger further than the first knuckle so as to satisfy her sexual desire; for the same purpose she pushes a cloth into her organ during her menstrual period, or she flushes her organ with falling water, or water dropping from the roof-eaves, or, taking a bath in a rapid stream, stands with her organ against the stream. Finally she could push up her organ several kinds of roots, such as turnip roots and small round onions, and other kind of roots. It seems that human ingenuity knew no boundaries.

Abbreviations

A	<i>Āṅguttara-Nikāya</i> (PTS edition).
BD	<i>The Book of the Discipline</i> (translation of Vin by Horner; SBB).
Bhi-Vin	<i>Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya</i> , Sanskrit version.
BHS	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit.
BHSD	<i>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary</i> (Edgerton, 1953).
CPD	<i>A Critical Pāli Dictionary</i> (Copenhagen).
KS	<i>Vātsyāyana Kāma-Sūtram</i> (Varanasi, 31982).
M-Bhi-Vin	<i>Mahāsāṃghika-Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya</i> (Chinese text in English, translated by Hiraoka, 1982).
M-L-Bhi-Vin	<i>Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda-Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya</i> (Sanskrit text, edited by Roth, 1970).

MW	<i>A Sanskrit-English Dictionary</i> (Monier-Williams; Oxford).
PED	<i>Pali-English Dictionary</i> , London
PTS	The Pali Text Society; London
SBB	<i>Sacred Books of the Buddhists</i> .
Sp	<i>Samanta-Pāsādikā</i> (Commentary on Vin; Nalanda edition).
Vin	<i>Vinaya-Piṭakam</i> (Pali text, PTS).

Notes

1. 'In all enumerations of obstacles to perfection, or of general divisions and definitions of mental conditions, *kāma* occupies the leading position' PED p. 31
2. The compound is registered neither in MW, nor in BHSD.
3. The interpretation of *The Shorter Oxford Dictionary* (1974) of the verb 'to masturbate' as 'to practise self-abuse' is not very helpful.
4. Jaina sources could not be consulted.
5. *Tena kho pana samayena aññataro bh-u anabhiratiyā pīlito attano aṅga-jātaṃ chindi*. Vin ii 110.
6. *aññamhi so bhava mogha-puriso chetabbamhi aññaṃ chindi. na bhava attano aṅga-jātaṃ chetabbam. yo chindeyya, āpatti thullaccayassā.* ti. Ibid.
7. CPD wrongly gives it as the opposite of a male *aṅga-jāta*. PED's interpretation under (4) as 'sexual organ' is not quite correct, either.
8. *aññataro bh-u sāratto lepa-cittassa nimittaṃ aṅga-jātena chupi*. Vin iii 36.
9. *dāru-dhitalikāya nimittaṃ aṅga-jātena chupi*. Ibid.
10. *tena kho pana samayena aññataro bh-u mata sarīraṃ passi ... so ... aṅga-jāte aṅga-jātaṃ pavesetvā vaṇena/aṅga-jātena nihari*. Ibid.
11. *aññataro bh-u sīvathikaṃ gantvā akkhayitaṃ sarīraṃ passitvā tasmim methunaṃ dh-aṃ paṭisevi*. Ibid.
12. *yebhuyyena akkhayitaṃ ... yebhuyyena khayitaṃ* Vin iii 37.
13. *chinna-sisaṃ passitvā vatta-kate mukhe ... aṅga-jātaṃ pavesesi*. Ibid.
14. *tena kho pana samayena aññataro bh-u aññatarissā itthiyā paṭibaddha-ṇitto hoti. sā kālaṃ-katā, susāne chadditāni aṭṭhikāni vippakiṇṇāni honti. atha kho so bh-u sīvathikaṃ gantvā aṭṭhikāni sāmakkaddhitvā nimitta aṅga-jātaṃ paṭipādesi*. Vin iii 37.
15. 'The condition seems extremely rare; and scarcely any study of it has been accomplished, most descriptions being based on speculation.' *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micro-paedia* 1982 (Vol. VII, p. 239.).
16. *pañcahi bh-ave ākārehi aṅga-jātaṃ kammaniyaṃ hoti: rāgena, vaccena, passāvena, vātena, uccāliṅga-pāṇaka-datṭhena. imehi kho bhava pañcahi ākārehi aṅga-jātaṃ kammaniyaṃ hoti*. Vin iii 38, 39.
17. *uccāliṅga-pāṇakā nāma lomasa-pāṇakā honti, tesam lomehi phuṭṭhaṃ aṅga-jātaṃ kaṇḍum gahetvā thaddhaṃ hoti*. Sp 523
18. *ākāse kaṭṭhi kampento' ti, ākāse vāyamantassa aṅga-jātaṃ kammaniyaṃ hoti*. Vin iii 113.
19. *pañc' ime bh ave ādinavā muṭṭha-ssatissa asampajānassa niddam okkamayato: dukkhaṃ*

- supati, dukkhaṃ paṭibujjhati, pāpakaṃ supinaṃ passati, devatā na rakkhanti, asuci muccati.* Vin i 295 (= A iii 251).
20. *ye te ānanda bh-ū upaṭṭhita-sati sampajānā niddaṃ okkamenti tesam asuci na muccati, ye pi te ānanda puthu-jjanā kāmesu vīta-rāgā tesam pi asuci na muccati.* Vin i 295.
21. *supinantena, uccāraṃ karontassa, passāvaṃ karontassa, kāma-vitakkaṃ vitakkentassa, uñhodakena nhāyantaṃ.* Vin iii 116; they are all an-āpatti.
22. *anāpatti supinantena, no mocanādhippāyassa, ummattakassa, khitta-chittassa, vedanaṭṭassa, ādi-kammikassāti.* Ibid.
23. *tassā bh-uniyā purato āṅga-jātaṃ vivaritvā āsane nisīdi.* Vin iii 205.
24. *atha kho āyasmā udāyi sāratto tassā bh-uniyā āṅga-jātaṃ upanijjhāyi, tassa asuci mucchi.* Ibid., 205. In the Chinese version of the M-Bhi-Vin (p. 339, No. 120) 'the couple squatted without hiding their sexual organs, and gazed at each other with desire.' Also M-L-Bhi-Vin p. 269. § 234.
25. 'he aims at it, he makes the effort, it is emitted,' BD.
26. *dasa sukkāni, nilaṃ pītakaṃ lohitaṃ odātaṃ takka-vaṇṇaṃ, daka-vaṇṇaṃ, telavaṇṇaṃ, khīra-vaṇṇaṃ, dadhi-vaṇṇaṃ, sappi-vaṇṇaṃ.* Vin iii 112
27. a) *ehi me tvaṃ āvuso sāmaṇera āṅga-jātaṃ gaṇhāhīti. so tassa āṅga-jātaṃ aggahesi, tassa asuci mucchi;* b) *bh-u suttassa sāmaṇerassa āṅga-jātaṃ aggahesi, tassa asuci mucchi.* Vin iii 117.
28. *mā kassaci ārocesīti.* Vin iv 127.
29. *eva āvuso āyasmā upanando sakya-putto tumhākaṃ sambhāvito kulūpako yen' eva hatthena saddhā-deyyaṃ bhuñjati ten' eva hatthena upakkamitvā asuciṃ mocesi.* Vin iv 30.
30. *tena kho pana samayena āyasmā seyyasako anabhirato brahma-cariyaṃ carati. so tena kiso hoti lūkho dubbaṇṇo uppaṇḍu-ppaṇḍuka-jāto dhamani-santhata-gatto.* Vin iii 110.
31. *tena hi tvaṃ āvuso seyyasaka yāvad-atthaṃ bhuñja yāvad-atthaṃ supa yāvad-atthaṃ nhāya, yāvad-atthaṃ bhuñjitvā yāvad-atthaṃ supitvā yāvad-atthaṃ nhāyitvā yadā te anabhirati uppajjati rāgo cittaṃ anuddhamseti tadā hatthena upakkamitvā asuciṃ mocehīti.* Ibid.
32. *vaṇṇavā ahoṣi pin' indriyo pasanna-mukha-vaṇṇo vipassanna-chavi-vaṇṇo.* Ibid.
33. The word is not registered in this sense by MW.
34. *tena kho pana samayena dve bh-uniyā anabhiratiyā pīlītā ovarakaṃ pavisitvā tala-ghātaṃ karonti. bh-uniyā tena saddena upadhāvitvā tā bh-uniyā avocaṃ: kissa tumhe ayye purisena saddhiṃ sampadussathā 'ti. na mayaṃ ayye purisena saddhiṃ sampadussamā 'ti bh-unīnaṃ etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ.* Vin iv 260.
35. *tala-ghātake 'ti mutta-karaṇa-tala-ghātake.* Sp 960
36. Chatsumarn Kabilsingh, *A Comparative Study of Bhikkhuni Pāṭimokkha* (Delhi, 1984, p. 97), quoting *Thai Tripiṭaka* (Bangkok, Vol. v., p. 163). Her quotations are not attested to by a sufficient bibliography.
37. *hasta-talena āsphoṭayanti āṅga-jātaṃ.* M-L-Bhi-Vin 265.
38. See R.K. Rai, *Encyclopedia of Indian Erotica* (Varanasi, 1983 s.v.).
39. *cirāciraṃ* is translated 'constantly' by both PED and BD; see also I.B. Horner, *Women Under Primitive Buddhism* (London, 1930, p. 343). That does not make sense and ignores the Sp 961

interpretation 'cirena cirena gacchati.' The Thai version (*op. cit.*, p. 97) reads: 'The king, lady, seldom came to see you.'

40. *katham tumhe dhārethā* 'ti which PED (p. 176) without any obvious reason translates 'how do you suppress, or conceal pregnancy?' Sp explains *dhārethā* 'ti *sakkotha*.
41. *jatu-maṭṭhakena*; the compound is interpreted by PED as 'a decking with lac; used by women to prevent conception,' which is very hard to imagine. BD reads, more reasonably, an 'application of lac.'
42. *ādiyivā* 'having taken,' BD, but cf. Sp: *yaṃ kiñci daṇḍakaṃ pavesentiya*.
43. *tena kho pana samayena aññatarā purāṇa-rājorodhā bh-unīsu pabbajitā hoti. aññatarā bh-unī anabhiratiyā pīlītā yena sā bh-unī ten' upasaṃkami, upa-saṃkamitvā taṃ bh-unīm avoca: rājā kho ayye tumhe cirāciraṃ gacchati, katham tumhe dhārethā* 'ti. *jatu-maṭṭhakena ayye* 'ti. *kim etam ayye jatu-maṭṭhakan ti. atha kho sā bh-unī tassā bh-uniyā jatu-maṭṭhakaṃ ācikkhi. atha kho sā bh-unī jatu-maṭṭhakaṃ ādiyivā dhovituṃ vissaritvā ekamantaṃ chaḍḍesi. bh-unīyo makkhikāhi samparikīṇṇaṃ passitvā evaṃ āhaṃsu ...*
44. *jatu maṭṭhake* 'ti *jatunā kate maṭṭha-daṇḍake*. The meaning of *daṇḍa(ka)* as 'penis,' so common in Sanskrit, is not even registered by PED.
45. *jatu-maṭṭhakaṃ nāma jatu-mayaṃ kaṭṭha-mayaṃ piṭṭha-mayaṃ mattikā-mayaṃ.*
46. *ādiyeyyā* 'ti, *saṃphassaṃ sādiyanti antamaso uppala-pattaṃ pi mutta-karaṇaṃ paveseti, āpatti pācittiyassa*. M-L-Bhi-Vin 266.
47. *jatu-maṭṭhakaṃ ... aṅga-jātākāraṃ kṛtvā sve aṅga-jāte praveśeti tena ca kāmarāgaṃ vinodeti*. A better reading would be *aṅga-jātākāraṃ kṛtvā*, which appears in the 'Index of Words' (p. 355), referring to this passage. Kabilsingh, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98, quotes other schools on this passage: 'Making a man's organ and put into a woman's (Mahīśāsaka-Pācittiya 72); 'making a man's organ from Indian lac' (Dharmagupta-Pācittiya 73); 'touching a woman's object with a man's object' (Sarvāstivāda-Pācittiya 85).
48. *tena kho pana samaneya bh-unīyo paṭi-sote nahāyanti dhārā-saṃphassaṃ sādiyanti*. Vin ii 280; 'consenting to the touch of the current' (BD).
49. *rakta-cittā*, which does not occur in BHSD (neither does *ratta-citta* in PED).
50. *tehiṃ aṅga-jātaṃ dhāreti tena ca kāma-rāgaṃ vinodeti*. M-L-Bhi-Vin 273. *Dhāreti*, as in the previous story, could have been used in the sense 'to masturbate.'

On Perceptual Judgement

Shoryu Katsura

When I discussed Dharmakīrti's theory of truth, I tried to point out the peculiar but important nature of perceptual judgement in his theory of knowledge as well.¹ Now I would like to present a more detailed account of perceptual judgement together with textual sources. It is my great pleasure to submit this paper to the Commemoration Volume of Prof. A.K. Warder, who always encouraged me to pursue the study of what he regarded as the core of Indian philosophy, *pramāṇa-vidyā*, while I was studying at the University of Toronto between 1968 and 1974.

It seems to be Th. Stcherbatsky who first gave the name 'perceptual judgement' to some Indian epistemological terms, e.g. *adhyavasāya*.² He devotes one chapter to the discussion of judgement in his celebrated work, *Buddhist Logic*, Volume 1, and the gist of his arguments can be found in its Appendix as follows:

Judgement, (1) perceptual (*adhyavasāya* = *vikalpa* = *niścaya*), a decision of the understanding concerning the identification of a point-instant of external reality with a constructed image or concept; its pattern ((this is a cow)); its subject always the element ((this)), its predicate always a universal; its formula $x = A$, where x is pure sensation and A a concept or image; it establishes ((similarity between things absolutely dissimilar)); this fact is called ((conformity)) (*sārūpya*); the real judgement is the perceptual judgement; ... [Stcherbatsky 1932: 554-555]

Although I generally agree with his characterization of perceptual judgement, I have some reservations regarding his proposed Sanskrit originals. For example, *vikalpa* must have a wider connotation than perceptual judgement as Stcherbatsky himself gives several English equivalents for it; viz. concept, a constructed mental image, dichotomy, synthesis, understanding, etc.³ In Dharmakīrti's terminology, I think, *vikalpa* means 'indirect and conceptual knowledge' in general, which is to be distinguished from 'direct and non-conceptual knowledge' (*kalpānapoḍha* / *nirvikalpa*). Only a particular kind of *vikalpa* may be identified with perceptual judgement.

Perceptual judgement may be characterized as knowledge which arises immediately after the direct knowledge or pure sensation (*pratyakṣa*) of an external object, and which identifies that object with some universal characteristic

(*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) in the form that this is such and such. In *Pramāṇavārttika* (henceforth PV) Chapter 2 (= *Pramāṇasiddhi*) verse 3, Dharmakīrti calls such judgement '*sāmṃvṛta*' (conventional):

Source 1: Conventional knowledge (*sāmṃvṛta*) is not regarded [as *pramāṇa*], for it grasps [merely] what has already been grasped (*gr̥hītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāmṃvṛtam*) [Katsura 1984: 219]

Sāmṃvṛta can be identified with perceptual judgement because Manorathanandin, one of the commentators of PV, paraphrases it as 'conceptual knowledge which follows perception' (*darśanottarakālaṃ ... vikalpajñānam*) [Dharmakīrti 1968: 5]. Later he explains it as 'conceptual knowledge which arises immediately after perception and which functions like *pramāṇa*' (*pratyakṣapṛṣṭhajaś ca vikalpo ... pramāṇavyāpārānukārī ...*) [Ibid: 7], '[knowledge] which takes the whole, etc., as its object' (*avayavyādiviśaya*) or 'conceptual construction of identity among separately grasped colour-form, etc.' (*pr̥thaggr̥hītānām eva rūpādīnām ekatvena vikalpanāt*) [Ibid: 8]. It apparently takes the form "this is a pot" (*ghaṭo yam*) [Ibid: 5]. Referring to the same kind of judgement, Dharmakīrti himself mentions 'knowledge of a universal arising after perceiving an object itself' (*svarūpādihigateḥ param ... sāmānyaviññānam*) [PV II.5d-6a Katsura 1984: 220].

As I discussed in my previous paper, Dharmakīrti does not regard perceptual judgement as *pramāṇa* because it does not give any new information of its object beyond what is known by the immediately preceding perception.⁴ Rather it presents an incomplete and somewhat distorted image of an object. Therefore, in PV Chapter 1 (= *Svārthānumāna*) verses 68-69, perceptual judgement is called '*samṃvṛti*' (concealing):

Source 2: Die fremde Form wird mit der eigenen Form bedeckt von einer Erkenntnis, die Einen Gegenstand erscheinen läßt, obwohl sie sich auf verschiedene Dinge stützt; von dieser, der "Bedeckung" (*samṃvṛtiḥ*), wird die Verschiedenheit der Dinge verdeckt (*samṃvṛtanānātvāḥ*), so daß sie, obwohl an sich verschieden, in irgendeiner Form wie nichtverschieden erscheinen. [Vetter 1964: 52]⁵

(*pararūpaṃ svarūpeṇa yayā samṃvriyate dhiyā /
ekārthapratibhāsinyā bhāvān āśritya bhedināḥ* // 68 //
tayā samṃvṛtanānārthāḥ (sic) *samṃvṛtyā bhedināḥ svayam /
abhedina ivābhānti bhāvā rūpeṇa kenacit* // 69 //
[Dharmakīrti 1960: 38])

Here *samṃvṛti* is characterized as 'knowledge (*dhi*) which manifests one and the same object (*ekārthapratibhāsin*).⁶ According to Dharmakīrti, a seemingly single object like a pot in fact consists of many different things, e.g. its peculiar colour and shape, hardness, etc. Perceptual judgement conceals (*samṃvṛ*) all the different features of a pot with a single universality, potness, or more precisely 'exclusion

of non-pots' (*aghaṭāpoha* / *aghaṭavyāvṛtti*); thus they appear as a unified pot in perceptual judgement. In other words, by disregarding all the unique features of a pot, which may be directly grasped by each corresponding perception, we can form perceptual judgement "this is a pot." In his own commentary to the above verses, Dharmakīrti traces the root cause of such 'concealing' knowledge back to 'impression' (*vāsanā*) [Dharmakīrti 1960: 38]. He gives a few other names for such perceptual judgement of identity, e.g. '*ekapratyavamarśa*' [PV I.73, 109, 119], '*abhedapratyavamarśana*' [PV III.162], and '*abhinnākāra-parāmarśapratyaya*' [Dharmakīrti 1960: 50], all of which amount to meaning 'recognition of identity'.

Why does Dharmakīrti call perceptual judgement '*saṃvṛti*' or '*sāṃvṛta*'? Because the idea of perceptual judgement goes back to a kind of pseudo-perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) mentioned by Dignāga, i.e. '*saṃvṛtisajjñāna*' (knowledge of conventional existence).⁶ He describes it in *Nyāyamukha* as follows:

Source 3: Similarly, the pseudo-perception includes all the knowledge which arise with reference to such conventional existence (*saṃvṛtisat*) as [substance like] a pot, [property like] number, [action like] upward motion, [universality and speciality like] existence in general and potness, etc. Because they, with reference to real existence, form some extraneous [conceptual] images and superimpose such extraneous contents [upon it]. [Katsura 1982: 90]⁷

It may be interesting to note in passing that what Dignāga considers to be conventional or nominal existence (*saṃvṛtisat*), i.e. that which people think existent, correspond to five of the six categories (*padārtha*) of the Vaiśeṣika school, viz. *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*, *sāmānya*, and *viśeṣa*.

The idea of *saṃvṛtisajjñāna* can be traced to that of *saṃvṛtijñāna* (conventional knowledge) mentioned in Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāhi*:

Source 4: Auch eine scheinbare Erkenntnis (*saṃvṛtijñānam*) ist dadurch abgelehnt. Denn eine solche wird nach Töpfen usw. als Topferkenntnis usw. benannt, aber sie entsteht nicht dadurch, da diese, weil sie scheinbar sind, nicht Ursache sein können. Sie entsteht vielmehr bloß durch die Form usw., welche so (d.h. als Topf) aufgefaßt wird. [Frauwallner 1957: 18]

(*kun rdzob pa'i shes pa yang 'dis gsal* (sic) *te / de ltar ni bum pa'i shes pa [bum pa'i shes pa] zhes pa 'di ltar de bum pa la sogs pa rnams kyis tha snyad bya zhing / de de rnams las 'byung ba ni ma yin te / de rnams ni kun rdzob tu yod pa nyid kyis rgyu ma yin pa nyid kyi phyir ro // gzugs la sogs pa de ltar yang dag par zhen pa rnams kho na las de 'byung ngo //*) [Ibid: 35]

Vasubandhu defines perception as 'knowledge directly derived from an object' (*tato 'rthād vijñānam*) [Frauwallner 1957: 35-36]. Thus *saṃvṛtijñāna*, such as knowledge of a pot, is excluded from perception because a pot, being mere conventional existence (*saṃvṛtisat*) conceptually constructed, cannot actually give

rise to that knowledge. The real cause of such knowledge is nothing but colour-form (*rūpa*), etc. Vasubandhu gives the following definition of conventional existence in *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter 6, Verse 4:

Source 5: That of which notion disappears when destroyed physically, e.g. a pot, or when mentally excluded from others, e.g. water, is called *saṃvṛtisat*; others are called *paramārthasat*.

(*yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat /*
ghaṭāmbuvat saṃvṛtisat paramārthasad anyathā //)⁸

Here *dharma*s, such as *rūpa*, are called *paramārthasat* (ultimate reality) because they cannot be analysed into further components. Things that can be analysed in terms of others are called *saṃvṛtisat*. Therefore, *saṃvṛtijñāna* is knowledge of such nominal existence as a pot and water.

It is to be noted that *saṃvṛtijñāna* has a broader connotation in Abhidharma literature. In the *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter 7, *saṃvṛtijñāna* is regarded as one of the ten kinds of knowledge. It is called 'saṃvṛti' because its object is *mainly* such conventional existence as a pot, cloth, man & woman, etc. (*prāyeṇa ghaṭapaṭaṣṭrīpuruṣādisaṃvṛtigrahāt*) [Vasubandhu 1967: 392]. However, *saṃvṛtisajñāna* is only a part of *saṃvṛtijñāna*, because the latter can take as its object all *dharma*s, both conditioned and unconditioned (*saṃvṛtijñānasya sarvadharmāḥ saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtā ālambanaḥ*) [Ibid: 392]. Although essentially it is not knowledge of the ultimate (*aparamārthajñāna*) [Ibid: 395], *saṃvṛtijñāna* includes knowledge of the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, such as 'impermanence' and 'non-soul,' which are to be realized in the meditational process through enlightenment [Ibid: 395].⁹

Now, according to Dharmakīrti, *saṃvṛtisajñāna* is not born out of the sense organ (*anākṣaja*) [PV III.289], yet it tends to be taken for perception, because it arises immediately after perception (*pratyakṣāsannavṛtti*); it is conceptual knowledge (*vikalpana*) which depends upon our verbal convention (*saṃketasaṃśraya*) and which superimposes some extraneous contents (*anyārthasamāropa*) upon reality [Ibid: 290]. Further, *saṃvṛtisajñāna* cannot occur without recollection of what has been directly experienced (*anubhūtasmarāṇa*) [Ibid: 292].

As a matter of fact, the above characterization of *saṃvṛtisajñāna* is shared by another kind of pseudo-perception, i.e. *bhrāntijñāna* (erroneous knowledge), such as knowledge of water in a mirage. Thus it is clear that perception, according to Dharmakīrti, may be followed either by *bhrāntijñāna* (wrong judgement) or by *saṃvṛtisajñāna* (perceptual judgement). If there is some cause for an error (*bhrāntinimitta*) and no condition for correct decision (*niścayaapratyaya*), then there arises erroneous knowledge, such as one which takes a conch-shell for a silver coin.¹⁰ On the other hand, if there is no cause for an error and if there is condition for correct decision, then there arises perceptual judgement that this is a conch-shell. The two kinds of knowledge differ in the end, viz. *bhrāntijñāna* will

lead us astray and will not satisfy our expectation, while *saṃvṛtisajjñāna* will lead us to a successful action.

When the content of *bhrāntijñāna* or superimposition (*samāropa*) of wrong notion comes to be suspected, it can be corrected by *pramāṇa*. For example, the knowledge of a silver coin can be corrected by someone else who says that this is not a silver coin but a conch-shell. Dharmakīrti considers that inference and verbal knowledge can dispel such erroneous superimpositions.¹¹ He seems to use the term '*smārtaniścaya*' (recollecting decision) in order to distinguish perceptual judgement from decision (*niścaya*) in general.¹² It is called 'recollecting decision' because perceptual judgement grasps what has already been grasped by perception (See Source 1). Inference and verbal knowledge, on the other hand, can reveal a new fact with reference to an unperceived object; therefore they are regarded as *pramāṇa*. *Smārtaniścaya*, or perceptual judgement, although not *pramāṇa*, functions like *pramāṇa*, as it will lead us to a successful action by preventing erroneous superimpositions from occurring.

Further, Dharmakīrti calls perceptual judgement '*pratyabhijñā*' (recognition) in PV III.238, and '*smṛti*' (recollection) in *Hetubindu*. By now, the reason for such a naming must be quite clear. Perceptual judgement is recognition or recollection of what has already been grasped by the preceding perception. Let me quote a passage from *Hetubindu*, where the criterion for *pramāṇa* is discussed as at the beginning of PV II.

Source 6: Die Erinnerung [dagegen], die, nachdem dieses sobeschaffene [Einzelne] gesehen worden ist, kraft [dieser] Wahrnehmung entstanden ist und die die Nichtgemeinschaft [des Einzelnen] mit dem, womit immer es nichtgemeinsam (*asādhāraṇa* –) ist, als [seine] Verschiedenheit davon benennt und [so] die Sonderung von Nicht-Diesem zum Objekt hat, ist nicht [mehr] maßgebliche Erkenntnis, weil sie [nur] die Erscheinungsform (*ākāraḥ*) [des Individuellen] in der Weise, wie sie [bereits] gesehen worden ist, erfaßt ... Ist dagegen das Individuelle erkannt, dann ist die kraft dieses [Erkennens] entstandene Vorstellung, die dieses [Individuelle] nachbildet, weil das [Individuelle] ihrer Wirkung nach [aber nicht ihrem inhaltlichen Bild nach ihrer] Objekt ist, nur eine Erinnerung nicht [aber] maßgebliche Erkenntnis, weil [durch diese Vorstellung] nicht die Gestalt eines [zuvor] nicht-erkannten Dinges erkannt wird; bei der Feststellung, ob etwas maßgebliche Erkenntnis ist [oder nicht], kommt es nämlich auf das Ding an, weil das Handeln von [Leuten], die [die Erfüllung eines bestimmten Zwecks] erstreben, sich auf dasjenige richtet, das geeignet ist, [diesen bestimmten] Zweck zu erfüllen, [also auf das Ding]; denn das Ding ist [ja] bestimmt als das, was geeignet ist, einen Zweck zu erfüllen. [Die auf die Wahrnehmung des Individuellen folgende Vorstellung ist ferner deshalb nicht maßgebliche Erkenntnis,] weil auch auf Grund dieser [Erinnerungs-]Vorstellung ein Handeln [zustande kommt], das nur auf das

[reale] Ding gerichtet ist, indem [das inhaltliche Bild der Vorstellung durch sie] als diese [Individuelle] begrenzend festgelegt wird; mit Bezug auf das Handeln nämlich ist dann der Nutzen der Vorstellung der gleiche wie der der Wahrnehmung. [Translated by Steinkellner, Dharmakīrti 1967b: 35-36]

(*tasmin tathābhūte dṛṣṭe sati sa yena yenāsādhāraṇas tadasādhāraṇatām tato bhedaṃ abhīlāpayanty atadvyāvṛttiviśayā smṛtir utpannā pratyakṣabalena yathā dṛṣṭākāragrahaṇān na pramāṇam ... adhigate tu smṛtir eva na pramāṇam, anadhigatavastu-rūpānadhigateḥ, vastvadhiṣṭhānatvāt svalakṣaṇe tatsāmānyajanmā vikalpas tadanukārī kāryatas tadviśayatvāt pramāṇavyavasthāyāḥ, arthakriyāyogya viśayatvāt tadarthināṃ pravṛtteḥ, arthakriyāyogyalakṣaṇaṃ hi vastu; tato 'pi vikalpād vastuny eva tadadhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ, pravṛtttau vikalpasya pratyakṣenābhinnayo-gakṣematvāt.*) [Dharmakīrti 1967a: 2*-3*]

Here perceptual judgement is characterized as 'conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*) produced by perception (*pratyakṣabalena utpanna-*)' which imitates (*tadanukārīn*) the image of a particular object.' It takes as its object universal characteristic in the form of 'exclusion of others' (*atadvyāvṛtti*) and expresses it as 'differentiation' (*bheda*) from others. Perceptual judgement produces 'determination' (*adhyavasāya*), which further induces us to an action (*pravṛtti*) towards a particular and real entity (*vastu*). Thus, seen from the point of view of a human activity, perceptual judgement, as well as determination, can be said to share the same object with the preceding perception. Perceptual judgement is called 'recollection' (*smṛti*) because it grasps what has been grasped by perception (*yathā dṛṣṭākāragrahaṇa*). Therefore, it is not *pramāṇa*.

It may be important to note in passing that Dharmakīrti seems to distinguish in Source 6 perceptual judgement from *adhyavasāya* which was identified by Stcherbatsky with the former. Now it is *adhyavasāya* which actually prompts a man to start acting towards an object. Dharmakīrti states that without *adhyavasāya* (determination) one can neither proceed nor stop.¹³ The term comes to play a very important role in post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist epistemology. For instance, Dharmottara declares that perception can be *pramāṇa* only when it is followed by *adhyavasāya*.¹⁴

In conclusion, let us summarise the essential characteristics and functions of perceptual judgement so far discussed:

(1) Perceptual judgement is conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*) which arises immediately after perception (*pratyakṣa*) unless there is some cause for erroneous knowledge (*bhrāntijñāna*). Since it resembles *pratyakṣa*, it is called *pratyakṣābhāsa* (pseudo-perception).

(2) Perceptual judgement, unlike perception, does not reveal an object as it really is. Rather it conceals its particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) with universal characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Thus, it is called *saṃvṛti* (concealing).

(3) Perceptual judgement identifies and names an object. Although actual

reality consists of many distinct objects, they appear as one in perceptual judgement. Thus perceptual judgement is called *ekārthapratyavamarśa*, etc., meaning 'recognition of identity,' and it takes the form "this is such and such."

(4) Perceptual judgement is called *sāmṇvṛta* (conventional) perhaps because it depends upon verbal convention (*saṃketa*). It is also called *saṃvṛtisajjñāna* because it deals with such conventional existence (*saṃvṛtisat*) as a pot, etc. The idea of *saṃvṛtisajjñāna* goes back to that of *saṃvṛtijñāna* (conventional knowledge) in Abhidharma literature.

(5) The two main functions of perceptual judgement are to prevent *bhrāntijñāna* from arising and to produce *adhyavasāya* (determination) which induces us to a purposive activity (*pravṛtti*). In this context, perceptual judgement can be said to play a more important role in the cognitive process towards a human activity than the initial perception which, being free from conceptual construction, lacks the power of determination.

(6) Perceptual judgement is called *smṛti* (recollection), *smārtaniścaya* (recollecting decision) or *pratyabhijñā* (recognition), because it grasps what has already been grasped by the preceding perception. Thus it is not regarded as *pramāṇa* (the reliable source of knowledge), for it does not provide new information of an object as perception and inference.

Finally, I should like to present the classification of knowledge according to Dharmakīrti, which I have reconstructed from his scattered statements, so that I can show the place of perceptual judgement in the scope of his epistemology:

jñāna

I *avikalpa*

- 1) *bhrānta* (*taimira*, *yogijñāna of aśubhā*, etc.)
= *pratyakṣābhāsa* (*viśaṃvādin*, *apramāṇa*)
- 2) *abhrānta* = *pratyakṣa* (*aviśaṃvādin*, *pramāṇa*)
indriya-, *mānasa-*, *yogi-pratyakṣa*,
svasaṃvedana

II *vikalpa* (*bhrānta*)

- 1) *viśaṃvādin* = *bhrāntijñāna* (*marīci-jñāna*, etc.)
= *pratyakṣābhāsa* (*apramāṇa*)
- 2) *aviśaṃvādin*
 - a) **perceptual judgement**
= *pratyakṣābhāsa* (*apramāṇa*)
 - b) *anumāna* (including *śābda*) (*pramāṇa*)
≠ *pratyakṣābhāsa*

I do not claim that the above is the complete list of various kinds of knowledge discussed by Dharmakīrti. It remains to be considered how to classify such mental states (*caitta*) as 'desire,' etc. Further, it is to be noted that the above list does not cover knowledge of the enlightened (*buddha*), but that of the people who have not yet experienced *āśrayaparāvṛtti* (conversion of the basis) only. According to Dharmakīrti, even the intuitional knowledge of *yogins* are ultimately not non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*). Therefore, only the knowledge of the *buddhas* can be free from conceptual construction.¹⁵

Notes

This is a completely revised version of my paper with the same title, read at the first International Dharmakīrti Conference in Kyoto (16/6/1982). I should like to thank Prof. E. Steinkellner, who then kindly made a valuable comment on my paper.

1. See Katsura, 1984.
2. Nagin Shah also paid much attention to perceptual judgement and discussed why it is not regarded as *pramāṇa* despite of its importance in the cognitive process. See Shah, 1967: 276-281.
3. See Stcherbatsky, 1932: 552-557.
4. See Katsura, 1984. Dharmakīrti defines *pramāṇa* as 'non-contradictory knowledge of a previously unknown object' (*aviśaṃvādi jñānam ... ajñātārthaprakāśaḥ*) [PV II.1, 5].
5. Cf. Ota and Vora, 1980: 7: Objects, though distinct by nature, appear as if [they are] identical in a certain form since their distinction is eclipsed under the cover of that cognition, which though depending on distinct objects presents [to the mind] a single object; for all the other forms are concealed by its own form.
6. Pārthasārathi Mīśra gives the name of *pratyakṣābhāsa* to the perceptual judgement of the universal of a logical mark (*liṅga*). See Kumārila, 1978: 281: *liṅgāśāmanāyam ... svalakṣaṇadarśanaprabhāvād vikalparūpāt pratyakṣābhāsāj jñānāntarād avagamyate ...* Kumārila calls it '*smṛta*' (recollection). *Ibid*: 282.
7. Cf. Tucci, 1930: 51-52. The description of *saṃvṛtisajjñāna* in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is less elaborate than one found in *Nyāyamukha*. See Hattori, 1968: 28.
8. See Katsura 1976.
9. See La Vallée Poussin, 1971: 4, 5, 12, 15.
10. See Dharmakīrti, 1960: 26: *yadi dṛṣṭasvarvatattvasyāpi bhāvasya tathāniścayapratirodhiṇā bhrāntinimittena guṇāntaram ... yujyeta / yathā śuktau rajatākāraḥ ... niścayapratyayavai-kalyāt tv aniścinvan tatsāmānyam paśyati* / Cf. Mookerjee and Nagasaki, 1964: 99-101.
11. See Dharmakīrti, 1960: 26-27: ... *tadvyavacchedakāni bhavanti pramāṇāni ... yadā punar anumānena samāropavyavacchedaḥ kriyate ...*
12. See Dharmakīrti, 1960: 28: *yatra tu pratipattur bhrāntinimittam nāsti tatraivāsya tad-darśanāviśeṣe 'pi smṛto niścayo bhavati* / Cf. Mookerjee and Nagasaki, 1964: 111.
13. See Dharmakīrti 1967a: 25*: *ayam analam paśyann apy analo 'yam na salilam ity anadhyavasayan na tiṣṭhen nāpi pratiṣṭheteti dustaram vyasanam pratipannaḥ syāt*.
14. See Dharmottara, 1955: 84: *adhyavasāyam kurvad eva pratyakṣam pramāṇam bhavati*. Cf.

- Mokṣākaragupta, 1952: 14: *idaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ yatraiva svānurūpaṃ vikalpaṃ janayati tatraiva pramāṇam*. See Kajiyama 1966: 44.
15. See Dharmakīrti, 1916: 68: *gnas ma gyur pa'i phyir rnal 'byor pa gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa rnams kyis gzhan gyi sems shes pa yang / tha snyad la mi slu ba nyid kyis gzugs la sogs pa mthong ba bzhin du tshad ma nyid yin no //*.

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Buddha and Gods in Contemporary Sri Lanka: The Twofold Structure of Buddhism

Egaku Mayeda

I. Purpose

The subject of gods and deities is not necessarily a fundamental problem in Buddhism, in which the ultimate goal is *nirvāṇa*. When Buddhism assumes concrete forms in society, however, it comes to be involved in various relationships with native gods and deities. The nature and depth of the relationships are varied, depending on the particular school; at times, there is fusion, and at others, opposition. For traditional Buddhism, a determined attitude in relating to native deities has already been established historically within the various schools, and thus, it is perhaps difficult to claim that today this question is seriously taken up by Buddhism in general.

All schools of Buddhism have adopted native gods and deities in some form and thus gained a stable position in society. Even in Shin Buddhism, which, with its focus on "the one Buddha Amida," takes the most radical stance among traditional forms of Buddhism, we find such statements as that of Rennyo Shōnin, "All gods, in their fundamental nature, are transformations of Buddhas and bodhisattvas." Thus, he adopts the gods and deities just as they are into Shin, and further states: "When you have taken refuge in the compassionate Vow of the one Buddha Amida, although you do not take special pains to worship or express faith in the gods, such faith is harboured in your taking refuge in Amida." Further, he admonishes: "You must not be contemptuous of the gods."¹ This way of thinking is commonly considered today to be a means by which Buddhism, in the process of developing and taking form within society, compromised with and subsumed belief in native deities while maintaining the superiority of Buddha in relation to such gods. In this view of such an attitude as a "compromise" and "means" we see an attempt to uncover political overtones. In fact, probably not a few such cases existed historically, but I think that the faith that viewed certain deities and special personages as transformation bodies of Buddhas is not as shallow as we are inclined to believe today. Recently, I have become interested in Prince Shōtoku, who was worshipped by Shinran Shōnin. There is no question that Shinran deeply believed that Prince Shōtoku was a transformation body of Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva.² We must recognise that, in the hearts of believers, there is a firm bond between the faith in the Buddhas that are the original state (*honji*) from

which the gods are manifested, and faith in the gods that are traces (*suijaku*) or incarnations of Buddhas, and that both are established together.

It is also true, however, that for Buddhists who do not maintain faith in native gods, such belief is regarded as an impurity. Here, there is a problem for the religious body, if not for the individual. Thus, in considering the issue of native gods and deities, it is impossible to ignore a cultural and social perspective.

When I use the term "Buddhism," I am taking it broadly to mean a comprehensive cultural system which takes the Buddha as its founder and which views *nirvāṇa* or enlightenment and salvation as its highest, ultimate value. Hence, I am not adopting a method that considers "Buddhism" to be the teaching that was taught by the Buddha and leads to Buddhahood, and regards the doctrinal teaching alone as foremost. If one adopts such a narrow perspective, one inevitably comes to exclude the issue of gods and deities as a foreign impurity, and does not accord it any fundamental importance. Research into the problem of gods and deities requires a broader social and cultural perspective.

Recently, I have done fieldwork and research investigating Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka. This is research into Theravada as contemporary Buddhism. If it were an investigation of Buddhism for attaining Buddhahood, it might be adequate simply to ask monks who have carried on their profound practice in the forest monasteries (*āraṇya sēnāsanaya, yōgāśrama*) about their methods of practice and the results. In order to carry on research into Buddhism in its broader, cultural sense, however, it is necessary to investigate not only the ordinary temples and the life of the monks dwelling in them, but also the attitudes and customs of lay Buddhists and their folk beliefs. Here, the issue of gods and deities arises.³

Recently, there have been many advances in sociological and anthropological research concerning Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and the question of Buddhism and the native gods has received considerable attention. To give an example, there is the book, *Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries*, edited by Heinz Bechert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978). I have also edited a volume, *Gendai Suriranka no Jōza Bukkyō* (Contemporary Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Tokyo: Sankibō, 1986), in which this question is considered. Here I should like to discuss my basic views on the issue of Buddhas and gods in Buddhism, focussing on contemporary Sri Lanka as an example.

II. Doctrinal Buddhism and Popular Buddhism

— Theravada Buddhism and Sinhalese Buddhism

Here, I should like to consider Buddhism by distinguishing two aspects, doctrinal Buddhism and popular Buddhism. This distinction has been employed by Dr. Sukomal Chaudhuri and myself in our book, *Contemporary Buddhism in Bangladesh* (Calcutta, 1982), which reports the findings of our joint research in Bangladesh. In doctrinal Buddhism people seek to carry out faithfully the teachings



set forth in the scriptures. It maintains a pure stance of pursuing always the highest, ultimate value in Buddhism. Such Buddhism must be pursued from the stance of the individual, and the problem of the relation to gods is of no concern; rather, this entire problem is regarded as something to be rejected.

Popular Buddhism is syncretic Buddhism that has – with the broad reception of Buddhism in society, the establishment of temples and monk organizations, and adherence of large number of lay followers – fused with the native faith of the people and given a place to popular religion within itself. Popular Buddhism refers to the forms born through the encounter of Buddhism with the native deities in the actual conditions of society. From the perspective of people taking the stance of Buddhism as purely a way to *nirvāṇa*, such syncretic Buddhism may be viewed as an impure admixture or the result of compromise. There are probably also people who, influenced by this view, find that they must review their own systems of beliefs and values. On the other hand, there is also the view that distinguishes the functions of Buddha and gods and affirms the reasonableness of their co-existence. There are surely many who simply and unquestioningly accept the belief that the gods are incarnations of Buddhas (*honji suijaku*) without any sense of contradiction. We must not forget that peoples who have established some form of accepting the existence of both Buddhas and gods are in fact surprisingly realistic and religiously healthy peoples.

In applying this distinction of doctrinal and popular Buddhism to contemporary Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka, we may substitute the terms Theravada Buddhism and Sinhalese Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism is a “pure” Buddhism that takes the Pāli scriptures as its foundation and that focusses on practising monks who strictly observe precepts and perform meditation. The Buddhism of Burma and Thailand is basically identical, and is also Theravada Buddhism.

By contrast, Sinhalese Buddhism is a syncretic Buddhism that gives a place to the deities of native belief – in the case of Sri Lanka, such gods as Nātha, Viṣṇu, Pat-tini, Kataragama, Saman, and Hūniyan – as well as such demons and evil spirits as *yakā*, *prēta*, and *bhūta*. As has frequently been pointed out, in the popular Buddhism of Burma, we find a fusion with belief in *nat*,⁴ and in Thailand with belief in *phii*;⁵ such mixture constitutes the special characteristic of popular Buddhism in the various areas. Such popular Buddhism is not pure; hence, it is often criticized by practicing monks as not being Buddhism at all from the perspective of “true” Buddhism.

Although it is possible to draw a distinction thus between doctrinal Buddhism and popular Buddhism, this does not mean that there are two separate kinds of Buddhism. This method of analysis has been adopted for the sake of convenience in explaining the various aspects of one, living Buddhism. Thus, it may be said that Buddhism possesses a dual structure. Traditionally, Buddhism has been divided into the two truths, the highest or absolute (*shintai-mon*) and the conventional or

worldly (*zokutai-mon*). It should be noted that in this case, the conventional or worldly is also regarded as truth. Buddhism certainly does not abandon or ignore the aspect of the worldly.

We have divided Sri Lankan Buddhism into doctrinal Buddhism and popular Buddhism, but if we adopt a different terminology, doctrinal Buddhism may be said to form the superstructure of Sri Lankan Buddhism, while popular Buddhism forms the infrastructure. Sometimes the relationship is said to be "stratified," but these two do not form a simple composite in which the superstructure stands on the infrastructure. The upper or superstructure includes an aspect in which the lower or infrastructure is denied, and in this denial the truth of the upper is expressed, but it is not a case in which it is adequate simply to deny or reject. If the infrastructure were rejected and eliminated, the stability of the superstructure would be lost and it would be unable to survive for long. The rejection of the infrastructure by the superstructure is the working of wisdom, but there must also be the compassion that embraces the infrastructure and works through it. This is the path by which the superstructure can more broadly flourish. The infrastructure, because of its impurity, is criticized by the superstructure, but it supports the superstructure while recognizing its value, and through believing in and maintaining the superstructure, its own development becomes possible. Further, in this it gains its own *raison d'être*. On the one hand, superstructure and infrastructure are in a relationship of mutual opposition, but simultaneously, on the other hand, they are in a relationship of co-existence.

III. Doctrinal Buddhism: The Forest Monastery

When we turn to the actual situation in Sri Lanka, we find first that the condition of doctrinal Buddhism is symbolically represented by the forest monastery. According to documents of 1973 not yet made public,⁶ there were 560 monks in 162 *āranya* throughout the country (Colombo 12; Kalutara 10; Galle 18; Matara 20; Kegalle 21; and Kurunegala 27). According to documents of 1984,⁷ there were 71 monasteries with 889 monks affiliated with the Mahāvihāra Vaṃśika Śyāmōpāli Vana-vāsa Nikāya, a branch of the Siyam school, and 72 monasteries with 337 monks affiliated with the Śrī Kalyāṇi Yōgāśrama Saṃsthāva of the Rāmañña school. These two groups alone, then, include 173 monasteries and 1226 monks. According to the 1973 documents, there were 6,504 temples and 20,130 monks in all in Sri Lanka; in the 1984 documents there were 9,290 temples and 30,832 monks.

Practice in the forest monasteries is severe, and isolated locales are selected as sites; hence, their overall number is not large. The practicing monks in them, however, are highly venerated by lay believers, who bring donations of food daily. The forest monasteries are most commonly large forest areas in which small huts (*kuṭiya*) are built here and there, usually occupied by a single person who pursues a life of meditation. The monastery is directed by a High Priest, and there is a

purified place or house (*śīmā*) where almost bi-weekly confessionals are held. There is usually a hall for an image of the Buddha (*budugē*), but there are also monasteries, such as Island Hermitage at Doḍandūva village, which do not have a Buddha hall. Monks do not prepare their own meals; neither do they do much begging. Most subsist on the food which believers take turns in bringing. At the entrance to the forest monastery is a hall for food donations (*dānasālā*), and believers determine the order among themselves in which they are to bring food. When a monk enters the forest to perform practices, he gathers commitments from a number of such believers and carries on his practice depending on their food donations. Practice in the forest, then, is a cooperative activity undertaken together with lay believers. In the hall for food donations of a large forest monastery, there is a sizeable room in which sermons may be given, and it is customary for monks who have received donations of food to give sermons to the believers there. In this case, the believers expect to accumulate merit (*puñña*) through their *dāna*. They do not seek to attain enlightenment. It is hoped that the practicing monks will gain enlightenment. Even if the monk were not to teach the believers who perform *dāna* for him about merit, but instead were to tell them to abandon their mistaken folk beliefs, they would undoubtedly ask him to attain enlightenment quickly, so that their own donations would increase in merit.

IV. Popular Buddhism: The Ordinary Temple

The majority of the ordinary temples, while based in doctrinal Buddhism, embrace all the aspects of popular Buddhism.⁸ Normally the term "temple" (*vihāraya*, *pansala*) refers to ordinary temples. They far outnumber the forest monasteries. In order to grasp the nature of the temples, it is necessary to consider their structure and function.

In the temples there are usually three places for worship: the shrine room (*vihāraya*, *budugē*), the stūpa (*dāgāba*, *thūpa*, *cetiya*), and the Bo-tree (*Bōdhiya*). Occasionally, there is no stūpa or Bo-tree, but in these cases there is a consciousness that it is missing. Historically, the stūpa, in which the Buddha's relics are placed, and the Bo-tree, which symbolizes Śākyamuni's enlightenment, have been employed since early times, and the shrine room for the enshrinement of a Buddhist image developed slightly later. Today, however, the shrine room holds the greatest attraction for the populace. In the southern part of Sri Lanka, there is even a temple that has constructed a great Buddha hall in the hope of attracting tourists.

These three features – the shrine room, stūpa, and Bo-tree – all share the aspect of being places for the worship of Śākyamuni. Śākyamuni has already died and entered *nirvāṇa*, but the Dharma he left behind pervades all the Buddhas of the past, present and future. Just as the biographies of the Buddhas of the past are described with the same outlines as the biography of Śākyamuni Buddha, so the Buddhas of the future will also enter the world in the same way as Śākyamuni.

Śākyamuni occupies the supreme position in the pantheon of deities.⁹ This reflects symbolically the position of the ultimate realm of *nirvāṇa*. The gods that are still within the realm of transmigration differ in nature and dimension of existence. When offerings (*pūjā*) are made to the Buddha, however, in addition to palm oil lamps and flower petals, food offerings are made. Here, we see actions of serving the Buddha as a living person.¹⁰

Believers who visit temples pay homage to the three places of worship dedicated to Śākyamuni and thus accumulate merit. We do not necessarily find a proper order in worshipping at these three places; moreover, the relative locations of the three differ among the temples, for determining a uniform layout is impossible.

Another place of worship in the temples are the altars (*devālaya*, pl. *devāla*: house of the gods) in which gods are enshrined. Next in rank below Śākyamuni is Maitreya-Nātha. It is said that he will become the next Buddha in the future world, and that he is presently performing practices in Tuṣita heaven. After Nātha is Viṣṇu. Needless to say, Viṣṇu is a Hindu god, but it is now believed that he will attain Buddhahood in the future world after Nātha. He has come to possess two aspects – as a Hindu god, and as a protecting deity of the Buddha. Like Nātha and Viṣṇu, such deities as Vibhīṣaṇa of Kelaniya temple, which is associated with the legend of Śākyamuni's visit to Sri Lanka, and Saman (Sumana), the protector god of the sacred mountain Śrī Pāda, possess deep relationships with Buddhism. The deities that possess such relations, even though originally they may have had harsh natures, have gradually become gentle, and at the same time their popular appeal has declined. The goddess Pattini, for example, is said to have lost the power she once held.¹¹

By contrast, there are gods that have only a slight relationship with Buddhism. These deities are wild and violent, and though on the one hand they possess an aspect of aiding people, on the other, they attack human beings, possessing a fearful aspect of meting out punishment. People seeking benefit in the present consider gods of this character to be the more dependable. In present-day Sri Lanka, overwhelmingly the most popular god is Kataragama. His origins may be traced back to the Hindu god Sukandha, but he has become firmly established today as a Sri Lankan god. Particularly after World War II, with the urbanization of society, pilgrims to the sacred site of Kataragama in southern Sri Lanka have increased quickly. This is because the phenomenon of urbanization brings in its wake an alienation from, and indifference to highly developed traditional religion, and results in a return to simple, primitive religion. The deities Devol Deviyo and Basnaira Deviyo (Rajjurubaṇḍāra Deviyo) are objects of underground faith in southwest Sri Lanka, but have not yet become widely worshipped.

In the temples of Sri Lanka, it is common for a number of such gods to be worshipped. The gods possess a geographical character, and which deities are

worshipped varies from temple to temple. The most widely worshipped gods are Nātha and Viṣṇu.

Occasionally, there are no altars for deities found in temples. In such cases, at a different place somewhere in the village, altars have been constructed. Among the altars, the great altars (*maha-devālaya*) dedicated to specific deities and existing independently of temples occupy an important position. Saman Devālaya in Ratnapura, a town producing precious stones, and Kataragama Devālaya in Badulla, a mountain town, are examples. These independent shrines, like the shrines within temples, are supported by Sri Lankan Buddhists.

Thus, in Sri Lankan temples, in addition to the shrine for the Buddha, stūpa, and Bo-tree, there are often altars to various gods occupying one corner. At Rajamahavihāraya in Kotte or Horana, the altar to gods is positioned in relation to the Buddha's shrine-room, and at the village temple in Ingiriya it is placed near the Bo-tree. The people in all sincerity worship Śākyamuni and accumulate merit, and simultaneously at the god altars they pray for wealth. Moreover, they dedicate the merit freshly acquired from worshipping Śākyamuni to the gods in their prayers for worldly benefits.

In the temples, there are monks' quarters (*āvāsa*) where *bhikkhus* and *sāmañeras* live. In these quarters there is a room for the High Priest of the temple, individual rooms for monks, a dining hall, kitchen, store room, wash room, bath room, toilets, etc. In temples with a large number of *bhikkhus*, there is a purified house for confessional (*uposatha*) surrounded by *śīmā* stones. At times, the living area for monks is called "*pansala*" (original meaning "hermitage") and is distinguished from the *vihāra*, a sacred area including the shrine room for the Buddha's image. However, as with *vihāra*, *pansala* is used as a popular term indicating the temple as a whole. The people's veneration for *bhikkhus* living in temples is fundamentally the same as that in which practicing monks of the forest monasteries are held. Believers kneel before the *bhikkhus* and pay homage by touching their forehead to the front of their feet.

We must also note the existence of priests (*kapurāḷa*), who conduct prayer at the altar to gods. They probably may be said to be the representatives of popular Buddhism. Unlike the brahmins of Hinduism, they are clearly followers of Sinhalese Buddhism. Since they marry and have families, they are laymen. As laity (*dāyaka*), they also participate in carrying food to the temple. They do the work at the god-altars in the temple, but act wholly in accordance with the instructions of *bhikkhus*. The monks, perhaps because they consider themselves to be superior to the gods that the *kapurāḷa* serve, do not themselves worship the gods. However, the believers among the people, when they visit the temple and go to the altars for worship, request the intercession of the *kapurāḷa* and have them intone incantations (*yātikā*) and offer prayers. The *kapurāḷa* thus serve as intermediaries between the gods and the people. They live outside the temples with their families, and when necessary, they come to the temple and perform their services. Keys to the shrine

are usually held both by the *bhikkhus* and the *kapurāḷa*, but in temples where there are no *kapurāḷa*, monks at times fulfil the functions they perform.

At altars, in addition to money, food and fruit are offered. The income from such offerings is a significant sum in the management of the temple. In some cases, the altar is better known than the *vihāra* itself, and attracts a number of worshippers to the temple. An example is the royal temple Maharagama. In ordinary temples also, the altars are attractive economically and monks wish to have them, but there are also temples in which educated believers are opposed to the altars, making their installation impossible. There are also temples like Vajiraramaya in Colombo, which maintains the attitude that basically altars to gods should not be given a place in the temple. But such temples must be said to be the exception.

Another important building in the temples is the preaching hall (*dham-masālāya*). This is a widely used building in which activities for the people take place. Large numbers of believers gather there to listen to sermons, and in addition, Sunday school, various religious ceremonies, and festivals are held. First ordination ceremonies are also performed there. It is generally located in a position of easy access within the temple. It is one of the largest buildings of the temple, rectangular in shape with entrances on each side, any of which may be freely used.

In addition, the temples often include a library, a bell mount, and a well. In the larger temples there are schools (*piriveṇa*) for training future *bhikkhus*.

V. Conclusion

Above, while focusing on the relationship of Buddha and the gods, I have considered briefly the structure and attitude of common temples. Even from this overview, it is clear that while the ordinary temples maintain their significance as places for encouraging the *bhikkhus* and *sāmaṇeras* in their practice as monks, they are not necessarily located in places isolated from other human habitation, but occupy positions in the middle of towns and villages. Large numbers of people gather there, and in response to the popular beliefs of the people, the temples house altars to gods while promoting their own socially oriented religious activities.

Popular religious faith is not restricted to the altars to the gods. There is also a deeply rooted faith in primitive demons and evil spirits (*yakā*, *prēta*, *bhūta*, etc.). At the Kataragama festival held for two weeks every summer, it is possible to see vividly and directly various forms of such belief. One may witness enthusiastic Kāviri group dances, which express gratitude for curing sickness, as well as people hanging in mid-air with their bodies pierced with arrows, and others in trance or a state of possession by *bhūta*. Those who act as mediums to demons and evil spirits such as *yakā* are called *kaṭṭandiyā*; they are distinguished from the *kapurāḷa*, but it is impossible to consider them here.

Further, in southwest Sri Lanka, in god-altars dedicated to Devol or Basnaira,

people with grievances and resentments make prayers for cursing their adversaries.¹² We should also note the deep respect for astrology. Not only dates for marriages, funerals, and other usual ceremonies of ordinary life, but even for ordination and receiving precepts are determined through consulting horoscopes.

It would not be very difficult to comment on the superiority of doctrinal Buddhism over popular Buddhism. The people already recognize this. But for ordinary people, however, lofty a teaching it may be, if it does not directly alleviate their actual problems – for example, by exorcising evil spirits or curing diseases – it holds no attraction for them. Further, people totally immersed in worldly desires are harshly judged by doctrinal Buddhism. What believers can hope for – or rather, what they find desirable – is a better and richer life in the world to come. This is possible through the merit they accumulate by making offerings. At the same time, the practice of *dāna* or donation is an entrance to *nirvāṇa*. The next life, however, is soon enough for actual entrance into *nirvāṇa*. When pain is experienced in this life and the aspiration to seek *nirvāṇa* arises, then for the first time people renounce homelife, become monks, and enter lives of practice. Doctrinal Buddhism is fundamentally for such people.

As long as we find both the spirit of the renunciation of home life in aspiration for the realm of *nirvāṇa*, and the desire for worldly benefits in one's present situation, Buddhism will continue to possess such a double structure.

Notes

1. Otani Chōjun, *Teihon Gojō Ofumi*. Volume 1, pp. 64-65 (fascicle 3, letter 10).
2. For example, see *Kōtaishi Shōtuko Hōsan*: "The great bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, savior of the world, manifested himself as Prince Shōtoku; like a father, he does not abandon; like a mother, he is always present." (In *Shinran Shōnin Zenshū, Wasan hen*, p. 202).
3. In this connection I note that I became strongly aware while carrying on fieldwork, that there are social activities which the native people feel to be so obvious that they need not be commented on, and that among these there are some extremely important matters. I think that in the past, many of these important and fundamental matters were not recorded. Thus, textual studies have attempted to formulate history based on such incomplete records. It is impossible to underestimate significance of this. This problem must be kept in mind, when considering the matter of gods and deities also.
4. For example, J.F. Brohm, *Burmese Religion and the Burmese Religious Revival*, Ph.D. thesis presented to Cornell University, 1957, p. 13 ff.
5. For example, S.J. Tambiah, *Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in Northeast Thailand*, Cambridge, University Press, 1970, pp. 38 etc.
6. Egaku Mayeda, ed., *Gendai Suriranka no Jōza Bukkyō*. (Contemporary Buddhism in Sri Lanka, Tokyo: Sankibo, 1986), p. 170.
7. *Ibid*, p. 171.
8. See my article, "Seiron ni okeru Jiin no Bukkyō," in *Shūkyō Kenkyū* (Journal of Religious Studies), No. 200 (1969), p. 119 ff.

9. See G. Obeysekera, "The Buddhist Pantheon in Ceylon and its extensions," *Anthropological Studies of Theravāda Buddhism*, ed. M. Nash, Yale University Press, 1963, pp. 1 ff., esp. p. 6.
10. Sō Takahashi, "Shinhara Bukkyō no Shakaigaku, Bunka Jinruigaku teki Shokenkyū," in Egaku Mayeda (ed.) *Gendai Suriranka no Jōza Bukkyō*, p. 400.
11. Noriaki Akaïke, "Suriranka Seinanbu no Maha Dēvālē to Kami Shinko no Genkyō," in Egaku Mayeda, ed., *Suriranka Chiiki Kaihatsu ni Hatasu Jōza Bukkyō no Yakuwari* (report of fieldwork undertaken with a grant from the Ministry of Education, Japan, 1984-85), p. 4.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

Śubhagupta's Theory of Sense-Perception Disputes between Realists and the Vijñānavādins

Esho Mikogami

In the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, Dignāga (c. 480-540 AD) criticizes the theory of sense perception which is held by some realists as follows:

[If that which forms a cause of cognition, although it assumes an appearance different from its real form, is to be recognized as the object, then] there would be also the absurd conclusion that even the visual sense and the other [senses] would be [admitted as] objects [of cognition], this is because they also exist, in the ultimate sense, in different forms [from those appearing in a cognition] and [yet they] become the cause of such cognitions as the representations of something blue, etc., or of a double moon, etc.¹

Hattori points out, in his footnote to the above statement, that this criticism is related to Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (henceforth *ĀP*), verse 2.² In addition it is related to verse 1.

Śubhagupta (c. 650-750 AD) presents the Vaibhāṣika (realist) position, against this kind of criticism which is made from the standpoint of the Vijñānavādins, in his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* (henceforth *BASK*).³ It reads:⁴

The object of cognition of a man with properly functioning sense organs is not [produced by] an external object, because [it is of the nature] of cognition, and because it is [of the nature of] appearance as object. It is just like the cognition of dream or the cognition of a double moon. [*BASK* Verse 2]

In such a view the Vijñānavādins argue for the non-existence of external things. First, because [there is] a correspondence [between appearance as object and external object], those who claim that [external things] exist say "No." [*BASK* Verse 3]

Because [there is] no correspondence [between the moon in the external world and a double moon appearing in the cognition], and because [the object appearing in the cognition of a dream] not based on [the atoms such as] colour-form, etc., there is no object at all [in the external world as the objective ground of cognition in either case]. [Therefore,] the two [reasons presented by the Vijñānavādins as the inferential marks] also cannot be accepted. [*BASK* Verse 4]

From these verses we can tentatively formulate the argument presented by the Vijñānavādins in the following way:

Syllogism A⁵

Thesis: Gross form such as something blue, etc., [appearing] in knowledge does not exist [in the external world].

Reason: Because [it is of the nature] of appearance as object.

Example: Whatever is appearance as object [such as something blue, etc.] does not exist [in the external world]. [It is] like a double moon.

Syllogism B

Thesis: All cognitions do not possess objective ground (*ālambana*) [in the external world]

Reason: Because [they are of the nature] of cognitions.

Example: Like a cognition in a dream.

Kamalaśīla (c. 740-790 AD) quoted Śubhagupta's syllogism in his commentary on Verse 2051 of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* which goes against the Vijñānavādins' Syllogism A. It reads:⁶

Syllogism C:

Thesis: The appearance [of gross form] such as something blue, etc., of a man with properly functioning sense organs must be produced by something which is similar but different [from itself, i.e., knowledge]

Reason: Because [it is of the nature of] an appearance which is in accordance with [an object in the external world].

Example: Like the form of the apprehending knowledge.

In this article I would like to investigate the dispute between Syllogism A and Syllogism C, but not go into the problems related to Syllogism B.

B.K. Matilal has made a correct observation on the dispute between realism and idealism in his book entitled *Perception*. There he states:⁷

The external dispute between realism and idealism (or, should we say, externalism and internalism) turns mainly upon the possibility of finding an independent criterion for distinguishing veridical perceptions from non-veridical ones.

Śubhagupta in Syllogism C makes the point that the appearance of gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc., is veridical perception under the condition that it is in correspondence (*saṃvādin* or *avisamvāda*) with the object in the external world. Explaining the term 'correspondence' he states:⁸

Whatever perception is in correspondence with [its external object] in the terms of space and time, with any other, is called 'non-erroneous.' There is no other definition for 'non-erroneous.' [BASK Verse 8]

In this connection, Prajñākaragupta, who might criticize Śubhagupta's realism in his defense of the impression (*vāsanā*) theory of the Vijñānavādins, makes the following statement:⁹

There are two ways of having a false object: having non-being as an object (*asadarthatva*) and not having a correspondence (*visaṃvāditva*).

Every perception which possesses a false object is non-veridical. Therefore, a perception which has non-being as an object is non-veridical, as well as a perception which does not correspond to an object. The problem of a cognition possessing non-being as an object is related to Syllogism B, and thus need not be discussed here. But, the problem of a cognition not possessing a correspondence is related to Syllogism A, the main topic here.

The Vijñānavādins hold the position that correspondence or non-correspondence is produced only by firm mental impression or weak mental impression, as explained by Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660 AD).¹⁰ Śubhagupta, by contrast, holds the position that correspondence or non-correspondence is produced by the power of the external object or material impression (*arthavāsanā*).¹¹ But gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc., is produced in the mind by a defective mental impression.¹² Thus, Śubhagupta's theory of sense-perception is based on a theory of impression different from that of the Vijñānavādins. Prajñākaragupta describes such a view in the following statement:¹³

The externalists accept [as a cause of cognition] both the impression (*vāsanā*) known as causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) and the external object (*bāhya*).

Śubhagupta admits the fact that gross form does not exist in the external world, but still maintains that there are objects of sense perception – i.e. atoms. Śubhagupta has thus produced a unique theory of perception within the framework of the Vaibhāṣika theory. We can now turn to his theory of sense perception.

2. Śubhagupta's Theory of Sense Perception

B.K. Matilal explains Śubhagupta's theory in the following way:¹⁴

The possible implication of Śubhagupta's theory of perception may be this: the gross form or the illusory spatial stretch must be the apprehensible object of our constructive or conceptual perception (*savikalpa pratyakṣa*), which can be illusory in any case. In non-constructive or *nirvikalpa* stage, however, we must be perceiving the atoms themselves, a multitude of them, though not as one unitary form.

Now, we turn to the problem of sense perception, based on the materiality. Śubhagupta explains the process of producing the appearance of gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc. in his mind, in his statement quoted in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*:¹⁵

When many homogeneous atoms in a spatial stretch are grasped simultaneously [by visual perception], to the confused one, the gross form (*sthūla*) – that is, the mental illusion – appears.

According to this passage, visual perception, which is a non-constructive perception, apprehends the atoms themselves directly, though they are not one unitary form, just as Matilal has explained.

Two other verses of Śubhagupta, quoted by Śāntarakṣita, explain further this theory:¹⁶

Cognition is an awareness, which simply perceives [atoms]. When [one] is deceived, [it is] the defective [mental] impression that gives rise to [gross] form, such as something blue, etc., which is [of the nature of] cognition. [Verse 1]

It (i.e. gross form, such as something blue, etc.) is a cognition of [atoms, such as] blue, etc. [However,] gross form, such as something blue, etc., does not exist [in the external world]. One who is unaware of how it (i.e. gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc.) arises is [confused into] thinking that [gross form, such as] something blue, etc., belongs to the external object. [Verse 2]

Kamalaśīla presents Śubhagupta's explanation of these verses in his commentary of the *Mādhyamakālaṃkāra*.¹⁷ According to it, in the first stage, an awareness in which one simply perceives [atoms] is a non-constructive perception. It occurs without being imbued form, such as something blue, etc., (*anāpannanilādyākāro-parāga*). This is the non-constructive (*nirvikalpa*) stage. In the second stage, when a [mental] cognition perceives something, – i.e. gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc. – one (i.e. *pratipatṭr*) comprehends something blue, pot, etc., just as if it were the external object, on account of his nescience. This mental cognition is a constructive cognition. And here, theoretically, 'one who comprehends' (*pratipatṭr*) and 'a mental cognition' are one and the same.¹⁸ This is the constructive (*savikalpa*) stage. The gross form, such as something blue, etc., appears in the mind as an object of mental cognition, and can function as an instrument of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) according to his explanation.¹⁹ What this means, is that gross form, such as something blue, etc., is a cognition – that is, a sense perception of the external object. This is precisely what Vijñānavādins have criticized. They think that gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc., must be a mental cognition and not a sense perception. The question of whether gross form is a sense

perception (non-constructive cognition) or a mental cognition (constructive cognition) is the crux of the dispute between Vaibhāṣikas like Śubhagupta and the Vijñānavādins.

Let us proceed to examining Śubhagupta's theory and the Vijñānavādins' criticism of such a view. Generally speaking, the Vaibhāṣikas hold the so-called theory of formless knowledge (*nirākāravāda*) according to which an object is perceived by a cognition not endowed with an image of the object. In Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, the Vaibhāṣika's theory of perception of external objects is explained in this way:²⁰

A cognition not endowed with an image, produced simultaneously with its object by the unitary aggregated cause, is the means of valid knowledge of an [external] object.

This same phenomenon is explained by Śubhagupta as follows:²¹

[The unitary] aggregated cause of the preceding moment gives rise to cognition simultaneously with its object [in the next moment]. [BASK Verse 81ab]

In Śubhagupta's case a cognition in the next moment is a mental cognition and not a sense perception. This means that cognition is not the means of valid knowledge of the external object. However, its object in the next moment, produced by the same unitary aggregated cause, is a sense perception of the external object and therefore the means of valid knowledge of the external object. The gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc., corresponds to the external object in terms of space, time, etc. It is at the same time an object of mental cognition. In other words, the object appearing in the mind is a cognition of atoms in the external world, and is endowed with gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc..

But, in the case of Guṇaratna's explanation, a cognition not endowed with an image of the object, produced by the unitary aggregated cause, is the means of valid knowledge of the external object. Here we can see a difference between the Vaibhāṣika's theory in Guṇaratna's explanation and in Śubhagupta's. In Śubhagupta's case we can describe his theory as the theory of knowledge with an image (*sākārajñānavāda*). It is in a sense different from the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavāda, because he introduces another cognition which perceives its object endowed with gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc.²² It is a mental cognition.

According to the Vaibhāṣika's theory, there is only one cognition in any single moment.²³ In this framework, gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc., must not be a cognition, but an object of mental cognition. The reason is that there is another cognition – i.e. mental cognition – in the same moment that this object appears. Strictly speaking, in the Vaibhāṣika's framework Śubhagupta would not be allowed to call gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc., the cognition of atoms. It is the object of mental cognition, nothing beyond that.

This can also be described using the categories 'cognizable object' (*prameya*), 'means of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa*) and consequence of cognition (*pramāṇaphala*). Atoms are the cognizable object (*prameya*); gross form such as something blue, pot, etc., is the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*); and cognition, which sees gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc., appearing just like an external object in the mind and judges 'this is that' is the consequence of cognition of the external object.

Prajñākaragupta, it seems, would criticize the theory of sense perception presented by Śubhagupta, quoting Verse 294 of *Pramāṇavārttika* (henceforth PV), Perception Chapter; and Verse 1 of Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. They read:²⁴

Some people claim that it (i.e. a cognition of a double moon, etc.) is a mental [illusion]. They contradict the passage [of Dignāga] which states that the sense organs are also the cause of a cognition of something blue, a double moon, etc. [Verse 294 of PV]

Even if atoms are the cause of sense perception, they are not the object of it, because [they do] not appear as them (= atoms). This is likewise true of sense organs. [Verse 1 of ĀP²⁵]

What is pointed out in the first quotation is that gross form, such as a double moon, is not a mental illusion, even if this gross form is different from its real form in the external object and even if it is caused by a defective visual sense organ, as stated by Dignāga. The second quotation is explained by a remark made by Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, which is cited at the beginning of this article: "[If that which forms a cause of cognition, although it assumes an appearance different from its real form, is to be recognized as the object, then] there would be also the absurd conclusion that even the visual sense and the other [senses] would be [admitted as] objects [of cognition], ..."

Surely, Śubhagupta accepts a theory of sense perception in which gross form is a mental illusion if it is produced by a defective mental impression (*vāsanā*). But gross form which possesses a correspondence with the object in terms of time, space, etc., is by no means a mere mental illusion. The wise know the process of how gross form arises, and how it is produced in part by the external object, i.e. atoms.

Prajñākaragupta describes his opponent's view on this matter as follows:²⁶

Atoms, which are separate from each other, appear in the first [stage]. And [in the second stage] a constructive cognition produces the appearance of a [unitary] aggregated form (*dhanākārābhāsa*). [Verse 598 of PVBh]

The same claim: Possessing the appearance of a unitary aggregated [form] is a property attributable to constructive cognition (*vikalpavijñāna*). Atoms are the objects of it (i.e., of constructive cognition), because atoms are the cause of it indirectly (*pāramparyeṇa*).

The opponent's view is very similar to Śubhagupta's, except that atoms are the indirect cause.²⁷ In Śubhagupta's case atoms are the direct cause. Prajñākaragupta criticizes both views by invoking Verse 1 of the *Ālambanaparikṣā*. One point made there is that such a constructive cognition is not a sense perception, so it is not proper to mention a mental cognition when a sense perception is being discussed. By contrast, another point made there by opponents is that if a cognition produced by a sense organ is a mental one, we would arrive at the absurd conclusion that every cognition becomes a mental cognition.²⁸ However, Śubhagupta claims that gross form, such as something blue, pot, etc., is mental and also sense perception, because it is produced directly by a unitary aggregated cause consisting of atoms, sense organ, cognition, etc.

Hence, we can conclude that, for Śubhagupta, gross form, such as something blue, etc., is both a sense perception and a constructive cognition, but not in the sense of constructive cognition as defined by language. In short, there is a constructive cognition, but not a conceptual one. If gross form, such as something blue, etc., is a mental illusion only, it will perish under examination.²⁹ By contrast, if we see a pot – in other words, atoms limited in a spatial stretch in the form of a pot – then even if we think that this gross form does not belong to the external object, it will never disappear as long as we look at it.³⁰ Likewise, a double moon appearing as gross form is not only mental illusion, but a sensory illusion caused by a defective visual sense organ. This is Śubhagupta's position.

3. *The Problem of Correspondence (avisamvāda or samvāda)*

Śubhagupta adopts the term 'correspondence' as a criterion for distinguishing veridical perceptions from non-veridical ones. The concept of correspondence or accord with the object means, in the experience of daily life, conformity with the behaviour patterns of judging, speaking, acting, etc., that immediately follow from a sense perception. The Vijñānavādins reject this in favour of a theory of impressions – specifically, there are two kinds of impressions (*vāsanā*), one characterized by firmness and the other by weakness (*dārdḥya-śaithilya-lakṣaṇā*).³¹

Śāntarākṣita provides an interesting example of an illusory sense cognition.³² Here the actual shell is white, but the person sees yellow; a white conch-shell mistaken for a yellow one because of colour-blindness. Some philosophers would claim that the cognition of a yellow conch-shell is a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), even if it is illusory, because it is not inconsistent in producing effects (*arthakriyā-avisamvāda*). The judgement that immediately follows an illusory sense perception such as "This is a conch-shell," is coherent with our daily judgemental behaviour pattern, so it is a valid means of knowledge. Kamalaśīla provides an explanation of this cognition after critically examining it. He asserts that consistency in producing effects is caused by a mental impression (*vāsanā*) as long as this cognition of a yellow conch-shell possesses [an inseparable] connection with

the impression of a white conch-shell, and that it is not caused by the external object.³³ This kind of impression theory goes back to Dharmakīrti. A passage from his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* reads as follows:³⁴

Even the unwise do not see trustworthiness in [this kind of] judgement, because there is a defect in it – i.e. it is connected to the disturbed impressions (*upaplava-vāsanā*). Hence, it cannot be called a valid means of knowledge. The other kind of judgement can be called a valid means of knowledge in terms of its coherence. The reason is that, as long as birth and death last, [it] possesses an inseparable connection with firm impressions (*dr̥dhavāsanā*).

Śubhagupta criticizes this kind of impression theory presented by Dharmakīrti by claiming that, without admitting the existence of external objects, impressions would not have the limitations of time, space, etc. Moreover, firm impressions are produced by the external object, so correspondance or non-correspondence with the objects in terms of time, space, etc., is what makes it dependant on the external object.³⁵

Let us examine this theory further. In his *Nyāyaviniścayavivarāṇa*, Vādirājasūri (c. 11th century A.D.), a Jainist philosopher, introduces the impression theory of the Vijñānavādin, Prajñākaragupta, and attacks it from a realist standpoint. His summation of the Vijñānavādin position reads:³⁶

Another says: "Depending upon the distinctions of the [cognitive] impressions (*vāsanā*), there arises the distinction [that this cognition is veridical or this cognition is non-veridical]." Impression is a capacity (*saṃskāra*) brought about by each preceding cognition, and it is distinguished by either the characteristic of firmness or the characteristic of weakness. Therefore, on the basis of that (i.e. distinction of the impression) this (i.e. distinction of the cognition) is to be admitted. That is, a distinction or determination is made, such as "The cognition of this pot is veridical" or "The cognition of hair, etc. [by a person with improperly functioning sense organs] is non-veridical." ... Indeed, the determination of a cognition as veridical or non-veridical is established according to whether an impression is firm or weak, and not according to whether an object exists or not ...

Prajñākaragupta does indeed criticize the realist theory of the existence of external objects, by invoking the theory of two kinds of impression. But, to the extent that I have researched the subject, his theory of impressions is not well known to Indian philosophers except Jainists. Realists usually attack Verse 336 of the Chapter on Perception in the *Pramāṇavārttika* with this criticism:³⁷

One [cognition] is what makes the [mental] impression of another [cognition] ripen. The determination of cognition [in terms of time, space, and so

forth] is made by it (i.e. the preceding cognition). It is not based on an external object. [Verse 336 of PV III]

The Jainist philosopher, Akalaṅkadeva (c. 720-780 AD) has responded to this kind of critique. We can tentatively formulate his response in the following way:³⁸

Thesis: Gross form, such as a pot which is delineated in terms of space, etc., is based on something else.

Reason: Because of the property of having a cause or causes.

Example: Like the cognition of the verbal acts [of other people].

Akalaṅkadeva holds the view that every cognition, which is delineated in terms of space, etc., is produced directly or indirectly by an external object, which can be differentiated from cognition. A cognition in a dream is no exception, and is indirectly based upon an external object. This view is very common among realists, including Śubhagupta. But, the Vijñānavādins reply to it with examples such as the cognition of one's own head being cut off.³⁹ Though one has never had such an experience, in a dream such a thing can happen. So in such cases, the cognition of having one's own head cut off could not be based even indirectly on a real experience that is separate from cognition.

Prajñākaragupta presents the following argument in this context in an attempt to bring realists over to his way of thinking:⁴⁰

[A realist, possibly Śubhagupta, claims that] the [external] object is the objective ground (*ālambana*) because it is the cause [of cognition]. [If you hold that position,] it would be reasonable [to say] that impressions are the cause [of cognition], for there is never [an instance when they are] not a cause. [Hence, impressions are the objective ground.] In addition, [we] admit that impressions possess the capacity to produce the [gross] form of that (i.e. object). You, too, hold a similar view.

It is true that Śubhagupta admits that the cognitive impression possesses the capacity to produce gross form, such as a pot appearing in the mind. But he also maintains that an external object possesses the capacity to produce directly or indirectly the limitations of space, time, etc., which gross form, such as a pot, possesses.

4. Final Considerations

Concerning the problem of determining a veridical or non-veridical cognition, Prajñākaragupta holds the view that a firm cognition is veridical and a weak cognition is non-veridical. He argues as follows:⁴¹

Even though [we Vijñānavādins maintain that] every cognition is erroneous, [we still recognise that] a relation exists between [a cognition] that is

negated and one that negates it. The reason [that can occur] is that there are [degrees of awareness based on] degrees of impressions. [Verse 946 of PVBh]

For him, a firm cognition can negate a weak one. Validity or invalidity depends on the relative degree of the impression, whether it is firm or weak, and not on the existence of external objects.

Śubhagupta holds the theory that only external objects can be the cause of firmness of impressions. In other words, the firmness of the impression depends on the existence of external objects, and weakness depends on the non-existence of external objects. For Śubhagupta, gross form appearing in the mind, such as something blue, etc., is produced by a firm impression, but possesses a correspondence with the object in terms of time, space, etc. It is not merely a cognitive impression but also a material impression.

Abbreviations

AAA	<i>Abhisamayālaṃkāra</i> of Haribhadra, ed. by Wogihara U. Tokyo, 1932.
ĀP	<i>Ālambanaparikṣā</i> , Tibetan Text: F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, Dignāga's <i>Ālambanaparikṣāvṛtti</i> , JIP, vol. 10, No. 2, 1982.
AS	<i>Aṣṭasahasrī</i> by Vidyānanda, Nirnayasagar Press, Sholapur, 1915.
BASK	<i>Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā</i> , See Mikogami (86)
Hattori (60)	Hattori, M., <i>Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā of Śubhagupta</i> . JIBS, vol. 8, No. 1, 1960.
Hattori (65)	Hattori, M., <i>Pratyakṣābhāsa – Dignāga's View and Dharmakīrti's Interpretation</i> . Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia Nos. 6-7, Kyoto, 1965.
Hattori (68)	<i>Dignāga, on Perception</i> . Harvard University Press 1968
Ichigo	Ichigo, M., <i>Chugan-shogon-ron no kenkyu</i> . Bunneido, 1985.
Kajiyama (65)	Kajiyama, Y., "Controversy between the Sākāra – and Nirākāravādins of the Yogācāra School – Some Materials." JIBS, vol. 14, No. 1, 1965
Kajiyama (77)	Kajiyama, Y., "Realism of the Sarvastivāda School," in L.S. Kawamura ed., <i>Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization; Essays in Honour of Herbert V. Guenther</i> . California, Dharma Publishing, 1977.
MAP	<i>Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā</i> of Kamalaśīla. see MAV
Matilal	Matilal, B.K., <i>Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge</i> . Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986.
MAV	<i>Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti</i> of Śāntarakṣita; Ichigo, <i>Madhyamakālaṃkāra</i> , Kyoto: Bunneido, 1985.

Mikogami (85)	Mikogami, E, "Jitsuzaironsha no Yuishikisetsu Hihan" in <i>Buddhism and its Relation to Other Religions. Essays in Honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi on his Seventieth Birthday</i> . Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1985.
Mikogami (86)	Mikogami, E., <i>Śubhagupta no Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā</i> . Ryukoku-Daigaku-Ronshu No. 429, 1986.
Mimaki	Mimaki, K., <i>BLO GSAI GRUB MTHA. Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo</i> Kyoto: Universite de Kyoto, 1982.
NV	<i>Nyāyaviniścaya</i> of Akalaṅkadeva See NVV
NVV	<i>Nyāyaviniścayavivarāṇa</i> of Śrī Vādirāja Sūri. Vol. 1, ed. by Mahendra Kumar Jain, Banaras, 1944.
PV	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> of Dharmakīrti – See Tosaki and Tosaki (85).
PVBh	<i>Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya</i> of Prajñākaragupta. ed. by Rāhula Śāṅkṛityāyana, Patna, 1953.
PVin	<i>Pramāṇaviniścaya</i> of Dharmakīrti. ed. by Tilmann Vetter, Wien, 1966.
PVSV	<i>Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti with the autocommentary</i> , ed. by Raniero Gnoli, Roma, 1960.
Shastri	Shastri, N.A., "Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā," <i>Bulletin of Tibetology</i> . vol. 4, No. 2, 1975.
SVB	<i>Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā</i> . Vol. 1, edited by M. Kumar Jain, Banaras, 1956
Tola and Dragonetti	Tola, F., and Dragonetti, C., "Dignāga's Ālambanaparikṣāvṛtti," <i>JII</i> vol. 10, No. 2, 1982.
Tosaki	Tosaki, H., <i>Bukkyo-Ninshiki-ron no kenkyu</i> . Tokyo: Jyokan Daitoshuppan, 1979.
Tosaki (85)	Tosaki, H., <i>Bukkyo-Ninshiki-ron no kenkyu</i> . Tokyo: Gekan Daitoshuppan, 1985.
TRD	<i>Tarkarahasyadīpikā</i> of Guṇaratnasūri: <i>Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya</i> of Haribhadrasūri ed. by Mahendra Kumar Jain, Calcutta, 1969.
TS	<i>Tattvasaṃgraha</i> of Śāntarakṣita, See TSP
TSP	<i>Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā</i> of Kamalaśīla. ed. by Swami Dwarkadas Shastri, Varanasi, 1968.
Yamakami	Yamakami Shodo, "Nyāyabhūṣaṇa no kenkyu (1)," <i>Kyoto-Sangyo-Daigaku-Ronshu</i> vol. 14, No. 1, 1984.

Notes

1. Quoted from Hattori's Translation. Hattori (68), p. 35.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 120

3. Hattori (60), pp. 369-395. There, Hattori identified quotations of Śubhagupta in the *Bahirarthaparikṣā* of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and its commentary with the verse from the *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* of Dge-srun, and he also gave a brief account of Śubhagupta's arguments and fixed his date at c. 650-750. Also, cf. E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga und Anderen," *Festschrift Moriz Winternitz*, 1933, pp. 240-241. Moreover, see Shastri (75).
4. Mikogami (86), p. 6.
5. Cf. Tola and Dragonetti, Translation, pp. 108 and 124. SVt provides this syllogism in the following way:
(vyāpti) yad avabhāṣate na tat sat yathā dvicandrādi
(pakṣadharmatā) avabhāṣate ca jñānaghaṭādi
6. TSP, p. 701: atra bhadantaśubhaguptaḥ pramāṇayati – yo jñānākāraḥ, sa saṃvāditve sati tathāvidhāparapadārthajanitāḥ, tadyathā grāhaka ākāraḥ / jñānākāraś cāyam aviṣrutendriyasya nilādipratibhāṣaviśeṣaḥ saṃvāditi.
7. Matilal, p. 370.
8. Mikogami (86), p. 7. / yul dan dus dan mi gzan la // śes pa mi bslu gaṇ yin pa // de ni mi 'khrul yin par śes // ma 'khrul mtshan nīd gzan med do // 8 //
9. PVBh, p. 383. dvividhaṃ hi mṛṣārthatvaṃ asadārthatvaṃ viśaṃvāditvaṃ ca.
10. Cf. PVin, p. 100, Yamakami, p. 136-137, and Mimaki, p. 136.
11. Mikogami (86), p. 8. dbaṇ don med la skyes pa'i blo // bag chags skad cig skad cig la // smin pa 'thob dan bar chad do // dbaṇ po don dag brtan pa'i rgyu // 12 //

This kind of realist's idea is reflected in the following passage in AS, p. 248: yathaiṣaṃ hi jāgradaśāyāṃ bahirarthavāsanāyā drḍhatamatvāt tadākārasya jñānasya satyatva-abhimānaḥ, svapnādidaśāyāṃ tu tatvāsanāyā drḍhatvābhāvāt tadvedanasya asatyatva-abhimāno lokasya ...

12. Cf. Mikogami (86), p. 12, BASK verse 35. Also, TS and TSP, p. 673:
tulyetyādinā bhadantaśubhaguptasya parihāram āśaṅkate / sa hy āha – yathā sadṛśāparāparakṣaṇotpādād vipralabdhasya grāhite 'pi pratyakṣeṇa śabdādau nityatvābhiramaḥ, tathā paramāṇūnām....
Dharmakīrti expresses a similar view in his PVSV, commenting on verse 238, PVSV, p. 119: tasmād indriyavijñānaviśeṣānubandhī sabhāgavāsanopādānavikalpapratibhāsavibhramāḥ padam / vākyam caikābavhāsi mithyaiva /
13. PVBh, p. 363: kāryakāraṇabhāvākhyā vāsanābhyupagamyate / bāhyārthavādiḥ bāhyam.... // 704 //
14. Matilal, p. 368.
15. TPS, p. 673. paramāṇūnām avicchinnaśeṣānām sajātiyānām yugapadgrahāṇe sthūla itī mānaso vibhramo bhavati / And also, cf. fn. 11 of this paper.
16. MAV, p. 162, and cf. Ichigo, pp. 58-61.
17. MAP, p. 163 and cf. fn. 1. AAA, pp. 632-633. Ichigo identified quotations on Kamalaśīla's commentary in the AAA: atha sarvaṃ eva pṛthagjanasya jñānam anāpannanilādyākāro-parāgaṃ pravartate. tatraikatvāhānīprasaṅgo na bhaviṣyati acitrarūpatvāt. nilādisaṃvedanarūpatā yā tasya vyavasthāpyate sā tatsaṃvedanarūpatvān na tu

nīlādirūpāpatteḥ tathā hy ālambanagrahaṇaprakāra evākāro. na tu tādrūpyam. yat tu nīlādi bahir iva pratibhāsamānam ālakṣyate tan na jñānākāratayā. api tu jñānam nīlādisamvedanam anubhavan pratipattā mohāt tathā bahirūpeṇa nīlādikam adhyavasyatīti.

18. Cf. Mikogami (86), p. 25, BASK Verse 92; That cognition is not an agent [of cognizance] and also not activity [of cognizance] in the ultimate sense. There must be cognition only. It is stated that [there is an agent of cognizance] by superimposing the property of agent [on that cognition].
19. Cf. fn. 17 of this paper. *ālambanagrahaṇaprakāra evākārah.*
20. Kajiyama (65), p. 428. *nirākāro bodho 'rthasahabhāvy ekasāmagryadhīnas tatrārthe pramāṇam.* TRD, p. 73.
21. Cf. Mimaki, fn. 226 and JNA, p. 351. *pūrvikaiva tu sāmagrī sajjñānam viṣayakṣaṇam / sālokarūpavat kuryād yena syāt sahavedanam // 81 //*
22. JNA, p. 351. *sāmagryā yadi niṣpanno vyakto 'rtho vedanena kim //*
23. Cf. Kajiyama (77), p. 129 – fn. 3. There, he made a correct observation, saying: “The theory that two or more cognitions cannot occur at once is common to the Sarvāstivāda, Vaiśeṣika, and Naiyāyika...”
24. PVBh, pp. 335-336. Cf. Tosaki, p. 388-389.
25. Śubhagupta presents his counter-argument against verse 1 of ĀP in the passage quoted in the TPS, p. 711: *yady apīndriyavijñapter grāhyāṃśaḥ kraṇaṃ bhavet / atadābhatayā tasyā nākṣavad viṣayaḥ sa tu //* And cf. Mikogami (85), pp. 285-299.
26. PVBh, p. 336: *parasparaviviktānuprathamapratibhāsanam / vikalpakāt tu vijñānāt dhanākārāvabhāsītā // 598 // paraḥ prāha / vikalpakasya vijñānasya ekadhanāvabhāsītā / tasyāpi pāramparyeṇa paramāṇavo hetuvād viṣayaḥ / ...*
27. Cf. fns. 5 and 11 of this paper, as well as Mikogami (86), p. 13, BASK verse 36. According to Sautrāntika, etc., external object is not even the direct cause as a helper (*upakāra*) of producing a cognition of something blue, etc.: see NVV, p. 403: *arthasya nīlāder janakatvena vyāpāra upakāro na viṣayatvena ... sautrāntikādyanugamena ca idam uktam, svataḥ sāṅśād api tatra tadupakārābhāvāt.*
28. PVBh, p. 336-337: *yadi tāvad mānasam etad dvicandrādijñānam indriyabhāvābhāvānurodhi na syāt / athendriyabhāvābhāvānurodhy api mānasam evaitat / tathā sati stambhādijñāneṣv api mānasatvaprasaṅgaḥ / prathamam svākāram eva jñānam paścād arthākāratā manasi ...*
29. See the following syllogism (SVt, p. 113):
(pakṣa) tad vivādagocarāpannam jñānam na mānasam
(hetu) pratisamkhyā-anirodhyatvāt
(dṛṣṭānta) yat punar mānasam na tat pratisamkhyā-anirodhyam
*yathā gavi sannihite gaur ayam ity *amānaso vikalpaḥ*
*(*mānaso vikalpaḥ in the text).*
30. See PVBh, p. 391: *nanu yo hi janitvā pradhvaṃsate sa mithyāpratrayo yathā na idaṃ rajatam iti ayam tu stambhādīḥ svaparaniṣcitāḥ katham viparyastaḥ /*
31. NVV, p. 402: *pūrvapūrvavikalpopanītaḥ saṃskāro vāsanā, tadbhedo dārḍhyaśaithi-lyalakṣaṇas tasmāt tam āśritya ayam pratiyamāno ghaṭādijñānam tathyam mithyā ca*

keśādiññānam iti bhedo nirṇayaḥ ... saṃskāradārdr̥ḥyaśaithilyābhyām eva kvacij jñāne tathyamithyātva-vibhāgaviniścayo na viśayabhāvābhāvābhyām iti ...

Also see fn. 9 of this paper.

32. Cf. Hattori (65), p. 128 and TS verse 1323 (p. 482):

pītaśaṅkhādibuddhīnāṃ vibhrame pi pramāṇatām / arthakriyāviśamvādād apare sampracaṣate //

33. TS verse 1328 and its commentary, TSP, p. 484:

pītaśaṅkhajñānasya vāsanāparipākahetuḥ śukla eva śaṅkhaḥ, tadādhipatyena tatparipākāt / vāsanāparipākahetutaḥ samutthānam yasyāviśamvādasya sa tathoktaḥ //

Cf. fn. 7 of this paper, as well as NVV, p. 403; NV verse 101 and NVV ad verse 101.

34. Yamakami, pp. 136-137. He identified this quotation of PVin in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: *upaplavavāsanābhisandhidoṣād aprabuddhasya apy anāśvāsikaṃ vyavahāram utpaśyann ekam apramāṇam ācaṣita, aparam ā saṃsāram aviśliṣṭānubandhadṛḥhavāsanatvād iha vyavahārāviśamvādāpekṣayā pramāṇam.*

35. Cf. fn. 7 of this paper, as well as NVV, p. 403; NV verse 101 and NVV ad verse 101.

36. Cf. fn. 28 of this paper.

37. Tosaki (85), p. 20: *kasyacit kiñcid evāntarvāsanāyāḥ prabodhakaṃ tato dhiyāṃ viniyamo na bāhyārthavyapekṣayā //* 337 // PVBh, p. 390.

38. NV, p. 403: *pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā parāpekṣāḥ sahetavaḥ / vicchinnapratibhāsinyo vyāhārādidiyo yathā //* 101 //

39. Mikogami (86), p. 7 and BASK verse 6: "If you claim that the cutting off of the head and the growing of the body is like a dream, then why do you endeavour to run away [from being cut] and to obtain [the growing]?"

40. PVBh, p. 395: *nanu yadi hetutvād evālambanatā vāsanāhetukam eva yuktaṃ / na hi sā na hetuḥ / dṛṣṭaśaktiś ca vāsanā tadākārajanane / tathā ca pratipāditāṃ bhavataiva /*

41. PVBh, p. 385: *mithyātve sarvabuddhīnāṃ tāratamyādibhāvataḥ / bādhyabādhakabhāvo 'yaṃ vāsanātāratamyataḥ //* 946 //

Sodō Mori

1.

Several years ago a comprehensive study of the Pāli Aṭṭhakathā literature¹ was published by Dr. Friedgard Lottermoser.² I reviewed it in English,³ comparing it with my own work on the same subject.⁴ Lottermoser's book referred to above is a fundamental study of the "Sihaḷa Sources" or "lost Sihaḷaṭṭhakathā literature" for the Pāli commentaries composed by Buddhaghosa (first half of the 5th century A.D.) and other commentators, which is based upon a thorough investigation of all the verse passages in the texts, specifically in Buddhaghosa's works. Although her achievement is indeed quite remarkable, there still remain many unresolved problems and new questions have also been raised. As one of various matters to be considered further, Lottermoser lists the following six kinds of "vague source references in the prose context":⁵

1. *Ariyavaṃsa* (the lineage of the noble ones)
2. *Ācariyagāthā* (the verse of a teacher)
3. *Ācariyaparamparā* (the lineage of teachers)
4. *Ānisaṃsakathā* (talk on profits)
5. *Pubbācariyehi* (by the former teachers)
6. *Māgandiyasuttupattiyam* (the origin of the Māgandiyasutta)

The majority of these six references are not mentioned even in Part I, the relevant section of my book which contains discourses on a total of thirty-five sources for the Pāli commentarial texts.⁶ Therefore, I examined each of the six, and wrote an article on four "source references" excluding the first and third ones. As regards these two omitted items, the third is not a reference to a source at all, but an indication of a topic to be investigated, as stated by Lottermoser herself. I have treated this topic in detail elsewhere.⁷ The first item, "*Ariyavaṃsa*" contains many aspects requiring careful and thorough examination calling for ample time. This being the case, I have given this item fresh consideration and would like to examine it in some depth in the present paper, together with "*Ariyavaṃsa-kathā*", a different source with a similar name, which has been newly discovered during my research.

Concerning the *Ariyavaṃsa*, all that is stated by Lottermoser is as follows:

- (1) "*ariyavaṃsa* (the lineage of the noble ones)" (Sv 1016 (1) = Mp III 56). This source is discussed by Rahula (1943) (see fn. 26).

As is clear from the above statement, Lottermoser did not devote any discussion to the *Ariyavaṃsa*, merely referring to Rahula's study.⁸ In fact, his study is practically the only detailed discussion available on this topic; no better research has been published so far.⁹ It begins with a critique of the earlier view by Paranavittana. Rahula states that the word "*Ariyavaṃsa*" has been used in three ways: (1) a *sutta* bearing that name; (2) the preaching of it (*desanā*), and (3) the practicing of the teaching given in that *sutta*, and he discusses these aspects based on various texts and inscriptions. He also mentions that the assembly for preaching the *Ariyavaṃsa* became a very popular large-scale festival of Buddhism in ancient Sri Lanka. His research is not adequate, however, and leaves plenty of room for further investigation, particularly concerning the historical changes in the meaning and content of the *Ariyavaṃsa*. To my knowledge, we are able to find in the canon the word "*Ariyavaṃsa*", but not "*Ariyavaṃsa-sutta*", and, furthermore, we are unable to find the *Ariyavaṃsa* as the title of an independent *sutta* in the present canon. The name of the *Ariyavaṃsa-sutta* appears for the first time in the Aṭṭhakathā literature. This fact leads us to consider the *Ariyavaṃsa* as source material for the Aṭṭhakathās, which fact was merely hinted at by Lottermoser by listing it as a "vague source reference," as stated before. I will therefore examine in some depth various aspects of the *Ariyavaṃsa*, especially its characteristics as a source reference, and I will do so by making use of some Chinese texts in the northern tradition which have not been taken up by Rahula.

2.

With respect to the *Ariyavaṃsa* found in the Pāli canon, it can be seen in at least five (or six) *suttas*, i.e. the *Dīgha*, *Āṅguttara*, *Jātaka*, *Mahāniddeśa* and *Paṭisambhīdāmagga* (as well as the *Cūḷaniddeśa*).¹⁰ The contents of the *Ariyavaṃsa* in these texts are all the so-called "*cattāro ariyavaṃsā*".¹¹ Yet they are not identical, but are further divided into the following two sorts:

(1) Teachings warning against avarice with regard to the four necessities of life, i.e. clothing (*cīvara*), food (*piṇḍapāta*), dwelling (*senāsana*) and medicine (*gilānapaccayabhesajja*). They are found in the above MNd, and will hereafter be referred to as Type A.

(2) Teachings warning against avarice in relation to the first three requisites, as listed above, and in addition a teaching about pleasure in self-cultivation and in self-abandonment through meditation (*bhāvanārāma*, *pahānārāma*). This replaces medicine as the fourth item. These teachings are given in the above DN and AN, and will hereafter be referred to as Type B.

Discrimination between Types A and B also appears in Chinese texts: the four items mentioned in the *Shūjū-kyō* (*Chun-chi-ching*), of the *Dirghāgama-sūtra* and the *Binibo-kyō* (*P'i-ni-mu-ching*) of the *Vinaya-piṭaka* are Type A,¹² while those in the *Sessho-kyō* (*Shuo-ch'u-ching*) of the *Madhyamāgama-sūtra*, the *Shūimon-sokuron* (*Chi-i-mên-tsu-lun*), *Hōun-sokuron* (*Fa-yün-tsu-lun*), *Honrui-sokuron*

(P'in-lei-tsu-lun), Daibibasha-ron (Ta-p'i-p'o-sha-lun), Kanromi-ron (Kan-lu-wei-lun), Kusha-ron (Chü-shê-lun), and Junshōri-ron (Shun-chêng-li-lun) are all Type B.¹³ In this connection, according to the *Abhidharmakośa* the original Sanskrit words for Type B are: *civara*, *piṇḍapāta*, *śayanāsana*, and *pahānabhāvanārāmatā*.¹⁴ In the final explanations for each of the four items of the *Ariyavaṃsa* appearing in the Pāli texts (the above DN, AN, MNd), the following stereo-typed passages are repeated: "Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave (bhikkhu, āvuso or no such word) *porāṇe aggaññe ariyavaṃse ʾthito*."

Concerning the original, it is interesting to find certain corresponding sentences in some of the Chinese texts referred to above, e.g. the *Shūjū-kyō*, *Sessho-kyō*, *Shūimon-sokuron* and *Hōun-sokuron*. Such textual evidence suggests that the above mentioned stereo-typed expression was composed at a fairly early period in the Buddhist history, and transmitted into different schools.

As to the derivation and relation of the two types of the *Ariyavaṃsa*, the four items of Type A, i.e. the three living necessities (clothing, food, and dwelling) plus medicine are none other than the so-called "four resources of *bhikkhu*" (*cattāro nissayā*, *cattāro paccayā*). However, only the first three are really absolutely essential requisites for human life. Although medicine is, of course, a very important material, it is still unnecessary for the healthy, and even for sick persons no extra amount or higher quality of medicine is needed beyond that necessary for a return to good health. On this point, then, it would be contradictory to insist on the same degree of importance for medicine as for clothing, food and dwelling. Moreover, Buddhist practice cannot be complete simply by adhering to these aspects. For the above reason, positive practices such as pleasing in self-cultivation and abandonment through meditation, could at times have been exchanged for the practice of restricting medicine to a minimum. I imagine that the *Ariyavaṃsa* of Type B was formed in this way.

In spite of such situations, it was nevertheless impossible to deny Type A entirely, and to alter it to Type B, partly because of its relation to the teachings of the four *nissayas* already explained. Then, at least in the Theravāda Buddhism of later times, they expounded that medicine was to be included as an item of food, or the two types were combined to form the "*Mahā-ariyavaṃsa*" (Large *Ariyavaṃsa*), which thus consisted of five items. I will make further points on this later in the present paper.

3.

Let us now proceed to the investigation of the many aspects of the *Ariyavaṃsa* found in later Pāli literature, e.g. the *Aṭṭhakathās*, chronicles, narratives, etc.: the so-called *Aṭṭhakathā* literature in the broader sense. First of all, how are the passages commenting upon the *Ariyavaṃsa* appearing in the five *suttas* discussed earlier, namely the *Dīgha*, *Āṅguttara*, *Mahāniddesa*, *Jātaka* and *Paṭisambhidāmagga*? In the case of the commentaries upon the DN, AN and MNd (but not in the case of

the J and the Pṭṣ),¹⁵ their corresponding passages are essentially identical with the exception of the fourth item of the *Ariyavaṃsa*. With regard to the latter, as explained before, the DN and AN show Type B, whereas the MNd shows Type A, hence the commenting sentences both in the DA and AA differ from that in the MNdA. Nevertheless, a common textual tendency can be seen throughout the passages in question in those three commentarial works. In particular, the corresponding passages in the DA and the AA are almost identical.¹⁶

To take up the case of the DA, it starts with a detailed explanation of the word “*Ariyavaṃsa*” itself, which is followed by *verbatim* comments on the original passages of the DN. Its annotation is comparatively rudimentary as Abhidhammic method: it gives equivalents to commented words or simply paraphrases original phrases. Such elementary comments are most probably based upon the older Aṭṭhakathā, which originated in India.¹⁷ On the other hand, we are able to find some detailed narrative stories and references to certain later persons and texts, which must have been inserted into these basic comments. That is to say, in the portion of the *Ariyavaṃsa*, several passages have been added: the story of an elder residing in the *Cetiyaṭṭhāra-vihāra*; a view of the well-known *Mahāsīvatthera*;¹⁸ and references to Dhammasenāpati Sāriputtatthera of India and to the *Visuddhimagga* (three times). It is clear that at least most of them were added later in Sri Lanka. Such insertions have increased the size of the passage regarding the *Ariyavaṃsa* quite considerably. In the case of the DA, it amounts to ten pages in total, although the commented passages of the DN are only a little over a single page in extent (34 lines to be exact). Comparing the commentary with the commented part, we are compelled to conclude that the scale of expansion of the former is very unusual. From this angle, we can judge that the *Ariyavaṃsa* gradually obtained people’s interest and became highly esteemed as time went on.

Furthermore, we must pay attention to the following fact regarding the part of the *Ariyavaṃsa* of the DA and the AA: they give Type B as to the four items, and thereby medicine is not taken up here as the fourth. According to the four *nissayas* (or *paccayas*), however, the fourth should definitely be the item of medicine. Having some doubts about this, the composer of the old Aṭṭhakathā purposely made a reference to “medicine” which was not found at all in the commented original. It is mentioned as follows:

*Gilāna-paccayo pana piṇḍapāte yeva pavitṭho.*¹⁹

(The requisite of medicine is regarded as a kind of food.)

Even though medicine and food can be seen as something in common in that they are both taken orally, nevertheless medicine is still medicine, and not a sort of food. The above interpretation therefore cannot as yet be considered a satisfactory explanation concerning the lack of medicine as the fourth. I think that the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa*, which consists of the five items was newly adopted in order to resolve this difficulty.

Let me now discuss the matter of the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa*. As I have briefly mentioned, the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa* is the larger *ariyavaṃsa* which contains the five items; the result of uniting Types A and B. This can be seen from the following three similar expressions:

1. *catupaccasantosa-bhāvanārāma-mahā-ariyavaṃsa* (AA II, 249)
2. *catupaccayasantosabhāvanārāma-paṭimaṇḍitaṃ mahā-ariyavaṃsa-paṭipadaṃ* (AA I, 192)
3. *catupaccayasantosa-bhāvanārāmatādīpakam mahā-ariyavaṃsa-paṭipadaṃ* (Vis I, 93)

Strictly speaking, not all the above expressions include "*pahānārāma*" (half of the fourth item of Type B. Nevertheless, as the above obviously contains the five items, the result of combining Types A and B, it can be assumed that the *pahānārāma* is included here. In spite of the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa* being the extended *Ariyavaṃsa*, as discussed above, the two are not necessarily strictly differentiated: in fact, it is said that the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa* was often simply called the *Ariyavaṃsa*. However, I am more inclined to think that ever since a certain later period in ancient Sri Lanka, the name of the *Ariyavaṃsa* was generally adopted to mean the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa* with the five items, and the original *Ariyavaṃsa* of the four items was then forgotten. As a result of this, it then became unnecessary to discriminate between these two. I think it rather difficult to assume that once the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa* of the five items began to be popular, the original *Ariyavaṃsa* of either Type A or Type B was still preached by persons who held fast to its old content.²⁰

We are able to see in the Aṭṭhakathā texts the name of the "*Ariyavaṃsa-sutta*" or the "*Mahā-ariyavaṃsa-sutta*", a name which appears neither in any text of the Pāli canon, nor in the list of titles of the canon.²¹ This is perhaps an indication of the developmental process of this *sutta*, showing that many additions and revisions were gradually made to the original minor part discussing the *Ariyavaṃsa* in a *sutta*, which finally formed an independent *sutta* both in quality and in quantity. One example of such an addition is the following story of Nāgātthera and Nāgāttherī.²² During the crisis caused by Brāhmaṇa-Tissa (or Caṇḍāla-Tissa) between 102 and 89 B.C., i.e. the interregnum of King Vaṭṭagāmaṇi who enthroned himself twice in Sri Lanka (a serious famine also occurred at that time),²³ Nāgātthera visited his sister, Nāgāttherī, who was living in the Bhātara Village. The sister intended to offer a meal which she had gained through alms, but the younger brother, afraid that it would be his own burden in mind on the occasion of preaching the *Ariyavaṃsa* after this famine has once been over, refused the meal. From this story it can be deduced that the *Ariyavaṃsa* in those days already contained the teaching that a *bhikkhu* should not accept meals from a *bhikkhunī*. Such a minute discipline as this had probably not been included in the earliest *Ariyavaṃsa*, i.e. the *Ariyavaṃsa* of the canon.

In any case, the (*Mahā-*) *Ariyavaṃsa-sutta* became highly valued in the course of time, and at long last there appeared a specialist who recited and expounded the text of this *sutta* for transmission. He is none other than the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa-bhāṇakatthera*, whose view is quoted in the SA (III, 182). A *Bhāṇaka* was initially the specialist in recitation for the transmission of particular *suttas*, whereas later his task, as the expert on a respective *sutta*, was not limited to repeating the text from memory, but extended to discussing its contents. The *Bhāṇakas* whose names are known to us through the *Aṭṭhakathā* texts are as below: the major figures are the *Bhāṇakas* of the *Digha*, *Majjhima*, *Saṃyutta*, *Aṅguttara*, *Jātaka*, and *Dhammapada*; and the minor figures are the *Bhāṇakas* of the *Ubhato-vibhaṅga* in the *Vinaya-piṭaka*, the *Mahācattāṭṭhāsaka*, *Ariyavāsa*, and also the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa* now in question.²⁴ In any case, the appearance of the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa-bhāṇaka* as a specialist would fully prove the fact that this (*Mahā-*) *Ariyavaṃsa-sutta* developed into an important independent text.

The "*Ariyavaṃsika*", a name similar to the (*Mahā-*) *Ariyavaṃsa-bhāṇaka*, occurs in the identical passages of the DA (II, 524) and the AA (IV, 17). These passages describe that when there were many cases of transgressors of precepts during the rainy season retreat for practice and study, the Order made the *Ariyavaṃsikas* preach the *Ariyavaṃsa* on the last day of it. The above statement also testifies that the *bhikkhus* as specialists on the *Ariyavaṃsa* definitely existed in the Order, and that they performed their duty on request. We are then justified in regarding the (*Mahā-*) *Ariyavaṃsa-bhāṇaka* and the *Ariyavaṃsika* as equivalents.²⁵

4.

The next topic concerns the social aspects of the (*Mahā-*) *Ariyavaṃsa-sutta* in the Buddhist community of ancient Sri Lanka. Its main topic relates to the assembly or festival for preaching the *Ariyavaṃsa*, which Rahula has already discussed in considerable detail.

I would like to examine the various materials in chronological order. The earliest datable statement so far exists in the AA (II, 249).²⁶ It relates that a woman living in Ullabhakolakaṇṇika took her baby and travelled a distance of five *yojanas* (ca. 35 miles) in order to listen to a sermon on the *Ariyavaṃsa-paṭipadā* delivered by Dighabhāṇaka-Mahā-Abhayatthera, who is regarded as having lived between the end of the 2nd and the first half of the 1st centuries B.C.²⁷ The date of this story coincides with that of Nāgatthera, mentioned above. From this story the following two points can be concluded: (1) the *Ariyavaṃsa-sutta* itself, as well as the assembly for preaching it, became so popular that even a lady follower attended the assembly; also (2) the teaching was never so difficult as to be within the comprehension only of the elders, i.e. specialists, nor was it useful only to them. In this connection, the *Daibibasha-ron* of the Sarvāstivāda School²⁸ contains the very long Abhidhammic arguments on the *Ariyavaṃsa*, which are quite probably intended for the comprehension of elder experts only. By contrast, the *Ariyavaṃsa*

of Sri Lankan Buddhists must not have been like this, but rather a very practical text, familiar even to beginner lay-Buddhists.

The second earliest mention is made in the *Mahāvamsa*. Chapter 36 of this chronicle²⁹ describes that King Vohārika Tissa (reigning in 214-236 A.D.) gave continuous donations to wherever the *Ariyavamsa* was preached throughout the island of Sri Lanka. This statement proves that the *Ariyavamsa* assembly was widely held over the country in the reign of this king, who promoted it by means of financial support. The *Visuddhimagga* (I, 66) also relates a story that once upon a time in a village an *Ariyavamsa* assembly was in session, in which a sincere *bhikkhu*, who always lived on food from begging, took part even though his friends were absent. In spite of the fact that the exact date of this story is uncertain,³⁰ it confirms that this assembly at the time was so popular that it was held even in remote country places. According to Rahula,³¹ moreover, the *Rasavāhini* includes three stories concerning the *Ariyavamsa*. He has also researched the frequency and dates of the *Ariyavamsa* assembly or festival, and has concluded that although they were not necessarily fixed,³² it was generally held during the rainy season retreat of the Order (between June and October).³³ There are records that it was held once a year: one record gives it as being held on the last day of the rainy retreat, while another says that it was on the twelfth day (near the full-moon) of the Nikaṇi Month (which starts in the middle of August) in that period. Other accounts state twice a year, or even twice a month on the Uposatha days in the retreat period. Even outside the rainy season retreat optional assemblies seem to have been occasionally held.

Today we are unable to find out why or when the (*Mahā*-)*Ariyavamsa-sutta*, and the assembly or festival connected with it which had been so prosperous, ceased to exist. There are almost no traces left of this *sutta* or even of its assembly in present-day Sri Lanka. Rahula reported that a book of the *Ariyavamsa-sutta* with its commentary in Pāli and an old *Sanne* (paraphrase) on it in Sinhalese was published in Colombo in 1898.³⁴ This work is likely to be the same as the Sinhalese *Sanne* on the *Ariyavamsa-sutta* written by Bāminivatte Unnāṇse, which is referred to in a book entitled the *Sanṅharājasādhucariyāva*, published in 1916. Its author is Āyittāliyadde Muhandirama, who lived in Kandy in the reign of King Kīrti Śrī Rājasimha, i.e. in 1747-1780. However, no one can, at present, describe the contents of this extant *Ariyavamsa-sutta*, or say whether or not it bears any close relation or similarity to that of the ancient *Ariyavamsa-sutta* under consideration in this paper.

5.

In this section discussion will centre on the "*Ariyavamsa-kathā*" which, in spite of having a very similar name to the "*Ariyavamsa*" already mentioned, can be concluded to be different material. Just like the *Ariyavamsa* itself, the

Ariyavaṃsa-kathā is one kind of “Sihala Source” for the Pāli Aṭṭhakathā texts, to which no one has paid any particular attention.

To my knowledge, the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā* appears only in Chapter 20, the *Maggāmagga-nāṇadassana-visuddhiniddessa*, of the *Visuddhimagga* (II, 626 f.). This chapter is part of a section discussing the matter of *paññā* (wisdom) in the above work, the composition of which is based wholly on the system of the three *sikkhās*, i.e. *sīla*, *saṃādhi* and *paññā*. That is to say, it is one of the five chapters (18 to 22) which treat the “*paññāya sarīra*” (trunk of wisdom) as the third topic of the “theory of how to practice *paññā sikkhā*”. In this chapter, profound or superficial wisdom of varying levels, and a great deal of methodology on how to obtain them, are expounded in detail. As part of it, there is a full exposition of the method of comprehending “formations” (*saṅkhārā*) by attributing the three characteristics (*anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta*) to them by means of the *rūpa-sattaka* (material septad) as well as *arūpa-sattaka* (immaterial septad).

The quotations from the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā* (“discourse on the noble ones’ heritage”) now in question can be seen in the passage explaining the way of the *arūpa-sattaka*. The *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā* is referred to in comparison with the *Visuddhi-kathā* (“discourse on purification”). The *arūpa-sattaka* is as follows: (1) by groups, (2) by pairs, (3) by moments, (4) by series, (5) by removal of [false] view, (6) by abolition of conceit, (7) by ending of attachment. Of the above seven cases, both in the first and seventh, the method mentioned in the *Visuddhi-kathā* is described first, and then the method in the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā* is cited. In the first case, moreover, it is stated that the method according to the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā* is better than that advocated by the *Visuddhi-kathā*, and therefore the former is also taken up in all other cases. In this manner, the method of the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā* is extensively adopted throughout all the seven methods of the *arūpa-sattaka*.

Certain questions remain unanswered, such as, what really are the *Visuddhi-kathā* and the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā* both quoted here in the Vis?; and what is the original material for them? Nor have we any clues for solving the mystery of whether these were two independent sources or parts of a certain large original source. Yet it should be obvious at least that these two “*kathās*” could have never been derived from the *Vimuttimagga* of the Abhyagiri fraternity in the Theravāda School, which text is surely one of the major sources for the *Visuddhimagga*, though no clear reference to the Vim is specifically made in the Vis., because the *Vimuttimagga* includes no quotation from, nor any reference to, the two “*kathās*”. We are compelled, from the above, to conclude that they were two kinds (or two parts) of the Old Sihala Source of the Mahāvihāra fraternity. This conclusion can be strengthened by textual evidence that Buddhaghosa, the author of the Vis who belonged to the Mahāvihāra, gives positive quotations from the two “*kathās*” especially from the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā*, as stated before.

Although no further details are known,³⁵ the following point is clear, to say the

least: judging from the quoted views of the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā*, it is *not* the same as the *Ariyavaṃsa-sutta* teaching of the *Ariyavaṃsa* with four items, nor as the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa-sutta* teaching with five items as the later enlarged text. Consequently, the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā* under discussion, together with the *Visuddhi-kathā*, is most likely another kind of Sīhaḷa Source for the Pāli Aṭṭhakathās, than the (*Mahā*-)*Ariyavaṃsa-sutta*.

Incidentally, Rev. Nyānamoli comments in his English translation of the Vis as follows:³⁶ "The Discourse on Purification" (*Visuddhi-kathā*) and the "Discourse on the Noble Ones' Heritages" (*Ariyavaṃsa-kathā*) are presumably names of chapters in the old Sinhalese commentaries no longer extant." His conjecture, however, is not founded in thorough investigation; in particular, there is no evidence at all for his opinion that the coupled *kathās* are names of chapters in the old Sinhalese commentaries. Notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that these "*kathās*" are some kinds of Sīhaḷa source reference for the Aṭṭhakathā literature; this is in reality the sole possible conclusion.

6.

To conclude, I should like to sum up as follows:

(1) The *Ariyavaṃsa* was originally *not* an independent *sutta*, because the name of this *sutta* cannot be found either in any text of the Pāli canon, or in the list of all the *suttas*.

(2) The *Ariyavaṃsa* in the Pāli canon always means the "*Cattāro Ariyavaṃsā*" ("the *Ariyavaṃsa* of the Four Items"). It is divided into two types: Type A refers to the items of clothing, food, dwelling and medicine; Type B refers to the first three above with the additional fourth item of "pleasure in self-cultivation and self-abandonment through meditation." Since these two types are differentiated in various Chinese versions of the canon and later texts, it is therefore not a teaching peculiar only to the Theravāda School.

(3) In the Aṭṭhakathā texts there appears the new *Ariyavaṃsa* consisting of five items as a joint system of the two types, which is generally named *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa*.

(4) Buddhists in ancient Sri Lanka placed great importance upon the *Ariyavaṃsa*, and so enlarged and revised it, adding abundantly to its content. As a result, the titles of the *Ariyavaṃsa-sutta*, and the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa-sutta* occurred in the Aṭṭhakathās for the first time. This fact means that the *Ariyavaṃsa* developed into an independent text. This can also be proved by the fact that the name of the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa-bhāṇakatthera* or the *Ariyavaṃsika* as a specialist for transmitting and expounding this *sutta* can be seen in the Aṭṭhakathās. However, this is not a *sutta* listed in the canon, and therefore it should be regarded as one variety of the lost Sīhaḷa Sources for the Aṭṭhakathās.

(5) The (*Mahā*-)*Ariyavaṃsa-sutta* which became a valuable text both in terms

of quality and quantity was often preached not only to elders, but also to ordinary lay-believers at every place in Sri Lanka: the assembly or festival for teaching it became a big event in the Buddhist community. The event seems to have principally been held during the rainy retreat period on a particular day or days, but the frequency and dates of its occurrence varied. The earliest story about an *Ariyavaṃsa* sermon can be traced back to around 100 B.C.

(6) it is unclear when and why the *Ariyavaṃsa-sutta* and its assembly declined. There is almost nothing left regarding them in Sri Lanka today.

(7) Another text, called the *Ariyavaṃsa-kathā*, similar in name to the *Ariyavaṃsa(sutta)* is quoted and referred to only in the *Visuddhimagga*, during a comparison with the *Visuddhi-kathā*. Judging from its contents, however, it is not the same as the *Ariyavaṃsa(sutta)*, but one other kind of the Sihaḷa source reference of the Mahāvihāra Order.

Abbreviations

References to Pāli texts refer to the Pāli Text Society's editions, unless otherwise specified below.

AA	<i>Āṅguttaraṭṭhakathā</i> , Manorathapūraṇī
AN	<i>Āṅguttaranikāya</i>
CNd	<i>Culla-Niddesa</i>
CNdA	<i>Culla-Niddesaṭṭhakathā</i> , Saddhammapajjotikā
DA	<i>Dīghaṭṭhakathā</i> , Sumaṅgalavilāsini
DN	<i>Dīghanikāya</i>
J	<i>Jātaka</i>
Kośa	<i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> (ed. P. Pradhan, Patna, 1967)
MA	<i>Majjhimaṭṭhakathā</i> , Papañcasūdanī
Mhv	<i>Mahāvaṃsa</i>
MNd	<i>Mahā-Niddesa</i>
MNdA	<i>Mahā-Niddesaṭṭhakathā</i> , Saddhammapajjotikā
Pts	<i>Paṭisambhidāmagga</i>
PTS	Pāli Text Society
SA	<i>Sāmyuttaṭṭhakathā</i> , Sāratthappakāsini
Taishō	Taishō Edition of Chinese Buddhist Texts
VibhA	<i>Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā</i> , Sammohavinodanī
Vim	<i>Vimuttimagga</i> (the original text is lost)
Vis	<i>Visuddhimagga</i>
VisT	<i>Visuddhimaggaṭṭhikā</i> , Paramatthamañjūsā (ed. B.N. Shukla, 3 vols., Varanasi, 1969-71)

Notes

I am grateful to Miss B.A. Scott, a former British visiting professor, Women's Junior College of Josai University, Japan, for having looked over my English in the present article.

1. This here refers to the *Visuddhimagga* and the primary commentaries upon the Pāli canon, and is also called the (Pāli) *Aṭṭhakathās*, the *Aṭṭhakathā* texts, the (Pāli) commentaries, etc.
2. F. Lottermoser, *Quoted Verse Passages in the Works of Buddhaghosa – Contributions towards the Study of the Lost Sīhaḷaṭṭhakathā Literature*, Göttingen, 1982, xxviii+ 631 pp.
3. The *Bukkyō Kenkyū*, (*Buddhist Studies*) XV (Hamamatsu, 1985), pp. 125-143.
4. S. Mori, *Pāli Bukkyō Chūshaku-bunken no Kenkyū – Aṭṭhakathā no Jyōzabuteki-yōsō* (*A Study of the Pāli Commentaries – Theravādic Aspects of the Aṭṭhakathās*, Tokyo, 1984; Japanese with English summary and table of contents)
5. Lottermoser, *op. cit.* (n. 2) p. 216 f.
6. Mori, *op. cit.* (n. 4) pp. 75-307.
7. S. Mori, "Some Minor Sources for the Pāli Aṭṭhakathās – with Reference to Lottermoser's Study" in *Indological and Buddhist Studies – Volume in Honour of Professor J. Takasaki on his 60th Birthday*, Tokyo, 1987, pp. <143>-<154>.
8. W. Rahula, "The Significance of Ariyavaṃsa", *University of Ceylon Review*, vol. I, No. 1 (April 1943), pp. 59-68.
9. The essential points of this study are reproduced in his own work, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo, 1956. pp. 268-273), and C. Witanachchi's statement on this topic in the *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* (ed. by G.P. Malasekera, Colombo, vol. II, Fasc. 1, pp. 89-92) never surpasses Rahula's study.
10. DN III, 224 ff.; AN II, 27 f.; J II, 441; Pts I, 84. According to Professor K. Mizuno's Japanese translation of the *Cullanidesa* (*Nanden-daizōkyō* XXIV, p. 415 f.), the CNd contains a passage on the *Ariyavaṃsa* almost identical to that of the MNd. Yet his translation is not of the PTS edition (by W. Stede, 1918), which is an abridged text, but of a Siamese edition (1926), which is a complete text. The passage under consideration in the CNd is included in the prose part for verse 42, and this part and the later parts, for some unknown reason, do not exist in other editions, such as the Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition, the Indian Nālandā edition and the Sri Lankan Buddha Jayanti edition. There arises, therefore, the possibility that all these parts are later additions occurring only in the Siamese edition. However, as these parts complete the text, it would be better for the text to include them from the point of view of content, and, moreover, the PTS's commentary on the CNd also contains the part commenting upon verse 42 and the later parts. In any case, since the passage on the *Ariyavaṃsa* in the CNd is almost the same as that in the MNd, only the passage in the latter is dealt with here. For the present study no difficulty arises from this method.
11. Only in the Pts (I, 84) does "cattāri ariyavaṃsāni" (nt., pl.) appear, and here its content is not shown.
12. Taishō I, 51a; XXIV, 804c.
13. Taishō I, 563bc; XXVI, 392bc, 466bc, 738abc; XXVII, 907a f.; XXVIII, 978bc; XXIX, 117bc, 970a. Cf. the *Abhidon-shinron-kyō* (*A-p'i-t'an-hsin-lun-chin*; Taishō XXVIII, 862b).

14. Kośa, p. 336, II. 7-11.
15. In the case of the *Jātaka*, the type of *Ariyavaṃsa* is unknown, and in the case of the Pṭs, only the name of the *Ariyavaṃsa* is given (cf. n. 11).
16. DA III, 1009-16; AA III, 44-56. As concerns the close correspondance between DA and AA, it seems that the AA consulted the DA, because it has been concluded that the DA was composed earlier than the AA. See Mori, *op. cit.* (n. 4) pp. 92-104.
17. Cf. Mori, *op. cit.* (n. 4) p. 52 f.
18. As regards *Mahāsīvatthera*, see S. Mori, "Mahāsīvatthera as seen in the Pāli Aṭṭhakathās," *Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies*, vol. 1, Colombo, 1987, pp. 117-127.
19. DA III, 1016; AA III, 56.
20. But even in the Aṭṭhakathā texts, there exist certain passages explaining the *Ariyavaṃsa* of the four items, e.g. the Vis (I, 59) shows Type B of it. It should be understood that they are derived from an older stratum of sources of Indian origin which would be more or less common to the canon. Generally speaking, the Aṭṭhakathā texts have two basic strata: an older stratum mentioned above, and a newer stratum added in Sri Lanka. Cf. Mori, *op. cit.* (n. 4) p. 52f.
21. MA I, 15 for the former; MA II, 246 and AA III, 44 (as *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa-suttanta*) for the latter.
22. DA II, 535 ff.; MA II, 399; AA II, 343 f.
23. As to the dates of the reigns of Sri Lankan kings, those given in S. Paranavitana, "A Chronological List of Ceylon Kings," in *University of Ceylon, A Concise History of Ceylon* (Colombo, 1961) pp. 341-346 are adopted here as the most recent and reliable ones.
24. With respect to the *Bhāṇakas*, cf. Mori, *op. cit.* (n. 4) pp. 274-282, and VibhA, p. 459 (only for the *Ariyavaṃsa-bhāṇaka*).
25. Yet this *sutta* was not necessarily preached by the *Mahā-ariyavaṃsa-bhāṇakas* only; e.g. it is mentioned that Nāgatthera and Dighabhāṇaka (Mahā) Abhayatthera, neither of whom were *Ariyavaṃsa-bhāṇakas*, preached this *sutta*. DA II, 535 ff.; MA II, 399; AA II, 249 and III, 343 ff.
26. According to Rahula, p. 67 f., in the Bhābru Edict of King Aśoka there appears the name "Aliyavasāṇi" as one of the seven *suttas* which were widely recommended to both elders and lay-Buddhists by the king. Rahula considers this *sutta* to be the *Ariyavaṃsa*. If this is so, then this inscription would be the oldest datable reference to the *Ariyavaṃsa*.
27. As regards him, cf. S. Mori, "Chronology of the 'Sihala Sources' for the Pāli Commentaries (II)," *Bukkyō Kenkyū* (n. 3) vol. XVII, 1988, pp. 126 ff.
28. Taishō XXVII, 907a-909c.
29. Mhv., Chapter XXXVI, Verse 38.
30. Rahula, *op. cit.* (n. 8) pp. 6 2ff. thinks that it dates from the time of Buddhaghosa (first half of the 5th century A.D.), but his opinion has no solid basis. In fact, it should be dated back to a much earlier period. Cf. Mori, *op. cit.* (n. 27), pp. 150-161.
31. Rahula, *op. cit.* (n. 8) p. 62.
32. His judgement is likely to be sound, because the assembly or festival had continued

throughout Sri Lanka for a long period stretching over several centuries. There are a variety of possibilities.

33. Rahula, *op. cit.* (n. 8) p. 68.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Regarding this, Visṭ (III, 1473 f., 1476 f.) makes no comment.

36. Bhikkhu Nyāṇamoli, tr., *Path of Purification – Visuddhimagga*, 2nd edition, Colombo, 1964, p. 729, note 25.

This is a revised paper under the same title published in the *Bulletin of Josai University*, XIII (Saitama, Japan, 1989) pp. 1-12.

The Metre of the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Upāli-sūtra

K.R. Norman

1. Introduction

The *Upāli-sutta*¹ of the Pāli *Majjhima-nikāya*² ends with ten verses of three lines each, i.e. six *pādas*, containing 100 epithets of the Buddha. These verses belong to the small body of texts in Pāli and Ardha-Māgadhī written in the old *āryā* metre.³ This metre, also called old *gīti*,⁴ consists (as has been described by Alsdorf)⁵ of (usually) four *pādas*, of which the first and third (the “odd” or “prior” *pādas*) comprise three *gaṇas* of four morae each, the second commonly being an amphibrach (◡ – ◡), followed by an anceps syllable (◡). As Alsdorf states, this shows that it is correct to speak of “*pādas*,” whereas it is not strictly correct to do so of classical *āryā* verses. The second and fourth *pādas* (“even” or “posterior”) comprise the same pattern of *gaṇas*, but before them is placed a prefix of one, two, or even three syllables. It is likely that in origin this prefix consisted of either a single long or two short syllables. The distinction between odd and even *pādas* would then be the same as that between the odd and even *pādas* of *vaitāliya* or *aupacchandāsaka* verses. In practice, however, this prefix may be one, two, or three shorts, one or two longs, a short and a long, or a long and a short, just as can be found in less regular *vaitāliya* or *aupacchandāsaka* verses. There is in the *Jātakatthavaṇṇanā*⁶ a pair of verses consisting solely of even *pādas* following this pattern. This would be comparable to a metre consisting solely of even *vaitāliya* or *aupacchandāsaka pādas*.

If an odd *pāda* ends in a short syllable, and the even *pāda* begins with a trochee (– ◡), then the resulting fourth *gaṇa* is an amphibrach, and this (with the shifting of the caesura to the end of the third *gaṇa*) would result in the form of the classical *gīti*, since both lines would have a sixth *gaṇa* (i.e. the second full *gaṇa* of the even *pādas*) consisting of four morae, commonly in the form of an amphibrach. It is possible that a trace of this development can be seen in the rule whereby, if in a classical *āryā* the caesura does not come at the end of the third *gaṇa*, then the fourth *gaṇa* must be an amphibrach.

Since the fourth *gaṇa* in its shortest form may consist of only two short syllables (where the odd *pāda* ends in a short and the even *pāda* begins with another short), or of other combinations varying in length up to three long syllables (where the odd *pāda* ends in a long and the even *pāda* begins with two longs), it is not possible to state the normal morae count of an old *āryā* line. It could be as little as 6 x 4, + 2

+ 1 (where the eighth *gaṇa* is a short syllable) or as much as 6 x 4, + 6 + 2 (where the eighth *gaṇa* is a long syllable), i.e. from 27 to 32 morae.

As Alsdorf has pointed out,⁷ the form of the odd *pādas* of the old *āryā* metre can sometimes be identical with a particular form of an odd *śloka pāda*. This sometimes led to a situation where an odd *śloka pāda* could occur in place of an odd old *āryā pāda*.

2. The metre of the Pāli Upālisutta

Since every *pāda* in the ten Pāli verses⁸ ends with either an epithet of the Buddha in the genitive singular with the ending *-assa* or *-issa*, or the verb *asmi*, it happens by chance that every odd and every even *pāda* ends in a short syllable. The pattern for the beginning of the even *pādas* (i.e. after the caesura) is as follows: *◡* – in 1(i),⁹ 9(i); *◡* ◡ in 1(ii), 2(i, ii), 5(i), 7(i), 10(i); *◡* ◡ in 7(ii), 8(i, ii); – in 3(i, ii), 4(i, ii), 5(ii), 6(i, ii), 9(ii), 10(ii); *◡* ◡ ◡ in 1-10(iii). This produces a situation where six of these fourth *gaṇas* are amphibrachs, with the caesura after the first short syllable. The other patterns of fourth *gaṇas* are as follows: *◡*, *◡* –; *◡*, *◡* ◡; *◡*, –; and *◡*, *◡* ◡ ◡.¹⁰

Professor von Hinüber has recently discussed the metre of the Pāli *Upālisutta*.¹¹ He notes that the metre is *āryā*, but it is not clear whether he realises that it is old *āryā*, with all the implications of that metre. He states¹² that in 5(ii) the form *-dh<uv>ajassa* (i.e. with a *svarabhakti* vowel) should be read in place of *panna-dhajassa* (from Skt *panna-dhvajasya*). This suggested reading would give a regular fourth *gaṇa* with four morae forming an amphibrach. As, however, eight other lines, as just noted, have the same pattern in their fourth *gaṇas* as 5(ii), i.e. an iambus (*◡*, –), there seems to be no reason for emending the text in this way.

Śloka pādas are found in place of odd old *āryā pādas* in lines 2(iii), 3(i, ii), 6(ii, iii), 7(ii, iii), 9(ii, iii) and 10(ii), i.e. in ten of the thirty lines. Von Hinüber comments¹³ that in 10(ii) *āhūniyassa* is more correct metrically than the form *āhuneyyassa*, which is found in the PTS edition, and he therefore suggests that the former is the correct reading, as it (probably) is in Ja V 221, 29*¹⁴. It is undoubtedly true that *āhūniyassa* gives a scansion which is correct by the standards of the classical *āryā*, but the metre of the odd *pāda* of 10(ii) as it stands is *śloka*, and in view of the fact that there are nine other *śloka pādas* in this set of verses, it would seem that there is no good reason for believing that *āhuneyyassa* is incorrect in this position. It is noteworthy that a number of the *śloka pādas* show resolution of a long syllable, usually the sixth, into two short syllables.

Although the second full *gaṇas* of the even *pādas*, i.e. the sixth *gaṇas* of the lines, are usually amphibrachs, there are examples of other *gaṇa* patterns: *◡* ◡ – in 2(ii), 3(ii); *◡* – – in 7(i) and *◡* ◡ ◡ ◡ in 1(i), 6(ii), and 10(i).

As noted above, the morae count for the old *āryā* metre may lie between 27 and 32. The morae count for the Pāli *Upālisutta*, for those lines which do not contain *śloka pādas*, is either 28 or 29.

3. The BHS version

Fragments of a BHS version of these verses attributed to Upāli, with an extra verse of two lines added at the end, totalling eleven verses in all, were published by Hoernle in 1916.¹⁵ In 1979 Ernst Waldschmidt published a new edition of the BHS version,¹⁶ based upon two fragments from the German Turfan Collection. He commented¹⁷ that the first and third lines of each verse have 30 morae and the middle lines 30 or 27 morae. Although he did not say so specifically, this would seem to indicate a belief that in some verses the first and second lines constitute a regular classical *āryā* verse (with 27 morae in the second line), and in other verses a *gīti* verse (with 30 morae in the second line), with the third line repeating the pattern of the first, although such a development of the classical *āryā* does not seem to occur elsewhere. Waldschmidt stated¹⁸ that he had intended to ask Ludwig Alsdorf to survey the metre of these verses, but his request was thwarted by Alsdorf's untimely death.

The purpose of this paper, offered in honour of Professor A.K. Warder, whose study of Pāli metre¹⁹ is still unsurpassed, is to carry out the task which Alsdorf was unable to do, as far as the fragmentary nature of the material permits. There are gaps in the BHS version as edited by Waldschmidt, but even when the Sanskrit version is completely missing, it is usually possible to deduce from the Chinese translation the meaning of the Sanskrit words which are lost, and hence to supply the corresponding Pāli words, and from these to deduce what forms the missing Sanskrit words might have had. It is on the basis of Waldschmidt's attempts to do this that this analysis is made. Its aim is to define any differences between the metres of the Pāli and BHS versions, and to assess the significance, if any, such differences might have.

4. A comparison of the Pāli and BHS versions

When the BHS version is compared with the Pāli version, it is seen that there is a considerable rearrangement of the verse order. Corresponding to Pāli 1-10, the BHS version has I, II, IX, IV, V, VII, III, VI, VIII, X. The order of *pādas* varies, too, with part of 8e going with 4a-d to make IV; 4e going with 5a-d to make V; 5e going with 7a-d to make VI; 10c and 6e going with 8ab, d to make IX; 8c going with 10 ab, de to make X.

Even in the *pādas* there are changes in the words: the refrain ends with *śrāvaka Upāli* in the BHS version instead of the Pāli *sāvako asmi* (to follow Alsdorf's emendation); BHS has *vigata-lobhasya* in V(ii), but Pāli has *vītarāgassa* in 5(ii); BHS has *akuhasya* in VII(i) which equals Pāli *akuhassa* in 6(i), but one BHS manuscript has *adruhasya*, which has no parallel in Pāli; BHS *pādakasya* is not in VII(ii) with *snātakasya* (cf. Pāli 6(ii)), but in VIII(iii) with *saṃgātigasya*; *vīrasya* is in BHS VII(iii) with the unparallelled *viprasannasya*, not in IX(iii) with *māyāchido* (cf. Pāli 3(iii)); BHS *vigatakrোধasya* is in VIII(i), but Pāli *vītalobhassa* is in 9(i); BHS

atulasya (VIII(ii)) and *amamasya* (X(ii)) have exchanged positions when compared with Pāli *atulassa* (10(ii)) and *asamassa* (9(ii)), doubtless because they scan in an identical way; the odd *pāda* in BHS X(iii) begins with *yaśo*, and ends with *p(rā)ptasya*, making the position of the equivalent of Pāli *mahato* doubtful.

The list of one hundred epithets in both is not identical, since there is a small change of vocabulary. Only Pāli has *viditaveda*, *tiṇṇa*, and *tārayanta*; only BHS has *śamitavaira*,²⁰ *viprasanna* and *amāya*, as Waldschmidt has pointed out.²¹

5. *The metre of the BHS version*

When the form of the BHS verses is considered, it is immediately apparent that, despite the changes of vocabulary just mentioned, the structure of the Pāli and BHS verses is the same, and apart from some *śloka pādas* the metre of the BHS verses is old *āryā*, for the morae count is not sometimes 30/30/30 and sometimes 30/27/30 as Waldschmidt stated. There is, in fact, no example of a sixth *gaṇa* (as reconstructed by Waldschmidt) with a single short syllable, although he can be excused for thinking so, because of the fragmentary nature of his text. The conclusion is justified, I think, that the metre of the BHS version was simply taken over from the MIA version upon which it was based.

As is typical of BHS texts, consonant groups have been restored in the BHS version, with a complete disregard for the effect which this would have upon the metre. When a consonant group is restored at the beginning of a word, it lengthens a short syllable at the end of a preceding word. This usually distorts the metre, except when the preceding short syllable is at the end of an odd *pāda*, and therefore in an anceps position. Von Hinüber does not notice this, and states²² that the restoration of *pr-* in *prahīna-* in I(i) does not make position. Since the preceding vowel is in an anceps position, there is nothing to show whether it makes position or not. The same applies to *kṣṇa-* in V(i), *praviviktasya* in VI(ii), and *trai-* in VII(i).

Restoration of consonant groups in other initial positions, however, does render the metre incorrect: *śrāvaka* in I-X(iii); *prānta-* in V(i); *brahma-* in VII(i); *snātakasya* in VII(ii); and *prabhāsa-* in IX(ii). The situation with regard to *prāptasya* in X(iii) is unclear, because it does not seem to be possible to reconstruct the *pāda*. The restoration of a consonant group in the middle of a compound may also ruin the metre if the MIA equivalent had a single consonant preceded by a short vowel, e.g. *kṛta-śrāmaṇyasya* in II(ii), cf. Pāli *-sāmaṇassa*; *vaśa-prāptasya* in III(iii), cf. Pāli *vasi-pattassa*; *mauna-prāptasya* in IV(i), cf. Pāli *-pattassa*; *agra-prāptasya* in VI(ii), cf. Pāli *-pattassa*; *brahma-prāptasya* in VII(i), cf. Pāli *-pattassa*; *bhūri-prajñasya* in VIII(i), cf. Pāli *-paññassa*; and *vigata-krodhasya* in VIII(i), where the Pāli has *vīta-lobhassa*. In some positions the metre is flexible enough for the insertion of consonant groups not to matter, e.g. *prāpti-prāptasya* in III(i) giving a fourth *gaṇa* ~, - -; and *vyākaraṇeṣu*²³ in III(i) giving a sixth *gaṇa* -, -.

The BHS redactor also inserted²⁴ a replacement for non-historic case endings which occur in the Pāli version, and which probably also occurred in the MIA version which underlies the BHS version, e.g. he writes *akathamkathasya* for *akathamkathissa*,²⁵ *virajaso* for *virajassa*, and *māyāchido* for *mānacchidassa*, even though these “corrections” sometimes go against the metre. It can, therefore, be deduced that if the underlying MIA version had included *vedissa*, the BHS redactor would have written *vedino*, but the presence of *vedino* does not prove the occurrence of *vedissa* in the MIA version.²⁶ It also appears that the BHS redactor wrote *-śrāmanyasya* for the form *-sāmaṇassa* he received,²⁷ doubtless thinking that the latter was a non-historic MIA form. Waldschmidt was, therefore, probably correct in replacing other non-historic forms by correct Sanskrit forms in his reconstructions, e.g. *bhāvītātmanaḥ* in III(i), *saṃvṛtātmanaḥ* in IV(ii), and *āhavanīyasya* in VIII(ii), although all these forms are unmetrical.

The BHS redactor also changed unhistoric vowel lengthening which occurs in the Pāli version for metrical reasons, even though his changes ruin the metre, e.g. *anupamasya* (in II(iii)) for Pāli *anopamassa*, and *smṛtīmato* (in III(ii)) for Pāli *satīmato*. It is not clear why Hoernle’s MS reads *-śayānasya* (in V(i)).

Hiatus is common in the Pāli version, and was apparently common in the MIA version underlying the BHS version. For the most part the BHS redactor did not worry about this, and he frequently left the ending *-asya* uncontracted with an initial vowel of a following word. There are, however, one or two places where he shows signs of being conscious of hiatus. In IV(i) he inserted *ca* before *aprameyasya* according to Waldschmidt’s MSS, although *ca* does not occur in Hoernle’s MS. This then produced *cāprameyasya* by crasis. After changing *-cchidassa* to *-chido* (*-cchido* in Hoernle’s MS) in IX(iii), by replacing the non-historic case ending *-assa* with *-o*, he then inserted *hy*, presumably to prevent the usual *sandhi* of initial *a-* becoming *’* after final *-o*. That he was not completely unaware of *sandhi* is also shown by his consistent writing of *śrāvaka* before *Upāli* in I-X(iii). Waldschmidt was doubtless correct in assuming that the BHS redactor would have written *dhyāyino* for *jhāyissa* in VI(i), which would have led to the elision of *a-* in the following word *anugātāntarasya*, as Waldschmidt conjectured, unless a particle such as *hy* had been inserted. The Pāli version tolerates hiatus in *no apanatassa*, but the BHS redactor doubtless thought that he should either follow the *sandhi* rule and write *no ’vanatasya* (with *ava-* for *apa-*), or give a contracted form *nāvanatasya* in III(ii), with the negative *na* replacing the less common *no*. The result of this is that the sixth *gaṇa* is an iambus (˘ –). The one place where a simple contraction takes place between the final vowel of one word and the initial vowel of the next is unfortunately across the caesura in II(ii), where the redactor wrote *manujasyāntima-*.

As already noted, not only do the verses of the BHS version occur in a form which makes it clear that the old *āryā* verses have been taken over and transformed²⁸ without any regard for the errors in metre which this produces, but

it can also be seen that the *śloka pādas* were taken over, too. Although the odd *pādas* in BHS VIII(ii) = Pāli 10(ii) and IX(i) = 3(i) are lost, it can be seen that if Waldschmidt's reconstructions are accepted the *pādas* are still *śloka*. Of the others, II(iii) = 2(iii), III(ii) = 7(ii), III(iii) = 7(iii), V(iii) = 6(iii), VI(iii) = 9(iii), IX(ii) = 3(ii), and X(ii) = 9(ii) are all *śloka*. It is not obvious why *atha* has been added in VII(ii) = 6(ii),²⁹ where the odd *pāda* scans as a *śloka* with resolution of the sixth syllable. Some odd *pādas* which were old *āryā* in the Pāli, and probably in the underlying MIA version also, scan as *śloka* in the BHS version, but this would seem to be unintentional, and probably arises by chance from the restoration of Sanskrit forms, e.g. II(iii)* = 2(iii) (with resolution of the first syllable), III(i)* = 7(i), and IV(ii) = 4(ii), where the addition of an asterisk (*) indicates that the reading, and therefore the metre, is not certain.

The introduction of initial consonant groups in the BHS version leads to a situation where the scansion of the fourth *gaṇas* (as reconstructed by Waldschmidt) is as follows: -, ∪ in I(i), ∪, - ∪ in I(ii), II(i)*; ∪, ∪ ∪ ∪ in I(iii), III-X(iii) and X(i); - (without caesura) in II(ii); -, ∪ ∪ ∪ in II(iii); -, - in III(i)*; ∪, ∪ ∪ in III(ii); ∪, - in IV(i), V(ii), VIII(ii), IX(i*, ii), X(ii); -, - in IV(ii), VII(ii)*; -, - ∪ in V(i); -, ∪ in VI(i)*; -, ∪ ∪ in VI(ii); ∪, - ∪ in VIII(i). In the extra verse XI(i) has ∪, - ∪, and XI(ii) has -, - but this becomes -, - if, as is probable, -ār<a>hasya is read in the sixth *gaṇa*.³⁰ Although XI(ii) is an old *āryā* line as it stands, it is likely that the underlying MIA version had *purato nigantha-parisāya*, which would give an amphibrach in the second *gaṇa*. The ending -aḥ before *varṇam* is not good Sanskrit *sandhi*.

The scansion of the sixth *gaṇas* in the BHS version, following Waldschmidt's reconstructions, but excluding IX(i) for which no reconstruction is given, and marking the defective lines with an asterisk, is as follows: ∪, ∪ ∪ ∪ in I(i)*,³¹ I-X(iii), V(ii), VII(ii), X(i); ∪ ∪ in I(ii)*, II(i)*, IV(ii)*, V(i), VI(i)*, VIII(ii), X(ii); ∪ ∪ - in II(ii); -, - in III(i); ∪, - in III(ii); ∪, - in IV(i), VI(ii); -, - in VII(i); ∪, ∪ ∪ - in VIII(i); and -, ∪ - in IX(ii); XI(i) has ∪ ∪, ∪ ∪ and XI(ii) has -, - ∪, but this becomes ∪ ∪ ∪ if -ā<ra>hasya is read, although this makes the fourth *gaṇa* into -, -.

6. The Chinese version

Waldschmidt quoted in his footnotes, in translation, the epithets from the Chinese version of the *Upāli-sūtra*. As identified by him, some parallels are hard to find in the BHS and Pāli versions, and it is possible that some of the Chinese epithets are based on Sanskrit or MIA words which are not found in the BHS or Pāli versions as we have them, e.g. "high" beds, where the BHS version has *prānta*-. The order of the second and third verses is reversed, when compared with the BHS version,³² and sometimes the order of words varies when compared with that version, e.g. for *aprabhitasya* ("unafraid") the Chinese has "without anger," but it has "without fear" in place of *viśāradasya* ("clever"). Occasionally the Chinese version agrees with the Pāli version against the BHS, e.g. BHS has -*krodhasya* where Pāli

has *-lobhassa*, and the Chinese has “who has done away with worldly desire.”³³ Sometimes the Chinese disagrees with both the Pāli and the BHS, e.g. where BHS has *purantarasya* and the Pāli has *purindadassa*, the Chinese has “who is not returning.” It is, however, possible that these and other examples merely represent the imprecision of the Chinese translator. As Waldschmidt pointed out,³⁴ the Chinese translator had difficulty in defining shades of meaning, e.g. between several synonyms for “incomparable,” and it is possible that in the context he thought that *prānta* meant “high.”

7. Conclusions

An examination of the structure of the verses of the BHS *Upāli-sūtra* shows clearly that the transforming into Sanskrit was made from an MIA exemplar in a way which was almost entirely mechanical. The redactor restored consonant groups, replaced non-historic case endings with more correct endings, and inserted some *sandhi* forms, e.g. *śrāvaka Upāli* in I-X(iii), without any regard for the metre. The frequent examples of hiatus have been reproduced almost without exception, the insertion of *ca* in IV(i) and of *hy* in IX(iii) being the only attempts made to avoid hiatus. There are two examples of inserted crasis of a final vowel with a following initial vowel, i.e. *nāvanatasya* in III(ii) and *manujasyāntima-* in II(ii), the latter being all the more noticeable because it is between *pādas*, thus destroying the caesura. The replacement of *sarīra* by *deha* in this last compound also ruins the metre. Compared with the *Udāna-varga* where, as de Jong states,³⁵ “there is a deliberate attempt to rewrite these verses in Sanskrit, by the transposition of words, avoidance of hiatus, preservation of the metre, etc.,” there is an almost complete lack of translating ability. The fact that the metre remains almost intact, with the few exceptions listed above, is purely accidental.

The eleventh verse of the BHS version does not scan correctly, but a restoration of its presumed MIA form produces a pair of lines in old *āryā* metre, with the sixth *gana* of XI(i) scanning as ∪∪, ∪∪. The verse has only two lines, as opposed to the three lines of all the other verses, and is lacking in Pāli, but there is no reason to doubt that it was taken over from MIA. It was certainly not written by the BHS redactor, who clearly had no feeling for the metre. There is also an eleventh verse in the Chinese translation, but since this includes more than BHS version,³⁶ possibly indicating a three-line verse, the two versions cannot go back to the same predecessor.

Although there is a clear relationship between the Pāli, BHS and Chinese versions of the first ten verses of the *Upāli-sūtra*, it is obvious that no one version is directly derived from any other. The order of the verses, *pādas*, and even words in the *pādas* varies between the three versions. There are sometimes different readings between the three versions, e.g. the BHS version has *atha* in VII(ii). Occasionally the three BHS MSS differ among themselves, e.g. Waldschmidt’s two MSS have *akuha* and *adruha* in VII(i), while Hoernle’s MS does not include *ca* in IV(i).

The Chinese translation sometimes has a different interpretation, e.g. the Chinese equivalent of BHS *-(sa)ttama* in VII(i) is "seventh," which indicates an interpretation of the underlying *sattama* as the equivalent of Sanskrit *saptama*. This suggests that there was a different exegetical or commentarial tradition available to the Chinese translator.³⁷ If we assume that the Pāli, BHS and Chinese versions are all direct or indirect transformations or translations of MIA versions, it can be seen that the three underlying MIA versions all drew upon the same corpus of rather more than one hundred epithets, for they all have a few epithets not shared with the other versions. Some of these epithets were already linked in position with other epithets, doubtless for metrical reasons, and the redactors and translators were able to sort and arrange these epithets and groups of epithets as they wished. The situation is similar to that underlying the corpus of *Dharmapada* verses, where no two versions agree for more than a few verses, at most, at a time, although clearly all versions had access to the same basic store of material. The ability to rearrange material in this way was aided by the fact that many epithets scan in the same way, and can be interchanged without damaging the metre, if hiatus is ignored, e.g. *buddhassa, vīrassa, suddhassa, dhīrassa, muttassa; akūhassa, rūcirassa, tusitassa, kusalassa, vimalassa*. There are even long compounds with the same metrical pattern which can interchange, e.g. *śamitavairasya, viditavedassa*. Some epithets are used twice, e.g. Pāli *muttassa*, Sanskrit *buddhasya*.³⁸ This situation probably arose from an earlier oral tradition, when there was no one particular order which was always followed, but each reciter was free to recite verses, lines, *pādas* and words in any order he liked, as long as the metre was preserved. The Pāli and the BHS versions, or rather the MIA form upon which the latter is based, are so different that they cannot be traced to a common source. The BHS and the Chinese versions are much closer, and perhaps represent variations of a Northern tradition which differed somewhat from the tradition underlying the Pāli recension.

In our investigations into the techniques employed when transforming or translating from one language or dialect into another, comparative studies of metre are likely to be of great value. We must, however, define our methods of working very carefully, and must recognise suggestions for what they are. They are very rarely certainties, in the sense that they are the only possible explanations of the problems we encounter. To postulate an error, which can perhaps be explained otherwise, or to suggest changes of form for metrical reasons, when such changes are unnecessary, and then on the basis of such suggested emendations to draw conclusions about the dialect geography of MIA and the transmission of texts does not seem to be a very critical method of scholarship,³⁹ nor one which is likely to lead to very satisfactory results.

Notes

1. Abbreviations of the titles of Pāli texts are as in the *Epilegomena to A Critical Pāli Dictionary* (= CPD) Volume I. Other abbreviations: PTS = Pali Text Society; PED = The PTS's

Pali-English Dictionary; MW = Monier-Williams' *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*; PSM = Sheth: *Pāia-sadda-mahaṇṇavo*; BHS = Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit; MIA = Middle Indo-Aryan; Pkt = Prakrit; Skt = Sanskrit; MS(S) = manuscript(s); *m.c.* = metri causa.

2. *Upāli-sutta* = M I 386, 3-32.
3. See L. Alsdorf, "Itthiparinā" in *IJ* II (1958), pp. 249-70, and *Die Āryā-Strophen des Pali-Kanons* (Mainz, 1967). See also A. Mette, "The Tales Belonging to the *Namaskāra-vyākhyā* of the *Āvaśyaka-Cūrṇi*" in *ITXI* (1983), pp. 129-44 (See esp. pp. 138-40).
4. See A.K. Warder, *Pali Metre* (London, 1967), §198.
5. L. Alsdorf, "Itthiparinā" (see n. 3) pp. 252-53.
6. Ja IV 92, 3*-10*. See Sadd 8.5.3.1 (p. 1165).
7. L. Alsdorf, "Itthiparinā" (see n. 3) p. 252.
8. All my analyses are based upon Alsdorf's emended text (*Āryā-Strophen* (see n. 3), pp. 261-62), except where I state otherwise. It is to be noted that in 6(i) the consonant group *br-* in the word *brahma-* does not make position. The pre-Pāli version probably had *bambha-*. In 7(i) *veyyākaraṇassa* does not scan. We must read *viyā-*, i.e. *vēyā-*. The development must have been *e > ě* (i.e. *i*) before the double consonant, and then the double consonant became single *m.c.* See Alsdorf, *op. cit.*, p. 261, fn. *ad* 7b.
9. I use Arabic numerals (1-10) for the verses of the Pāli version; capital Roman numerals (I-XI) for the verses of the BHS version; letters (a-f) for the *pādas* of the verses; lower case Roman numerals (i-iii) for the lines of the verses (because the use of the letters a-c by Hoernle and Waldschmidt is liable to cause confusion with the *pāda* letters).
10. I mark the position of the caesura by a comma [,].
11. O. von Hinüber, "Upāli's Verses in the Majjhima-nikāya and the Madhyamāgama" in L.A. Hercus, et al. (edd.): *Indological and Buddhist Studies (Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday)* (Canberra, 1982), pp. 243-51.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
14. It is Trenckner's conjecture there. See CPD, s.v. *āhūniya*.
15. A.F.R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains* (Oxford, 1916), pp. 27-35.
16. E. Waldschmidt, *Varṇaśatam*, NAWG, No. 1 (Göttingen 1979).
17. *Ibid.*, p. 3, n. 2.
18. *Ibid.*
19. See note 4.
20. Presumably *śamita-vaira* is < MIA **śamita-vera*, which does not appear in the Pāli version, where *vidita-veda* occurs at this point. The close agreement in form between *-vera* and *-veda* suggests that one of the two is simply a *d / r* alternation of the other, without any indication of which might be the original. If *-veda* became *-vera* then the redactor would have needed to change *vidita-*, which no longer made sense. Conversely, if *-vera* became *-veda*, then *śamita-* would have been changed for the same reason.
21. Waldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
22. von Hinüber, *op. cit.*, p. 243.
23. The locative plural ending of *vyākaraṇeṣu* is unexpected among so many genitive singular

forms, but it is possibly based upon a Sanskritisation of the metrically correct MIA form **viyākaraṇassa*, with **viyā-* written *m.c.* for **viyyā-*, which would be an orthographic variant of the *vēyyā-* found in Pāli (see note 8, above). A mechanical transformation of **viyākaraṇassa* would have produced BHS *vyākaraṇasya* which, if taken as a noun, would make no sense in the context. It is possible that the redactor “corrected” this into a locative form and understood it as being constructed with *prāpti-prāptasya* as Waldschmidt (*op. cit.*, p. 7, n. 30) suggests. The Chinese version, however, has separate translations for these two epithets, and the rendering “who is self-relying in explanations” suggests that the Chinese translator received a version which had an adjective here.

24. When I write of the BHS redactor doing something, I am not excluding the possibility that it had already been done by the redactor of the exemplar he was following, except when I particularly specify one or the other.
25. We might have expected the BHS redactor to write *akathaṃkathino*, since (as can be seen from BHS *vipaśyasya* where Pāli has *vipassissa*) he did not approve of the ending *-isya* which a mechanical translation system would have produced. Nevertheless, *akathaṃkathasya* is perfectly good Skt, since it can be taken as a possessive adjective.
26. BHS *vedino* does, however, support the view that Alsdorf’s conjecture of *devassa* for Pāli *vedassa* is unnecessary. Von Hinüber (*op. cit.*, p. 244) states that *vedino* proves that the Pāli reading should be *vedissa*, not *vedassa*, and suggests that *veda* entered the canonical text from the commentary, where Buddhaghosa explains *vedassā ti vedo vuccati nāṇaṃ tena samannāgatassa* (Ps III 97, 15). I do not think that it proves any such thing. PED does not list *vedin*, so the word probably does not exist in Pāli, at least in the canon, although such an argument from silence is by no means conclusive. PSM does list *vei* (from Skt *vedin*) but not from any early text. MW lists *vedin*, although not specifically in the sense of “one who possesses knowledge.” I see no reason for rejecting an etymology for *veda* < *vaidā*, which is quoted only on his own authority by MW in the sense of a “wise man,” but is quoted by PSM, in the form *vea*, from the *Bhagavatī-sūtra*, as an adjective with the meaning *vijñā*. Buddhaghosa was therefore explaining the adjective as having the same form as the noun from which it was derived. If *vedassa* had occurred in the BHS redactor’s exemplar, but Skt *vaidā* was unknown to him, it would not be surprising that he replaced it by a word which had the same meaning, i.e. *vedino*.
27. I accept Alsdorf’s conjecture of *sāmaṇa* in place of *samaṇa*. Von Hinüber (*op. cit.*, p. 243) states that *sāmaṇa* is Eastern MIA for Pāli *sāmañña*. It is possible that he was misled by Alsdorf’s comment “lies -ña?” into thinking that writing -ñ- instead of this suggested -ñ- must be an Eastern characteristic. Pāli *sāmaṇa* is, however, derived not from *sāmañña*, but from Skt *śrāmaṇa*, which is a correct Skt formation, made by taking *ṛddhi* of the first syllable and adding the suffix -a- in accordance with Pāṇini V.1.130. It is, in fact, included in the *gaṇa yuvādi* which goes with that *sūtra*. The formation is comparable to *brāhmaṇa* (“the state of being a *brāhmaṇa*”), which occurs in Pāli, e.g. at Th 631 and Sn 655, as the equivalent of *brāhmañña* (from Skt *brāhmaṇya*). The writing of -ñ- instead of -ñ- would not, however, have been an Eastern feature for, as can be seen from the Aśokan inscriptions, where *pāna*

(from Skt *prāṇa*), *khana* (from Skt *kṣaṇa*) and *ānapayati* (from Skt *ājñāpayati*) occur in Eastern versions, the Eastern Pkt had -n- in place of -ṇ- and -ñ-, not -ṇ-.

28. To use Bechert's term (See H. Bechert (ed.) *The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition* (Göttingen, 1980), p. 12).
29. It is clear that the BHS redactor did not insert *atha* to improve the metre, since *atha snātakasya* does not scan. Nor, however, would *atha nahātakassa*, if the word *a(t)ha* had been in an earlier version of the Pāli verse. If we assume that there was a form **nātaka* (cf. Skt *nāpita*), then it can be seen that *a(t)ha *nātakassa* in the MIA exemplar would give a correct old *āryā pāda*, which could also be scanned as a *śloka pāda* with resolution of the first syllable. Such scansion perhaps helps to explain how *pādas* of the two metres could interchange.
30. In the underlying MIA exemplar there would certainly have been a *svarabhakti* vowel between -r- and -h-.
31. I mark the word division in the *gaṇa* by a comma [,].
32. Which led Hoernle, who assumed that the BHS and Chinese versions followed the same order, to the belief that his MS, which actually began with verse III, began with verse II and had omitted the third verse "possibly by the scribe's inadvertence" (*op. cit.*, p. 31).
33. von Hinüber, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
34. Waldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
35. J.W. de Jong, "A brief history of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America (Part II)," in *The Eastern Buddhist* New Series VII, No. 2 (October 1974), pp. 49-82 (p. 53).
36. "The corresponding Chinese stanza ... obviously renders a more comprehensive original" (Waldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 4).
37. See Waldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 10, n. 68. It is, of course, possible that the commentarial tradition gave both interpretations, of which the BHS redactor chose one, and the Chinese translator the other. Although Buddhaghosa gives only the explanation "seventh" (Ps III 97, 26-27), Dhammapāla gives both explanations at Th-a III 195, 25-27 (See K.R. Norman, *Elders' Verses I*, London, 1969, p. 294 (*ad* Th 1240)).
38. Waldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
39. The statement that the metre requires the Eastern form *dhuvajassa* is repeated by von Hinüber: "es muss mit typisch östlicher Anaptyxe *pannadhuva* gelesen werden" ("Sanskrit und Gāndhārī in Zentralasien," in *Sprachen des Buddhismus in Zentralasien*, Wiesbaden, 1983, pp. 27-34 (p. 31)). As noted above, the metre of the *Upāli-sutta* does not in fact afford any support for the belief that this form ever existed.

The Term '*bhāva*' and the Philosophy of Nāgārjuna

Leonard C.D.C. Priestley

One of the more obvious features of Nāgārjuna's philosophical writing¹ is his use of the term '*bhāva*' at many points where an acquaintance with earlier Buddhist literature would lead us to expect '*dharma*'. It is only against the background of that earlier literature that the oddity of this usage becomes apparent; the term is so common in the literature of Nāgārjuna's school, and in later Indian philosophy generally, that its occurrence in Nāgārjuna's own works seems quite natural. And yet Nāgārjuna's own use of the term would appear, at first sight at least, to be an innovation.

This observation gives rise to a number of questions. First of all, is '*bhāva*' (in the sense of a being or entity) really equivalent in Nāgārjuna's writings to '*dharma*' (in the sense of an element or primary phenomenon), or did Nāgārjuna intend to make a distinction between *bhāvas*, the subject of his critical analysis, and the *dharma*s of traditional Buddhism? If '*bhāva*' and '*dharma*' are not actually equivalent, then we might expect to find '*bhāva*' in the earlier literature which he criticizes. This leads to a further question, whether Nāgārjuna's use of the term is an innovation after all. Perhaps he merely brought into prominence an obscure word which was already established as a Buddhist term in some part of the literature. Or perhaps the term became current in the Mahāyāna, with whose teachings Nāgārjuna's philosophy is identified, and Nāgārjuna took the term over as a matter of course from the Mahāyāna sutras. But then, of course, we might wonder why the Mahāyāna would adopt a term alien to the Buddhist tradition when its own legitimacy as a form of Buddhism was in doubt. And finally there is the question of whether '*bhāva*' was associated with any of the non-Buddhist traditions at the time of Nāgārjuna or earlier.

These are the questions which I should like to consider in this paper. To explore them thoroughly would, of course, be an enormous undertaking; all that I have attempted here is a preliminary investigation of some of the relevant material. The answers that I have given are necessarily tentative, but they seem to me to shed light on a particularly obscure period in the history of Buddhist thought, and to suggest a number of interesting directions for further inquiry.

Our first question was whether '*bhāva*' is really equivalent to '*dharma*' in the writings of Nāgārjuna. At first sight there seems to be some basis for thinking that the terms are not synonymous. In his critique of Nirvana in the *Mūlamadhy-*

amākārikā, Nāgārjuna says, "And if Nirvana were a *bhāva*, Nirvana would be created (*saṃskṛta*). For nowhere is there any *bhāva* whatever that is uncreated (*asaṃskṛta*)."² Now as Nirvana was recognised by all the schools of Buddhism as an uncreated *dharma* it seems obvious that '*bhāva*' here cannot be equivalent to '*dharma*'; it looks as if Nāgārjuna were assuming something like the Sautrāntika doctrine that the uncreated *dharma*s are not actual entities³ in spite of their being of the utmost importance for the practice of Buddhism. Candrakīrti, in his commentary on this verse, seems to confirm our impression: "If Nirvana were a *bhāva*, then Nirvana would be created, like consciousness and the rest, because of its being a *bhāva*; but that which is uncreated is not a *bhāva*, as for example the horn of a donkey."⁴ And Bhāvaviveka similarly observes in his *Madhyamakahrdaya*: "For if Nirvana were a *bhāva*, it would be created, because of its being a *bhāva*,"⁵ and explains in his commentary (*Tarkajvālā*), "A 'being' (*dhos po*, *bhāva*) is so called because it comes to be (*hbyuñ ba*, *bhavati*), that is, is created by its causes and conditions."⁶ At this point, then, '*bhāva*' seems to be a term narrower in meaning than '*dharma*': *dharma*s may be created or uncreated, concrete entities or sheer unrealities like the horn of a donkey; *bhāvas*, however, are those *dharma*s which actually come to be, created by the convergence of their proper causes and conditions at a particular place and time.

This supposition seems to gain further support from the fact that a similar distinction had already appeared among the Sarvāstivādins. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā* there is an account of four rival explanations of the way in which *dharma*s which exist in the past and future as well as in the present (in accordance with the characteristic doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins) can nevertheless be identified as past, present or future. The first of these explanations is Bhadanta Dharmatrāta's: "When any *dharma* moves through the three times, it changes in being (*lèi*,^a *bhāva*), but not in substance (*tī*,^b *dravya*). As when a golden vessel is made into other things, its shape changes but not its colour, and as when milk is transformed into curds, it loses its flavour and potency but not its colour, so any *dharma*, when it comes from the future into the present, loses its future being and gains present being, but in its substance there is neither gain nor loss; and when it goes from the present into the past, it loses its present being and gains past being, but in its substance there is neither gain nor loss."⁷ Here the *dharma*, which in substance exists in all of the three times, is distinguished from the *bhāvas* which constitute its temporal existence, its being as past, present or future. Since for a Buddhist there can be no real distinction between a *dharma* and its being, the *bhāva* will simply be the *dharma* itself when temporally determined; the word '*bhāva*' will then mean a created (*saṃskṛta*) *dharma* in its concreteness, and its impermanence and (given Buddhist assumptions about the nature of temporal occurrence) its conditionality will follow automatically from its definition. By the same token, there can be no *bhāvas* corresponding to an uncreated (*asaṃskṛta*) *dharma*: the notion of an uncreated *bhāva* is self-contradictory.

This usage seems to be well established in the *Abhidharmakośa*. In a celebrated verse of obscure pedigree Vasubandhu sums up the Sautrāntika critique of the Sarvāstivāda: "The own-being (*sva-bhāva*) exists always, and yet the being (*bhāva*) is not admitted to be permanent, And the being is not different from the own-being! This can only be by divine decree!"⁸ The own-being of the *dharma* is of course its unchanging nature, which Dharmatrāta refers to as its substance. Its *bhāva* is the *dharma* as it occurs concretely as something past, present or future, and so it is necessarily impermanent. But the *bhāva* is not something apart from the *dharma*: its identity as a temporal occurrence of the *dharma* is the identity of the *dharma* itself, its own-being. The absurdity which Vasubandhu sees in this identification of two disparate entities, the one permanent and the other impermanent, is one of the main points at which Nāgārjuna's dialectic attacks the illusion of substantiality, and it is tempting to suppose that we have here the explanation for his use of the term '*bhāva*': his concern is not with *dharma*s as such, but rather with the created *dharma*s as they actually occur, that is, with *bhāvas*; for his intention is to show the absurdity of ascribing to the created *dharma*s the determinacy and stability implied by the notion of own-being, and to show at the same time the impossibility of conceiving of the uncreated *dharma*s as any kind of temporal entity.

But there are serious difficulties with this explanation. To begin with, where Nāgārjuna uses the term '*dharma*' (in the sense of an entity), he does not seem to mean by it anything beyond what he means by '*bhāva*'. *Dharma*s, like *bhāvas*, are empty,⁹ being essentially unarisen and undestroyed;¹⁰ and as "there is no independent *bhāva*,"¹¹ that is, no *bhāva* which is uncreated (*asaṃskṛta*), so likewise "there is no *dharma* at all which is not dependently arisen."¹² The terms '*dharma*' and '*bhāva*' seem in fact to be interchangeable. This impression is confirmed by the earliest commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, the *Akutoḥbhaya*. "*Bhāvāḥ*," it says, "means *dharma*s," and adds, "The term '*bhāva*' is the usual one among all the *tīrthikas* (non-Buddhists)."¹³ (The significance of this slightly mysterious observation we shall consider presently.)

Moreover, it is not at all certain that the term '*bhāva*' as Vasubandhu uses it in the *Abhidharmakośa* is to be identified with the '*bhāva*' by which Dharmatrāta seeks to explain the temporal determination of *dharma*s. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* rejects Dharmatrāta's theory on the grounds that a *dharma*'s being (*bhāva*) cannot be anything apart from its own-being (that is, from the *dharma* itself), and so the absurdity would follow that in coming from the future into the present the *dharma* would have to be destroyed (as future being) and in going from the present to the past it would originate (as past being).¹⁴ Vasubandhu says simply that Dharmatrāta's theory is a doctrine of transformation and so is *Sāṃkhya* rather than Buddhist.¹⁵ It seems altogether unlikely that either the *Vaibhāṣikas*¹⁶ or Vasubandhu would adopt the term '*bhāva*' from a theory which they are at one in rejecting; what is more likely is that they use the term simply as an equivalent for '*dharma*,'

and we are then left with the question of why they, like Nāgārjuna, should use this term in the place of one sanctioned by the Buddha.

The extent to which '*bhāva*' (in the relevant sense) was current in Buddhist literature before Nāgārjuna remains unclear. The *Abhidharmakośa* is pretty certainly later, and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* is generally taken to be contemporary with Nāgārjuna.¹⁷ Whether the term was used in earlier Sarvāstivādin literature is virtually impossible to determine through the Chinese translations; its usual equivalent does not seem to appear in the Tibetan *Prajñaptiśāstra*,¹⁸ and I have not found it in any of the edited Sanskrit *abhidharma* fragments which have been available to me.¹⁹ The fact that the related term '*svabhāva*' (whose equivalents in Chinese are more readily identifiable) appears in some of the primary *abhidharma* works of the Sarvāstivāda²⁰ might suggest that '*bhāva*' came into use at an early stage; but as we shall see, the two terms are by no means invariably associated. In fact, in the Theravāda, where *sabhāva* is an important exegetical term, '*bhāva*' seems never to have been used in this sense.²¹ As for the other pre-Mahāyāna schools, the few works that remain of their doctrinal and philosophical literature are in Chinese²² and so cannot be expected to shed much light on the matter.

There are, however, two Sanskrit literary poems (*kāvya*) in which '*bhāva*' seems to be used occasionally for '*dharma*:' these are the *Buddhacarita* and the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa.²³ Aśvaghoṣa's dates are characteristically uncertain, but he seems not to have been later than Nāgārjuna;²⁴ his sectarian affiliations, though apparently pre-Mahāyāna, are similarly obscure.²⁵ But however unclear the position of this great poet in the development of Buddhist thought, the few occurrences of '*bhāva*' in his poems might be considered a precedent (even if a meagre one) in the literature of the early schools for Nāgārjuna's use of the term. On the other hand, if Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna were in fact contemporaries, it is also at least conceivable that Aśvaghoṣa was influenced by Nāgārjuna. In any case, that the term does appear in these poems is certainly interesting and deserves further discussion; but it will be enough at this point merely to note that the only works deriving from the early schools up to the time of Nāgārjuna in which '*bhāva*' certainly occurs are thus not treatises on doctrine, but literary works, presumably written for the general reader; and these are late.

This circumstance might suggest that the use of '*bhāva*' (in the relevant sense) is rather characteristic of the Mahāyāna; and in fact we find that it appears rather frequently in at least one of the Mahāyāna sūtras. What is surprising, however, is that it does not occur in the sūtras with which Nāgārjuna's philosophy has been traditionally associated. These, of course, are the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras, which teach that all *dharma*s without exception are empty, devoid of own-being (*svabhāva*), like a mirage. The central theme of Nāgārjuna's philosophy is similarly the relativity of all beings and their consequent emptiness of own-being. A commentary on the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* is ascribed to Nāgārjuna (rightly or wrongly),²⁶ and according to biographical legend he was responsible

for bringing the largest of these sutras, the *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, out of the realm of the Nāgas.²⁷ He is in fact traditionally assumed to have been pre-eminently an interpreter of the Perfection of Wisdom. But the term 'bhāva,' in the peculiar sense in which Nāgārjuna uses it, seems not to occur anywhere in these sutras. A few passages in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* seem to come near to it, and also a closely related passage in the *Śatasāhasrikā*; but in these, 'bhāva' evidently means "existence" or "being" rather than "beings" even when particular *dharma*s are spoken of as instances of (apparent) existence: "bhāva" in the *Śatasāhasrikā* passage corresponds to "bhavati" ("exists") in the exactly parallel passage in the *Pañcaviṃśati*,²⁸ and in another passage in the *Pañcaviṃśati*, 'bhāva' is used in the singular as a complement in a series of nominal sentences, some of whose subjects are plural.²⁹ In the verse summary of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, the *Ratnaguṇasamcayagāthā*,³⁰ we also find something similar to it, in the expression "bhāva-svabhāva," which can be understood as "own-being of beings" and thus as equivalent to 'dharma-svabhāva.' But "bhāva-svabhāva" may again be simply "own-being of existence;" and that in fact is how Conze translates it,³¹ though evidently with some hesitation.³²

Where the term 'bhāva' does occur is in the *Laṅkāvatāra*. Here we find it used much as Nāgārjuna uses it, particularly in the "Sagāthaka" section, but also in every other chapter of any length. The *Laṅkāvatāra* has generally been assumed to be later than Nāgārjuna;³³ but the date of neither is certain, and in view of the close affinities between them,³⁴ the possibility that the *Laṅkāvatāra* is contemporary with Nāgārjuna or earlier cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the *Sūtrasamuccaya* ascribed to Nāgārjuna in the Tibetan canon³⁵ includes passages from the *Laṅkāvatāra*; if the ascription is correct, there can be no doubt that the *Laṅkāvatāra* was among Nāgārjuna's sources.³⁶

The term also appears occasionally in the *Samādhirāja* (*Candrapradīpa*)³⁷ and in passages quoted from the *Tathāgataguhyā*³⁸ in the *Prasannapadā*³⁹ and the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*;⁴⁰ both of these sutras are quoted in the *Sūtrasamuccaya*. But apart from what may also represent its occurrence in two other passages in the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, from the *Prasenajitparipṛcchā* and the *Sūryagarbhaparivarta*,⁴¹ I have not been able to find it used in this sense in any other Mahāyāna sutra.

That 'bhāva' should occur extensively only in the *Laṅkāvatāra* seems very surprising. If there was a precedent in the Mahāyāna for Nāgārjuna's use of the term, it must surely have been the *Laṅkāvatāra*, unless the *Laṅkāvatāra* itself was formed under the influence of Nāgārjuna. But whatever the relationship between them, we have to look for the source of this usage, both in the *Laṅkāvatāra* and in Nāgārjuna's writings, either in the rare appearances of the term in the *Samādhirāja* and a few other sutras, or else in its use outside of the Buddhist tradition. The way in which 'bhāva' is used in the *Samādhirāja* does in fact suggest how the term might have developed within the tradition; but its association with some of the non-Buddhist traditions can hardly have been a matter of indifference to Buddhist

writers, and so it might be useful at this point to review the main areas of its occurrence in non-Buddhist philosophical literature before Nāgārjuna, before proceeding to consider what might have led to its development (or its adoption) within the tradition.

The *Akutoḥhaya*, we may recall, says that '*bhāva*' is the term usual among the *tīrthikas*, the non-Buddhists. The non-Buddhist philosophy with which we most readily associate Nāgārjuna is the Nyāya, since Nāgārjuna wrote one of his works, the *Vaidalyasūtra* and its commentary, specifically as an attack upon that school. At first sight the *Nyāyasūtra* seems to confirm the hypothesis that Nāgārjuna adopted '*bhāva*' as a Nyāya term and first used it in criticising the Nyāya, for the term occurs at a number of points in the *Nyāyasūtra*'s fourth chapter.⁴² On the other hand, it seems to occur nowhere outside of that chapter, and the fourth chapter is the one devoted to refuting the arguments of other schools, and particularly those of the Buddhist *sūnyavāda*. If, as seems likely, the chapter was written or revised in response to Nāgārjuna's criticism,⁴³ it is entirely possible that the occurrence of '*bhāva*' in the fourth chapter is simply a reflection of Nāgārjuna's usage.

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does not use '*bhāva*' in Nāgārjuna's sense. For the Vaiśeṣikas, there is existence (*bhāva*), but no "existences" or "beings"; existence is a single universal⁴⁴ by virtue of which anything actually occurring can be said to exist.

With the Sāṃkhya the situation is more complex. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* uses '*bhāva*' only for "states of mind";⁴⁵ but the closely related *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali contains one passage in which '*bhāva*' seems to mean "beings" or at least "states of being".⁴⁶ And in the earlier Sāṃkhya of the *Mahābhārata*, in the *Mokṣadharma* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, we find '*bhāva*' similarly used in the sense of "states of being" or "forms of being".⁴⁷ It would appear that by the time of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* the term '*bhāva*' had come to be restricted in Sāṃkhya to its psychological significance, but in the earlier period (and perhaps in other schools of Sāṃkhya than that represented by the *Kārikās*) it was used ontologically as well.⁴⁸

In the *Upaniṣads*, '*bhāva*' seems to occur in this sense in only two passages, one in the *Muṇḍaka*⁴⁹ and one in the *Maitrāyaṇīya*,⁵⁰ and even in these its interpretation is not beyond doubt. The usual Upaniṣadic term for a being is '*bhūta*'.

We find '*bhāva*' used occasionally in this sense in the early literature of the Jainas,⁵¹ including a few passages in which the views of non-Jaina schools are represented.⁵² It seems likely that the term was current among both the Jainas and the Ājīvikas, and perhaps generally in the *śramaṇa* community. If this is so, then the Buddha's avoidance of the term is surely significant. Since much of the terminology of early Buddhism was evidently common to the *śramaṇa* movement as a whole, there must have been some particular way in which this term was felt to be incompatible with the Buddha's teaching.

The explanation seems clear enough. Both '*bhāva*' and '*dharma*' can mean

"character" or "nature," and so either could be used as a term for all of those recurrent features in the flux of phenomena which the *śramaṇa* found it necessary to identify and explain. But 'bhāva' also has the meaning of a state of existence, a mode, whereas a *dharma* (from the standpoint of Buddhism) is rather a quality or property which recurs consistently under identifiable circumstances and whose regularity, "holding" at all times, is thus part of the general regularity of the universe. A *dharma* need not be conceived of as inhering in some kind of persisting substance; the word 'bhāva,' on the other hand, by its very etymology implies the existence of something further to which the *bhāva* belongs as its mode of being. Such an implication would have been of no concern to the Jainas and Ājīvikas, who believed in permanent constituents of the universe; but it would no doubt have been embarrassing to the Buddhists.

Where the term 'bhāva' would have been most at home is in the early Sāṃkhya, for it is there that we find the idea of the evolution of a single reality through successive states of being or modes. We may suppose that the conception of particular features of the world as *bhāvas*, forms of being, was inherited or adopted by the *śramaṇas*, or at least by as many of them as held the universe to consist of permanent realities, whose derivative formations might similarly be regarded as in some sense their states or modes. It is possible, then, that for a long period the term 'bhāva' had clear associations with "eternalism" (*śāśvata-vāda*), and particularly with the cosmological speculations of early Sāṃkhya. If in fact it did, then certain peculiarities of the term's distribution in Buddhist literature become more comprehensible.

To the extent that Sāṃkhya terminology became part of the general vocabulary of the educated, we might expect 'bhāva' in this sense to appear in any context dealing with cosmology or spiritual discipline which was not specifically Buddhist. In Aśvaghōṣa's *Buddhacarita*, any such context appearing before the account of the Buddha's enlightenment in the fourteenth canto is manifestly pre-Buddhist, and we find 'bhāva' not only in Arāḍa's exposition of Sāṃkhya in the twelfth canto,⁵³ but also in Gautama's reply to the advice of Śreṇya Bimbisāra, king of Magadha, in the eleventh.⁵⁴ And in the *Saundarananda* it occurs only in a passage rejecting all such views as the Sāṃkhya's concerning the origin and structure of the world.⁵⁵

Several (though not all) of the occurrences of 'bhāva' in the *Abhidharmakośa* are similarly in contexts reminiscent of early Sāṃkhya;⁵⁶ perhaps even at the time of the composition of the *Kośa* the term was felt to be particularly appropriate to such contexts, though by no means restricted to them. And its criticism of Dharmatrāta's theory that the temporal occurrences of a *dharma* can be understood as its *bhāvas*, its states of being, is more obviously apposite if 'bhāva' was still at that time specifically associated with the Sāṃkhya.

Such an association might also account for the prevalence of 'bhāva' in the

Laṅkāvatāra. The whole sutra is remarkable for its generally polemical character, for the fact that its principal opponents are not the Buddhists of the early schools, but the “*tīrthyas*” or “*tīrthakaras*”, the non-Buddhist philosophers, and for the apparent similarity of its doctrines to those of the early Sāṃkhya. It seems in fact to be a sutra in which the doctrines of the Mahāyāna are expressed in such a way as to make the Sāṃkhya and other non-Buddhist philosophies seem like clumsy and misleading approximations of them; and since the true teaching must then be outwardly similar to what approximates it, much of the sutra is devoted to how the Mahāyāna differs fundamentally from the philosophies which it has been made to resemble.⁵⁷ In such a work, the term for ‘*dharma*’ which (as the *Akutoḥhaya* puts it) “is the usual one among all the *tīrthikas*” would be obviously appropriate. The Buddha adopts the terminology of the non-Buddhist philosophers in order to lead them (or at any rate those who might be sympathetic to them) towards a realisation of the truth.

But what about the use of ‘*bhāva*’ in the *Samādhirāja*? Here there is no obvious connection with the *tīrthikas*. But in five out of the dozen passages in which I have found the term, it is associated with its negative counterpart, ‘*abhāva*’, “non-being”.⁵⁸ This use of the term seems to be a natural extension of its use in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*⁵⁹ where, as we have seen, it refers to things generally in their apparent existence whose own-being or nature is really non-existence. The distinction between existence or being in general and particular things as instances of being, between being and beings, is in any case not very clear in Buddhist thought, since any acknowledgement of being as a distinct reality would seem to lead in the direction of *ātmavāda*, and particularly to the doctrines of Sāṃkhya and the *Upaniṣads*. When the sutras speak of being, then, what is meant is simply particular things in their generality; and so the use of ‘*bhāva*’ for particular beings would seem entirely natural. When it appears in the *Ratanaḥsaṃcayagāthā*,⁶⁰ in the expression “*bhāva-svabhāva*”, whose ambiguity we have already noted, it is quite possible that both meanings were intended, and were in fact hardly felt to be distinct meanings.

Nevertheless, ‘*bhāva*’ in the sense of a particular being, however natural it might have been as an extension of recognised Buddhist usage, was apparently associated with the Sāṃkhya and generally avoided in early Buddhist literature except in contexts involving the Sāṃkhya or similar forms of thought. Why then does it appear, even rarely, in the *Samādhirāja* in contexts which are entirely Buddhist? Perhaps in the period when the Mahāyāna was developing its doctrines, the Sāṃkhya had already become influential, especially (we may suppose) through the Sāṃkhya materials incorporated into the *Mahābhārata*, and the Mahāyānists, even when they were addressing themselves to the Buddhists of the early schools, always had the *tīrthikas* somewhere in the periphery of their vision. It is possible that the Perfection of Wisdom sutras were as much a response to the increasing

influence of the Sāṃkhya as to the growing rigidity of early Buddhism, and that their characteristically ontological approach was a reflection of the ontological outlook of their non-Buddhist opponents. The term 'bhāva' would then have been appropriate in the exposition of the Mahāyāna's negative ontology for the same reason that made it appropriate for the Sāṃkhya: it affirmed the essential identity of all particular things with the original being of which they were the modes or transformations. But for the Mahāyāna, of course, the particular beings are illusions, and the original being is the original and universal illusion of *avidyā* (ignorance). In the *Samādhirāja* 'bhāva' occurs at a few points where perhaps the apparent existence of *dharma*s is to be emphasized; in the *Laṅkāvatāra*, where the challenge to the positive ontology of the *tīrthika*s has become explicit, we find it everywhere as a regular equivalent for 'dharma.'

In this respect (as in others) the writings of Nāgārjuna seem closely akin to the *Laṅkāvatāra*. Only one of his minor works is directed specifically against the *tīrthika*s,⁶¹ and his *magnum opus*, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, seems to be addressed solely to other Buddhists; yet it was in a commentary on this latter work that the author of the *Akutoḥbaya* declared that 'bhāva' is the term "usual among all the *tīrthika*s". The implication seems to be that even here Nāgārjuna was writing obliquely, as it were, for a non-Buddhist audience as well, unless we are to suppose that he was so deeply influenced by the *Laṅkāvatāra* that he adopted its terminology as a matter of course. But we can hardly be sure that the *Laṅkāvatāra* was not itself influenced in its terminology by Nāgārjuna. The *Sūtrasamuccaya* which has come down to us in Tibetan translation, and which contains passages from the *Laṅkāvatāra*, may after all be wrongly ascribed to Nāgārjuna, like the *Akutoḥbaya*,⁶² and the fact that the *Laṅkāvatāra* contains what has been interpreted as a prophecy of Nāgārjuna's birth and career may be evidence that at least the "Sagāthaka" section is later than Nāgārjuna.⁶³ If the *Laṅkāvatāra* was indeed one of Nāgārjuna's main scriptural sources, it is strange that his biographies associate him only with the Perfection of Wisdom sutras. But in fact there are a number of doctrines which are central in the *Laṅkāvatāra* but which appear only occasionally, if at all, in the writings of Nāgārjuna.⁶⁴ It is perhaps safer to assume that Nāgārjuna's philosophy and the *Laṅkāvatāra* represent cognate but distinct developments in Buddhist thought, belonging to roughly the same period and showing their kinship in their similar use of 'bhāva.'

This evocation of the philosophical outlook of the *tīrthika*s would of course not be Nāgārjuna's only purpose in adopting the term. Like the Perfection of Wisdom sutras and the *Samādhirāja*, Nāgārjuna's philosophy is essentially ontological, his critique an ontological critique. As we have noted, the term 'bhāva' meets the requirements of a negative ontology as well as those of a positive one: for Nāgārjuna a *bhāva* is still a being, an entity, though one whose existence is not actual, but only imaginary or assumed. In fact the terminology of the Sāṃkhya and similar *tīrthika* philosophies, which from the standpoint of the Mahāyāna is

blatantly erroneous, actually serves Nāgārjuna's purpose better than the more subtly misleading terminology of traditional Buddhism.

Moreover, '*bhāva*' fits neatly into a tetrad of related terms which together suggest the structure of our ontological projections: '*bhāva*', '*abhāva*', '*svabhāva*' (whose historical antecedents seem to be rather different from '*bhāva*'s) and '*parabhāva*'. Ringing the changes on these terms in the course of his dialectic, Nāgārjuna is able to show how being and non-being, self and other oppose each other and combine, springing from a primordial illusion of existence and growing up through a morbid proliferation of thought into the vast, complex and unstable system of *saṃsāra*; and in doing so, he reduces the whole magical creation to emptiness.

To sum up, then: '*bhāva*' in the sense of a being or entity is a term which had very limited currency in Buddhist literature before Nāgārjuna, but which was well established in several of the non-Buddhist traditions. Its original provenance was probably Sāṃkhya, not of course the classical Sāṃkhya of the *Kārikās*, but the earlier Sāṃkhya represented in the *Mahābhārata*, which was still close to its roots in the *Upaniṣads*. Early Buddhism generally avoided the term on account of its ontological and cosmological associations, except in contexts relating to the *tīrthikas*; but as the Mahāyāna developed its negative ontology, '*bhāva*' began to appear occasionally in its sutras, and in contexts which were purely Buddhist. In the *Laṅkāvatāra*, which challenges the various non-Buddhist ontologies directly, we find '*bhāva*' established as a regular equivalent for '*dharma*.' And in the writings of Nāgārjuna, '*bhāva*' similarly represents the particular forms arising out of the primordial illusion, and recalls the intellectual elaborations of that illusion in the philosophies of the *tīrthikas*.

It remains only to note some areas for further inquiry. My investigation has been confined almost entirely to materials surviving in Sanskrit. In Chinese translations '*bhāva*' is usually represented by 'fā,^c' the same word that is used for '*dharma*,' and occasionally by other equivalents equally ambiguous. But in Tibetan the distinction between '*dharma*' ('*chos*') and '*bhāva*' ('*dños po*,' '*no bo*')⁶⁵ is generally preserved, and so cautious use of the Tibetan translations might extend our knowledge of the distribution of the term. It would be of great interest to learn whether there are other sutras which resemble the *Laṅkāvatāra* in its regular use of '*bhāva*,' and if so, whether they too are directed primarily against the *tīrthikas*.

The use of the term in the various *tīrthika* traditions might also be explored further. It is curious, for example, that it is adopted, presumably from the early Sāṃkhya, by the Jainas and the Ājīvikas, and later by the Buddhists (through Nāgārjuna and the *Laṅkāvatāra*), only to be abandoned in the classical Sāṃkhya of the *Kārikās*.⁶⁶ And its occurrence in the grammatical tradition, notably in the *Vākyapadīya*, but also as early as Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*,⁶⁷ likewise deserves further investigation.

Finally, the history of the term in Buddhist literature after Nāgārjuna is evidently complex and might prove to be illuminating. Naturally enough, the use of 'bhāva' continues to be characteristic of the Mādhyamika school, but the term does not seem to have been adopted by the *Yogācāra*, even though the *Laṅkāvatāra* was presumably one of their principal sources. Further study might serve to confirm that there is such a discrepancy, and to shed some light on what might account for it. A consistent distinction in terminology between two schools which, though certainly opposed to each other, were also closely akin⁶⁸ could surely not have been a mere accident of tradition. Perhaps the term 'bhāva', with its persistently heterodox associations, seemed to the philosophers of other schools of the Mahāyāna to suggest a kind of objective and substantial existence which, whether affirmed or denied, had nothing to do with the essentially phenomenological approach of the Middle Way.

Notes

1. How many of the works ascribed to Nāgārjuna are in fact by the author of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is still unclear. There seems to be no serious reason to doubt the genuineness of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, *Ratnāvalī*, *Catuhstava*, and several of the short works surviving in Tibetan translation, such as the *Śūnyatāsaptati*, the *Vaidalyasūtra* and *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, and the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*. v. D.Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka School*, pp. 8, 31, 126 f., and C. Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana*, pp. 11, 121.
2. MK 25.5:
*bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇaṃ nirvāṇaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ bhavet
nāsaṃskṛto hi vidyate bhāvaḥ kva cana kaś cana.*
3. cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, 2.55 (p. 321): *sarvaṃ evāsaṃskṛtaṃ adravyam iti sautrāntikāḥ.
na hi rūpavedanādivat bhāvāntaram asti....* A similar view is ascribed in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* to the *Dārṣṭāntikas*^d (T 1545, p. 161a.10).
4. *Prasannapadā*, p. 526: *yadi nirvāṇaṃ bhāvaḥ syāt, tadā tan nirvāṇaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ bhaved
vijñānādivat bhāvatvāt. yas tv asaṃskṛto nāsau bhāvas tad yathā kharaviṣāṇavad iti....*
5. *Madhyamakahrdaya*, 110ab (Iida, p. 196): *bhāvo hi yadi nirvāṇaṃ bhāvatvāt saṃskṛtaṃ hi
tat.*
6. *Tarkajvālā* on MH 110ab (Iida, loc. cit.): *dños po šes bya ba hbyuñ baḥi phyir dños po ste; rgyu
dañ ryken rñams kyis* (following the Derge reading as noted by Iida) *ḥdus byas pa šes bya baḥi
tha tshig go.*
7. *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 77.1^e (T 1545, p. 396a.11).
cf. the almost identical account in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, 5.25 (p. 805): *bhāvānyathiko
bhadantadharmaatrātaḥ. sa kilāha dharmasyādhvasu pravartamānasya bhāvānyathātvaṃ
bhavati na dravyānyathātvaṃ. yathā suvarṇabhājanasya bhittvā 'nyathā kriyamānasya
saṃsthānānyathātvaṃ bhavati na varṇānyathātvaṃ, yathā ca kṣīraṃ dadhitvena pariṇamad
rasavīryavipākān parityajati na varṇam, evaṃ dharmo 'py anāgatād adhvanāḥ pratyutpan-
nam adhvaṇam āgacchann anāgatabhāvaṃ jahāti na dravyabhāvaṃ; evaṃ pratyutpannād
atītam adhvaṇaṃ gacchan pratyutpannabhāvaṃ jahāti na dravyabhāvaṃ iti. It is this*

parallel account in Sanskrit which allows us to identify 'lèi¹' as 'bhāva' with some confidence. cf. also *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, "Traikālyaparīkṣā", p. 614.

8. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, 5.27 (p. 811):
svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityaś ca neṣyate
na ca svabhāvād bhāvo 'nyo vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam.
 The same verse is cited in Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, 143 (La Vallée Poussin, p. 581, Vaidya, p. 271).
9. MK 25.22ab:
śūnyeṣu sarvadharmeṣu kim anantaṃ kim antavat. ...
10. MK 1.9ab:
anutpanneṣu dharmeṣu nirodho nopapadyate. ...
 MK 7.29:
yadaiva sarvadharmāṇām utpādo nopapadyate
tadaivaṃ sarvadharmāṇāṃ nirodho nopapadyate.
Acintyastava, 17cd (Lindtner, p. 146):
anutpannāś ca tattvena tasmād dharmās tvayoditāḥ.
11. *Lokātitastava*, 22c (Lindtner, p. 136):
bhāvaḥ svatanthro nāstīti. ...
12. MK 24.19:
apratītyasamutpanno dharmah kaścīn na vidyate
yasmāt tasmād aśūnyo hi dharmah kaścīn na vidyate.
13. *Akutobhaya* 1.1 (P5299, p. 17.5.2 ff.): *dños po ṣes bya ba ni chos rñams te; dños po ṣes bya baḥi sgra ni ḥdi mu stegs can thams cad dan thun moñ ño ṣes bya bar sbyar ro.* (This is the only commentary for whose author Nāgārjuna's use of 'bhāva' seemed unusual enough to require an explanation.)
14. *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 77.1⁸ (T1545, p. 396b.18).
15. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, 5.25 (p. 807): *pariṇāmavāditvāt sāmṅhyapakṣe nikṣeptavyaḥ.*
16. i.e. the Sarvāstivādin of the tradition of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.
17. Warder (*Indian Buddhism*, pp. 346, 473) assigns the *Mahāvibhāṣā* to c. 100 A.D. and the *Abhidharmakośa* to the fifth century A.D.
18. P5587-9.
19. I have consulted Lévi, "Note sur des manuscrits sanscrits"; Demiéville, "Un fragment sanskrit de l'Abhidharma des Sarvāstivādin"; Stache-Rosen, "Das Saṅgītisūtra und sein Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya"; and Imanishi, "Fragmente des Abhidharma prakaraṇabhāṣyam" and "Das Pañcavastukam und die Pañcavastukavibhāṣā".
20. The commonest Chinese equivalent, 'zì xìng',¹ occurs in the *Jñānaprasthāna* (T1544), the *Prakaraṇapāda* (T1542) and the *Vijñānakāya* (T1539).
21. As noted by Warder ("Dharmas and Data," p. 273), there is what might appear to be a definition of 'dhamma' as *bhāva* in the *Atthasālinī* (p. 40: *Evaṃ sante dhammo nāma bhāvo bhāvato ca añño abhāvo ti kusalaparā bhāvasaṅkhātā dhammā, añño akusulaparo dhammo abhāvo siyā*). But this is in the context of a discussion of the meaning of the phrase "kusalā dhammā"; and seems to be part of a captious argument which the author proceeds to

dismiss. (This is not to say that Buddhaghosa would deny that *dhammas* exist and are in that sense *bhāvas*; but he does not adopt 'bhāva' as a definition of 'dhamma' nor use it as an equivalent term.)

22. Apart, of course, from the Sanskrit *Abhidharmakośa* (Sautrāntika) and the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*, which has survived in Tibetan (P953) as well as in Chinese (T721); both of these are later than Nāgārjuna. There are only three others that I am aware of: the *Śāriputrābhidharma* (T1548), probably of the Dharmaguptakas, the *Āsrayaprajñāpti* (T1649) of the Sāmmitīyas, and the *Tattvasiddhi* (or *Satyasiddhi*) (T1646) of Harivarman, who seems to have had connections with a number of schools, including the Prajñāptivādins, the Bahuśrutīyas and the Dārṣṭāntikas. (v. Aiyaswami Sastri, *Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman*, vol. I, p. xxiii.). For the unsatisfactoriness of Chinese translations for the study of this term see below, p. 133.
23. *Buddhacarita*, 11.41cd (p. 121):
ya eva bhāvā hi sukhaṃ diśanti ta eva duḥkhaṃ punar āvahanti;
 and 12.27 (p. 131):
yas tu bhāvān asaṃdigdhān ekibhāvena paśyati
mṛtpiṇḍavad asaṃdeha saṃdehaḥ sa ihocyate.
Saundarananda, 17.21 (p. 113):
yasmān nirīhaṃ jagad asvatantraṃ naiśvaryam ekaḥ kurute kriyāsu
tat tat pratītya prabhavanti bhāvā nirātmakaṃ tena viveda lokam.
24. Johnston places him between 50 B.C. and 100 A.D. (*Buddhacarita*, II, p. xiii ff.)
25. Johnston suggests that he might have been Bahuśrutīya. (*Buddhacarita*, II, p. xxxv.)
26. *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*(*upadeśa*)*śāstra* (T1509). According to Lamotte, its author seems to have been not the author of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, but a Mādhyamika convert from the Sarvāstivāda of the early fourth century A.D. v. *Traité*, III, p. ix.
27. Walleser, "Life of Nāgārjuna," p. 428 f.
28. *Śatasāhasrikā*, pt. 1, fasc. 2, p. 181.19 f.: *punar aparaṃ śāradvatīputra bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caran na rūpaṃ bhāva iti yojayati na rūpaṃ abhāva iti yojayati.*
Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, p. 51.10-13: *punar aparaṃ śāriputra bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caran na rūpaṃ bhavatīti yojayati na rūpaṃ vibhavatīti yojayati.*
29. *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, p. 233.5 ff.: *sa cet subhūte aṣṭādaśāveṇikā buddhadharmā bhāvo etc.*
30. *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā*, 14.4b:
bhāvasvabhāvakuśalo paramārthadarśi;
 and 19.4d:
bhāvasvabhāvavigatā bhavatiha māyā.
31. Conze, *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines*, pp. 34, 43: "Skilled in seeing the own-being of existence, seers of ultimate reality;" and "What takes place is an illusion, which in its own-being is without existence."
32. Conze, *Materials*, p. 307, s.v. *bhāva-svabhāva-kuśala*.
33. Warder suggests the third century A.D. v. *Indian Buddhism*, p. 423.

34. Lindtner (*Nagarjuniana*, p. 122, n. 149) has drawn attention to the close relationship between Nāgārjuna and the *Laṅkāvatāra*.
35. P5330.
36. v. Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana*, p. 176.
37. e.g. *Samādhirāja*, p. 145.3 ff.:
yathā ca yasya bhāvehi vimuktaṃ bhoti mānasam
na tasya tehi bhāvehi bhūyo bhoti samāgamaḥ,
vimuktaṃ mama vijñānaṃ sarvabhāvehi sarvaśaḥ;
svabhāvo jñātu cittasya bhūyo jñānaṃ pravartate.
 and p. 281.21 ff.:
bhāvān abhāvān iti yaḥ prajānāti sa sarvabhāveṣu na jātu sajjate;
yaḥ sarvabhāveṣu na jātu sajjate sa ānimittaṃ sprśati samādhim.
38. This is not the *Guhyasamāja Tantra*, which is also known as the *Tathāgataguhyaka*. v. Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 635 (addition to p. 395, n. 3).
39. *Prasannapadā*, p. 367.9:
māyamarīcisamā dakacandrāḥ sarvi bhavāḥ supināntasabhāvāḥ.
 ("Bhavāḥ" is here equivalent to 'bhāvāḥ,' as at times also in the *Samādhirāja*. cf. De Jong, *Cinq chapitres*, p. 24.).
40. *Śikṣasamuccaya*, p. 359 (Vaidya, p. 192.28):
evaṃ bhāvā na lakṣyante kṣiyamāṇāḥ pratikṣaṇam.
41. *Sūtrasamuccaya* (P5330), p. 92.3.1: *dños po de dag la byan chub sems dpaḥ yoṅs su rtog paḥi ran bṣin can yin te yoṅs su rtog paḥi ran bṣin can de ḥdi sñam du gaṅ yaṅ byis pa blun po mi gsal ba mi mkhas pa ...*; and p. 94.1.4: *deḥi gsaṅ baḥi dños po thams cad snaṅ ṣin mñon par ḥgyur ba dañ....*
42. e.g. *Nyāyasūtra* 4.1.37, 38:
sarvam abhāvo bhāveṣv itaretarābhāvasiddheḥ;
na, svabhāvasiddher bhāvānām;
 and 4.2.26:
buddhyā vivecanāt tu bhāvānām yathātmyānupalabdhis tantvapakarṣaṇe paṭasadbhāvānupalabdhivat tadanupalabdhīḥ.
43. v. Matilal, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 78.
44. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 1.2.4:
bhāvāḥ sāmānyam eva;
 and 1.2.17:
sallīngaviśeṣād viśeṣalingābhāvāc caiko bhāva iti.
45. *Sāmkhyakārikā*, 40, 43, and 52.
46. *Yogasūtra*, 3.49:
sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātīmātrasya sarvabhāvādhiṣṭhātṛtvaṃ sarvajñātṛtvaṃ ca.
47. e.g. *Mokṣadharmā*, 203.34ab:
ete bhāvā jagat sarvaṃ bhavanti sacarācaram;
 240.11:

ye caiva bhāvā vartante sarva eṣv eva te triṣu,
anvarthāḥ sampravartante rathanemim arā iva;
and 308.179:

na tu kuṇḍe payobhāvaḥ payas cāpi na makṣikāḥ:
svayam evāśrayanty ete bhāvā na tu parāśrayam;
and *Bhagavadgītā* 7.12:

ye caiva sātṭvikā bhāvā rājasās tāmasās ca ye
matta eveti tām viddhi na tv ahaṁ teṣu te mayi.

48. v. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāṃkhya (I)."

49. *Muṇḍaka* 2.1.: tad etat satyam:

yathā sudiptāt pāvakād visphuliṅgāḥ sahasraśaḥ prabhavante sarūpāḥ
tathākṣarād vividhāḥ somya bhāvāḥ prajāyante tatra caivāpi yanti.

50. *Maitrāyaṇīya*, 6.25:

ekatvaṁ prāṇamanasor indriyāṇāṁ tathaiva ca
sarvabhāvaparitṛyāgo yoga ity abhidhīyate.

51. e.g. *Āyārācūlā*, 15.39: se bhagavaṁ arihaṁ jiṇe jāe, kevalī savvaṇṇū savvabhāvadarisī, sade-
vamanuyāsurasā loyassa pajjāe jāṇai ...;

and *Bhagavaī*, 1.290 ff.: puvviṁ bhaṁte loe, pacchā aloe, puvviṁ aloe, pacchā loe? rohā, loe ya
aloe ya puvviṁ pete, pacchā pete: do vete sāsaya bhāvā, aṇāṇupuvvī esā, rohā.

52. e.g. *Sūyagaḍa*, 1.1.1.15, 16 (Bollée, p. 15):

santi pañca mahabbhūyā iha-m-egesim āhiyā
āya cchaṭṭho; puṇo āhu: āyā loge ya sāsae.
duhao na viṇassanti no ya upajjāe asaṁ
sarve vi savvahā bhāvā niya-bhāvam āgayā.

and *Uvāsagadasāo*, 6.20 (Hoernle, 166: p. 97): haṁ bho kuṇḍakoliyā samaṇovāsaya, sundarī
ṇaṁ, devāṇuppiyā, gosālassa maṅkhaliputtassa dhammapaṇṇattī, natthi utṭhāṇe i vā
kamme i vā bale i vā vīrie i vā purisakkāraparakkame i vā, niyayā savvabhāvā; maṅguli ṇaṁ
samaṇassa bhagavao mahāvīrassa dhammapaṇṇattī, atthi utṭhāṇe i vā kamme i vā bale i vā
vīrie i vā purisakkāraparakkame i vā, aṇiyayā savvabhāvā.

53. v. *supra*, n. 23.

54. Johnston, *The Buddhacarita*, Part II, p. 158:

41. And since there is nothing absolute in the pleasures, therefore I do not entertain with
regard to them the idea of enjoyment; for the very states which show pleasure bring in their
turn suffering also.

42. For warm clothes and aloewood are pleasant in the cold and unpleasant in the heat; the
rays of the moon and sandalwood are pleasant in the heat and unpleasant in the cold.
(Johnston translates "bhāva" as "states"; but the following verse makes it clear that what is
actually meant is *things* such as clothes and aloewood.) Cf. *supra*, n. 23.

55. Johnston, *The Saundarananda*, p. 103:

Since the world has no motive force of its own and is not self-dependent, and since there is
no one being who exercises paramountcy over actions, and since states of being arise from
dependence on other states, he understood the world to be without soul.

56. e.g. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, 2.64 (p. 352): *yadi hy ekam eva kāraṇam īśvaraḥ syād anyad vā, yugapat sarveṇa jagatā bhavitavyam syāt; dṛśyate ca bhāvānām kramasambhavaḥ* (For if *īśvara* were the sole cause, or some other, the whole world would occur all at once; but we see that beings arise successively);
and 3.28 (p. 457): *nāsati hetau bhāvo bhavati, na cānutpattimato nityāt prakṛtipuruṣādikāt kiṃcid utpadyata iti* (A being does not occur in the absence of a cause, nor does anything arise from what has no arising, from something eternal like *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*).
57. e.g. *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 78: *tat katham ayaṃ bhagavaṃs tīrthakarātmavādatulyas tathāgatagarbhavādo na bhavati? tīrthakarā api bhagavan nityaḥ kartā nirguṇo vibhūr avyaya ity ātmavādupadeśaṃ kurvanti*;
and p. 198: *bhagavān āha, na mama mahāmate anirodhānutpādas tīrthakarānutpādānirodhavādena tulyo nāpy utpādānityavādena*.
58. *Samādhirāja*, p. 21.16:
abhāva jñāti sa sarvabhāvān
(but there is a variant reading, “*sarvadharmān*”);
p. 202.21-26:
sarvabhāvān vibhāvitvā abhāve ye pratiṣṭhitāḥ
na cānyo darśito bhāvo nābhāvo 'nyo nidarśitaḥ;
vijñaptā bhāvaśabdena abhāvasya prakāśanā,
na cāsau sarvabuddhehi abhāvaḥ śakyu paśyitum;
yo bhāvaḥ sarvabhāvānām abhāva eṣa darśitaḥ;
evaṃ bhāvān vijānitvā abhāvo bhoti darśitaḥ;
and similar passages at p. 41.22 f., p. 266.19 f., and p. 281.21-24 (v. *supra* n. 37).
59. *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, p. 232.19-21: *sa cet subhūte dharmadhātur bhāvo bhaviṣyan nābhāvo naivedaṃ mahāyānaṃ sadevamānuṣāsuraṃ lokam abhibhūya nirayāsyat*; *yasmāt tarhi subhūte dharmadhātur abhāvo na bhāvas tasmāt mahāyānaṃ sadevamānuṣāsuraṃ lokam abhibhūya nirayāsyati*; and p. 141.20: *tathā hi tena sarvadharmā abhāvasvabhāvā iti anugatā anuprāptāḥ*. Also v. *supra*, nn. 28, 29.
60. v. *supra*, n. 30
61. The *Vaidalyasūtra* and *-prakaraṇa*.
62. The *Akutobhaya* (27.24: p. 47.3.1) cites a verse from Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* (7.5), introducing it with “*btsun pa ḥphags pa lhas kyañ ...*” cf. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka School*, p. 47 f.
63. *Laṅkāvatāra*, “*Sagāthaka*,” 165 (p. 286):
dakṣiṇāpathavedalyāṃ bhikṣuḥ śrīmān mahāyaśaḥ
nāgāhvayaḥ sa nāmnā tu sadasatpakṣadārakaḥ.
64. e.g. the doctrines of the eight *vijñānas* and the *Tathāgatagarbha*.
65. The Tibetan translation of the *Abhidharmakośa* (P5591) uses ‘*dños*,’ ‘*dños po*’ and ‘*’no bo*’ as equivalents for ‘*bhāva*’. Of these, ‘*dños*’ and ‘*dños po*’ are also used for ‘*vastu*,’ ‘*dños*’ for ‘*maula*’ and ‘*dños po*’ for ‘*padārtha*’; ‘*’no bo*’ seems to be used exclusively for ‘*bhāva*’. (v. Hirakawa, *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.)
66. The term continues to appear in Jaina literature (e.g. Kundakunda, *Pañcāstikāya*-

śamayasāra, 15: *bhāvassa ṇatthi ṇaso ṇatthi abhāvassa ceva uppādo; guṇapajjavesu bhāvā uppādavae pakuvvaṃti*) but is no longer used (in this sense) in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. It is possible that its use in Jaina and Ājīvika writings made it less attractive to a school which maintained a connection with Brahmanical orthodoxy; but a more probable explanation may be that as the tradition represented by the *Kārikās* moved toward its characteristic subjectivism, the term 'bhāva,' as an expression for an objectively existing mode of the primordial being, no longer had a place in their system.

67. e.g. Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, 1.103:
viruddhaparimāṇeṣu vajrādarśatalādiṣu
parvatādisarūpāṇāṃ bhāvānāṃ nāsti saṃbhavaḥ;
 and Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya*, 4.1.3. (vol. 2, p. 197.8): *śadbhir prakāraiḥ satāṃ bhāvānāṃ anupalabdhir bhavaty atisaṃnikarṣād ativiprakaṣān mūrtyantaravyavadhānāt tamasāvṛtatvād indriyadaurbalyād atiprasādād iti.*
68. There are Yogācāra commentaries on Mādhyamika works: commentaries by Asaṅga and Sthiramati on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* have survived (T1565, T1567), and a commentary by Dharmapāla on Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka* (T1571).

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List of Chinese Characters and Passages in Chinese

a 類

b 體

c 法

d 謂或有執。擇滅非擇滅無常滅非實有體。如譬喻者。

e 謂尊者法救說類有異。...說類異者。彼謂諸法於世轉時。由類有異非體有異。如破金器等作餘物時形雖有異而顯色無異。又如乳等變成酪時捨味勢等非捨顯色。如是諸法從未來世至現在世時。雖捨未來類得現在類。而彼法體無得無捨。復從現在世至過去世時。雖捨現在類得過去類。而彼法體亦無得無捨。

f 類

g 說類異者。離法自性說何為類故亦非理。諸有為法從未來世至現在時前類應滅。從現在世至過去時後類應生。過去有生未來有滅豈應正理。

h 自性

Attitude Towards Past Lives in Theravāda Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta

Arvind Sharma

I

Considerable importance is attached to the ability to recall past lives in Theravāda Buddhism. In fact the three knowledges which are said to be constitutive of Nirvāṇa are (1) the knowledge of one's past lives; (2) the knowledge of the past lives of others and (3) the knowledge that the *karmas* have been destroyed.¹ The Jātakas, as a recollection of the past lives of the Buddha confirm this view,² as also actual practices laid down in *Theravāda* Buddhism for the actual recall of past lives. The *Visuddhi-Magga* describes one of them as follows: "The priest, then, who tries for the first time to call to mind former states of existence, should choose a time after breakfast when he has returned from his begging rounds, and is alone and plunged in meditation, and has been absorbed in the four trances in succession. On rising from the fourth trance, the one that leads to the High Powers, he should consider event which last took place, namely, his sitting room; the putting away of bowl and robe; his eating; his leaving the village; his going the rounds of the village for alms; his issuing forth from the monastery; his paying worship in the courts of the shrine and of the Bo-tree; his washing the bowl; his taking the bowl; what he did between his taking the bowl and rinsing his mouth; what he did at dawn; what he did in the middle watch of the night; what he did in the first watch of the night. Thus, in retrograde order, must he consider all that he did for a whole day and night."³

In this way one traces oneself back to the moment of one's birth. Piercing through to a previous life is a hard task but not beyond accomplishment so that finally the priest, "His alert attention, having become possessed of his knowledge, he can call to mind many former states of existence, to wit, one birth, two births, three births, four births, five births, then births, twenty births, thirty births, forty births, fifty births, one hundred births, one thousand births, one hundred thousand births, many destructions of a world-cycle, many renovations of a world-cycle, many destructions and many renovations of world cycle: 'I lived in such a place, had such a name, was of such a family, of such a caste, has such a maintenance, experienced such happiness and such miseries, has such a length of life. Then I passed from that existence, and was reborn in such a place. There also I have such a name, was of such a family, of such a caste, has such a maintenance,

experienced such happiness and such miseries, has such a length of life. I passed from that existence, and was reborn in this existence.' Thus he can call to mind many former states of existence, and can specifically characterize them." ⁴

Such knowledge of past lives is also recognized as one of the higher knowledge. It is stated that when, after the fourth *jhāna*, "when the mind is clear and cleansed, it acquires certain extrasensory faculties whereby it is possible to have a vision of one's past births (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*-, D.I.82)." ⁵

It is plain that in *Theravāda* Buddhism the recollection of past lives is both a means and end. The practice as recommended by Buddhaghosa is a means of realization; where as Buddha's ability to recall numerous past lives represented realization itself. ⁶ A second point to note is that *all* past lives cannot be recalled because the *Samsār* is without a beginning. ⁷ Although some texts describe Buddha as recalling all his past lives at the moment of *Nirvāṇa*, ⁸ a close study of the text reveals that the word used indicates not "all" but "many." ⁹

II

By contrast, in Advaita Vedānta, little importance is attached to a knowledge of past lives either as a means or as an end. The *Jivanamukta* is rarely referred to as one who knows his past life, on the contrary, a disregard for the past is said to be his characteristic attitude: "Not investigating the past, not being concerned about the future, indifference towards the present are the distinguishing marks of the *Jivanamukta*." ¹⁰ In fact, in Advaitic realization, a recollection of past life would involve a duality between the recaller and what is recalled and is therefore inconsistent with the non-dual experience. Thus, unlike realization in *Theravāda* Buddhism, the recall of past lives cannot be constitutive of Advaitic realization. Moreover, it is even doubtful if it is helpful even as a means towards achieving it. In the digest of Advaita called *Advaita - Bodha - Dipikā*, a reason for why we do not recall past lives is offered rather than a method of recovering it.

D.: Master, what was experienced on previous days can now be remembered. Why do we not remember the experience of past lives?

M.: This cannot be. See how the waking experiences repeat themselves in the dream but are not apprehended in the same way as in the waking state, but differently. Why? Because sleep makes all the difference, in as much as it hides the original bearings and distorts them, so that the main experience repeated in the dream is differently set, often aberrant and wobbling. Similarly the experiences of past lives have been affected by comas and deaths so that the present setting is different from the past ones and the same experience repeated in a different way cannot recall the past. ¹¹ As for the means of obtaining non-dual realization the method recommended is *not recalling* past lives but forgetting everything.

D.: Let it be so. How can the mind be extinguished?

M.: To forget everything is the ultimate means. But for thought, the world does not arise. Do not think it and it will not arise. When nothing arises in the mind, the

mind itself is lost. Therefore do not think of anything, forget all. This is the best way to kill the mind.

D.: Has anyone else said so before?

M.: Vasishtha said to so to Rama thus: Efface thoughts of all kinds, of things enjoyed, not enjoyed, or otherwise. Like wood or stone, remain free from thoughts.

Rama: Should I altogether forget everything?

Vasishtha: Exactly; altogether forget everything and remain like wood or stone.

Rama: The result will be dullness like that of stones or wood.

Vasishtha: Not so. All this is only illusion. Forgetting the illusion, you are freed from it. Though seeming dull, you will be the Bliss Itself.

It is also striking that the proof of the existence of Karma and rebirth is *not offered* through perception (*pratyakṣa*) but postulation (*arthāpatti*) in Advaitic epistemology.¹³ This confirms the lack of interest in past lives in Advaita, otherwise it could easily have mentioned that such lives could actually be perceived through yogis practices as some modern scholars have indeed suggested. It is therefore remarkable that although the *rāja-yogin* claim that “by bringing the residual tendencies (*saṃskāras*) into consciousness [through concentration] (*saṃnyama*) the knowledge of previous lives (*pūrva-jāti*) is obtained” (*Yoga Sūtra*, III,18); nevertheless, the Advaitin does not use this claim as a support for Karma....”¹⁴

It is true that in Yoga the question of past lives is actively discussed and pursued,¹⁵ but Advaita Vedānta is highly critical of Yoga. It has its own Advaitic understanding and formulation of the eight steps of Yoga. Moreover, “In the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā Bhāṣya*, Śāṅkara has explained why Yogic practice cannot be compatible with Advaita. Yoga, Patañjali defines, is the control of the mental modes. Śāṅkara says that those who regard Brahman alone as the Reality, and mind, senses etc., as superimposition like a ‘rope-snake’, have already attained liberation; and for them the question of controlling the mind does not arise at all. Only Yogins, who are devoid of the true knowledge of Ātman and think that mind is a real entity apart from and related to Ātman, have to control the mind for obtaining knowledge of Ātman and liberation.”¹⁶

There are striking similarities between Theravāda Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta – especially a shared belief in (1) Karma and rebirth; (2) in Mokṣa or liberation and (3) strikingly, a liberation which can be achieved in this very life. These similarities notwithstanding they differ in their attitude towards the recall of past life, a fact which must strike the student of comparative philosophies as both curious and significant.¹⁷

Notes

1. Edward J. Thomas, *A History of Buddhist Thought* (New York: Barnes & Nobles Inc., 1971), pp. 48-49.

2. Edward Conze, *Buddhism: Its Essence and Development* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 87.
3. Henry Clarke Warren, *Buddhism in Translation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1915), pp. 317-318.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 319-320.
5. K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), p. 108.
6. Edward J. Thomas, *The Life of the Buddha as Legend and History* (London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), pp. 66-67.
7. Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1974), p. 27.
8. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sutra: the Philosophy of Spiritual Life* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), p. 201, note 1.
9. Edward J. Thomas, *The Life of the Buddha*, p. 67.
10. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, verse 432.
11. Sri Ramanananda Sarasvathi, tr., *Advaita Bodha Deepika* (Tiruvannamalai: Ramanasramam, 1967), p. 16.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.
13. Dharendra Mohan Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical Study of the Vedānta Theory of Knowledge* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960), pp. 240-241.
14. Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction* (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1969), p. 71, note 8.
15. S. Radhakrishnan, *op.cit.*, p. 201 note 1; Ainslie T. Enbree ed., *Alberuni's India* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971), pp. 55-56.
16. K. Satchidanand Murty, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 136-137.
17. Modern Advaitins such as Ramaṇa Maharṣi also share this disinclination towards probing past lives. In *Talks with Sri Raman Maharṣi* (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramaasramam, 1984), "attempt to recall the past" is described as a "mere waste of time." (p. 215)

On upādāna (II)

Ālayavijñāna and its Two Kinds of upādāna

Jikido Takasaki

1.

At the 5th Conference of the IABS, held at Oxford in 1982, I read a paper entitled “On upādāna,” referring mainly to the concept of ‘upādāna’ as used in the *Madhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna, and in its commentary, the *Prasannapadā* composed by Candrakīrti.¹ In that paper, I tentatively suggested that ‘upādāna’ has two meanings, namely, (1) “that which takes (something)” and (2) “that which is taken”; that the latter is otherwise termed ‘upādeya’; and that this upādāna-upādeya relationship constitutes the core of the doctrine of *pratītya-samutpāda* as symbolically expressed in the formulae ‘upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ’ and ‘anupādāya nirvāṇam.’

I also suggested that Nāgārjuna, by identifying *pratītya-samutpāda* with *upādāya-prajñapti*, expanded the latter to the whole sphere of *dharma*s in contrast to the Abhidharmic understanding in which *upādāya-prajñapti* is applied only to *ātman*. In other words, in the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, or Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, all *dharma*s are, like *ātman* deprived of their substantiality (*niḥsvabhāva*, *śūnya*). In the present paper, I wish to examine how these concepts relating to upādāna developed after Nāgārjuna in the doctrine of the Yogācāras.

2.

Our observations will start with the following passage from the *Triṃśikā-kārikā*s:²

tatrālayākhyam vijñānam vipākaḥ sarvabījakam // 2 //
asamviditakopādīsthānavijñaptikam ca tat /

These *pādas* belong to the passage describing the *ālayavijñāna* as the first of the three *vijñānaparīṇāmas*, on the basis of which are produced various kinds of access (through verbal designation) to *ātman* and the *dharma*s (*ātmadharmopacāra*; *upcāra* = *prajñapti*). The first line gives the explanation of the ‘body’ of *ālayavijñāna*, and the second line its object, or basis (*ālambana*) and the feature or content of cognition (*ākāra*). The point in question is the meaning of the term ‘upādī’ in the compound ‘*asamviditakopādīsthānavijñaptikam*’ and how to resolve this compound.

In his *Triṃśikā-bhāṣya*³ Sthiramati begins the explanation of this line with the following introductory comments:

[Objection] If there be an *ālayavijñāna* which functions apart from the acting consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*), it should always have its own basis and feature in its capacity as consciousness.

[Answer] Indeed, it does have its own basis and feature as consciousness, but they are quite indistinct (*aparicchinnāsaṃviditaka*) because the *ālayavijñāna* acts in two ways:

- (1) internally, as cognition (*vijñapti*) of stuff (*upādāna*), and
- (2) externally, as cognition of the receptacle world of indistinct feature (*aparichinnākāra-bhājanavijñaptitah*).

Here, 'internal stuff' (*adhyātma-upādāna*) means:

- (a) residue of inclination towards things construed by thought (*parikal-pitasvabhāvābhiniṣeṣavāsanā*),
- (b) faculty stuff and the body as its foundation (*sādhīṣṭhānam indri-yarūpaṃ*), and
- (b') mental stuff (*nāma ca*) (i.e. *vedanā, saññā, saṃskāra, vijñāna*).

In the explanation following the verse, however, Sthiramati interprets the compound in a different manner. Namely, he resolves it into 'that which has *asaṃvidi-takopādi* and *asaṃviditakasthānavijñapti*.'⁴ Furthermore, 'upādi' (= *upādāna*) in this verse is explained as being of two kinds, as in the introductory comment, but in a little more detail.

The first of these two, i.e., residue, is explained to be (a) the residue of cognition (discrimination or construction in thought) of *ātman*, etc. (*ātmādivikalpavāsanā*), and (b) the residue of *dharma*s, material and other (*rūpādidharmavikalpavāsanā*). This residue is called '*upādāna*' because owing to its existence *ātman* or form, etc., are taken (*upātta*) by *ālayavijñāna* as the result of construction. This means that residue is the stuff (*upādāna*) to be taken (*upādeya*) by the agent (*upādātṛ*), i.e. *ālayavijñāna*, for its act of *vikalpa*. Here '*vikalpa*' is synonymous with '*vijñāpti*' or '*upacāra*' (in *ātmadharmopacāra*, v. 1). The second kind of *upādi*, on the other hand, is explained to be '*āśrayopādāna*,' i.e., the taking of the basis.⁵ Namely, *upādāna* is used here to denote the function of taking, while by *āśraya* is meant *upādāna* as in (b) and (b') of the foregoing passage, i.e., *sādhīṣṭhānam indriyarūpaṃ nāma ca*. And the function of *upādāna* is further explained as '*ekayogakṣematvena upagamana*,' i.e., to have access or become one through sharing bliss with one another. This is the orthodox definition of the function of *vijñāna* as sustaining the individual body throughout life. In addition, it is said that in the spheres of desire and the material, both mental and material bases are taken, but in the sphere of the non-material, mental stuff only. This does

not mean that there remains nothing material in the non-material world, but that the material remains there only in a state of residue.

3.

Sthiramati's interpretation is somewhat obscure, and contains some unique points in comparison with other Yogācāra texts. Firstly, Dharmapāla's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, available only in Chinese translation, interprets it in the following manner:⁶

Vijñapti in the verse signifies *ākāra*, while *sthāna* means *bhājanaloka* and together with *upādi* (= *upādāna*) represents *ālambana*. There are two kinds of *upādāna*, i.e. *bīja* and **sendriyakāya*. Of these two, *bīja* means **nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vāsanā*, while *sendriyakāya* means *rūpindriya* and *indriyādhiṣṭhāna*. These are both taken (*upātta*) by *vijñāna*, made as one with it, and 'share security and danger' with it. [This is the usual expression in Chinese, corresponding with *ekayogakṣetmatva*.] *Ālayavijñāna*, when it receives its body, transforms itself internally into *bīja* and *sendriyakāya*, and externally into *bhājanaloka*, and making what is transformed its own basis, i.e. supported by them (as by sticks), obtains its feature of cognition (*ākāra*).

Here both *upādi* and *sthāna* are regarded as the objects of *vijñapti*. This agrees with Sthiramati's first interpretation. As for the interpretation of *bīja* or *vāsanā*, as is well known, Dharmapāla's interpretation is based on *Sandhinirmocana*,⁷ while Sthiramati's is based upon the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*,⁸ but both are fundamentally identical because both signify the sphere of thought construction impressed upon consciousness. The biggest difference is the addition of 'nāma ca' by Sthiramati to '*sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpam*,' which is not observed in any other text. We shall consider this point later.

Another point in question is the ambiguity of the meaning of *upādāna* in relation to *vijñapti*. This we shall now examine by searching for the background to its use in the Abhidharmic tradition.

4.

The concept '*upādāna*,' as equivalent to '*chih-shou*' [chinese]⁹ in Chinese is used for denoting the function of sustaining the individual throughout life by collecting materials into the body. Its agency is sought in the mind, and the materials sustained in the body are called '*upātta*' (*you-chih-shou* [chinese]). According to the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, '*upātta*' is defined as follows:¹⁰

[What is called 'the material sustained in the body' is] That which is taken up (*udgrhīta*) by the mind and its associated mental functions as being the foundation [of their activity] (*adhiṣṭhāna*). It is because they (the *upātta*

and the mind) are conforming to each other (*anyonyānuvidhāna*) in both accepting [things good for them] and rejecting [things not good for them] (*udgraha-upaghātābhyām*). It is what is called sensual (*sacetana*) in the world.

Among all *dharma*s as classified into the eighteen elements,

(1) the seven mental elements (six *vijñānadhātu* and *manodhātu*), *dhar-madhātu* and *śabdadhātu* (sound) are always 'not taken' (*anupātta*);

(2) of the five elements beginning with the eyes, i.e. the five faculties, those existing in the present are '*upātta*,' and those belonging to the future and the past are '*anupātta*;' and

(3) of the remaining four elements, i.e. colour, smell, taste and the touch-able, those existing at present and connected with the five faculties (namely, materials constituting a living body) are '*upātta*,' and all others (the outer world, including a corpse, excrement, most parts of the hair, etc., which are capable of being cut off) are '*anupātta*.'

The same grouping of elements is accepted by the texts of the Yogācāras, such as the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Ch., fasc. 66),¹¹ *Abhidharmasamuccaya*,¹² and *Mahāyāna-pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*.¹³ Among the definitions given in these texts, the definition of '*upātta*' as materials which offer the foundation for the origination of sense (*vedanotpattiyāśrayarūpa*) in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is equivalent to '*sacetana*' in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, while '*anyonyānuvidhāna*' in the latter has the same import as '*ekayogakṣematva*' mentioned previously.¹⁴ Notable is the fact that throughout these texts the mind and its associated functions (*citta-caitta*), i.e. the four *skandhas* beginning with *vedanā*, or *nāman* of *nāmarūpa*, are always excluded from the group of *upāttas*.

Now, in the doctrine of the *Abhidharmakośa* and other texts of the Sarvāstivāda and other similar schools, this function of *upādāna* or the *upādāna-upātta* relation exists between *citta-caitta* and *sādhiṣṭhāna-indriyarūpa*, and the former is denoted (if we apply it in the process of the present life according to the doctrine of dependent origination) by *vijñāna* at the moment of conception, '*nāman*' (of '*nāmarūpa*'), and '*mana āyatana*' (among the *ṣaḍ-āyatana*) in the following stages. To this a query is raised by the Yogācāras in view of the fact that even in a swoon life continues to be sustained, and thus they assumed the existence of a subconsciousness behind the acting mind and named it '*ālayavijñāna*.'

For example, among the eightfold testimony concerning the *raison d'être* of the *ālayavijñāna* given at the beginning of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*,¹⁵ the first is called 'the impossibility of sustaining the basis (*āśrayopādānāsambhavatva*) without *ālayavijñāna* (*antareṇālayavijñānam*).'¹⁶ (The Sanskrit terms are taken from the quotations in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā*.)¹⁶ This statement is made on account of five reasons, of which the first is as follows:¹⁷

The *ālayavijñāna* is caused by the formative forces of the previous life, while the eye-consciousness and other acting consciousnesses are caused by the conditions of the present life (*ālayavijñānaṃ pūrvasaṃskārahetukam / cakṣurādīpravṛttivijñānaṃ punar vartamānapratyaya hetukam /*)

This means that the *vijñāna* of the first moment in this life must be *ālayavijñāna* and not the acting consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*), and this characterisation of *ālayavijñāna* naturally leads to its being regarded as the substratum of formative forces since the time of death. Thus the eighth statement, 'the impossibility of the transmittance [of life] by consciousness without *ālayavijñāna*' (*vijñānacyutyasambhavatva*) is explained in the following manner:¹⁸

In the case of the dying *vijñāna* leaves the body from either above or below, gradually making it cool. This *vijñāna* cannot be *manovijñāna* because it does not function sometimes even during life. Therefore it is observed that the body becomes cool or insentient (*dehāpratisaṃvedana*) when the *ālayavijñāna* that sustains the body (*dehopādānaka*) leaves it, not on account of the leaving of the *manovijñāna*.

A description of *ālayavijñāna* as the substratum of biotic forces in *saṃsāra* is found in the *Manobhūmi* section of the *Mūlabhūmika* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Namely, it is said in short that¹⁹

after *vijñāna* has left its foundation (i.e. the body), making it cool, a new sort of foundation (*āśraya*) is produced out of the seed (*bīja*) [of *vijñāna*] owing to the impressing force of frivolous discrimination and good or evil acts, and becomes an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*). When the time has come, and it is conceived in the womb, *ālayavijñāna*, consisting of all seeds (*sarvabījaka*) and of the nature of the matured (*vipākasaṃgrhīta*), attaches to it (i.e. the foundation of *antarābhava*) (?) by sustaining it and congeals into a body (*sammūrcchati*). Thus, inside the womb there grows a *kalala* consisting of *kāya-indriya* only as its foundation for taking.

Because of this function of sustaining the individual throughout life or taking the foundation (*āśrayopādāna*), *ālayavijñāna* received its name of *ādānavijñāna* as observed in the *Sandhinirmocana* and other works.²⁰

In the passage following this in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, however, 'bīja' is explained to be synonymous with 'ālaya,' 'upādāna,' etc., besides 'satkāyadrṣtyadhiṣṭhāna,' etc.²¹ Hence we learn that *upādāna* has the character of 'kleśa' or affection, which causes *saṃsāric* existence and that this function of 'taking' is involved in 'bīja' itself. In other words, (in the state of *antarābhava*) there exists nothing but *ālayavijñāna* in the form of *bījas*, and on the one hand it produces *upādāna* or the foundation out of itself, but at the same time it sustains the latter (*āśrayopādāna*). But how is it possible for *ālayavijñāna* to work in two ways simultaneously? This relates to another function of *ālayavijñāna*, i.e. the function of cognition.

In addition, mention should be made of a passage in the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra* referring to the momentariness of *dharmas* (MSA XVIII.83 & comm.),²² where the momentariness of '*sarvasaṃskārāḥ*' is explained to be established among other things, through their relationship as cause and effect to the mind which is admitted to be momentary. Namely, for the mind *rūpa* and other *saṃskāras* are the cause – this is referring to '*saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam*' – but they are also its effect because they are 'taken' (*upātta*) by the mind and governed (*adhipatya*) by the mind. As regards *upāttatva*, the text goes further on to say that all the formative forces, i.e. the mental faculties of the eye, etc., and their foundations are 'taken' (or sustained) by the mind and together with it congealed into a body as being in association with its benefit (*cittena hi sarve saṃskārāḥ cakṣurādayaḥ sādhiṣṭhānāḥ upāttāḥ saha sammūrcchanāḥ tadanugrahānūvṛttitāḥ*/). For this passage an authority is given in quotation as '*vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpam*.' Thus we come to know that this passage is referring to the causal chain of co-origination around '*vijñāna*,' the third limb, and that here lies the fundamental model of *ālayavijñāna* defined as '*vipākasaṃgrhita*' and '*sarvabijaka*' as well as '*ādāna*.' This model may be illustrated by means of the following diagrams:




Diagram I




Diagram II

5.

Of the two kinds of *upādāna* what has remained unexplained is the *upādāna* as *vāsanā* of *ātma-dharma-vikalpa*. According to the *Sandhinirmocana*, it is termed '**nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanopadāna*' (*upādāna* [characterised as] the residue of frivolous multiplicity in verbal expression about characteristics and names and discrimination; acc. to Tib.).²³ It is otherwise called '**nāma-vāsanā*' or '**nāma-bija*' in contrast to the '**karma-bija*' or '*vāsanā*' which causes *samsāra*. It is related to cognition as the proper function of *vijñāna*. Namely, it is a kind of impression stored within *ālayavijñāna* as a result of cognition. This impression is also waiting for a chance to be expressed, as in the case of *karma*, but

it is not of any long term as in the latter case, but of every moment. In this cognition of every moment, *ālayavijñāna* keeps the result of cognition and, making this the basis, creates the next cognition. In this respect Sthiramati designated *vāsanā* or *bīja* as 'upādāna of *vikalpa*.' Hence *upādāna* means the stuff of cognition, being synonymous with '*ālambana*.'

What was termed the 'result of cognition' above is generally referred to in terms of '*ātman*' and the *dharma*s. It is a mere product of thought construction and of no reality. This is the fundamental standpoint of the Vijñānavāda. As for *ātman*, however, its non-reality is recognised even in the Abhidharmic doctrine, as observed in the *Abhidharmakośa*.²⁴ Namely, *ātman* is a verbal construction (*prajñapti*) on the basis of (*upādāya*) the five *skandhas* as stuff (*upādāna*). In the *Madhyamakakārikā*, however, besides *ātman*, all the *dharma*s, i.e. the five *skandhas*, too, are regarded as '*upādāya prajñapti*.'²⁵ The Vijñānavāda school took over this doctrine, but restored the reality of the stuff of *upādāna* in *upādāya prajñapti*. Thus they (hypothetically) established *ālayavijñāna* consisting of *vāsanā* or *bījas* as the basis (*upādāna*) of the cognition of *ātman* and the *dharma*s, i.e. *upādāna* of the verbal construction (*prajñapti* = *upācāra*) of *ātman* and the *dharma*s, and regarded it alone as real (*sad*), being dependently originated (*pratītyasamutpanna*), with the name of *paratantra-svabhāva*. As *bīja* or *vāsanā* it is stuff (*upādāna* or *upātta*), but functionally it is the taking (*upādāna*) or taker (*upādātṛ*). In this sense 'taking' is synonymous with '*vikalpa*,' '*vijñāna*' and '*prajñapti*' (in the active sense of *prajñāpayati*).

6.

I have indicated above the two kinds of function of *upādāna*, namely (1) sustaining the individual body and (2) cognition or verbal construction. From the standpoint of the monism of *vijñāna*, however, these two are again reduced to the latter function. Namely, sustaining is a kind of function of *vijñāna*, and cognition of the outer world is also a kind of *upādāna* in the latter sense. Embracing these two, the function of *vijñāna* is technically called '*vijñapti*,' 'making known' or 'information.' Within this 'information' the whole world is divided into subject and object, or *ālambana* and *ākāra*, and while in that state, into impression and expression (*bīja* and **abhinirhāra*), standing in turn for cause and effect, and thus constituting the process of time. This whole is otherwise called '*vijñānapariṇāma*,' or 'the transformation of consciousness,' in which the 'cognition' of *ātman* and *dharma*s and the 'taking' of their residue are repeated alternatively.

If we divide the same process into internal and external, information of the outer world is nothing but the cognition of *dharma*s, and its result, i.e. the content of cognition, is impressed in the form of residue. But as far as it is cognised as the outer world, it is never taken (*upātta*) or made to constitute an individual body. On the other hand, internal *dharma*s are taken by *vijñāna* and continue to exist (in a continuity of momentary change: *santati*, *santatipariṇāma*) and at the same time

originate the cognition of *ātman*, while the physical elements 'taken' by *ālayavijñāna* put their residue of *karma* in *ālayavijñāna* and make themselves the stuff of *saṃsāra*.

Thus we learn that what are the same in cognition are divided into the internal and external in accordance with the function of 'taking.' It may also be said that in the direction from *bīja* to *abhinirhāra* there is the distinction of being internal or external, but in the direction from *abhinirhāra* to *bīja* both are simultaneously directed towards the internal.




Diagram III: Structure of *ālayavijñāna*

Now, lastly, we should solve the problem of the inclusion by Sthiramati of '*nāman*' in the internal *upādāna*. The answer may be found in the difference of scope in '*upātta*' and the cognition of *ātman*. In the traditional doctrine only the physical body and faculties are 'taken' for the sake of maintenance. But we usually include in individuality our consciousness which 'takes' the body. '*Nāman*,' or mental elements are not the 'taken,' but they are necessary for the cognition of *ātman*. Being internal to individuality they are well said to be at one with *ālayavijñāna* by sharing bliss with it. They are, namely, *manas* and the six *vijñānas*.

In order to show the position of these acting *vijñānas* within the whole process of *vijñāna-pariṇāma*, the fourfold manifestation of *vijñāna* described in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (I.4)²⁶ is most helpful for our understanding. Namely, (a) manifestation as the object (*artha*) means the six objects (*ṣaḍviśaya*), which corresponds to the cognition of the outer world; this is *anupātta*; (b) manifestation as sentient beings (*sattva*) means the five (physical) faculties (*pañcendriya*), which corresponds to '*sādhiṣṭhāna-indriyarūpa*;' while (c) manifestation as *ātman* (self) means *manas* or *manaindriya*; and (d) manifestation as making known (*vijñapti*) means the six acting *vijñānas* (*ṣaḍ vijñānāni*). These last two, i.e. (c) and (d) combined, constitute *nāman*, i.e. the internal four *skandhas*. Among these four manifestations, *vijñapti* and *artha*, and *ātman* (*manas*) and *sattva* represent the subject-object relationship. In other words, *manas* internally takes *sattva* and cognises *ātman*, while *vijñapti* externally cognises *dharmas*.

In these manifestations, however, the residue or *bīja* is naturally not included. It is merely an impression of the four manifestations, which in turn is worthy of

being called *vijñapti* or expression. The relationship of *ālayavijñāna* to this *vāsanā* or *bija* is, on the other hand, not suitable for being called *vijñapti* or expression. Rather, it may be better called 'upādāna' or 'taking.' It is also notable that this *upādāna*, i.e. the taking of *vāsanā* by *ālayavijñāna*, involves the sense of 'affection' or 'clinging' which causes saṃsāric existence (*bhava*) through the repetition of transformation between *bija* and the manifestation, impression and expression within *vijñāna*.²⁷

This whole process is shown in the diagram below:




Diagram IV: vijñaptin-mātra

Notes

This paper was first read at the 8th Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies held at Berkeley in August, 1987. The original text of this paper was published in Japanese under the title "Ārayashiki to engi – shūju/upādāna to no kanren" (*Ālayavijñāna* and Dependent Origination: In Relation to the Concept of "upādāna") in *Bukkyo shisō no shomondai* (dedicated to Prof. A. Hirakawa on his 70th birthday, Tokyo, Shunjūsha, 1985), pp. 33-53.

1. J. Takasaki, "On upādāna, upādāya prajñapti" in *Orientalia Iosphi Tucci Memoriae Dicata* (Volume III, SOR LVI, 3, IsMEO, Roma, 1988, pp. 1451-1464.
2. Lévi, S., *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Deux Traités de Vasubandhu ... Viṃśatikā et Trīṃśikā*, Paris, 1925, pp. 18.21–19.25 (vv. 2cd, 3ab, and commentary thereon).
3. *Ibid.*, p. 19.2-8.

4. *Ibid*, p. 19.10-16.
5. *Ibid*, p. 19.16-25.
6. Taishō 31, p. 10a
7. Taishō 16, p. 692b (Tib: E. Lamotte, ed., 1935, p. 55).
8. Taishō 30, p. 580a
9. Not 'ts'ü' [chinese], which is used for denoting the ninth *bhavāṅga*.
10. Taishō 29, p. 8b; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ed. by P. Pradhan, Patna, 1975 (rev. ed.), p. 23.7-27, ad 1.33
11. Taishō 30, p. 666a.
12. Taishō 31, p. 672a; *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, ed. by N. Tatia, Patna, 1976, p. 43 (§43).
13. Taishō 31, p. 850c.
14. Cf. *Yogācārabhūmi*, Ch. fasc. 100 (Taishō 30, p. 880a), where *ekayogakṣematva* is explained by *anyonyānuvidhānatva* in *udgraha-upaghāta* between *rūpa* and *citta-caittas*.
15. Taishō 30, p. 579a.
16. *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, p. 11. (§9B).
17. *Ibid.*, p. 12 (§9B, 1(a)).
18. *Ibid.*, p. 13 (§9B, viii); *Yogācārabhūmi*, Taishō 30, p. 579c.
19. *Yogācārabhūmi*, ed. by V. Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 15.7-25.1 (p. 24.3-5: ... *tatra sarva vijakam vipakasamgrhitam āśrayopādānād ālayavijñānam sammūrccati*); Taishō 30, pp. 281b-283a.
20. *Sandhinirmocana* (Taishō 16, p. 692b); *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Taishō 31, p. 701c); *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, p. 11 (§9A: *punaḥ punaḥ pratisamdhibandhe ātma-bhāvopādānād ādānavijñānam*); *Mahāyānasamgraha* (Taishō 31, p. 133bc, Tib. sDe-dGe ed., p. 3b, 3-5 (Sanskrit reconstruction by Nagao: *kiṃ kāraṇam ādānavijñānam ity ucyate*/. (a) *sarvarūpendriyopādānatvena* (b) *sarvātmabhāvopādānāśrayatvena ca / tathā hi* (a) *tena pañcarūpindriyāny upādīyante vināśāya yāvad āyur anuvartate* / (b) *pratisamdhibandhe ca tadabhinirvṛtтыupādānatvenātmaabhāva upādīyate / evaṃ tad ādānavijñānam ity ucyate* / Tokyo: Kodansha, 1982, pp. 11-12); and *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Taishō 31, p. 14c.
21. *Yogācārabhūmi*, Skt., p. 26.17-18; Taishō, p. 284c.
22. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, ed. by Sylvain Lévi, Paris, 1904, pp. 150.27-151.8
23. Taishō 16, p. 692b; Lamotte ed., p. 55.
24. Taishō 29, p. 152c; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, p. 461.20-21: *adhyātmikān upātān vartamānān skandhān upādāya pudgalāḥ prajñāpyate* /.
25. *Madhyamakakārikā*, XXIV.18. See Takasaki, *op. cit.* (note 1).
26. *Madhyāntavibhāga*, ed. by G.M. Nagao, Tokyo, 1964, v. I.3: *arthasattvātmavijñapti-pratibhāsam prajāyate / vijñānam nāsti cāsyārthas tadabhāvāt tad apy asat* //.
27. On this subject I consulted the following works:
G. Nagao, "Shoen gyōsōmon no ichimondai" (A Problem Concerning *ālambana* and *ākāra*), *Chūgan to yuishiki*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978, pp. 373-388.
S. Suguro, "Ārayashiki no gōgi" (The Meaning of the Term *ālayavijñāna*), *Bukkyō kyōri no kenkyū*, (Prof. Tamura Felicitation Volume), Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1982, pp. 52-56.

K. Yokoyama, *Yuishiki no tetsugaku* (The Philosophy of the Vijñānavāda) Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1979.

The same subject was discussed by S. Takeuchi in his article “Yuishikigaku ronsho ni okeru shūju no futatsu no imi” (On the Two Usages of *upādāna* in Vijñaptimātratā Treatises), *Bukkyō to ishūkyō* (Prof. Kumoi Felicitation Volume) Kyoto: Heirajiku Shoten, 1985, pp. 267-278.

Prof. L. Schmithausen's recent work, *Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*, (2 parts, *Studia Philologica Buddhica*, Monograph Series IV, a, b, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987), discusses the “*upādāna*” function of *ālayavijñāna* (pp. 69-73: §§4.3-4), and reference to and criticism of my article in Japanese (in Hirakawa Felicitation Volume, 1985) are given (notes 512, 513, 517, 518, 526 and 529).

Vyāpti in Jainism

Atsushi Uno

In Indian logic the invariable concomitance of probans (*hetu*, e.g. smoke) with probandum (*sādhya*, e.g. fire) is generally called *vyāpti*. *Vyāpti* as a statement (*vyāpty-ākāra-vākya*) is sometimes mentioned together with example like a kitchen etc. in the third member of syllogism *udāharāṇa*. Basically, *udāharāṇa* as a member of a syllogism seems to have been intended, as the term literally means, as an example where probans and probandum coexist, and probably *vyāpti* was inserted into the third member in later times. In my view, *vyāpti* is not to be mentioned directly in any member of a syllogism, but is to be constructed mentally by each inferer outside the syllogism, probably immediately after the mention of *hetu*.

Major premise and minor premise in the syllogism of Western traditional logic roughly correspond to *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* respectively. Thus there is no divergence of opinion among Indian philosophical systems that these two are postulated as indispensable factors, either separately or jointly, for obtaining the conclusion, or the final inferential cognition (*anumiti*). The Mīmāṃsakas employed these two separately, while the later Naiyāyikas regarded the cognition of the jointed two as an immediate cause (*vyāpāra*) of *anumiti* in the name of *parāmarśa*. Later Buddhists even employed these two as the sole members of inference.

The concept of *vyāpti* has generally been scrutinized from the following three standpoints: i) definition (as connotation); ii) type (as denotation); and iii) how the knowledge of *vyāpti* is obtained. There is a difference of views among philosophical schools regarding these three spheres. The concept of *vyāpti* invariably involves various factors beginning with the probans etc., the interpretations of which are again totally based on the specific ontology and epistemology of each school. In this article the discussion of *vyāpti* is confined to the first standpoint.

I

When contact relation is established between two entities, x and y, one can say x is connected with y and vice versa. However, *vyāpti* is, as it were, a non-symmetrical relation, with a one-sided direction proceeding from probandum to probans. Though one expects a subtle and strict definition of *vyāpti* from the later Naiyāyikas, the notion of *vyāpti* could not but be expressed in a very vague and negative

way in earlier stages. It was often called *sāhacaryaniyama* (necessity of co-presence) or *avinābhāva* (impossibility [of one] in the absence of the other) or it was indicated by such concrete statements as 'wherever there is smoke there is fire,' or 'wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke.' It is very likely that *vyāpti* was understood as a mere relationship between probans and probandum, and that its direction, i.e. from which it proceeds to which, was not clearly understood in early times.

According to Matilal, various designations have been given to this *vyāpti*. 1) *sambandha-mātra* (Bhūṣaṇakāra) 2) *avyabhicaritatva* (Nyāyakandalī) 3) *avinābhāva* (Dignāga, Praśastapāda, etc.), 4) *svābhāvika-sam.* (Udayana), 5) *nimitta-naimittika* (Sāṃkhya?), 6) *tādātmya* (Dharmakīrti), 7) *anaupādhika-sam.* (Udayana etc.), 8) *niyama* (Mīmāṃsaka, Vaiyākaraṇa), 9) *sāhacarya-niyama* (Naiyāyika), 10) *pratibandha* (Dharmakīrti) and so on.¹

Vyāpti, being identical with *vyāpyatā* (or *vyāpyatva*), is a property (*dharma*) or a sort of relation (*sambandha*), i.e. *vyāpaka-vyāpyatā*, which resides in what happens to be a *vyāpya*. Navya-naiyāyikas call such terms *sāpekṣa-dharma*, and Ingalls aptly renders them as 'relational abstracts.' Dignāga seems to be the first to use the term *vyāpti*, and among his near successors Kumārila used this term most often. In my opinion this term is more positive and advanced in character than those mentioned above, by opening the way to a more analytical and rigid investigation of the relation in question. For *vyāpti* cannot be the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of probans by probandum in the literal sense; rather, it means the pervader-pervaded relation between the denotations (domains) of occurrences of the probandum and of the probans.

Later Naiyāyikas, however, lay considerable stress on the concomitance (*sāhacarya*) or co-existence (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) of both relata in one locus, with a view to defining the *vyāpti*. It is quite interesting that the term *niyama* found greater favour with the successors of Kumārila, while later Naiyāyikas devotedly used the term *vyāpti*. As for the definition of *vyāpti*, Gaṅgeśa, who is supposed to be the founder of Navya-nyāya, mentioned twenty-nine kinds of definition, out of which twenty-one are tentative and the remaining eight are ultimate. Thus *vyāpti* is considered a property or a relation to be attributed to the right probans, in the sense of 'necessary co-existence with probandum.' It is generally held among philosophical schools that a right probans (*hetu*) possesses at least three features or characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) (beside *vyāpti*): i) 'existence in the subject' (*pakṣa-sattva* or *pakṣadharmatā*), ii) 'existence in the homologue' (*sapakṣa-sattva*), and iii) 'absence in the heterologue' (*vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*). It is quite strange that *vyāpti* is totally unaccepted as a characteristic on a similar level with the 'three characteristics.' Such an interpretation may possibly be due to the fact that the 'three characteristics' concern the occurrent relation of probans exclusively to various loci, i.e. *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa*, and *vipakṣa*.

II

To the Jains also the terms *vyāpti* or *avinābhāva* seemed to have been quite familiar long since, judging from the following statements in *Nyāyāvatāra* (henceforth NA):²

i) *sādhya-sādhanayor vyāptir yatra niścīyatetarām /*

sādharmyeṇa sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ sambandha-smaraṇān matam // (NA 18)

[The instance, in which the necessary concomitance (*vyāpti*) of probans and probandum is ascertained (without leaving any room for doubt), is regarded as one based on similarity. It is endorsed in order to stimulate the memory of necessary concomitance.]

ii) *antarvyāptyaiva sādhyasya siddher bahir udāhṛtāḥ /*

vyarthā syāt tad-asad-bhāve 'py evaṃ nyāya-vido viduḥ // (NA 20)

[The establishment of the probandum is secured exclusively by internal concomitance (*antar-vyāpti*) and its citation outside the subject will be useless and such also will be the case if the said concomitance will be unknown. Such is the considered verdict of the adepts in logic.]

iii) *sādhyāvinābhuvō hetor vaco yat pratipādakam /*

parārtham anumānam tat pakṣādi-vacanātmakam // (NA 13)

[A statement which demonstrates a probans standing in a relation of necessary concomitance (*avinābhāva*) to the probandum is called inference for the sake of the other. It consists in the statement of the subject (*pakṣa*) and others.]

Later Jaina logicians like Deva Sūri (1086 – 1169 A.D.) refer to the two-fold 'usage of probans,' i.e. *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti*, which undoubtedly correspond to *anvaya-vyāpti* and *vyatireka-vyāpti* in the ordinary sense. However, besides these concepts, there exist at least two other views concerning *vyāpti*. One is attributed to Pātrakesari and Siddhasena Divākara, and the other to Hemacandra.

1. View attributed to Pātrakesari and Siddhasena

Tattvasaṃgraha introduces in the beginning (§§1364-1379) of the 'inference' chapter a view that a right probans possesses a unitary feature '*anyathānupapannatva*' instead of 'three characteristics,' and thereafter criticizes it severely. Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* (abbr. TSP), commentary on *Tattvasaṃgraha* (abbr. TS) attributes this view to Pātrasvāmin, a Digambara Jain. In Jaina tradition, Pātrasvāmin, otherwise known as Pātrakesari or Pātrakesarisvāmin, is believed to have flourished in the latter half of the 6th century, and to have written a work entitled *Trilakṣaṇakadarthana* (Refutation of Three Characteristics), though it is not extant. However, almost nothing particular about him and his view is known even in Jaina tradition, and all subsequent references to his views in any work, Jaina or non-Jaina,

have been taken exclusively from one source, i.e. TS and TSP. Though the stated view has been unanimously attributed to Pātrakesari in any logical text, Siddhasena Divākara also mentions the same term in his *Nyāyāvatāra* (abbr. NA). Which of them was the first to put forward this theory remains unknown.

Pātrakesari does not regard the term *anyathānupapannatva* as equivalent to *vyāpti* as is the case with Siddhasena, judging from the following statements:

i) *avinābhāva-sambandhas trirūpeṣu na jātucit / anyathā 'sambhandha-vaikāṅga-hetuṣv evopalabhyate* // (TS 1367)

[The relation of universal concomitance is by no means present in the probans having 'three characteristics'; it is really found in those probans which have the one characteristic *anyathānupapannatva*.]

ii) *anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasya tasyaiva hetutā / drṣṭāntau dvāv api stāṃ vā mā vā tau hi na kāraṇam* // (TS 1368)

[That alone is the true probans which has *anyathānupapannatva*; as for corroborative instances, they may be there, or they may not; as they are not the means.]

iii) *nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim / anyathā nupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim* // (TS 1369)

[If *anyathānupapannatva* is not there, what is the use of 'three features'? And if *anyathānupapannatva* is there, what is the use of the 'three characteristics'?]

iv) *anyathānupapannatvaṃ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam / tad-apratīti-saṃdeha-viparyāśais tad-ābhata* // (NA 22)

[The characteristic of the probans has been stated to consist in *anyathānupapannatva*. The aforesaid probans is said to be fallacious simulation if it is subject to indecision, doubt, and definite error.]

This view propounded by Pātrakesari or Siddhasena Divākara has succeeded as an established theory to subsequent Jaina logicians. Siddhasena, however, puts forward another stanza in his *Nyāyāvatāra*, requiring *anyathānupapatti*, instead of *anyathānupapannatva*, together with its counterpositive term *tathopapatti* for establishing probandum:

hetos tathopapattyā vā syāt prayogo 'nyathā 'pi vā / dvividho anyatareṇa 'pi sādhyā-siddhir bhaved iti // (NA 17)

[The usage of the probans may be two-fold, either in the positive form (*tathopapatti*), or in the negative form (*anyathānupapatti*). The proof of probandum is realized by either way.]

These two forms undoubtedly correspond to *tathopapannatva* and *anyathānupapannatva*, respectively. This two-fold usage of probans has been handed down to

posterity, and we can find a good example of it in the *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka* (abbr. PNT) by Deva Sūri:

hetu-prayogas tathopapatty-anyathānupapattibhyāṃ dvi-prakāraḥ
(PNT III.29)

[The usage of the probans is of two kinds: by 'logical possibility in the presence of the other' and by 'logical impossibility in the absence of the other.']

saty eva sādye hetor upapattis tathopapattiḥ, asaty sādhye hetor anupapattir evānyathānupapattiḥ (PNT III.30)

[*tathopapatti* is 'logical possibility of probans only in the presence of probandum', and *anyathānupapatti* is 'logical impossibility of probans in the absence of probandum'.]

According to commentaries on TS, NA, and PNT, the term *anyathā* is interpreted as 'in the absence of probandum,' (*sādhyena vinā, sādhyābhāva-prakāreṇa, sādhyam antareṇa*, etc.) and *anupapannatva* or *anupapatti* as 'logical impossibility of probans' (*hetor avidyamānatā, hetor aghaṭanā*, etc.). Judging from these interpretations, *anyathānupapannatva* or *anyathānupapatti* undoubtedly refers to *vyatireka-vyāpti* in the form of *yatra yatra vahny-abhāvas tatra dhūmābhāvaḥ*, while *tathopapatti* denotes *anvaya-vyāpti* in the form of *yatra yatra vahnis tatraiva dhūmaḥ* or *yatra yatra dhūmas tatra vahnīḥ*.

The term *anyathānupapannatva*, which was first propounded by Jaina pioneers as a unitary characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) different from *vyāpti* proves to be nothing but *vyāpti*. On the other hand, the term *a-vinā-bhāva* which was understood as identical with *vyāpti* may be interpreted analytically as *vinā-abhāva*. Here *vinā* means 'in the absence of probandum,' and *abhāva* 'logical impossibility of probans,' respectively. Thus we cannot but conclude that the term *anyathānupapannatva* initiated by Pātrakesari or Siddhasena referred substantially to *vyāpti*.

Why is it then that the term in dispute was not taken to be identical with *vyatireka-vyāpti* and that *vyāpti* was not given equal status with the 'three characteristics' of a right probans? In my opinion, what was supposed to be a 'feature' or 'characteristic' (*lakṣaṇa*) attributed to a right probans was basically originated as a 'property' (*dharma*) on subsumptive basis in relation to its various loci, i.e. *pakṣa, sapakṣa*, or *vipakṣa*. On the other hand, *vyāpti* was, in the early stage, understood not as a property (*dharma*) attributed to a correct probans, but as a sort of relation (*sambandha*) between probans and probandum.

2. View propounded by Hemacandra

Hemacandra (1088-1173) mentions two kinds of definition of *vyāpti* and comments on them in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* (abbr. PM). However, it is interesting to note that his descriptions are quite similar to the definitions given by Dharmakīrti

in his *Hetubindu* (abbr. HB) and to the comments thereon made by Arcaṭa in *Hetubinduṭīkā*. Since Hemacandra makes no particular reference to *vyāpti* except for the above-mentioned descriptions, it is very likely that he followed the views of Dharmakīrti and Arcaṭa almost *ad verbum* as regards *vyāpti*.³

vyāptir vyāpakasya vyāpye sati bhāva eva vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāvaḥ /

[PM (I. iv. 2)]

[Hemacandra interprets *tatraiva* as *vyāpake gamye sati*.]

HB (Steinkellner's rendering from Tibetan)

vyāpter vyāpakasya tatra bhāva eva vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāvaḥ /

[Arcaṭa interprets the term *tatra* as *yatra dharminī vyāpyam asti tatra*, and *tatraiva* as *vyāpake gamye sati*.]

Translation: *vyāpti* means that i) the pervader (*vyāpaka*, e.g. fire) necessarily exists where the pervaded (*vyāpya*, e.g. smoke) occurs, or ii) the pervaded (e.g. smoke) exists only in a place where the pervader (e.g. fire) occurs.

Let *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* be expressed by *x* and *y*. It can be easily understood that both definitions refer to *anvaya-vyāpti* only: it may be paraphrased by:

i) *yatra yatra dhūmas tatra vahnīḥ* ($x \supset y$), and

ii) *yatra yatra vahnīs tatraiva dhūmaḥ* ($y \supset x$).

Usually *anvaya-vyāpti* is expressed in the form *yatra yatra dhūmas tatra vahnīḥ* ($x \supset y$), and *vyatireka-vyāpti* in the form *yatra vahnir nāsti tatra dhūmo nāsti* ($\sim y \supset \sim x$), one acting as a contraposition of the other. Now out of these two definitions by Dharmakīrti ii) appears to be an invalid *vyāpti*, because it is not equipollent with i). Then how can it be accepted as a valid *vyāpti*?

Take, for example, a hypothetical-categorical syllogism; it consists of the major premise as a hypothetical proposition, the minor premise as a categorical proposition and the conclusion as a categorical proposition. If *p* and *q* stand for an antecedent and its consequent, four kinds of syllogism may be possible.

a) $p \supset q, p, \therefore q$ (modus ponendo ponens)

b) $p \supset q, \sim q, \therefore \sim p$ (modus tollendo tollens)

c) $p \supset q, \sim p, \therefore \sim q$

d) $p \supset q, q, \therefore p$

Out of these four, a) and b) are valid syllogisms, each acting as a contraposition of the other, but c) and d) are invalid due to the fallacy of denying the antecedent and affirming the consequent.

As a matter of fact, *vyāpti* here is expressed by a two-fold method of determining a causal relation between two instances of a phenomenon. This method is basically expressed by ' $x \rightarrow y$ ' and ' $\sim x \rightarrow \sim y$ ' and indicates a rough causal

correspondence between the two instances, far from being perfectly valid. It essentially does not serve to show any ontological relation between the instances. Thus the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* does not apply outright to the formation of *vyāpti*, especially of *anvaya-vyāpti*, and it might invoke difficulties arising from the 'plurality of causes' and the 'combination of causes,' etc. That is why this method seems to have long been misinterpreted among scholars as in the forms ' $x \rightarrow y$ ' and ' $\sim y \rightarrow \sim x$ ' respectively.

To apply this method to *vyāpti*, it may be expressed as follows:

[*vyatireka-vyāpti*] *yatra yatra vahny-abhāvas tatra dhūmābhāvaḥ*. (1)

[*anvaya-vyāpti*] *yatra yatra vahnis tatra dhūmaḥ* (2)

(2) depends on *anvaya* as a method of determining the causal relation between 'smoke' (= effect) and 'fire' (= cause). The objective relation between the two, however, should be expressed in a verbal way with some determinants, or even better, by restrictive qualifications like *eva* etc. So (2) may be modified thus:

yatra yatra vahnis tatra eva dhūmaḥ. (3)

If (3) is to be formulated without such wordy expressions as *eva* etc., it should be further modified by a contraposition of (1):

yatra yatra dhūmas tatra vahniḥ. (4)

We can conclude that *anvaya-vyāpti* is to be expressed in either way, i.e. (3) or (4), which corresponds to the two-fold definition formulated by Dharmakīrti.⁴ Thus we can understand that *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti* refer to *anvaya-vyāpti* and *vyatireka-vyāpti* respectively.

Arcaṭa here introduces a very strange interpretation for the two definitions by Dharmakīrti, and Hemacandra also seems to accept Arcaṭa's view by quoting his statements almost *ad verbum*. According to Arcaṭa, *vyāpti* is a property attributed either to the 'pervader' or to the 'pervaded,' and it is considered 'an occurrence of one in the locus of the other.' In the case of i) *vyāpti* is the necessary occurrence (*bhāva eva*) of the 'pervader' in the locus of the 'pervaded,' and in the case of ii) it is the occurrence of the 'pervaded' exclusively in (*tatraiva*) the locus of the 'pervader.' As compared with the Naiyāyikas, in my opinion, Arcaṭa does not have in mind a definite direction between the 'pervaded' and the 'pervader,' i.e. from which it proceeds to which.

Here the employment of the restrictive adverb *eva* in both definitions is intended to convey a restrictive qualification, and its construction cannot be reversed. According to Arcaṭa, in the case of i) it has the force of excluding the contingent occurrence [of probandum in the locus of the probans] (*ayoga-vyavaccheda*), and in the case of ii) it has the force of excluding the occurrence [of the probans] in a locus other than that [of the probandum] (*anya-yoga-*

vyavaccheda). Both Arcaṭa and Hemacandra conclude their statements about vyāpti with the following stanza:

liṅge liṅgī bhavaty eva liṅgiṇy evetarat punaḥ /
niyamasya viparyāse 'sambandho liṅgi-liṅgiṇoḥ //

[the probandum (= *liṅgin*) 'necessarily exists' (*bhavaty eva*) in the locus where the probans (= *liṅga*) occurs, and the probans exists 'exclusively in a locus' (*tatraiva*) in which the probandum occurs (*liṅgiṇy eva*). If this necessary restriction were reversed, the concomitance between the probans and the probandum will not be necessary.]

However, in the later Nyāya school or Navya-nyāya, vyāpti is considered to be [vyāpaka-] vyāpyatā but not conversely, so it is nothing other than the property of what is 'pervaded' (vyāpya).

Notes

1. Cf. B.K. Matilal, "Review of 'Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmaṇi' by Goekoop," J.A.O.S. (1972) No. 1, p. 84 ff.
2. Cf. Satkari Mookerjee, "A Critical and Comparative Study of Jaina Logic and Epistemology on the basis of the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara," *Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin* No. 1, Vaishali, (1971), p. 68 ff.
3. Cf. Pt. Sukhlal Sanghavi, et. al. (edd.), *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* (Singhi Jaina Series No. 9, Calcutta, 1931), p. 38.; S. Mookerjee and N. Tatia (trans.), *A Critique of the Organ of Knowledge* (Calcutta, 1946), pp. 97-100.; E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Hetubindhu* (Teil I, Vienna, 1967), p. 33.; S. Sanghavi and Jinavijaya (edd.), *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa* (Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 113, Baroda, 1949), pp. 17-18.
4. Cf. A. Uno, "A Study of <anvaya> and <vyatireka>" (In Japanese), *Journal of the Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies* 11 (II) Narita (1988), pp. 105-127.

On *Bhoga* and Social Ethics of Early Theravāda Buddhism

N.K. Wagle

The present paper deals with the Pāli Canonical ideas about money, and moral and ethical concerns associated with it, as these are described in the four *Nikāyas* (*Āṅguttara*, *Saṃyutta*, *Dīgha* and *Majjhima*) and the *Vinaya* composed between cir. 400-300 B.C.¹ By that period, we find the existence of flourishing cities with a series of hierarchically based urban and rural settlements to support them.² The centuries immediately preceding the Buddha had witnessed a shift in the main centres of Indian civilization to the Gangā basin, a shift which also entailed the spread of Vedic cultures and their inevitable interaction with the existing local cultures of the Gangā valley. The development of iron technology, the iron tipped plough and the increase in agriculture output with the emphasis on labour inducing rice crop in the early iron age (cir. 1000-700 B.C.) led way to the subsequent development of settled peasant communities with new urban centres. The resulting surplus economy fed a growing population which came to be characterised by increasing social, political and economic complexity. The semi-tribal, lineage based political structures of Vedic society gave way to the stable state formations.³ We find the petty states constantly engaged in territorial wars and power struggles. By the Buddha's time, Magadha and Kosala had emerged as the wealthiest and most powerful of the states of the region, constantly seeking to expand their territories by drawing into orbit the quasi-republics and smaller states.⁴ The Buddha achieved his "greater success among the cities of the monarchical kingdoms".⁵ Without having a recourse to the vast and systematically collected archaeological data concerning the Buddha's period, and the period immediately following it, Max Weber had accurately observed that "Buddhism presents itself as a product of the time of urban development, of urban kingship and the city nobles."⁶ Weber might have added city bankers to his list.

What then was the nature of urban society? First, archaeological and textual evidence of large fortified cities presuppose extensive agricultural land to support them, a centralised bureaucratic state, the use of cash economy, institutions such as banking and usury, a complex division of labour and growing economic disparity between various classes within society.⁷

Second, the new economic order and activities engaged in were indicative of new values of materialism as well as impersonal, contractual nature of economic transaction.⁸ Third, the urban centres were characterised by a high degree of

occupational specialization, including craftsmen, servicemen, professionals such as doctors, accountants and money changers, as well as entertainers, merchants, and those in king's service such as warriors, civil administrators and servants⁹

The *gahapati* and the *setṭhi gahapati* class emerged as a wealthy segment, as evidenced by their generous support of Buddhist monks and other religious mendicants. In fact we notice a spirit of intense rivalry among religious mendicants for the patronage of this wealthy class.¹⁰ Majority of the *gahapatis* in the Pāli texts appear as city dwellers and rich traders, while others are shown as obtaining their wealth by means such as ownership of land and cattle keeping. In the *Aṅguttara*, for instance, it is affirmed that acquisition of money (*bhogādhippāyā*) and the search of knowledge (*paññupavicāra*), mentioned in that order of preference, are the shared goals of the *khattiya*, *brāhmaṇa* and *gahapati*, the three upper classes in society. In addition, to achieve excellence in his vocation is the *gahapati*'s determination (*sippādhiṭṭhānā*); to engage in an enterprise is his need (*kamantābhinivesā*) and; to carry to fruition his enterprise is his aim (*niṭṭhakamamanta pariyosānā*).¹¹ In many instances, the *gahapatis* are mentioned as having cash resources. To the physician Jīvaka, for instance, *gahapat* of Sāketa gave sixteen thousand *kahāpaṇas* (coins), a male and female slave and a horse chariot.¹² For curing his son a *gahapati* of Vārāṇasi gave similar amount,¹³ while another *gahapati* gave one hundred thousand *kahāpaṇas* for his brain operation.¹⁴ As financiers, the *gahapatis* are shown as lending money to promising shopkeepers. The outstanding example is, of course, that of the *gahapati* Anāthapiṇḍika who bought a piece of land for the Buddha in the city of Sāvatti, paying for it literally by covering every inch of the land with silver coins.¹⁵ Despite the obvious embellishment of this episode by the compilers of the texts to illustrate bountiful *dāna* by a devout *upāsaka*, the episode does indicate that the money economy had come of age.

In the light of the complex urban development mentioned above, we may ask: How did the Buddha's teachings hold such a wide appeal for his lay followers? What was there in his teachings that his lay followers found relevant to their mode of livelihood and thinking? Did the Buddha propound a monetary ideology specifically geared to the needs of the rising *gahapati* class? The answer to all these questions is: the Buddha, as far as it can be gleaned from the Pāli *Nikāya* and *Vinaya* texts, did expound on the subject of money: how to earn it legitimately, spend it and use it effectively to accumulate this-worldly and other-worldly gains.

The most frequently used Pāli term for money in the Canonical texts is *bhoga*, although we find the terms *dhana*, *aṭṭha* and *aḍḍha* used in similar sense. The Pāli dictionary derives its meaning from the root *buñj* to make use of, take advantage of, and to eat.¹⁶ The term *bhoga*, when mentioned in conjunction with *kāma*, to form the word *kāmaabhoga*, means enjoyment of sensual pleasure.¹⁷ The connotation of *bhoga* to eat or consume is also present in the usage of the term where it is used as synonym for cash; like pleasures of senses, money needs to be consumed.

The term *dhana* is occasionally associated with *bhoga*, although there is a distinction made between the two terms. It is said of Migāra Rohaṇeyya in the *Anguttara Nikāya*, that he is rich (*aḍḍho*) with great *dhana* and great *bhoga* (*mahādhano*, *mahābhogo*). Of gold there is worth ten millions (*sataṃ sataśahassānaṃ*); of silver who can tell. But that *dhana* is subject to the hazards of fire, water, kings, robbers and ill disposed heirs.¹⁸ Even the great robber is mentioned as rich (*aḍḍho*) with great *dhana* and *bhoga*.¹⁹ The annointed *khattiya rājā* is described as rich with great *dhana* and possessing treasures and granaries which overflow (*paripunnakosakoṭṭhāgāro*).²⁰ In former times, it is said, the *brāhmaṇas* accumulated (*sannidhiṃ*) neither *dhana*, grain, silver nor gold.²¹ The term *dhana* in the above cases seems to connote accumulated wealth or property which has to be conserved. The term *bhoga*, as stated above, and as can be adduced from the examples which we will be discuss below, refers to the concept of money, cash or the liquid assets.

Concerning the general attributes of money (*bhoga*), it is remarked that it is the power of luck which draws money (*bhoga*) to itself.²² Money (*bhoga*) is listed among ten things desirable, much esteemed and delightful but hard to secure in this world (*iṭṭhā kantā manāpā dullabhā lokasamiṃ*). The other nine things being beauty, health, virtues, the *brahmacariya* (life of continence), friends, truths, understanding, *dhamma* and heaven.²³ Sloth and non-exertion are impediments to acquiring money (*alassaṃ anuṭṭhānaṃ bhogānaṃ paripatho*), whereas energetic strivings are inductive to its acquisition.²⁴ Woman is utterly without charm, if she lacks beauty, money (*bhoga*), morality, diligence and the ability to bear children.²⁵ Possessed of five powers (*balāni*), women dwell at home in confidence: the power of beauty, the power of money (*bhoga*), kin group, sons and the power of virtue.²⁶

The early Theravāda texts categorically assert – for their lay constituency, ofcourse – that the pursuit of money, lawfully acquired, is a legitimate goal for people. In his advise to the famous *gahapati* Anāthapiṇḍika, the Buddha states that there are four cherished, but difficult conditions, to secure in this world. “What four? Let money (*bhoga*) by lawful means come to me. Having acquired money (*bhoge laddhā*), let good report attend me along with my kinfolks and teachers. Having acquired money, may I live longer and reach advanced age. Having acquired money, when I die may I attain heaven.”²⁷ Money brings happiness. There are two kinds of hapiness. One is the happiness due to money (*bhoga sukhaṃ*) which is obtained by enjoying ones money lawfully acquired (*dhammaladdhehi bhoge*), and with it doing meritorious deeds. This type of consumption of money (*bhoga*) is the best of its kind. For one has the happiness of real ownership of money (*atthi sukhaṃ bhoge me atthi*). The second is the happiness due to debtlessness (*anaṇa sukhaṃ*), further described as “the feeling one gets when one knows that no debt is owed, great or small, to any one.”²⁸

The counsel concerning the acquisition of *bhoga* continues. Money should be

sought after by lawful means (*dhammena bhoge pariyesati*) without harm to others (*asāhāsenā*). A person should make use of his money (*bhoga*) without greed, longing, without infatuation, watchful of the dangers arising out of money (*bhoga*), and alive to his well-being.²⁹

Money (*bhoga*) obtains legitimacy in the eyes of the Buddhist writers only when it is properly gained and put to use in a manner beneficial to society. As the Buddha explains to Anāthapiṇḍika:

There are five good reasons stated for possessing money (*bhogānam ādiya*). The lay disciple (*ariya sāvakā*) with money (*bhoga*) got by energetic striving, gathered by strength of arm (*bāhābalaparicitehi*), earned by sweat (*sedāvakkhittehi*), lawful (*dhammikehi*) and lawfully acquired (*dhammaladdhehi*), makes himself happy and cheerful, and he makes his parents, wife, children, his slaves and labourers happy. This is the first reason for acquiring money. Second, he makes his friends and acquaintance (*mittāmacce*) happy. Third, he makes himself secure against misfortunes such as may happen by way of fire, water, kings, robbers, and ill disposed heirs (*appiyato vā dāyādato*). Fourth, he is able to give a share (*bali*) to his kinfolds, to his guests, his ancestors (*pubbapetabalim*), to the king and to the gods. Fifth (from the Buddhist point of view perhaps more important) with the money he is able to institute offerings for the deserving *samaṇas* (mendicants) and *brāhmaṇas* who abstain from sloth and negligence. His bonus: after death he attains heaven.³⁰

We find the Buddha further elaborating on the question of the loss of hard earned and lawfully acquired money by the *ariya sāvakā* (lay disciple). If the *ariya sāvakā*'s money ran out (*bhogā parikkhayam gacchanti*) without fulfilling the duties and obligations encumbered on him, then the money (*bhoga*) spent in such a manner is called, "Money (*bhoga*) that has failed to seize its opportunity (*aṭṭhānagatā*), failed to acquire merit, (*apattagatā*) unfittingly made use of (*anāyatanaso*).” On the other hand, if the same disciple were to expend his money in doing meritorious deeds then that money (*bhoga*) would be deemed as spent in a proper and fitting manner, accruing points of merit for him. A person firmly rooted in the *ariya dhamma* (the Buddha's teaching) is extolled in this world; and afterwards he rejoices in heaven. The *ariya sāvakā* (lay disciple) should, thus, contemplate on the task well accomplished: "I have enjoyed (*bhutta*, literally consumed and eaten) my money (*bhogā*). Those serving me and those dependent on me have been freed from dangers. I have made the best of gifts (*dakkhiṇā*). I have nurtured the virtuous, the composed and the renouncers who lead a good path (*brahmacarayo*). I have gained money (*bhoga*) which the wise householders strive to secure. I have done deed never to be regretted.”³¹

Money (*bhoga*) is compared to a cool lake, useless in a desert, but useful near a town or a village for its use for the people staying in them. If the money (*bhoga*) is

not properly utilized (*aparibhuñjamāno*, literally not consumed, not eaten) then it is sequestered by kings or stolen by robbers, or is destroyed by fire or floods or appropriated by unpleasant heirs. Thus, *bhoga* that is not properly used runs to waste, not to proper consumption.³² It is evident from the above examples that the Buddhist writers wanted to inculcate a positive attitude towards money among their layfollowers. The attitude was geared to spending money for stabilizing the key elements of society consisting of family and household units, kinship groups and religious orders. The writers insisted that the lawfully acquired money was needed for discharging the political, social, economic and religious obligations and duties required of a householder.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we find the Buddhist texts, in keeping with their desire to enhance the well-being of their lay constituency, offer them advice on how to regulate their financial matters. In his famous advice to a *gahapat*'s son Sigāla, the Buddha says that one should amass money (*bhoga*) by correct means, like bee would while gathering honey from flowers. One should divide money (*bhoga*) in four portions. One portion of money should be designated for personal consumption (*ekena bhoge bhuñjeyya*). One should keep two portions for conducting one's business. The fourth portion should be kept in reserve, for one might need it in times of difficulty.³³ The Buddha in his discourse to Dīghajānu Koliyaputta and the *brāhmaṇa* Ujjaya explained his model of a "balanced life" (*samājīvitā*) for a *kulaputta* (householder belonging to a respectable lineage). In an earlier passage the Buddha had explained to both the persons above that the money (*bhoga*) had to be obtained by a *kulaputta* using lawful means and striving for it diligently. A *kulaputta* sensing "this much money (*bhoga*) is brought in and this much money (*bhoga*) is expended," should continue to lead a balanced life (*samaṃ jīvikam kappeti*), not unduly elated or depressed. He should think: "After deducting the loss, my income will stand at so much, and my out goings will not exceed my income." He should be knowledgeable like a master of weights (*tulādhāro*) and his apprentice (*tulādhāro antevāsī*) who know, on holding up the balance (*tulam*), that either by so much it has dipped down or by so much it has tilted up. If this *kulaputta*, have but a trifling earnings and live on a grand scale, it will be said of him: "This *kulaputta* eats his money (*bhoge khādatti*) like a fig-tree glutton." If his earning be great and he live meanly, report will say of him: "This *kulaputta* will die like a starveling."³⁴ In the passage following the above one, the Buddha elucidates on the four outlets for the flowing away (*cattāri apāyamukhāni*) of amassed money (*bhoga*). Those four are: womanising, habitual drinking, compulsive gambling and friendship, companionship and intimacy with the evil. The four inlets for the flowing in (*cattāri āyamukhāni*) of money (*bhoga*) are just the opposite i.e., abstinence from doing the above three things and cultivating friendship, companionship and intimacy with the good.³⁵

The moralising on the social ethics of gaining and utilising the money is once again comes for a scrutiny. Only with sustained hard work and enterprising spirit

one can generate money, increase it and spend it prudently. There are three kinds of persons (*puggalā*): the blind (*andho*), the one-eyed (*ekacakkhu*) and two-eyed (*dvicakkhu*). The blind has not the eye to acquire money (*bhoga*) as yet attained or to make the money (*bhoga*) he has increase. He is unable to distinguish bad from good, deserving from undeserving. He is ill-fated. The one-eyed-man, ignoring right or wrong searches for money (*bhoga*). With tricks, frauds and lies, but endowed with worldly cleverness, he is successful in gaining money (*bhoga*). But when he dies he suffers in hell (*niraya*). The two-eyed is the best (*setṭham*) among the lot. He acquires money (*bhoga*) with determination and by rightful means and gives it away in charity. Stay away (*parivajjaye*), warns the text, from the blind and the one-eyed, but mingle with the two-eyed man.³⁶ The meaning of the above passage seems to indicate that naivete is not the prerequisite for acquisition of money. That money can be earned by unethical means, but such means have unpleasant consequences in this and afterlife. That the best way to go about making money is to acquire it lawfully by remaining alert and discriminating. Having secured it, there is a need to distribute some of it in charity. The very same message concerning acquisition and spending of money rightfully was conveyed by the Buddha to the *gahapati* Anāthapiṇḍika in the *upāsaka vagga* of the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*.³⁷ But the idle talk about money is frowned upon by people. A man quite poor should prate of wealth (*daliddo vā samāno aḍḍavādaṃvadeyya*); one lacking possession should prate of possession (*adhamo dhanavādaṃvadeyya*); and one without money should prate of money (*abhogavā bhogavādaṃ vadeyya*), and when a time comes to acquire wealth, possession and money, he fails to do so.³⁸ In yet another telling instance, a man borrows money (*yācitakaṃ bhogaṃ yā citvā*), and with it, a handsome carriage, costly jewels and earrings and parades in the market place. People may observe him and say of him that he must be a monied man for only the men with money can consume money in that fashion (*bhogi vata evaṃ kir bhogino bhogāni bhuñjantīti*). However, the owners of those borrowed things if they see him thus will expose him of his borrowed splendour.³⁹

The material concerns about the money surface with regularity in the texts which are primarily concerned with the renunciation of worldly desires. Of course, it must be understood that the advice about the money was meant for the *upāsakas* and not for the renunciators like the Buddhist monks and nuns. Entrepreneurial skills are admired in the texts, for they help generate money (*bhoga*). A shopkeeper (*pāpaṇiko*), it is stated, is capable of acquiring money (*bhoga*) which he had not before, of holding the money (*bhoga*) which he gets or increasing the money (*bhoga*) which he holds. This is so because the shopkeeper does not attend closely to the business (*kammanta*), during morning, noon and in the evening. On the other hand, a shopkeeper who is shrewd, capable and skilled can inspire confidence in the *gahapatis* who would willingly support his business. They say of him, "This shopkeeper is shrewd, is capable and resourceful and competent to support his sons and wife and from time to time pay back money (*bhoga*).” They make

offers of money (*bhoga*) saying, "Take this money and multiply it (*ito bhoge kar-
itvā*).” The shopkeeper who is thus helped, acquires much money (*bhoga*) in due
course of time.⁴⁰ The *Dīgha Nikāya* observes that if a man should start an enter-
prise (*kammante payojeyya*) after contracting a loan (*inaṃ ādāya*), and if his busi-
ness should succeed, he should not only be able to pay off the original debt he had
incurred, but there should be surplus for maintaining a wife.⁴¹ In the *Anguttara
Nikāya*, we find a cleaver and energetic person who starts earning half a *kahāpaṇa*
(a coin) in some business or other gradually comes to a state whereby he begins to
earn 50 *kahāpaṇas* a day. Thereafter earning 100 and 1000 *kahāpaṇas*, and saving
what he got he amasses a vast amount of money (*mahataṃ bhogakhandhaṃ adhi-
gacceyyā*).⁴² Commercial activities from the above three passages seems to have
been chiefly responsible for building up of monetary resources. Agriculture, trade
and cattle-keeping are the preferred occupations mentioned in the texts (*ukatt-
haṃ nāma kammaṃ kasivāṇijjā gorakkhā*),⁴³ although trade in human beings,
flesh, weapons, intoxicants and poisons is forbidden for the Buddhists.⁴⁴ Even the
Buddha admits to the positive advantages accrued by pursuing trading activities.
The Buddha, in one instance, compares agriculture to trade (*vāṇijjā*). Agriculture,
he says, is an occupation where there is a great deal to do, many duties, administra-
tion and great problems, and yet a successful venture brings in small profit. On the
other hand, trading involves far less duties, administration and problems, yet a
successful venture brings in a great profit.⁴⁵ The reason why some commercial
ventures succeed and others fail is explained by the Buddha to his favourite monk
Sāriputta. Sāriputta sets before the Buddha the four probable outcomes for per-
sons engaged in trade (*vāṇijjā payuttā*). For some persons either it turns out to be
failure or does not turn out as intended or turns out as intended or there is growth
beyond expectations (*parādhippāyā*). The Buddha explains this phenomena by
resorting to the principle of *kamma*, the act and its retribution. He says that a per-
son's prosperity or failure depends on a proportionate ratio as to how much more
or less a person offers in his previous life to religious mendicants.⁴⁶

In an apparently acquisitive society the, the Buddhist writers articulate their
awareness of the imbalance and disparity of wealth found within it. They were
cynical enough to observe the grim social and economic reality of their environ-
ment. The reality that money can subvert justice and that lack of it can result in an
abject humiliation of a person. A certain person has to go to prison for theft of a
half a *kahāpaṇa* a *kahāpaṇa* or a hundred *kahāpaṇas*. Another person does not
have to go to prison, though he steals the same amount. This is because, comments
the Buddha, the former is a poor person (*daliddo*) with little money (*appabhogo*),
while the other person is rich (*aḍḍho*) and has lots of money (*mahābhogo*).⁴⁷ In
the second instance, it is said that one of the attributes of a great robber
(*mahācoro*) is that he is the one who influences people by giving them money
(*bhoga cāgī*). How so? Because he is rich (*aḍḍho*) and has plenty of money
(*mahābhogo*), he thinks, "Should any one question (*vakkhati*) me, I shall make

him friendly from now on by giving him money (*ito bhogena paṭisantharissāmī*).” If anyone does question him, he acts in this manner. Pursuing such a course, the robber breaks into houses, makes off with plunder, makes for lonely houses or lies in wait in the highway.⁴⁸ Commenting on poverty and wealth, the *Vinaya* with its usual cryptic manner observes: “Life is wretched (*pāpakam nāma jīvitam*). The life of the poor (*daliddānam jīvitam*) is wretched compared to the life of the rich (*aḍḍhānam*); of the unwealthy (*adhanānam*) is wretched compared to the life of the wealthy (*sadhanānam*); the life of the human beings (*manussānam*) is wretched compared to the life of the gods (*devānam*).”⁴⁹ A poor, needy and in straits, borrows. When the bills fall due, he does not pay and creditors press for money. They bind him and put him in jail.⁵⁰ However, it might be added here that the Buddhists would not allow anyone to become a monk unless that person cleared his debts first before joining the order.⁵¹

As the Tathāgata who had given up his householder’s life in search of *nibbāṇa*, the Buddha’s ultimate rejection of money (*bhoga*) for himself is self evident. Others too, who joined his *saṃgha* as monks and nuns, had to abandon the whole mass of money, however little or great (*appaṃvā bhoga kkhandham pahāya ... mahantaṃvā bhoga kkhandham*).⁵² In the final analysis, the money is not conducive to happiness. Even if a person were to accumulate vast amount of money (*mahantaṃ bhogakkhandam*), “would that person, because of his money (*bhogahetu*), on account of his money (*bhoganidānam*), as a result of his money (*bhogā adhikaranam*), be totally happy for a single night, or a single day or even half a night or half a day,” asked the Buddha. He receives answer in negative. Because, it is stressed in the passage, such cravings for money are impermanent, without substance and false.⁵³ In his sermon to the monks, the Buddha says that the loss of such thing as money (*bhoga*) is a trifling matter. The loss of wisdom brings in utter misery (*paññā parihāni*).⁵⁴ The Buddha, in yet another instance, shows his concern about the monks who may accumulate money (*bhoga*) and feast on such accumulated money (*bhoga*).⁵⁵ That this fear appears to have been justified could be seen from the pleas made by monks’ relatives, friends and even kings, asking them to return to the householder’s status. They say to a monk: “Come, monk, why should these yellow robes torment you? Why do you parade about with shaven head and bowl? Return to the lower plane of life. Enjoy the use of money (*bhoga*) and do deeds of merit.”⁵⁶

The monks were not allowed in the early Theravāda tradition to own houses, fields, cattle, the touch of gold or silver and engage in trade. They neither took part in production nor exercised the least control over the means of production. Their non-competitiveness, as Kosambi observes, may have given them competitive edge over the demanding brāhmaṇa priesthood.⁵⁷ But this very strategy may have exacerbated their dependence on the welfare doled out by the host society. The Buddhist order for their survival had to depend solely on gift (*dāna*) bestowed on them by their lay followers. The principle of gift-giving/charity (*dāna*) is often

emphasised in the Buddha's teachings to his lay followers. When gift (*dāna*) is given with faith it ripens and results in great increase of money (*bhoga*) and property for the giver. Moreover, the giver's children, wives, servants listen to him delightfully and serve him faithfully.⁵⁸ Gift-giving (*dāna*) is specially conducive to reaching heaven. By giving gift (*dāna*) to the future Buddha, a person is born seven times to the heavenly world.⁵⁹ Even among the close followers of the Buddha there is distinction made between a follower who practices giving gift (*dāna*) and the one who does not. The followers alike in faith, virtue and insight, after death, are reborn in the happy heaven. But the disciple who is a giver, when he becomes god, surpasses the non-giver god in five ways: in divine life-span, beauty, happiness, honour and power.⁶⁰

Summing up, the Buddha's teachings to his lay followers (*upāsakas, ariya sāvakas*), many of whom were urban, and the members of rich, powerful and rising *gahapati* class, addressed their economic, social and ethical concerns. The Buddha's message to them was clear that their success and happiness in life, to a large extent depended on possessing money, consuming it, conserving it and actively participating in its acquisition. Poverty was not a virtue to be cultivated. A concomitant message was that success in generating money depended on self reliance, hard work, diligence and enterprising spirit. To engage in commercial activities was a good method of making money. The Buddha, equally and strongly, stressed that money had to be earned by lawful and moral means and its possession brought with it corporate responsibilities to share it with members of the family and lineage and other dependents, in particular, dependents such as the Buddhist monks and nuns. The money, of course, had no intrinsic value for the renouncers like the Buddha and the members of his *saṃgha* in their pursuit of *nibbāṇa*.

Notes

1. For chronological discussion of the texts see, A.K. Warder, *Pali Meter: A Contribution to the History of Indian Literature* (Luzac: London, 1967), 4-5.
2. See Georgy Erdosy's chapter in this book for a detailed discussion concerning the correlations between the archeological data and the chronology of the texts; see also the works by D.K. Chakrabarti, "Distribution of Iron Ore and the Archaeological Evidence for Early Iron in India," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. 20, 1977, 166-184; R.S. Sharma, *Material Culture and Social Formation in Ancient India* (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1983). See also Romila Thapar, *Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1978), 40-93, for a sociological analysis of the change.
3. Romila Thapar, "State formation in Ancient India," *International Social Science Journal*, 32, 1980, 655-699.
4. See J.P. Sharma, *Republics in Ancient India* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971).
5. Romila Thapar, *Social History*, 41, 71
6. Max Weber, *Religion of India, the Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism* (tr. and ed. by H.H. Gerth and D. Martindale; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), 204.

7. Narendra Wagle, *Society at the Time of the Buddha* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966), 135-168.
8. D.D. Kosambi, *Introduction to Indian History* (new ed., Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1975), pp. 100-101; Thapar, *Social History*, 29.
9. N. Wagle, *op. cit.*
10. *Ibid.*, 74-75, 151-54.
11. A.III.363.
12. Vn.I.172.
13. Vn.I.276.
14. Vn.I.274.
15. Vn.II.158.
16. *Pāli English Dictionary*, 509.
17. A.V.177; D.III.125, Vn.I.203.
18. A.IV.6-7.
19. A.III.129.
20. A.II.157.
21. A.III.222.
22. S.I.44.
23. A.V.135.
24. A.V.136.
25. S.IV.238
26. S.IV.246.
27. A.II.66-67.
28. A.II.69.
29. A.V.177.
30. A.III.45-46.
31. A.I.68-69.
32. S.I.90-91.
33. D.III.88.
34. A.IV.282-83.
35. A.IV.283-84.
36. A.I.129-30.
37. A.V.176-82.
38. A.V.43.
39. M.I.365-66.
40. A.I. 115-16.
41. D.I.71.
42. A.V.84.
43. Vn.IV.6.
44. A.III.208.
45. M.197-99.
46. A.II.81-82.

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- 47. A.I.250-51.
- 48. A.III.129.
- 49. Vn.I.73.
- 50. S.III.351.
- 51. Vn.III.73.
- 52. A.I.208.
- 53. A.V.84.
- 54. A.I.15
- 55. A.III.109.
- 56. S.V.190.
- 57. D.D.Kosambi, *Introduction to Indian History*, 168.
- 58. S.I.89-90.
- 59. S.I.92.
- 60. A.III.32-33.

English Translation of the *Chung-Tsu-King*

Fumimaro Watanabe

Introduction

It goes without saying that the *Chung-tsu-king* (*Saṅgītisūtra*) is one of the most important *sūtras* in the *Ch'ang-ah-hsien* (*Ārghāgama*), which conjecturally belongs to the Dharmagupta school. In a word, the purpose of the *sūtra* is that Sāriputta tries to collect various doctrinal principles (*dhammas*),¹ which were well set forth and imparted by the Buddha in order to avoid disputes in the Buddhist community. From the *sūtra* we can learn the condition of the Buddhist community at the time of the Buddha, the characteristics of various doctrinal principles that his disciples were interested in, the condition of the school in relation to other schools, and so on.

S. Behrsing translated the *sūtra* into German in 1930,² and twenty-five years later E. Waldschmidt came across a Sanskrit fragment of it in the Turfan collections, and made it public.³ In 1968, *Das Saṅgītisūtra und Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya* was edited and published by Valentine Stache-Rosen.⁴ The *Chung-tsu-king* can be compared with the *Saṅgītisuttanta* of the *Dīghanikāya*, which belongs to the Theravādins and the *Ta-chi-fa-mên-ching*, which is not yet assigned to any school.⁵ Prior to the translation of the *Chung-tsu-king* into English, I will show a chart of the number of doctrinal principles from ones up to tens in the three *sūtras*:

	Chung-tsu-king	Ta-chi-fa-mê-ching	Saṅgītisuttanta
Ones	2	1	1
Twos	12	1	33
Threes	35	36	60
Fours	36	39	50
Fives	15	14	26
Sixes	14	15	22
Sevens	7	6	14
Eights	4	4	11
Nines	1	1	6
Tens	1	1	6
Total	127	118	230

As can be seen from the above, in the threes there is a marked difference among the three *sūtras*. But the most important thing here is not the number of doctrinal principles, but what kinds of principles are collected. On account of limited space in this paper, however, only the English translation of the *Chung-tsu-king* will be given below.

Translation⁶

Thus have I heard: the Buddha was once visiting the country of the Mallas, accompanied by one thousand two hundred and fifty monks. And he arrived at the mango-grove of Cunda, the smith, in Pāvā, the Malla capital.

At that time, at the full moon of the fifteenth night, the Buddha sat on the ground, and was surrounded both in front and in the rear by monks. He finished preaching long into the night, and told the venerable Sāriputta: "A number of monks are now gathering from the four directions, and striving to remove their sleep. I am suffering from a pain in my back and hoping to take a rest for a while. Sāriputta, you should preach to the monks for me."

"Yes, sir. I will try to preach to them as you have done," replied Sāriputta. Then the Buddha, letting his robe folded in four, took up the lion-posture on his right side, placing his feet, one in the curve of the other.

Then the venerable Sāriputta addressed the monks: The Nigaṇṭha, Nāthaputta, has just passed away at Pāvā. Since his death his disciples have been divided into two parties, and they always compare merits and demerits, speak ill of each other and mutually discuss rights and wrongs, saying: "We know the *dhamma* (doctrine), but you do not know it; you follow a wrong method, but we follow the right *dhamma*." Thus distracted with abusive talk, they are becoming confused in their talk; they assert that what they say is true by stating, "What we are saying is better than what you say."

Now I will be a speaker of *dhamma*-talks. If you have questions, come and ask them of me. Monks, just at this time, those who follow Nāthaputta in this country are disgusted with the great discord of disputes between two parties. This is because all such *dhammas* are really not true. If such *dhammas* are not true, they are not helpful to salvation. It is like a moldering pagoda that cannot be protected. All such *dhammas* are not what was taught by the Perfectly Enlightened One. Monks, only the *dhammas* taught by the Master, who is the highest of the Śākyas, are the best and can be helpful to salvation. It is like a pagoda under construction being easy to decorate. All such *dhammas* are what was taught by the Perfectly Enlightened One. Monks, we should collect⁷ the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* (Discipline) right now and avoid disputes. By doing so, the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

The Tathāgata, monks, taught a single right *dhamma*: all beings exist on food (*āhāra*). There is also a single *dhamma* which was taught by the Tathāgata: all

beings live through forces (*sāṅkhāra*). This is a single *dharmma*, respectively, taught by the Tathāgata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

The Tathāgata, monks, taught twofold right *dharmmas*:

1. sentience (*nāma*) and matter (*rūpa* as physical principles);
2. ignorance (*avijjā*) and desire (*taṇhā*);
3. eternalism (*bhava-diṭṭhi*) and nihilism (*vibhava-diṭṭhi*);
4. non-self-respect (*ahirika*) and non-fear-of-blame (*anottappa*);
5. self-respect (*hiri*) and fear of blame (*ottappa*);
6. knowledge of the destruction (*khayeññāna*) of defilements (*kilesa*) and knowledge of non-origination (*anuppāde ñāna*);
7. by means of causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*paccaya*), the desire for pleasure (*kāma-taṇhā*) arises: visible object and non-intention (*na saṃkappa*);
8. by means of causes and conditions, aversion (*dosa*) arises; hatred (*vera*) and non-intention;
9. by means of causes and conditions, a wrong opinion (*micchā-diṭṭhi*) arises: listening to others according to their opinions and wrong intention (*micchā-saṃkappa*);
10. by means of causes and conditions, a right opinion (*sammā-diṭṭhi*) arises: listening to others according to their opinions and right intention (*sammā-saṃkappa*);
11. freedom which should be obtained by learning and freedom of the learned;
12. activated world and unactivated world.

These, monks, are what was taught by the Tathāgata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

The Tathāgata, monks, taught three-fold right *dharmmas*:

1. three bad roots (*akusala-mūlas*): greed (*lobha*), aversion (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*);
2. three good roots (*kusala-mūlas*): freedom from greed, freedom from aversion and freedom from delusion;
3. three bad conducts (*duccaritas*): of body (*kāya*), speech (*vacī*) and mind (*manas*);
4. three good conducts (*sucaritas*): of body, speech, and mind;
5. three bad perceptions (*saññās*): pleasure (*kāma*), malevolence (*vyāpāda*) and cruelty (*vihimsā*);
6. Three good perceptions: renunciation († *nekkamma*), † non-violence (*avyāpāda*) and harmlessness (*avihiṃsā*);
7. three bad intentions (*akusala-saṃkappas*): pleasure, malevolence and cruelty;

8. three good intentions: renunciation, non-violence, and harmlessness;
9. three grounds for meritorious action (*puñña-kiriya-vatthū*): charity (*dāna*), equality (*samatā*), and development (*bhāvanā*);
10. three feelings (*vedanās*): happiness (*sukha*), unhappiness (*dukkha*), and neither-happiness-nor-unhappiness (*adukkhamasukha*);
11. three desires (*tanhās*): pleasure (*kāma*), existence (*bhava*) and non-existence (*vibhava*);
12. three influences (*āsavas*): pleasure, existence and non-existence;
13. three fires (*aggis*): passion (*rāga*), aversion (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*);
14. three researches (*esanās*): pleasure, existence and the best life (*brahmā-cariya*);
15. three powers (*ādhipateyyas*): ego (*attan*), world (*loka*) and *dhamma*;
16. three bad elements (*dhātus*): pleasure (*kāma*), malevolence (*vyāpāda*) and cruelty (*vihiṃsā*);
17. three good elements: renunciation (*nekhamma*), non-violence (*avyāpāda*) and harmlessness (*avihiṃsā*);
18. three elements: visible object (*rūpa*), non-visible object (*arūpa*) and cessation (*nirodha*);
19. three heaps (*rāsīs*): higher morality (*adhisīla*), higher thought (*adhicitta*), and higher understanding (*adhipaññā*);
20. three developments (*bhāvanās*): morality, thought and understanding;
21. three kinds of concentration (*samādhi*): empty (*suññata*), free from desire (*appaṇihita*) and signless (*animitta*);
22. three characteristics (*lakkhaṇas*): restraint (*saññama*), diligence (*appamāda*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*);
23. three sciences (*vijjās*): knowledge of recollecting one's former states of existence (*pubbe-nivāsānusatti-ñāṇa*), knowledge of the decease and rebirth of beings (*sattānam cut'ūpapāta ñāṇa*) and knowledge in the destruction of influences (*āsavānaṃ khaye ñāṇa*);
24. three wonders (*pātiḥāriyas*): power (*iddhi*), marvellous ability of mind-reading the character of others (*ādesanā*: lit. "prophecy") and instruction;
25. three kinds of rebirth in the sphere of pleasure (*kāma-upapattis*): to be born mankind and gods through the present pleasure (*paccupaṭṭhita-kāma*), to be born gods who produced delight (*nimmāna-ratino devā*) through the outward pleasure (*nimitta-kāma*) and to be born gods produced by another who has self-mastery (*paranimmita-vasavattino devā*) through the pleasure produced by another (*paranimmita-kāma*);
26. three kinds of happy attainment (*sukha-upapattis*): there are beings who naturally completed what to be done, producing the delightful mind, such as gods who belong to the company of Brahma (*Brahma-kāyikā-devā*), coming out first in this world, there are beings who become happy through their self-possession and

are satisfied with it, such as the brilliant gods (*abhassarā-devā*) and there are beings who obtained happiness through calming (*samatha*), such as lustrous gods (*subha-kiṇṇā-devā*);

27. three kinds of unhappiness: forces (*saṅkhāra*), unhappiness (*dukkha*) and change (*vipariṇāma*);

28. three faculties (*indriyas*): faculty that is unknown yet, that of knowledge and one that has already known;

29. three kinds of dwelling (*vihāra*): noble, divine and the best ones;

30. three kinds of exhortation (*codanā*): exhorting opinions (*diṭṭhis*), exhorting what has heard (*suta*) and exhorting suspicion (*parisaṅkā*);

31. three kinds of ground for discussion (*kathāvatthu*): there were such and such grounds (*vatthus*) and discussions (*kathās*) in the past; there will be such and such grounds and discussion in the future, and there are such and such grounds and discussions in the present;

32. three heaps (*rāsis*): that of well-doing entailing immutable good results (*sammatta-niyata*), that of wrong-doing entailing immutable bad results (*micchatta-niyata*) and that of what is not determined yet (*aniyatta-niyata*);

33. three kinds of depression (*domanassa*): body depression, speech-depression, and mind-depression;

34. three kinds of elder monks (*therā bhikkhū*): elder in birth (*jāti*), elder in doctrine (*dhamma*) and elder in tradition (*sammuti*);

35. three kinds of eye (*cakkhu*): physical eye (*maṃsa-cakkhu*), divine (*dibba*) eye and eye of wisdom (*pañṇā*).

These, monks, are what was taught by the Tathagata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

The Tathagata, monks, taught four-fold right *dhammas*:

1. four non-excellent modes of speech (*anariya-vohāra*): lying (*mūsā-vācā*), malicious speech (*pisuṇā-vācā*), abuse (*pharusā-vācā*) and vain talk (*samphā-palāpa*);

2. four excellent modes of speech (*ariya-vohāra*): abstinence from lying (*mūsā-vācā veramaṇī*), abstinence from malicious speech, abstinence from vain talk and abstinence from abuse.

3. four non-excellent modes of speech (*anariya-vohāra*): declaring what has not been seen to have been seen (*adiṭṭhe diṭṭha-vāditā*), declaring what has not been heard to have been heard (*assute suta-vāditā*), declaring what has not been thought to have been thought (*amute muta-vāditā*), and declaring what has not been known to have been known (*aviññate viññāta-vāditā*).

4. four excellent modes of speech (*ariya-vohāra*): declaring what has been seen to have been seen (*diṭṭhe diṭṭha-vāditā*), declaring what has been heard to have been heard (*sute suta-vāditā*), declaring what has been thought to have been

thought (*mute muta-vāditā*), declaring what has been known to have been known (*viññāte viññāta-vāditā*);

5. four kinds of food (*āhāra*): material food (*kabalīnkāra āhāra*), food of contact (*phassa*), food of cogitation (*mano-sañcetanā*) and food of consciousness (*viññāṇa*);

6. four kinds of teaching-acquisition (*dhammasamādāna*): one that brings present unhappiness (*dukkha*) and unhappy result (*vipāka*) in the future, one that brings present unhappiness and happy result in the future, one that brings present happiness and unhappy result in the future and one that brings present happiness and happy result in the future;

7. four kinds of attachment (*upādāna*): pleasure (*kāma*), ego-theory (*atta-vāda*), virtue and ritual (*śīlabbata*), opinion (*diṭṭhi*);

8. four bodily fetters (*kāya-ganthās*): covetousness (*abhiññhā*), malevolence (*vyāpāda*), being attached to virtues and ritual (*śīlabbata-parāmāsa*) and inclination to dogmatize (*idaṃ-saccābhīnivesa*);

9. four obstacles (*nīvaraṇas*): pleasure (*kāma*), aversion (*dosa*), opinions (*diṭṭhis*), and pride (*māna*);

10. four ways of birth (*yonis*): oviparous (*aṇḍaja*), viviparous (*jalābuja*), moisture-sprung (*samsedaja*) and transformed (*opapātika*);

11. four bases of self-possession (*satipaṭṭhānas*): a monk lives with reference to the body (*kāya*) observing the body internally or externally or both internally and externally, energetic, conscious, self-possessed, having eliminated desire and aversion for the world. In the same way he lives with reference to feelings (*vedanās*), thought (*citta*) and principles (*dhammas*);

12. four right exertions (*sammappadhānas*): to prevent demerit with skill from arising, to abandon it with skill when arisen, to produce merit with skill and to increase it with skill when produced.

13. four bases of power (*iddhipādas*): to develop the basis of power that is endowed with the forces of exertion for the concentration of will (*chandasamādhi*), for concentration of thought (*citta-*), for concentration of energy (*virīya-*), and for concentration of investigation (*vimamsā-*);

14. four meditations (*jhānas*): 1. becoming separated from pleasures (*kāmas*), becoming separated from bad principles (*akusala dhammas*), a monk enters and remains in the first *jhāna*, in which there is reasoning (*vitakka*) and reflection (*vicāra*), which is born of separation (*viveka*), which has joy (*pīti*) and happiness (*sukha*), 2. through the calming of reasoning and reflection he enters and remains in the second *jhāna*, which internally is serenity (*sampasāda*) and one-pointedness of thought (*citta-ekaggatā*), is without reasoning and reflection, is born of concentration, has joy and happiness, 3. through dispassion from joy he enters and remains in the third *jhāna*, remaining detached (*upekkhaka*: equanimous), self-possessed and conscious (deliberate), experiencing happiness in his body (or in

his mental being), the *jhāna* which the Āryans (translatable as the “noble ones”) describe as detached, self-possessed, remaining happy, and 4. by abandoning both happiness and unhappiness, by the extinction of his former elation (*somanassa*) and depression (*domanassa*), he enters and remains in the fourth *jhāna*, which is without unhappiness and without happiness and is the purity (*parisuddha*) of equanimity (*upekhā*) and self-possession;

15. four kinds of boundlessness (*appamaññā*): sympathy (*mettā*), compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekhā*);

16. four *jhānas* of invisible object (*arūpā*): the sphere of the infinity of space (*ākāsānañcāyatana*), the sphere of the infinity of consciousness (*viññāṇānañcāyatana*), the sphere of nothingness (*ākīñcaññāyatana*) and the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (*n’eva saññānāsaññāyatana*);

17. four bases of teaching (*dhammapadas*): non-covetousness (*anabhijjhā*), absence of malevolence (*avyāpāda*), right self-possession (*sammā-sati*) and right concentration (*sammā-samādhi*);

18. four kinds of noble family (*ariya-vaṃsā*): a monk should be satisfied with his robe (*cīvara*), should not contrive to have a nice one, should not feel depressed by having a bad one, should know it through non-defilements (*asankilesas*) and non-attachment (*anupādāna*), should understand the path of liberation, should not be lazy in making an effort to do so in this world, and should unfailingly complete it. And try to encourage others to complete it. This is called the first kind of noble family. He should not be anxious about the satisfaction with food received in the alms-bowl (*piṇḍa-pāta*), with his lodging (*senāsana*) and medicine for illness, and should not slander Devas, Death (*Māra*), Brahma, strivers (*samaṇas*), brahmans, gods and human beings at all. Thus he should be satisfied.

19. four grounds for friendliness (*saṅgaha-vatthu*): donation (*dāna*), kind speech (*peyyavajja*), meaningful life (*atthacariya*) and impartiality (*samānattatā*);

20. four factors existing in one who has entered the stream (*sotā-pannaṅgas*): perfect confidence (*avecca-pasāda*) in the Buddha, in the Dhamma, in the Buddhist community and in the Discipline;

21. four principles to be realized (*sacchikaraṇīya dhammas*): visible objects to be realized by eye (*cakkhu*), feelings to be realised by body (*kāya*), former lives (*pubbe-nivāsa*) to be realized by self-possession (*sati*) and the extinction of influences (*āsava-khaya*) to be realized by understanding (*paññā*);

22. four ways (*paṭipadās*): difficult way resulting in slow insight (*dukkha paṭipadā dandhābhiññā*), difficult way resulting in quick insight (*dukkha paṭipadā khippābhiññā*), easy way resulting in slow insight (*sukha paṭipadā dandhābhiññā*) and easy way resulting in quick insight (*sukha paṭipadā khippābhiññā*);

23. four noble truths (*ariyasaccas*): unhappiness (*dukkha*), its origination (*samudaya*), its cessation (*nirodha*), and the way leading to this cessation (*magga*);

24. four fruits resulting from strivership (*sāmañña-phalas*): the fruit of

obtaining the stream (*sotāpatti-phala*), the fruit of returning once (*sakadāgāmi-*), the fruit of non-returning (*anāgāmi-*) and the fruit of Arahantship (*arahatta-*);

25. four resolves (*adhiṭṭhānas*): to win truth (*sacca*), to become liberal (*cāga*), to attain understanding (*paññā*), and to be calm (*upasama*);

26. four knowledges (*ñāṇas*): truth (*dhmma*), inference (*anvaya*), convention (*sammuti*) and definition (*pariccheda*);

27. four bases of comprehension (*paṭisambhidā*): principle (i.e., dependent origination) (*dhmma*), meaning (or effect) (*attha*), language (*nirutti*), and intuition (*paṭibhāna*);

28. four kinds of consciousness-persistence or -station (*viññāna-tṭhiti*): conditioned by matter (*rūpa* as physical principles), matter-consciousness persists, and both matter and attachments (*upadhis*) increase. Thus feeling-consciousness, perception-consciousness and force-consciousness persist too;

29. four yokes (*yogas*): pleasure (*kāma*), existence (*bhava*), (false) views (*diṭṭhis*), and ignorance (*avijjā*);

30. four freedoms from yokes (*visaṃyogas*): freedom from pleasure, from existence, from (false) views and from ignorance;

31. four kinds of purification (*visuddhi?*):*⁸ purification of virtue (*sīla*), of thought (*citta*), of views (*diṭṭhis*), and doubt-overcoming (*kaṅkhāvitaraṇa*);

32. four kinds of knowing (?):* to know truly what to receive, to know truly what to do, to know truly what to enjoy and to know truly what to give;

33. four modes of movement (*iriyāpatha?*):* to know truly walking (*caṅkamati*), to know truly standing (*tiṭṭhati*), to know truly sitting (*nisidati*) and to know truly lying down (*seti*);

34. four kinds of investigation (*vīmaṃsā?*): a little investigation, vast one, boundless one and investigation of nothingness;

35. four methods of answering questions (*pañhabyākaraṇas*): to give a direct answer in the affirmative or in the negative (*ekamsa*), to give an analytical answer (*vibhajja*), to reply by a counter-question to ascertain what a question means (*paṭipucchā*), and to keep silent (*ṭhapanīya*);

36. four things that the Tathagata does not have to take heed of (*ārakkheyya*): the Tathagata is pure in all his forces (*kāya-saṅkhāra*), which are not defiled with influences (*āsavas*), because there is no misdeed of them. This can also be seen in speech (*vacī*), thought (*citta*), and livelihood (*jīvita*);

These are what was taught by the Tathagata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected and gods and human beings will gain peace.

The Tathagata, monks, taught fivefold right *dhammas*:

1. five spheres (*āyatanas*): eye (*cakkhu*) and visible object (*rūpa*), ear (*sota*) and sound (*sadda*), nose (*ghāna*) and odour (*gandha*), tongue (*jivhā*) and taste (*rasa*), body (*kāya*) and tangible object (*phoṭṭhabba*);

2. five aggregates attached to existence (*upādāna-khandhas*): matter (*rūpa* as physical principles), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), force (*saṅkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*);

3. five obstacles (*nīvaraṇas*): will of pleasure (*kāma-chanda*), malevolence (*vyāpāda*), stupidity (*thīna-middha*), flurry (*uddhacca-kukkucca*) and uncertainty (*vicikicchā*);

4. five fetters that belong to the world of pleasure (*orambhāgiya-saṃyojanas*): the theory of an existing body (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), the infatuation of virtues and ritual (*śīlabbataparāmāsa*) uncertainty (*vicikicchā*), will of pleasure (*kāma-chanda*), and malevolence (*vyāpāda*);

5. five fetters that belong to the upper world (*uddhambhāgiya-saṃyojanas*): passion in the visible world (*rūparāga*), passion in the invisible world (*arūparāga*), ignorance (*avijjā*), conceit (*māna*), and distraction (*uddhacca*);

6. five faculties (*indriyas*): confidence (*saddhā*), energy (*virīya*), self-possession (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*), and understanding (*paññā*);

7. five strengths (*balas*): confidence (*saddhā*), energy (*virīya*), self-possession (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*), and understanding (*paññā*);

8. five factors of exertion (*padhāniyaṅgas*): 1. a monk should exert himself to believe that there is the Tathāgata's enlightenment, which has the ten epithets such as Arhat, the perfectly enlightened (*sammā-sambuddha*), and so forth, 2. he should exert himself not to be ill, and to be always calm, 3. he should exert himself to be honest and not to be treacherous: to such a monk the Tathāgata will show the path of extinction (*nibbāna*), 4. he should keep it in mind, should not be embarrassed by it, and should not forget to remember the verses (*gāthās*) he chanted in the past, 5. he should see the origination and cessation of *dharmas* well and try hard to stop the origination of unhappiness in the light of the practice (*paṭipatti*) of the learned;

9. five exhortations (*codanās*): a monk should not speak at an untimely moment (*akāla*), not speak what is false (*abhūta*), not speak what is connected with nonsense (*anatta-saṃhita*), not speak roughly (*pharusa*), and not speak with anger (*dosantara*);

10. five other exhortations: a monk should speak at a timely moment, speak what is true, speak what is connected with making sense, speak gently (*saṃha*) and speak with benevolence (*metta-citta*);

11. five kinds of selfishness (*macchariya*): in a dwelling (*āvāsa*), in a tribe (*kula*), in gains (*lābhas*), in beauty (*vaṇṇa*), and in doctrine (*dhamma*);

12. five ways leading to liberation (*vimutti*): the recognition (*saññā*) of the non-purification of body (*kāya-asocceyya*), the recognition of the impurity of food (*āhāra-paṭikkūla*), the recognition of the fact that everything is impermanent, the recognition of the fact that everything in this world is unhappy, and the recognition of death (*maraṇa*);

13. five elements of liberation (*nissāraṇa-dhātus*): a monk should not be addicted to pleasure (*kāma*), nor perturbed by it, nor attached to it; he should understand the liberation from it, enjoy the separation from it, and should not be lazy in doing so; his mind should turn to self-control and to the liberation from pleasure; finally, he will cease from influences (*āsavas*) which arise from his pleasure, and be free from them. This is called the liberation from pleasure. In the same way the liberation from malevolence (*vyāpāda*), from trouble (*viheṣā*), from visible objects (*rūpas*) and from an existing body (*sakkāya*) will also be explained;

14. five spheres of liberation (*vimuttāyatanas*): if a monk is not of negligence, glads to live in the forest and concentrates on one-pointedness of thought (*citta-ekaggatā*), he will be able to get what he has not gotten yet, to destroy what he has not destroyed yet, and to calm what he has not calmed yet. What five? 1. A monk should listen to the teachings of the Tathagata, of one who leads to the best life, or of a teacher and should investigate (*vīmaṇsati*) and reflect on them, and should deal with the meaning of them in detail, and then he will feel joy in mind. After feeling joy, he will get the Dhamma-zest (*dhmma-rāga*); after it, he will be secure (*khema*) of his body and mind. After that, he will enter meditation (*jhāna*); after it, he will obtain knowing and seeing (*ñāṇadassana*). This is called the first sphere of liberation. 2. and 3. After delighting in listening to the teachings of the Tathagata, a monk feels joy in bearing in mind the teachings and in holding the recitation of them. 4. He also feels joy in explaining them for others, in giving deliberate after attention (*manasikara*) to them. 5. Thus he sustains concentration (*samādhi*) with them;

15. five kinds of never-returners (*anāgāmins*): one who reaches his final extinction in the middle of his lifetime (*antarāparinibbāna*) in the existence of visible objects (*rūpa*), one who reaches his final extinction after his lifetime (*upahacca*) in the existence of visible objects, one who reaches his final extinction without any forces (*asaṅkhāra*), one who reaches his final extinction with forces (*sasaṅkhāra*), and one who goes upwards in the stream of life and attains the sphere of neither perception, nor non-perception (*uddhamṣota Akaniṭṭha-gāmin*).

These are, monks, what was taught by the Tathāgata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

The Tathāgata, monks, taught sixfold right *dhammas*:

1. six kinds of internal spheres (*ajjhattikāyatanas*): eye (*cakkhu*), ear (*sota*), nose (*ghāṇa*), tongue (*jivhā*), body (*kāya*), and mind (*mano*);

2. six kinds of external spheres (*bāhirāyatanas*): visible object (*rūpa*), sound (*sadda*), odour (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*), tangible object (*phoṭṭhabba*) and principle (*dhamma*).

3. six bodies of consciousness (*viññāṇakāyas*): eye-consciousness, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body- and mind-consciousness;

4. six bodies of touch (*phassakāyas*): eye-touch, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body- and mind-touch;

5. six bodies of sensation (*vedanākāyas*): eye-sensation, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body- and mind-sensation;

6. six bodies of perception (*saññākāyas*): visible object-perception, sound-, odour-, taste-, tangible object- and principle-perception;

7. six bodies of thought (*sancetanākāyas*): visible object-thought, sound-, odour-, taste-, tangible object-, and principle-thought;

8. six bodies of thirst (*taṇhākāyas*): visible object-thirst, sound-, odour-, taste-, tangible object-, and principle-thirst;

9. six roots of disputes (*vivāda-mūlas*): 1. If there is a monk who gets angry (*kodhana*), never tries to get rid of it, does not take his refuge in the Buddha, not in the *Dhamma*, not in the *Sangha*, does not accomplish the virtues, defiles them, is disgusted with them and willing to raise contentions (*kalahas*) in his *Sangha*, then he will be disliked by human beings, and disturb his *Sangha*, and gods and human beings will not gain peace. Monks, you should reflect on yourselves. If there is such a monk, you should convene the *Sangha*, think of some skillful method and stop his disputes by it. You should also reflect deeply on yourselves.

If there is a monk who has already eliminated the waste of mind (*khila*), you should stop him from having it again by some skillful method. You should not raise it any more. 2. If there is a monk, who is hypocritical (*makkhin*), and malicious (*paḷāsin*), then he ... 3. If there is a monk who is jealous (*issukin*) and envious (*maccharin*), then he ... 4. If there is a monk who is treacherous (*saṭṭha*) and deceitful (*māyāvin*), then he ... 5. If there is a monk who is infatuated with his own opinion (*sandiṭṭhi-parāmāsin*), clutching it tenaciously (*ādhāna-gāhin*) and is loath to renounce it (*duppaṭṭissaggin*), then he ... 6. If there is a monk who is full of evil wishes (*pāpicchas*) and wrong opinions (*micchā-diṭṭhis*), then he ...;

10. six elements (*dhātus*): earth (*paṭhavī*), heat (*tejo*), water (*āpo*), air (*vāyo*), space (*ākāsa*), and consciousness (*viññāṇa*);

11. six appropriate treatments: eye deals with visible objects, ear, with sounds, nose, with odours, tongue, with tastes, body, with tangible objects, and mind, with principles;

12. six elements of liberation (*nissāraṇa-dhātus*): 1. A monk might say: "I develop mental liberation by sympathy (*metta-citto-vimutti*), and yet I multiply the thought of malevolence (*vyāpāda-citta*).” The rest of them will say: "You should not say it. You should not slander the Tathagata. He never says so.” Rather, he says: "After a monk gets rid of malevolence, he will cultivate benevolence.” In the same way, a monk might say: "I develop mental liberation by compassion (*karuṇā*), and yet I multiply the thought of trouble (*viheṣā*). I develop mental liberation by gladness (*muditā*), and that by equanimity (*upekkhā*), and yet I multiply the thought of discontent (*arati*), and that of passion (*rāga*). I develop

the contemplation of non-ego and the mental liberation of signlessness (*animitta*), and yet I multiply the thought of uncertainty (*vicikicchā*) and the consciousness of following signs (*nimittānusārin*)."

13. six kinds of supremacy: seeing (*dassana*), hearing (*savana*), gain (*lābha*), training (*sikkhā*), worship (*pāricariyā*) and mindful (*anussata*);

14. six bases of mindfulness (*anussati-ttāna*): the Buddha, the *Dhamma*, the *Sangha*, virtues (*sīlas*), abandoning (*cāga*) and gods (*devatā*).

These are what was taught by the Tathāgata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

The Tathāgata, monks, taught sevenfold right *dhammas*:

1. seven kinds of evil doctrine (*asaddhamma*): non-confidence (*asaddhā*), non-self-respect (*ahirī*), non-fear-of-blame (*anottappa*), little learning (*appassuta*), indolence (*kusitata*), forgetfulness (*muṭṭhasacca*), and non-understanding (*duppaññā*);

2. seven kinds of true doctrine (*saddhamma*): confidence (*saddhā*), self-respect (*hirī*), fear of blame (*ottappa*), much learning (*bahussuta*), energy (*virīya*), self-possession (*sati*), and understanding (*paññā*);

3. seven persistences or stations of consciousness (*viññāṇaṭṭhitis*): There are beings, such as gods and human beings, who are diverse both in body and in perception. This is the first station of consciousness. There are beings who are diverse in body and uniform in perception, such as gods who belong to the company of Brahma, originated (*abhinibbatta*), from the first meditation (*jhāna*). This is the second station of consciousness. There are beings, such as the brilliant (*ābhassarā*) gods (originated from the second meditation), who are uniform in body and diverse in perception. This is the third station of consciousness. There are beings, such as the lustrous (*subhakiṇṇā*) gods (originated from the third meditation), who are uniform both in body and in perception. This is the fourth station of consciousness. There are beings who are going to the sphere of the infinity of space (*ākāsānañcāyatanūpaga*). There are beings who are going to the sphere of the infinity of consciousness. There are beings who are going to the sphere of nothingness.

4. seven kinds of exertion (*padhāna*):* virtues (*sīlas*), to stop covetousness (*abhiijhā*), to reject wrong views (*micchā diṭṭhis*), much learning (*bahussuta*), energy (*virīya*), right self-possession (*sammā-sati*), and concentration (*samādhi*);

5. seven kinds of perception (*saññā*): foul (*asubha*), dispassion (*virāga*), abandoning (*pahāna*?), cessation (*nirodha*), impermanent (*anicca*), unhappy (*dukkha*) and non-ego (*anattan*);

6. seven requisites to the attainment of concentration (*samādhi-parikkhāras*): right theory (*sammādiṭṭhi*), right intention (*sammāsaṃkappa*), right speech

(*sammāvācā*), right action (*sammākammanta*), right livelihood (*sammā-ājīva*), right exertion (*sammāppadhāna*), and right self-possession (*sammāsaṭi*);

7. seven factors of enlightenment (*sambojjhaṅgas*): self-possession, investigation of truth (*dhmma-vicaya*), energy, joy (*pīti*), tranquility (*passaddhi*), concentration and equanimity (*upekkhā*).

These are what was taught by the Tathagata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

Tathagata, monks, taught, eightfold right *dhammas*:

1. eight kinds of worldly principles (*loka-dhammas*): gains (*lābhas*), loss (*alabha*), ill reputation (*ayasa*), reputation (*yasa*), praise (*paṣaṃsā*), blame (*nindā*), unhappiness (*dukkha*), and happiness (*sukha*);

2. eight freedoms (*vimokkhas*): to see visible objects (*rūpas*) as they really are, to see visible objects externally without the internal perception of them, to determine (*adhimuccati*) that the internal perception is lustrous (*subha*), to stop the perception of aversion (*dosa*) after surmounting that of visible objects and to stay in the sphere of the infinity of space, to stay in the sphere of the infinity of consciousness after surmounting that of the infinity of space, to stay in the sphere of nothingness after surmounting that of the infinity of consciousness, to stay in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception after surmounting that of nothingness, and to establish the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), where perception and feeling cease, after surmounting that of neither perception nor non-perception.

3. eight factors of the way (*maggaṅgas*): right theory, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right exertion, right self-possession, right concentration;

4. eight persons deserving a donation (*dakkhiṇeyya-puggalas*): (one who is) obtaining the realization of the fruit of stream-attainment (*sotāpatti-phala-sacchikiriya-paṭipanna*), one who has attained the stream (*sotāpanna*), (one who is) obtaining the realisation of the fruit of once-returning (*sakadāgāmi*), one who has been a once-returner (*sakadāgāmin*), (one who is) obtaining the realization of the fruit of never-returning (*anāgāmi*), one who has been a never-returner (*anāgāmin*), (one who is) obtaining the realization of the fruit of Arhatship, and Arhat;

These are what was taught by the Tathāgata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

The Tathāgata, monks, taught ninefold right *dhammas*:

1. nine kind of sentient beings' dwelling (*sattāvāsa*): 1. There are beings, such as gods and human beings, who are diverse both in body and in perception. This is the first dwelling of beings. 2. There are beings who are diverse in body and

uniform in perception, such as gods who belong to the company of Brahma, originated from the first meditation. This is the second dwelling of beings. 3. There are beings, such as the brilliant gods, who are uniform in body and diverse in perception. This is the third dwelling of beings. 4. There are beings, such as the lustrous gods, who are uniform both in body and in perception. This is the fourth dwelling of beings. 5. There are beings who are going to the sphere of non-perception, such as the non-perceptive gods (*asañña-satta-devas*), originated from the fourth meditation. This is the fifth dwelling of beings. 6. There are beings who dwell in the sphere of the infinity of space. This is the sixth dwelling of beings. 7. There are beings who dwell in the sphere of the infinity of consciousness. This is the seventh dwelling of beings. 8. There are beings who dwell in the sphere of nothingness. This is the eighth dwelling of beings. 9. There are beings who dwell in the sphere of neither perception, nor non-perception. This is the ninth dwelling of beings.

These are what was taught by the Tathāgata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

The Tathāgata, monks, taught tenfold right *dhamma*:

1. ten principles which do not require any further learning (*asekha-dhammas*): right theory, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right self-possession, right exertion, right concentration, right knowledge (*sammāñāṇa*), right liberation (*sammā-vimutti*).

These are what was taught by the Tathāgata. Let us collect the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya* in this way and avoid disputes, and then the best life will last long, rich profits will be expected, and gods and human beings will gain peace.

At that time the Buddha approved what was taught by the venerable Sāriputta, and the monks were pleased and delighted with it.

Notes

1. The word *dhamma* is generally used in Buddhism in the first of its senses, "doctrine" or "teaching." But, since the word as used in the *Chung-tsu-king* could be understood as meaning "principle," it will be employed as a plural hereafter in most cases.
2. *Das Chung-tsu-king des Chinesischen Dīrghāgama, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen* (Inaugural dissertation, Universität Leipzig, 1930); "Das Chung-tsu-king, Übersetzt mit Anmerkungen," *Asia Major* 7 (1932), p. 1-149.
3. "Die Einleitung des Saṅgītisūtra," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 1955, pp. 298-318.
4. *Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus II* (Berlin, Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1968).
5. The *Ta-chi-fa-mên-ching* was translated (from Sanskrit? into Chinese) by Dānapāla, a native of Udyāna, in 980 AD. See *The Taishō Edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka* (abbreviated to

T.), No. 12 (T. 1, 226c-233b), and in *The Japanese Translation of the Chinese Tripiṭaka* (Kokuyaku Issaikyo, Tokyo, 1929), the *Abhidharma* Section, Volume 1, pp. 11-33, there is a comparative list of doctrinal principles from ones up to tens in the three *sūtras*.

6. In translating the *Chung-tsu-king* into English, Buddhist terms will be restored not into Sanskrit but into Pāli, because Pāli, though probably not the language of the Buddha, is closer to it than Sanskrit.
7. In the *Saṅgītisuttanta*, the word *saṅgāyati*, meaning "chant," "rehearse," is used, but a literal translation is made here.
3. An asterisk means that there are no doctrinal principles corresponding to those in Pāli. The same shall apply hereinafter.

An Appraisal of the History of Buddhist Sanskrit Studies in East Asia

Akira Yuyama

Kūkai, his predecessors and successors

In the legendary histories, in particular those of the Shingon or Japanese Tāntric Buddhists, it was Kūkai^a (774-835) – also known as Kōbō Daishi^b, the honorific title bestowed upon him posthumously by the Emperor – who introduced to Japan the so-called *Siddham* studies, i.e. Sanskrit. He is thus regarded not just as the founder of the Shingon sect, but also as the originator of Sanskrit studies in Japan. From his school derived a number of branches of *Siddham* studies. However, in this paper I do not intend to describe a long and complicated history of its development.

Kūkai went to Ch'ang-an^c, the then capital of T'ang^d China, in the year 804, and studied with Ācārya Hui-kuo^e (745-805), the seventh of the eight founding ācāryas in the lineage (*paramparā*) of the Shingon sect.^f Hui-kuo must certainly have studied Sanskrit from his teacher Fu-k'ung^g, or Amoghavajra in his Indian name (705-774), the sixth in the Shingon lineage. Amoghavajra was born on the island of Laṅkā and came to Lo-yang^h in 715. From then until his death in Ch'ang-an he travelled to various places, even making a trip back to Ceylon and India in 741-746. In Lo-yang in 720 he started to study under Chin-kang-chihⁱ, or Vajrabodhi (681-746), who had just arrived from Ceylon after making an extensive tour of India, leaving his royal family in South India. Vajrabodhi became the fifth in the same lineage. He was active in propagating Tāntric Buddhism together with Shan-wu-wei^j, or Śubhaṃkarasimha (637-735), a Magadhan prince who had come to Ch'ang-an after having studied also at Nālandā under the guidance of Dharmagupta, a professor of Tāntricism. He was later named as the fifth of the eight founding ācāryas in the Tāntric tradition.^k Of those, I am particularly interested in Fu-k'ung (Amoghavajra), born in Ceylon, who, twenty years after he had begun studying with Chin-kang-chih (Vajrabodhi) in Lo-yang, went back to his island of birth as well as mainland India, leaving China in 741. In 746 Fu-k'ung returned to Ch'ang-an, where he educated Hui-kuo among others.

It was in this capital of Ch'ang-an, at that time one of the most international cities in the world, where Kūkai must have had a good chance to study Sanskrit from his Ch'ang-an-born elite teacher Hui-kuo, who had succeeded in firmly establishing the Indian tradition on Chinese soil. It is nevertheless still beyond our exact knowledge how much Sanskrit he had learnt and how much he taught to his

Japanese disciples after his return from China. Incidentally, Kūkai displayed his brilliance to the Ch'ang-an literary circle during his short stay.

After the introduction of *Siddham*¹ studies it became, in a sense, compulsory for Shingon priests in particular to learn Sanskrit, if only calligraphic. In the course of time the so-called *Siddham* script became not a tool or object of Sanskrit studies, but an object of worship as a holy script. This has led modern scholars to study such materials from the viewpoint of art history, and it has so far attracted very little attention from serious scholars of philology or linguistics.¹

Fa-Hsien, Hsüan-tsang, I-ching

Needless to say, before the aforementioned ācāryas there were Chinese monks who had mastered the Sanskrit language during their stay in India. From various angles I wish to talk about three of them. They are Fa-hsien^m (ca. 337–ca. 422), who left China at the age of over sixty years and travelled for twelve years altogether before returning; Hsüan-tsangⁿ (ca. 600–664), who left Ch'ang-an for Nālandā in 629 and returned in 645, and I-ching^o (635–713), who left by sea in 671, returning to Lo-yang in 695. All of them were extremely keen to learn the original Sanskrit language and to bring back the authoritative scriptures of Indian Buddhism.

Hsüan-tsang showed, above all, a keen interest in bringing out authenticated translations with his deep knowledge of the Sanskrit language, and original Indian source materials of Buddhism. This is an aspect of the background history to the T'ang period which can never be considered negligible. Later on, the translations made before him were considered to be "old renditions," those after him "new renditions."

Saichō and the Tendai School

It is perhaps worth noting here that Saichō^p (766–822), or Dengyō Daishi^q, the founder of the Tendai Sect, or Japanese T'ie-tai, does not seem to have shown an interest in Sanskrit studies, contrary to his contemporary and rival Kūkai. He went to T'ang China in 804, returning home soon in the following year. His successor is considered to be the first of the lineage of Sanskrit studies in the Tendai sect. Incidentally, Saichō was the first to have received the posthumous "Daishi" title in Japanese history, and his disciple Ennin received it at the very same time.

In succession to the founder of the Japanese T'ien-Tai Sect, but somehow in singular contrast to him, Ennin^r (794–864), or Jikaku Daishi^s, studied Tāntric Buddhism during his stay in China after 838.² And, after him, Enchin^t (814–891), or Chishō Daishi^u, whose mother happened to be Kūkai's niece, had also studied Tāntricism while in China from 853 to 858. They had thus acquainted themselves with Sanskrit studies. Both of them seem to have brought back with them a number of original Sanskrit manuscripts, which can be detected from the extant catalogues. Unfortunately, most of the manuscripts are now lost, but the remaining fragments, though small in number, prove that the manuscripts brought to Japan

must have been materials of first-class importance.³ Both Ennin and Enchin became the Head Priests of Mount Hiei, but separated ideologically, which later on produced two major factions within the sect. Like Kūkai, again, it is difficult at this stage of research to judge their real activities in promoting Sanskrit studies after their return from China to Japan.

Textbooks written by Chih-kuang and Fa-hu

Almost at the same time Chih-kuang^v (d. ca. 806) composed a well-known work entitled *Hsi-t'an tzü-c-hi*^w (Taishō No. 2132). Fa-hu^x (or Dharmarakṣa, more plausibly Dharmapāla: 962-1058) then wrote a book *Chin-yu t'ien-chu tzü-yüan*.^y Such materials composed in China have fortunately survived in Japan. For instance, the oldest manuscript of Chih-kuang's *Hsi-t'an tzü-chi*, which dates back to the early eleventh century, has been preserved in Japan. These works have become the textbooks for Japanese priest-scholars, who also produced a number of books on Sanskrit. In most cases their titles bear the word "Siddham" or "Shit-tan" in Japanese (= Chinese "Hsi-t'an"). Incidentally, the word "Siddham" is often considered to have come from the opening sentence of such works as *siddhir astu*. It seems rather to derive, however, from a decorative sign used at the beginning of a text, which was read *siddham*. It was later on used as appellation for the script. As a matter of fact, *siddhir astu* is frequently written as *siddhām rastu* in a confused way, even in the calligraphic alphabet attributed to Kūkai.⁴

On this occasion I should like to note also that Sanskrit studies on the Korean peninsula are a fit subject for future investigation. Among others, for example, one may name an Indian monk Chih-k'ung^z, or Dhyanabhadra, who was very active in the Koryō dynasty, living to a great age (1236-1363).⁵ By way of illustration, his version of the *Uṣṇiṣavijayā Dhāraṇī* in Chinese transcription proves to be of key importance to the study of various recensions. An old blockprint text, printed in Korea most probably in 1688, has survived in Japan. Incidentally, Chih-k'ung's transcribed version appeared a century after the printing of the famed Korean Edition of the Buddhist Canon (1236/1237-1251).⁶

Takakusu's contribution to the history of Sanskrit studies in Japan

It was Junjirō Takakusu^{aa} (1866-1945), the first holder of the chair of Sanskrit at the University of Tokyo, who spared no effort to investigate the Sanskrit materials preserved in Japan. He thus discovered a number of important texts which, though fragmentary in most cases, are lost elsewhere. Thanks to his detailed catalogue published in 1922,⁷ many other rare works have also come within our grasp. His short remarks in this catalogue are still extremely useful.

Since my interest lies in the Sanskrit works in East Asia, particularly in Japan before the introduction of Western methodology, it is pleasing to see the appear-

ance in facsimile, however belatedly, of Takakusu's handwritten notebooks on the history of Sanskrit studies in Japan. The existence of his posthumous manuscript was known to us already three decades ago.⁸ It is not a descriptive or critical appraisal of the subject, but a more or less memorandum-type catalogue of relevant works, including those written by Chinese priest-scholars which are preserved in Japan.⁹ There is no doubt that this publication will prove a great stimulus to those who are interested in the topic.

Jiun, Shūen, Jōgon, Donjaku, Jakugon

With regard to Sanskrit studies in Japan before the introduction of Western methodology, mention must be made in the first place of a well-known Shingon priest-scholar of the temple Kōki-ji, whose name was Onkō (= Kāśyapa; 1718-1804). He is always respectfully referred to with the honorific title of Jiun Sonja.^{ab} He himself often wrote his signature in the *Siddham* script as "Maitra-megha" which is a literal translation of his name Jiun into Sanskrit.

During his lifetime, among many religious activities such as the restoration of discipline according to the Vinaya, he tried to collect as many Sanskrit texts as possible. Finally, this became a collection of Sanskrit materials in one thousand fascicles, called *Bongaku Shinryō*^{ac}, which literally means, *The Girder of the Ford of Sanskrit Studies*. With a few exceptions, all these important texts copied (or written) by Jiun are unfortunately in a dormant state in that temple in the south of Osaka. It is fortunate, however, that Jiun himself and several of his disciples have recorded lists of his writings in the *Bongaku Shinryō*.¹⁰ A faithful reproduction of his selected works was published on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of Jiun's death with Juntarō Ishihama's introductory note (and its English version by Gadjin M. Nagao) in 1953.¹¹ Some of the texts published in facsimile do not seem to be of his own writing.¹² It is indeed amazing how carefully, and in many cases correctly, he has deciphered and identified the texts.

Jiun Onkō was followed by Shinna Shōnin Shūen^{ad} (1786-1859), who was, however, most probably independent of him. He was well known as a Tendai priest-scholar and was the thirty-first Head Priest of the Temple Sairai-ji^{ae} in Tsu in the South not far from Nagoya. At the same time he was a famed Shintoist scholar at the Kitano Shrine of Kyoto.¹³ Shūen's greatest contribution to the field of Sanskrit studies is an incredibly faithful reproduction in blockprint of the then extant important texts, including the *Hṛdaya-sūtra* and the *Uṣṇīṣavijayadhāraṇī*, a single palmleaf folio kept at the temple Hōryū-ji of Nara (now in the custody of the Tokyo National Museum), a rare *Lokaprajñapti* fragment kept in the temple Kōki-ji (now seemingly in the custody of the Nara National Museum), which had long been in the possession of the Temple Ganshō-in in the South of Kyoto (see my article in note 12). This blockprint book entitled *Asharajō*^{af}, or *The Book of Akṣaras*, consists of five fascicles. This extremely important work, published at

Sairai-ji in 1837, has fortunately been reprinted in facsimile with a somewhat misleading title.¹⁴ Shūen himself left for us his own interesting artistic calligraphy, such as a “Baumkuchen”-type inscription of the *Uṣṇīṣavijayadhārṇī*, which is kept in the temple Tō-ji, more officially named Kyōōgokoku-ji^{ag}, of Kyoto.

In connection with the history of Sanskrit studies in Japan the name of Jōgon^{ah} (Śuddhavyūha; 1639-1702) must not be forgotten. He was the pioneering Sanskritist who had paved the way for future generations. Jōgon also travelled extensively to search, decipher and copy important Sanskrit texts, including the Hōryūji manuscript of the “Heart Sūtra.” In editing this text, as a matter of fact, Max Müller made good use of Jōgon’s copy and reproduced it photomechanically in his book published in 1884. Jōgon’s collection of the *mantradhāraṇīs* has been a standard work since its publication in 1680, and was recently reprinted in facsimile.¹⁵ It is a matter of great satisfaction that a detailed study of his life and a bibliographical work on the writings by the priest-scholars at the Temple Reiun-ji have appeared one after another.¹⁶ It is interesting to learn that Jōgon, the founder of the Reiun-ji in the then Yedo, was active in his research while in Yedo, and not in the Kansai area.

A great number of Sanskrit scholars of Japan are listed by Takakusu in his aforementioned posthumous work. Only a few of them have been studied so far. One of the exceptions is Jakugon^{ai} (1703-1771), who translated his name into Sanskrit as Śāntivyūha. It is good to see the reprint of Chisui Watanabe’s biographical study on Jakugon, which was originally published in 1933.¹⁷ Tsūshō Kojima has shown his keen interest in Jakugon’s works in a series of his publications, but in a rather traditional way.

Jakugon seems to have had constant contact with the then authority on Sanskrit studies in Kyoto, Donjaku^{aj} [= Dharmaśānti] by name (1642-1742), who entrusted Jakugon with his posthumous work. A great many documents are still kept, untouched by modern scholars, at the Temple Hōtō-ji^{ak} of Kurashiki (cf. Watanabe, *op. cit.*, p. 75). Jakugon acquainted himself with Donjaku’s confidential disciple Jōmyō^{al} (1702-1784).

Indic-Chinese-Japanese

Gojūon: – Kūkai is often believed to have invented the Japanese alphabet called “Gojūon.”^{am} There seems to be no doubt that the “Gojūon” (“fifty sounds/syllables”) is a systematic syllabic alphabet evolved from Indic. On the basis of the historical phonology of the Japanese language, however, the “Gojūon” does not really represent the then phonetic system. In this connection a more thorough investigation with the help of specialists in Japanese linguistics is badly needed.

Kan-on and Go-on:

It is interesting to see that Japanese Buddhists have rather stubbornly stuck to “Go-on,” which represents an older stage of Chinese. This may perhaps be

explained by the fact that many terms had already been fixed among the Buddhists, rejecting "Kan-on," which represents the pronunciation of the capital of Ch'ang-an in T'ang China, the place which a great many Japanese intellectuals wished to visit. From the works of Siddham written by Japanese priest-scholars who studied in China, e.g. *Shittanzō* by Annen⁴⁰ in 880, one can learn of the history of arguments as to the adoption of either "Go-on" or "Kan-on."

Phonology in T'ang China:

It was in the T'ang period that the Chinese became conscious of their phonological system. The Indic (or Sanskrit) phonological system has doubtlessly played a great role in this regard. Hsüan-tsang must have been the central figure behind the scenes. Thus, in the fullness of time, say at the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries, there appeared two scholars who wrote an important work on the basis of their phonological studies in the Buddhist scripture. They are Hsüan-wan and Hui-lin.⁴¹ From them we are able to learn of the existence of the retroflex sounds in the T'ang Chinese, for instance. They were naturally used in order to transliterate Indo-Iranian retroflex sounds. In connection with such problems we badly need the help of specialists in the field of Chinese historical phonology.

Rare Chinese works on Sanskrit preserved in Japan:

In eighteenth century Japan Sanskritists were more active than ever. Reflecting this phenomenon, perhaps, the blockprinting of important texts also flourished. As a result, we are now fortunately able to see otherwise lost or hidden materials. For example, the famous Chinese-Sanskrit dictionary *Fan-yü tsa-ming* of Li-yen⁴², or Satyacandra, from Kučā, who was active in Ch'ang-an between 732 and 741, was published in blockprint from Kyoto in the seventeenth year of the Kyōho Era, i.e. 1732. The text has thus survived to date (as Taishō No. 2135). Another interesting dictionary, *Fan-yü ch'ien-tzŭ-wên*⁴³, a Sanskrit-Chinese dictionary according to the Chinese *Ch'ien-tzŭ-wên* (one-thousand-character alphabet), composed by the renowned I-ching, has also survived in a blockprint published in the second year of the Annei Era, i.e. 1773 (Taishō No. 2133).

The *Fan-yü tsa-ming* was published with Japanese pronunciation as well as that in the Ch'ang-an dialect of Chinese side-by-side, after the Sanskrit in Siddham script printed vertically. The *Fan-yü ch'ien-tzŭ-wên*, was published together with the Japanese pronunciation, also in Kana, to each corresponding Sanskrit word, followed by the Ch'ang-an pronunciation in the same T'ang period in Chinese characters. Needless to say, its meaning is given in the order of the Chinese *Ch'ien-tzŭ-wên*.

The pronunciations written either in Chinese or Kana characters do not always precisely follow those of the time. But it is possible to reconstruct the pronunciation in the corresponding periods. The above mentioned dictionaries have been carefully studied by Prabodh Chandra Bagchi in his *Deux Lexiques Sanskrit-Chinois* in two volumes (Paris, 1929-1937), which needs some revisions now. It is

hoped that the investigations into the scriptural libraries of old temples in Japan will continue and will be extended to other temples.¹⁸

Materials from Tunhuang:

It may well be worthwhile to note that a fragmentary manuscript of I-ching's *Fan-yü ch'ien tzü-wên*, with the pronunciations in Tibetan script has been found among the Tunhuang Collection of Paul Pelliot in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris. It was for the first time studied with utmost care by Tōru Haneda in his article published in the *Tōyō Gakuhō*, XIII, 3 (Dec. 1933), pp. 84 (390)-104 (410), with 3 plates.¹⁹ Unfortunately, this is a torn fragmentary document. Its importance is nevertheless enormous. Lo Ch'ang-p'ei (Luo Charnpeir) has published an indispensable, monumental work *The Northwestern Dialects of T'ang and Five Dynasties* from Shanghai (in 1933).²⁰ In this book he has made full use of Haneda's dissertation together with other Buddhist materials. Haneda had already suggested a kind of dialectal element different from that in Ch'ang-an. Such materials await more thorough investigation. In this connection one of the works that has been welcomed in recent years is "I-ching's Buddhist Sanskrit-Chinese glossary: a source for T'ang phonology" published by the Hungarian scholar F. Mártonfi in *Acta Orientalia Hungarica*, XXVIII, 3 (1974), pp. 359-392, and XXIX, 1 (1975), pp. 15-55, 2 (1975), pp. 225-246. With regard to the Chinese texts transcribed in Tibetan script I may perhaps have to add another Hungarian scholar, B. Csongor, who has published a series of articles such as "Some Chinese texts in Tibetan script from Tunhuang," *AOH*, X (1960), pp. 97-140. Also to be mentioned here is Walter Simon's "A note on Chinese texts in Tibetan transcription," *BSOAS*, XXI (1958), pp. 334-343.

On writing this, I cannot help remembering the history of a long, modern research project, beginning with Stanislas Julien (1799-1873), who tried to find a method of restoring Indic sounds from the Chinese transcriptions. Thereafter appeared a number of eminent scholars in related fields of study in the West. At the same time East Asian scholars have also made notable contributions. For example, Lo Ch'ang-p'ei has collected and classified 1152 Chinese characters, following the work done by his predecessors, to be found in the Tunhuang materials transcribed in Tibetan script. I have tried to glance briefly at such works in my recent article, "Notes on two manuscript fragments of Kumārajīva's version of the Lotus Sūtra in Tibetan transcription from Tunhuang (Fonds Pelliot tibétain, 1239 et 1262)" (1985).²¹

It is quite possible that some Northwestern Chinese pronunciation, in particular of proper names and technical terms, might have been influenced by the then old Turkic or Middle Iranian dialects in Central Asia. In this connection mention may be made of some other interesting works, e.g. F.W. Thomas's article on the Brāhmī materials published in *ZDMG*, in 1937, with a supplementary remark by Harold W. Bailey, followed by Thomas's reply in the next year; B. Csongor, "Chinese in the Uighur script of the T'ang Period." *AOH*, II (1952), pp. 73-119.

Conclusions

It is now high time that such materials were carefully studied from various angles. They are important even in the field of Buddhist Sanskrit philology, in which my special interest lies. Investigations into those materials will be of great value for future research in the comparative phonology not only of Sino-Tibetan and Sino-Japanese languages, but also of the Indic and Chinese languages, as well as for the history of Chinese translations of Indian Buddhist literature. Such materials as preserved in Japan will certainly shed light upon the approach to future studies in Japanese historical phonology, lexicography, and so on. What is important now is not just to inherit the tradition and pass it on to the next generation, but to evaluate it using modern methods. It is, therefore, to be hoped that in the future not only will hitherto unknown materials be discovered but also a systematic, interdisciplinary co-operation will be achieved. In fact, it is a matter of delight that I see such a move in this regard among the younger generation engaged in various fields of research.

Notes

Paper read at the XVth Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions (Buddhism Section) held at the University of Sydney (18-23 August 1985). I wrote the draft of that paper while I was visiting the University of Hamburg in the Summer Semester of 1985. I revised the paper during my visit to the University of Calgary in the Fall Session of 1988. The original title of this paper was "An appraisal of the history of Sanskrit studies in Japan." My bibliographical notes are neither exhaustive nor systematic. A list of Sino-Japanese characters is given at the end of this paper. In the context of my paper, I wish to draw attention to a brief but comprehensive article by Nagao, G. M: "Siddham and its study in Japan," *Acta Asiatica*, XXI (1971), pp. 1-12.

1. See e.g. Stevens, J., *Sacred Calligraphy of the East* (Boulder and London, Shambhala, 1981), with many illustrations.
2. Cf. Reischauer, E., *Ennin's Diary* (New York, Ronald Press, 1955) and *Ennin's Travels in T'ang China* (New York, Ronald Press, 1955).
3. Cf. e.g. Yuyama, A., "Remarks on the Kōkiji Fragment of the *Lokaprajñāpti*", in *India and the Ancient World: History, Trade, and Culture Before A.D. 650. (Festschrift P.H.L. Eggermont)* (Leuven, 1987), pp. 215-227.
4. Cf. van Gulik, R.H., *Siddham: An Essay on the History of Sanskrit Studies in China and Japan* (Nagpur, International Academy of Indian Culture, 1956; repr. New Delhi, 1980), p. 180 (Plate XI).
5. Waley, A., "New light on Buddhism in Mediaeval India," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, I (1932), pp. 355-376; Takakusu, J., "Bonsō Shikū Zenji to Daruma Daishi-no Gazō," *Takakusu Junjirō Zenshū*^{as}, IX (Tokyo, Kyōiku Shinchō-sha, 1978), pp. 377-394. See also "Bonsō Shikū-Den Kō," *Zengaku Zasshi*^{at}, XXIII 8 (1919), pp. 545(20)-552 (28).

6. Yuyama, A., "Enpukuji Dōshō-nō Bongo Meibun Oboegaki," *Tōyō Gakuhō*^{au}, LXVI, 1-4 (1985), esp. p. 347 f.
7. Takakusu, J., "Shittan Senjo Mokuroku," *Dainippon Bukkyō Zensho*^{av}, XXX (Tokyo, 1922), pp. 230-257 (= reprint edition XCV (1972), pp. 173-176a), which is now included in his collected works, *Takakusu Junjirō Zenshū*, IX (1978), pp. 395-422.
8. Yamada, R., *Bongo Butten-no Shobunken*^{aw} (Kyoto, Heirakuji Shoten, 1959), p. 18, n. 5.
9. Inokuchi, T. (ed.), *Takakusu Junjirō Ikō: "Nippon Bongogakushi" Shūsei*^{ax} (Tokyo, Meicho Fukyūkai, 1985), 564pp.; cf. T. Inokuchi (ed), *Takakusu Junjirō Kyūzō: Nippon Bongaku Shiryō Shūsei*^{ay} (1988), XX, 837, 17pp.
10. Cf. Hōshū Hase (ed.), *Jiun Sonja Zenshū*^{az}, Volume IX (in two parts) (Osaka 1926, repr. Kyoto 1974).
11. *Jiun Sonja Bonpon Chūso Eiga*^{ba} (Osaka 1953). Incidentally, a number of important materials in Sanskrit have been photo-mechanically reproduced in *Bonji Kichō Shiryō Shūsei*^{bb}, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Tōkyō Bijutsu, 1980, repr. with a few corrections 1981).
12. See e.g. *Sanskrit Manuscripts from Japan (Facsimile Edition)*, reproduced by Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1972); cf. Yuyama, A. "Ganshōin Baiyō Tenmatsuki," *Katsumata Shunkyō Hakushi Koki Kinen Ronshū: Daijō Bukkyō-kara Mikkyō-e*^{bc} (Tokyo, Shunjū-sha, 1981), pp. 1269-1278 (with plates on p. 1276).
13. Cf. *Tendai Gakusō Shūen-no Kenkyū*, edited by Shinna Shūen Shōnin Sangyōkai^{bd} (Kyoto, Hyakkaen, 1958) (collection of articles on Shūen).
14. Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, *Bijas and Mantras in Japan* (New Delhi, International Academy of Indian Culture, 1966).
15. Inagai, Y. (ed.), *Futsū Shingonzō*^{be} (Osaka, Tōhō Shuppan, 1979).
16. Cf. Miyoshi, R. (ed.), *Shingon Mikkyō Reunji-ha Kankei Bunken Kaidai*^{bf} (Tokyo, Kokusho Kankōkai, 1976); Ueda, R., *Jōgon Wajō Denki Shiryōshū*^{bg} (Tokyo, Meicho Shuppan, 1979); also Takakusu's *Nippon Bongogakushi*, p. 180 f.
17. Watanabe, C., *Sō Jakugon*^{bh} (Okayama, Onkokai, 1933; repr. Kurashiki, Hōtō-ji, 1969).
18. Cf. e.g. *Kōzanji Kyōzō Tenseki Monjo Mokuroku*^{bi}, IV (Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1981); *Ishiyamadera-no Kenkyū (Azekura Shōkyō Komonjo-hen)*^{bj} (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1981).
19. Haneda, T., "Kan-Ban Taion Senjimon-no Dankan."^{bk}
20. Lo Ch'ang-p'ei, *T'ang Wu-tai Hsi-pei Fang-yen*.^{bl}
21. Yuyama, A., "Myōhōrengekyō-no Zōji Onsha-ni yoru Tonkō Shutsudo Shahon Dankan Niten Oboegaki," *Kumoi Shōzen Hakushi Koki Kinen: Bukkyō to Ishūkyō*^{bm} (Kyoto, Heirakuji Shoten, 1985), pp. 233-247.

Postscript: I had read a partially analogous paper entitled "Some Remarks on Traditional Sanskrit Studies in Pre-Meiji Japan" in the VIIIth World Sanskrit Conference held in Vienna in 1990, because the East Asian Area was not included in the "Sanskrit Outside India" programme in the VII Conference (Leiden). However, in my Vienna Conference presentation, I had also discussed Indic loan words in the Japanese language. I hope to write a separate paper on that topic in the near future.

List of Sino-Japanese Characters

a	空海	ai	寂嚴
b	弘法大師	aj	曇寂
c	長安	ak	寶島寺
d	唐	al	淨明
e	惠果	am	五十音
f	真言宗付法八祖	an	漢音・吳音
g	不空	ao	安然: 悉曇藏
h	洛陽	ap	玄應・慧林
i	金剛智	aq	利言(禮言): 梵語雜名
j	善無畏	ar	義淨: 梵語千字文
k	密教傳持八祖	as	「梵僧指空禪師と達摩大師の画像」高楠順次郎全集
l	悉曇	at	「梵僧指空傳考」禪學雜誌
m	法顯	au	「演福寺銅鐘の梵語銘文覚書」東洋學報
n	玄奘	av	「悉曇撰書目錄」大日本佛教全書
o	義淨	aw	山田 龍城: 梵語仏典の諸文献
p	最澄	ax	井ノ口 泰淳(編): 高楠順次郎遺稿「日本梵語学史」集成
q	傳教大師	ay	高楠順次郎旧蔵・日本梵語学資料 集成
r	圓仁	az	長谷 寶秀: 慈雲尊者全集
s	慈覺大師	ba	慈雲尊者梵本註疏英華
t	圓珍	bb	梵字貴重資料集成
u	智證大師	bc	「巖松院貝葉類末記」
v	智廣		勝又俊教博士古稀記念論集・大乘仏教から密教へ
w	悉曇字記	bd	眞阿上人鎖仰会編: 天台学僧宗淵の研究
x	法護	be	稲谷 祐宣: 普通眞言藏
y	景祐天竺字源	bf	三好 龍肝: 眞言密教靈雲寺派関係文献解題
z	指空	bg	上田 靈城: 淨嚴和尚伝記史料集
aa	高楠 順次郎	bh	渡邊 知水: 僧寂嚴
ab	欽光・慈雲尊者 (高貴寺)	bi	高山寺經藏典籍文書目錄
ac	梵學津梁	bj	石山寺の研究(校倉聖教文書篇)
ad	眞阿上人・宗淵	bk	羽田 亨: 「漢蕃對音千字文の斷簡」
ae	西來寺	bl	羅 常培: 唐五代西北方言
af	阿又羅帖	bm	「妙法蓮華經の蔵字音写による敦煌出土写本断簡二点覚 雲井昭善博士古稀記念・仏教と異宗教
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